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Preface
The aim of this thesis is to examine the best policy 
rationale underlying the controlled foreign corporation 
("CFC") regime which commenced operation with effect from the 
1990/1991 year of income. The argument propounded in this 
thesis is that the CFC rules were introduced to protect 
Australia's domestic tax base in relation to (i) passive 
income derived by Australian resident taxpayers from foreign 
direct investments, (ii) related party income which is shifted 
offshore through the use of artificial transfer prices, and 
(iii) the operation of the foreign tax credit system ("FTCS"). 
How the CFC rules operate to achieve this purpose is examined 
in detail in Part IV, in particular, how the control and 
attribution rules (which contain extensive tracing rules) 
overcome the weaknesses with the residence and source rules 
which Australia traditionally has relied on to tax 
international income flows. The latter rules being limited in 
their operation, inter alia, by reason of the corporate veil 
doctrine which treats a subsidiary company as a separate legal 
entity from its parent company.
To give focus to the thesis, taxation of foreign source 
interest and dividend income will be explored. The reason for 
focussing on interest income is that it is traditionally 
regarded as the classic form of passive income which is easily 
manipulated to give what otherwise would have been Australian 
source income an artificial foreign source thus escaping 
Australia's tax net. The reason for focussing on dividend 
income, as well as being a classic example of passive income 
which is utilised by multinational companies to transfer 
profits from one company to another, the taxation of such 
income provides a good illustration of how double taxation is 
alleviated under the CFC regime while at the same time 
ensuring that taxpayers do not take advantage of such 
alleviation measures to the detriment of Australian revenue.
As far as other countries' CFC rules are concerned, the 
focus will be on the United States (US) CFC rules contained in 
Subpart F of Part III of Subchapter N of Chapter I of the 
Internal Revenue Code 1954. The reason for this is that the 
US was the first nation to introduce CFC provisions and has 
the most developed set of rules of the other 13 economically 
developed nations that have also introduced CFC rules. Thus, 
a comparison with the US provisions is warranted in view of 
the length of time which the US has operated a CFC regime.
The law is stated as at June 1996, but in a few cases, 
reference has been made to provisions, articles and draft 
rulings which appear after that date.
On a final note, I would like to extend my thanks and 
gratitude to Professor Richard Vann and Mr Lee Burns, both of 
the Faculty of Law at the University of Sydney who were my 
supervisors for the thesis. The time that they have devoted 
to this thesis is greatly appreciated. In particular, I would
like to express my deepest gratitude to Professor Vann, who 
throughout the years which this task has taken has provided 
invaluable guidance and insights. Thank you.
John Azzi 
September 1997
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Foreign direct investment Where the resident taxpayer owns a
non-portfolio interest in a foreign 
entity (eg., a CFC), then the 
investment is a foreign direct 
investment.
FSIIP Taxation of Foreicrn Source Income: 
An Information Paper (AGPS, 
Canberra, 1989).
CD Taxation of Foreicrn Source Income: A 
Consultative Document (AGPS,
Canberra, 1988) .
FIF Foreign investment fund.
CFC Controlled foreign corporation.
Non-portfolio interest An interest of 10% or more of the 
issued share capital and voting 
power held by the resident taxpayer 
in the non-resident company.
Portfolio interest An interest of less than 10% of the 
issued share capital and voting 
power held by the resident taxpayer 
in a foreign company.
Deferral There are two ways in which deferral 
occurs. First, deferral of residence 
country taxation through the 
interposition of a foreign company 
(which is normally resident in a low 
tax country) between the source of 
the income and the ultimate 
beneficial recipient of that income. 
Secondly, by simply accumulating the 
funds abroad, the resident taxpayers 
can defer residence country 
taxation.
Non-portfolio dividends A non-portfolio dividend means a 
dividend paid by a non-resident 
company to a company which has a 10 
per cent or greater voting interest 
in the company paying the dividend.
Inter-taxpayer equity The aim of any government should be 
to equalise as far as possible the 
rate of return on imported and 
exported capital. Thus, the term 
inter-taxpayer equity.
Efficiency Efficiency in the tax sphere 
requires that resident taxpayers'
decisions whether to invest 
domestically or abroad should not be 
affected by tax rate differentials 
existing between the two 
jurisdictions.
Capital- import neutrality Capital-import neutrality ("CIN") 
exists when firms of all nations pay 
the same rate of tax on capital 
earnings in a particular country in 
which they operate (and in the home 
or residence country) for which CIN 
is said to apply.
Capital-export neutrality Capital-export neutrality ("CEN") 
prevails if equal pre-tax returns on 
domestic and foreign investments 
provide equal after-tax returns.
Horizontal equity This concept of equity (which is a 
sub-set of inter-taxpayer equity), 
states that taxpayers in like 
positions should be treated alike.
Vertical equity This concept of equity (which is a 
sub-set of inter-taxpayer equity) 
requires that those in different 
positions should be treated 
differently.
Inter-nation equity Inter-nation equity requires that 
distribution of revenues between 
different States should be 
relatively fair.
Ability-to-pay approach This approach provides a means of 
defining inter-taxpayer equity in 
that people with equal capacity 
should pay the same tax (ie 
"horizontal" equity), while people 
with greater ability should pay more 
tax (ie "vertical" equity).
The benefit principle This principle as applied in this 
thesis provides that those who have 
benefitted from protection afforded 
to citizens of a particular state 
ought to contribute their fair share 
to the welfare of that state.
International double taxation The interaction of the residence
rule of one country with the source
rule of another country which adopts 
similar international tax rules 
could lead to an overlap of fiscal 
claims over the one amount of 
income. Thus international double 
taxation or internation juridical
Nimble dividends
double taxation.
Apart from the residence/source 
conflict international juridical 
double taxation can also arise in 
the following two situations: (i) 
where a taxpayer is regarded as a 
resident by more than one country 
("dual resident"); (ii) where the 
source rules of different countries 
may regard income as having a 
source within its territory 
according to its own law ("dual 
source").
Pursuant to the decision in Ammonia 
Soda Co Ltd v Chamberlain il918l 1 
Ch 266, a company can make a 
dividend payment from current 
earnings, despite the fact that the 
company had prior year losses. The 
court allowed the payment in this 
case, because it was held that 
dividends paid out of current 
earnings would not impair the 
capital of the company. See also 
Marra Developments Ltd v B W Rofe 
[1977] 2 NSWLR 616 at 630.
Residence-based source rule Such a rule stipulates that the 
source of income is dependant on the 
residency of the person paying the 
i n c o m e .
Quasi residence-based source 
(QRB) rule This rule identifies the source of 
income as the place where the 
beneficial owners of the income are 
r e s i d e n t .
Economic nexus rule This rule states that the source of 
income is where the economic 
activity generating such income is 
loc a t e d .
Associate-inclusive 
control interest This term, which is central to the 
definition of a CFC is defined in 
such a manner as to aggregate the 
entitv's direct and indirect control 
interests.
Direct control interest An entity will hold a direct control 
interest in a company equal to the 
percentage that the entity holds, or 
is entitled to acquire, of the 
interests in or rights to acquire 
paid-up capital, voting rights and 
rights to distribution of capital or
profits on a winding-up or 
otherwise.
Indirect control interest The function of this term is to 
trace indirect interests held by an 
Australian taxpayer in a CFC. An 
interposed entity is not to be taken 
into account in calculating an 
indirect control interest unless the 
entity is a CFE.
CFE A controlled foreign entity ("CFE") 
is defined as a (i) CFC; (ii) 
controlled foreign partnership 
("CFP") or (iii) controlled foreign 
trust ("CFT").
CFP A CFP is defined to mean a 
partnership which is not an 
Australian partnership and where at 
least one of the partners is a CFE.
CFT A CFT is defined as a non-Australian 
trust where there is an eligible 
transferor in respect of the trust 
and there is a group of 5 or fewer 
Australian 1% entities whose 
associate-inclusive control 
interests in the trust is not less 
than 50%.
Australian 1% entity The term "Australian 1% entity" is 
defined to mean an Australian entity 
(which broadly is an entity that is 
a "resident of Australia" as that 
term is defined in section 6(1), but 
which is modified to recognise the 
operation of the so-called "tie­
breaker" residence provisions in 
DTAs whose associate-inclusive 
control interest in the foreign 
company or trust is at least 1%.
De-facto control This concept of control proceeds on 
the basis that a single Australian 
entity (i.e., "assumed controller") 
whose associate-inclusive control 
interest in a foreign company is 40% 
or more does, in fact, control the 
company.
Transactional approach The transactional approach focuses 
on the income earned by the CFC with 
no express attempt to differentiate 
between CFCs located in high-tax or 
low-tax jurisdictions).
Entity approach The entity approach as well as
Designated comparable-tax 
jurisdictions approach
looking a the nature of the income 
earned by the CFC looks at other 
factors such as the tax rate in the 
country in which the CFC is resident 
and the corporation's activities.
Under this approach income sourced 
in those countries which have a 
comparable tax system to that of 
Australia will generally be exempt 
from the CFC measures.
United States shareholder A  United States shareholder ("USS") 
is defined as a United States person 
who owns directly, indirectly, or 
constructively 10% or more of the 
total combined voting power of all 
classes of stock entitled to vote of 
a foreign corporation. A  "United 
States person" is, in turn, defined 
to mean a citizen or resident of the 
US, a domestic partnership, a 
domestic corporation and any estate 
or trust (other than a foreign 
estate or t r u s t ) .
Designated concession income The term designated concession 
income ("DCI") is defined to mean 
income or profits of a kind 
specified in the regulations, where 
either (a) foreign tax imposed by a 
tax law of a listed country is not 
payable in respect of the income or 
profits because of a particular 
feature, or (b) foreign tax imposed 
by a tax law of the listed country 
is payable in respect of the income 
or profits but there is a feature in 
relation to that tax; and in either 
case, the feature is of a kind 
specified in the regulations.
De minimis exemption This exemption provides that if 
amounts included in the attributable 
income of the CFC which fall under a 
threshold will be exempt from being 
included in the attributable income 
of an eligible CFC.
Foreign base company income Section 9 5 4 (a) of the Internal 
Revenue Code 1954 (US), defines 
foreign base company income ("FBCI") 
for any taxable year as the sum of - 
foreign personal holding company 
("FPHC income") (which generally 
includes income of a passive 
n a t u r e ) ; foreign base company sales 
income; foreign base company
services income; foreign base 
company shipping income; and foreign 
base company oil related income.
FBC sales income Income of a CFC arising from a sale 
or purchase of personal property 
will not constitute FBC sales income 
if the personal property sold or 
purchased is manufactured, produced, 
grown, or extracted within the 
country in which the CFC is created 
or organised.
FBC services income FBC services income is the gross 
income (which includes compensation, 
commissions, fees, or other economic 
gains obtained from the performance 
of technical, managerial, 
engineering, architectural, 
scientific, skilled, industrial, 
commercial, or like services) that a 
CFC derives for the performance of 
services, for, or on behalf of, a 
related person, outside the country 
where the CFC is organised.
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PART I
INTRODUCTION 
1. The Thesis
In response to the assault on its domestic tax base from 
international tax planning, Australia has substantially reformed 
its taxation of the foreign income of Australian residents in 
recent years with the introduction in 1990 of a controlled foreign 
company ("CFC") regime.1 The general thrust of these reforms can
1 The reason why the main focus of this thesis is on CFCs 
is because evidence from other developed nations suggests that 
such companies are the main vehicles used to reduce residence 
country taxation. In view of the lack of Australian data 
confirming this point, it is appropriate to examine the US and UK 
data in relation to this point.
Recent statistics from the US show that the majority of 
foreign business activity is conducted by separate foreign 
corporations as opposed to branches. It is noted that in 1990, the 
largest 7,500 CFCs of US multinationals had $102.6 billion of 
earnings and profits and paid $23.8 billion of foreign income 
taxes: Internal Revenue Service, "Controlled Foreign 
Corporations," Statistics of Income Bulletin (Summer 1994) at pp 
89-111. Combined with the data produced from a study a decade 
earlier which showed that there was a five fold increase in US 
direct investment in tax havens (see Part II), it becomes apparent 
that CFCs are used by US taxpayers as the main investment vehicle 
to reduce US taxation.
Similarly, in a 1982 survey conducted by the United Kingdom 
(the "UK") Inland Revenue Department ("IRD") of 130 multinational 
corporate groups to establish the extent to which these 
corporations used CFCs to avoid UK taxation, it was identified 
that the main purpose of the activities of over 220 non resident 
companies was the reduction of UK taxation: Board of Inland 
Revenue: Taxation of International Business (IRD, London, 1982) at 
pp 15-16.
Professor John Prebble has stated some reservations about 
drawing direct proportional inferences from the US and UK 
experiences, as far as New Zealand is concerned, because New 
Zealand taxpayers, he argues, have not had the advantage of time 
from which to accustomize themselves with tax planning 
opportunities compared with the US and UK taxpayers. New 
Zealanders, he notes, have had a relatively short history with 
lack of exchange controls: Prebble J The Taxation of Controlled 
Foreign Corporations (Institute of Policy Studies, Victoria 
University of Wellington, Wellington, 1987) at p 4. Australian 
taxpayers have not had this problem. Even with full exchange 
controls, Australian taxpayers and their advisers have been fully 
aware of the tax planning opportunities available by introducing 
international aspects into a transaction. In an article published 
in 1979 the author's opening sentence stated that "[t]he purpose 
of this article is to explore ... methods of applying or
1
be characterised as changing the focus of the international 
taxation rules in respect of foreign source income derived by 
Australian residents conducting businesses through separately 
incorporated foreign subsidiaries from a distributions to a 
current basis. Therefore, in this thesis it will be argued that 
without CFC rules Australian based multinationals can escape 
Australian taxation liability either by diverting or accumulating 
income offshore (in particular, either a tax haven or a low tax 
country) and thus, the CFC rules protect the domestic tax base.* 2
In establishing this proposition it is noted that Australia 
is a small open economy which both imports and exports capital, 
and like many other developed nations, protects its revenue base 
by asserting a global basis of taxation over its residents. That 
is, residents are taxed on their worldwide (both foreign and 
domestic) income ("residence principle"). In applying this 
principle and in keeping with internationally accepted practice, 
Australia cedes primary right to tax income derived from sources 
outside Australia to foreign governments ("source principle"). The 
interaction of the residence and source principles may give rise 
to double taxation issues which are addressed unilaterally under 
the foreign tax credit system (the "FTCS") and bilaterally under
introducing international aspects in relation to particular 
transactions with a view to reducing the overall tax burden to 
which a client would otherwise be subjected ...." See Leibler M, 
"International Transactions in Tax Practice" [1979] Australian Tax 
Review 8.
2 The United States (the "US") was the first government to 
introduce CFC-type legislation to counter abuses of the US tax 
system by US multinationals accumulating wealth in foreign 
countries (viz., tax havens) thereby taking advantage of US tax 
deferral and low taxes in certain countries. The provisions for 
such legislation (which were introduced in 1962), were contained 
in Subpart F of the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC"). Both the House 
and Senate Committee reports explain the rationale underlying the 
enactment of Subpart F as the loss of tax revenue from income 
earned by a subsidiary that had been separated from the US parent 
merely to obtain a lower tax rate: S. Rep. No. 1881, 87th Cong.,
2d Sess. 78-9, reprinted in 1962-3 C.B. 707, 790; H.R. Rep. No. 
1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 57-8, reprinted in 1962-3 C.B. 405,
466 .
More, recently, the New Zealand Government released a 
discussion paper outlining the government's proposals for 
reforming its international tax rules. The government's overall 
aim in embarking on such a venture was clearly stated as the 
protection of its domestic tax base: International Tax: A 
Discussion Document ("ITDD") (Released 28 February 1995) at p 2.
2
the double tax agreements ("DTAs") which Australia has entered 
into with foreign governments.* 3
Generally, low-taxed passive income "derived"4 from a 
"foreign direct investment"5 by a resident controlling company is 
subject to the CFC regime. The CFC rules operate in this case by 
attributing the pro rata share of the CFC's income to the 
Australian resident taxpayer. Hence, by currently taxing foreign 
direct investment income that is beneficially owned by Australian 
residents, the CFC rules in effect import a "quasi" residence 
based source rule into the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (the 
"Act") which contains Australia's taxing legislation.6 This quasi- 
statutory source rule reflects other statutory source rules to be 
found throughout the Act, which is that income should be sourced 
where the economic activity generating that income is situated 
(i.e., the economic nexus rule).7 The argument canvassed here is
Australia has approximately 35 DTAs with foreign 
countries the aim of which, inter alia, is to avoid international 
juridical double taxation. The treaty network is growing 
constantly, but the focus has been directed at regional trading 
partners. Unlike most other OECD nations, Australia lacks 
bilateral treaties with a number of nations including a number of 
OECD member states and most low tax countries.
International juridical double taxation arises where two 
or more countries assert a jurisdiction to tax the same income of 
the same taxpayer. Cf the term "economic double taxation" which 
refers to the case where the same profits of "economically 
related" entities (usually parent and subsidiary) are taxed by two
tax jurisdictions.
4 The reference to the term derived extends to derivation 
in the sense of transfer or payment of income or profits as well 
derivation in the sense of accumulation of income or profits.
Where the resident taxpayer owns a non-portfolio 
interest in a foreign entity (eg., a CFC), then the investment is 
termed a foreign direct investment.
A "non-portfolio interest" means an interest of 10% or more 
of the issued share capital and voting power held by the resident 
taxpayer in the non-resident company.
The expression "quasi residence based source rule" is 
used throughout this thesis as a rule for determining source of 
income based on residence of the beneficial owners of the income 
(viz., controllers of the CFC). Traditionally, a residence based 
source rule provides that the source of highly mobile income is 
the place where the payer of that income is resident.
7 The economic nexus rule is to be found in the interest 
withholding tax provisions: see section 128B of the Act (discussed 
in Part III). Other provisions that reflect the economic nexus 
rule include section 6CA of the Act. This provision extends to the 
type of payment made to the taxpayer in Cliffs International Inc, 
v FCT (1985) 8$ ATC 4374. In that case, the taxpayer, a US
3
that without the original investment decision and/or supply of 
funds from the Australian controllers, the foreign company would 
not have derived the income in the first place.8
Australia's fiscal claim over passive income transferred from 
one non-resident company (which is controlled by an Australian 
resident taxpayer) to another non-resident company is also founded 
on the economic nexus rule to the extent that the income was 
generated from an economic activity in Australia. However, 
enforcement of this rule requires ascertainment of the true owners 
of such income. The traditional residence and source rules would 
not operate in this case primarily because they lack the look- 
through rules of the CFC regime which trace ownership of passive 
income to the ultimate beneficial owners of the non-resident 
company in which income is accumulated. Without such rules, the 
non-resident captive company could claim exemption from Australian 
tax under section 23(r) of the Act because it is a non-resident 
company deriving foreign source income.
In the case of income which is generated from genuine 
business activities abroad, there is a case for arguing that the 
income is sourced where those activities are situated - i.e., the 
foreign country, since without such activities there would be no 
income generated.9 This rationale serves as a justification for
incorporated company, was appointed world representative outside 
Japan under an agreement for the sale of iron ore produced by an 
international joint venture developing iron ore projects in 
Western Australia. The agreement provided for commission (which 
was not a royalty) on all sales of iron ore from the joint venture 
at 1.25 per cent of the sale price of the ore. Sales were made in 
Europe and Japan. It was held that the commission was not subject 
to Australian tax.
However, since that decision, section 6CA(2) was introduced 
into the Act. That section deems "natural resource income" (which 
broadly is income derived by a non-resident which is calculated by 
reference to value or quantity of natural resources produced, 
recovered, etc., in Australia after 7 April 1986) to have an 
Australian source.
See also comments of the High Court in FCT v Spotless 
Services Limited (1997) 34 ATR 183 at 185. In that case, their 
Honours observed that the original funds invested in a Cook 
Islands bank, originally arose as a result of the successful 
floatation of the taxpayer (a resident Australian company) which 
was facilitated by the existence of favourable market conditions 
in Australia.
See also Vogel K "Worldwide vs. Source taxation of 
income - A review and re-evaluation of arguments (1988) 11 
Intertax 393 at p 402, where the author observes that to the 
extent that sales income is derived through the seller's own 
manufacturing or market distribution, it may be taxed by the state 
in which it arose.
4
the active income exemption in the CFC rules.10 This is despite 
the fact that the Australian controllers beneficially own such 
income. Moreover, to ensure, inter alia, that the active income 
exemption is not abused by Australian taxpayers who attempt to 
give related party income (which may be genuine business income) 
an artificial foreign source, strong anti-abuse measures are 
needed.11 The requisite support is provided by the CFC rules in 
the form of disguised repatriation rules, tainted sales and 
tainted services income rules.
2. Defining the Policy Rationale for the CFC Regime
As will appear from the discussion in Part II, the Australian 
Government has embarked on a course of reform of its international 
tax rules which promotes capital export neutrality ("CEN") and
10 As will appear from section 3.1. of Part II, the 
justification for the inclusion of an active income exemption is 
not fully accepted by some commentators. The original argument 
postulated in relation to passive income which is that without the 
original supply of funds from the Australian controllers the 
foreign company would not have been able to generate the genuine 
business income. The New Zealand CFC rules are premised on this 
rationale and thus do not include an active income exemption. This 
is a very unsettled issue which is still being strongly debated in 
the US: see Joint Committee on Taxation. Description and Analysis 
of Present-Law Tax Rules Relating to Income Earned by U.S. 
Businesses From Foreign Operations (JCS-20-95), July 20, 1995.
The report which was prepared by the staff of the JCT for the 
purpose of a public hearing before the Senate Committee on Finance 
analyses the US tax rules relating to income earned by US 
businesses from foreign operations including the deferral of US 
tax on earnings abroad.
Professor McIntyre who was one of the witnesses speaking at 
the Finance hearing on 21 July 1995, said that "a complete end to 
deferral ... would improve the fairness of the tax system." In 
making such a statement , McIntyre was fully aware of the 
opposition to such a policy from big businesses. President Kennedy 
and President Carter encountered such opposition in their attempts 
at completely ending deferral. He went on to note that such a 
policy would be politically difficult since "some of the most 
powerful companies in America are major beneficiaries, and many 
wealthy and influential individuals also avoid US taxes by earning 
income through the use of foreign entities." (see (Vol. 11, No. 5 
Tax Notes International 260 (1995) ) .
11 The Commissioner of Taxation is empowered under Division 
13 of the Act (which contains Australia's transfer pricing 
regime), to determine the source of income where he has exercised 
his powers of reallocation (see section 136AE). The significance 
of this power lies in the fact that the provisions of Division 13 
are stated to override all other provisions of the Act (see 
section 136AB(1)). Therefore, the operation of any source rules 
elsewhere in the Act are subordinated to the operation of source 
rules expounded by the Commissioner under Division 13.
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inter-taxpayer equity. That is, the government has endeavoured to 
introduce international tax rules which, as far as possible, 
create an investment environment where effective rates of tax 
applying to the foreign-sourced income of residents are uniform 
across investments (i.e., whether the investment abroad is 
conducted through a foreign branch or a subsidiary).
Generally, Australian companies that conduct foreign 
operations through a foreign company can defer Australian tax on 
the income from those operations until the foreign company 
repatriates its earnings to Australia. This is to be contrasted 
with an Australian company conducting its offshore business 
activities through a branch. In the latter case the Australian 
company is required (under Australia's domestic tax laws) to 
include income (or loss) from its foreign branch operations on its 
Australian tax return for the year the income is earned or the 
loss incurred.
The problem of deferral described in the immediately 
preceding paragraph arises in two ways. First, under Australia's 
domestic tax laws a company is treated as a separate legal entity 
from its shareholders. Therefore, the avoidance of any exposure to 
the Australian taxation system simply involves the interposition 
of a foreign resident company (which is normally resident in a low 
tax country) between the source of the income and the ultimate 
beneficial recipient of that income, the Australian resident.
For present purposes it is merely sufficient to illustrate 
how interest income can be manipulated to avoid or minimise 
residence country taxation by interposing a foreign subsidiary. A 
finance company structure provides one such illustration. In such 
a structure, the parent company establishes the finance company to 
act mainly as an intracompany bank for the group companies.
Instead of the parent company directly injecting funds to its 
foreign subsidiaries, the finance company is used to provide 
member companies with loans, current account credits, bonds, etc., 
for which it receives interest income. The finance company is 
normally incorporated in a country which does not impose 
withholding tax on interest and therefore, is able to remit the 
interest income to the parent company free of interest withholding 
tax. Alternatively, the parent company can instruct the finance 
company to accumulate the funds offshore, thereby deferring 
payment of residence country taxation.
The second way that the deferral problem arises is by simply 
accumulating the funds abroad the Australian controllers can defer 
Australian tax on such income. This is particularly significant 
where the foreign company is resident in a tax haven which levies 
little or no tax on such income. As a result, under the FTCS the 
timing of the Australian resident's liability on the foreign 
income depends on the distribution policy of the foreign company. 
Where the foreign company retains the income rather than 
distribute it to its shareholders, deferral of shareholder
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(residence country) taxation occurs.12 The CFC rules address this 
problem by taxing Australian residents on a current basis in 
respect of income retained in foreign companies, thereby equating 
the taxation treatment of foreign branches of Australian companies 
with the taxation treatment of foreign subsidiaries of Australian 
companies. However, as noted above, given that the CFC rules 
contain an active income exemption, Australian companies with 
direct foreign investments that derive active income can still 
utilise the deferral advantage.
Therefore, it will be shown in this thesis that the CFC rules 
uphold the integrity of Australia's residence principle in 
relation to passive income by ignoring the fiction of the 
corporate veil as propounded by the House of Lords and applied by 
the High Court of Australia.13 In fact as will be shown in Part 
III, the CFC rules do no more than apply an existing definition of 
residence in section 6(1)(b) of the Act - i.e., a company will be 
regarded as being resident in Australia where its voting power is 
controlled by shareholders who are residents of Australia.14
12 See Burns L Controlled Foreign Companies: Taxation of 
Foreign Source Income (Longman Professional, 1992) at p 1.
13 See the House of Lords decision in Salomon v Salomon &
Co Ltd [1897] AC 22; which was applied in the High Court of 
Australia in the case of Gorton v FCT (1965) 113 CLR 604 at 627.
14 The ease with which Australia's source and residence 
principles can be manipulated in light of the foreign tax credit 
system (the "FTCS") and without the presence of CFC rules will be 
explored in Part III of this thesis. It will become apparent from 
the discussion therein that comprehensive statutory source rules 
are needed in order that the integrity of the source principle is 
not undermined. See also Azzi J, "Historical Development of 
Australia's International Taxation Rules" (1994) 4 Melbourne 
University Law Review 793 at pp 801-811.
The need for such statutory rules arises due to the fact that 
Australia cedes primary right to tax income derived from foreign 
sources to foreign governments. Accordingly, the Act provides a 
credit against Australian tax payable on foreign source income of 
its residents to the extent of foreign taxes paid on that income. 
To implement properly the rules for computing the foreign tax 
credit, there is a clear need to have comprehensive rules to 
determine the source of income, either Australian or foreign, for 
every class of income identified in the FTCS, and to allocate and 
apportion expenses which were incurred in relation to the various 
classes of income.
The Asprey Committee were strongly in favour of adopting this 
approach for dealing with the attack on the domestic tax base 
caused by manipulations of the source principle as it existed in 
1975 and which still exists 20 years later: see Asprey Committee 
Report op cit., at pp 263-265. See also Waincymer J Australian 
Income Tax Principles and Policy (Butterworths, Sydney, 1991), at 
p 350.
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3. Objectives of the CFC Regime
In general, three main policy objectives may be identified as 
possible explanations for the CFC regime. The first policy 
rationale is that the recently introduced measures were introduced 
in order to eliminate "deferral" per se. This rationale may be 
gleaned from the Consultative Document (the "CD") which the 
Treasurer released in 1988. The proposals outlined in the CD 
eliminated deferral and avoidance opportunities by currently 
taxing the interests held by Australian residents in non-resident 
companies where the foreign company derives the income in a low- 
tax country or where that income has benefited from a designated 
tax concession in another country. For this purpose the proposals 
drew a distinction between publicly listed and unlisted foreign 
companies. Resident taxpayers holding "portfolio interests" in 
public foreign companies (listed on recognised stock exchanges) 
were exempt under the proposals.15 The proposals also provided "an 
exemption from the FTCS for dividends received by companies from 
direct investments (i.e., those involving 10 per cent or greater 
voting interest) in non-resident companies or from other 
investments which have been subject to accruals taxation."16
However, given that the CFC rules (as currently enacted in 
Part X of the Act) exempt active income and non-portfolio 
dividends paid by a listed country CFC, the policy focus of such 
rules has shifted away from the elimination of deferral per se. 
Only certain deferral situations now attract current taxation and 
in terms of the total income indirectly derived by Australian 
residents through foreign companies only a relatively small 
proportion will be subject to current taxation.
A second rationale which could justify the introduction of 
the CFC measures is that they were introduced to counter tax 
avoidance. However, anti-avoidance is not a substantive policy 
basis on its own. There must be an underlying policy in the first 
place which would have spurred the Government into introducing 
such new measures. As will become apparent from the discussion in 
Part IV, Australia's CFC rules could be invoked to tax a certain 
transaction even where that transaction arises from perfectly 
legitimate activities.17 The underlying substantive policy 
initiative which arguably was the impetus for the introduction of 
the CFC regime was the creation of a "fairer" tax system.18
15 See Taxation of Foreign Source Income: A Consultative 
Document (AGPS, Canberra, 1988) (the "CD"), at p 19.
16 Ibid. , at p 1.
17 See also similar comments made by Senator McMullan in 
relation to the Bill containing proposals for a foreign investment 
fund ("FIF") regime: Senate Hansard: Standing Committee on Finance 
and Public Administration (Friday, 11 December 1992), at pp 47-48.
18 See Reform of the Australian Tax System: Draft White 
Paper (AGPS, Canberra, 1985) (the "Draft White Paper") at p 1.
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The third policy objective and the one that this thesis will 
be seeking to prove comprises of three interrelated objectives.
The first is that the CFC rules were introduced to protect 
Australia's income tax base in relation to passive income which 
has not been comparably taxed in a foreign jurisdiction or in 
Australia. That is, to curtail the tax benefit that arises from 
shifting income from highly mobile capital to a low tax country, 
thereby avoiding the net of the Australian taxation system (as the 
income would be foreign source income and derived through and 
retained in an interposed company). The novel approach to taxing 
such foreign investments established by the CFC rules should 
arguably increase the relative attractiveness of Australian 
investments over foreign investments (at least in respect of 
investments deriving passive income), with the likely consequence 
being an increase in the amount of Australian source income 
derived by Australian taxpayers.19 In this sense, therefore, the 
taxation of income derived from foreign direct investments that 
generate passive income could also be seen as protecting the 
domestic tax base by removing the tax incentive for investing 
abroad.
The second related objective of the CFC rules is backstopping 
transfer pricing rules which aim to catch related party 
transactions. Generally, transfer pricing occurs where an 
Australian resident enters into an international transaction with 
a related non-resident party to provide or supply services or 
property for less than arm's length consideration. By adjusting 
prices the Australian resident can effectively shift the source of 
income arising from the international agreement away from 
Australia to the foreign jurisdiction in which the non-resident 
related party is resident. The "tainted sales income" and "tainted 
services income" provisions contained in Part X of the Act provide 
this backstopping role by setting out tests for identifying 
whether goods or services have been "substantially altered" for 
the purposes of the active income exemption.20
The third related objective of the CFC rules is to strengthen 
Australia's FTCS. The CFC rules achieve this objective in two 
ways. First, by currently taxing foreign source income, the CFC 
rules overcome the avoidance opportunities associated with
For similar comments regarding the deterrent effects of 
the US equivalent to CFC rules (i.e., the Subpart F regime) see 
McIntyre M J The International Income Tax Rules of the United 
States (Butterworths Legal Publishers, 1989) (Looseleaf) at pp 6- 
83 to 6-88.
20 These latter provisions provide relief from some of the 
pressure on the transfer pricing rules (which, as will be seen 
later, are exceedingly difficult to administer), by eliminating 
deferral of Australian income tax on certain non-passive income 
(which usually is deflected to a low tax country), derived from 
transactions with related parties.
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accumulating income offshore.21 Secondly, by incorporating a 
comprehensive mechanism for keeping track of foreign taxes paid on 
previously attributed income (viz., attributed tax accounts), the 
CFC regime effectively strengthens Australia's rudimentary source 
rules as well as the foreign tax credit limitation which is the 
fundamental premise upon which the FTCS is based. Correlating 
attribution with distribution also circumvents the possibility of 
overtaxation either at the domestic or international level thereby 
promoting the efficient allocation of resources.
Given that Australia's CFC rules contain provisions which 
exempt (from Australian income tax) income which has been subject 
to tax in a comparable tax system or in Australia, it is predicted 
that the role of the FTCS (in alleviating international double 
taxation) will be substantially watered down.22 Nevertheless, the 
FTCS is an important instrument in helping to realise the goals of 
a robust international tax regime. The quarantining rules and the 
limitation on the foreign tax credit are significant in this 
respect.
Together, the three sub-objectives which comprise the third 
objective underlying the CFC rules provide a coherent explanation 
of Australia's new rules, or so it will be argued in this thesis.
21 At the time the FTCS was introduced into the Act, 
Australian taxpayers could easily circumvent its operation (and 
did in fact do so) by merely accumulating the income offshore in 
foreign resident companies. It is only when foreign source income 
is repatriated to Australia that the provisions of the FTCS are 
invoked. See the Draft White Paper op  cit.. at pp 232-233.
22 As the Assistant Commissioner at the time explained, the 
exemption was included in the CFC rules in order to reduce 
compliance costs given that little or no Australian tax will be 
collected in respect of such dividends.
"The tax treatment ... for foreign non-portfolio dividends 
and overseas branch profits is based on the principles that 
you see in the existing foreign tax credit system. Under 
that, a resident company that receives a non-portfolio (sic) 
dividend direct from a related foreign company is entitled to 
a credit for the withholding tax on the dividend as well as 
the underlying company tax.
The credit is not available under the foreign tax credit 
system where a trust or partnership is interposed. The 
accruals measures simply mirror that approach. Consistent 
with that ... section 23AJ ... provides that a resident 
company that receives a non-portfolio dividend direct from a 
company in a listed country will be exempt from Australian 
company tax on that dividend. The exemption was granted on 
the basis that to credit for foreign tax levied at rates 
comparable to Australia's would have the effect that little 
or no Australian tax would be payable anyway. The effect .. . 
is simply to reduce compliance costs." (Senate Hansard: 
Standing Committee on Finance and Public Administration 
(Friday, 14 December 1990), at p 45).
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They identify cases where income is effectively owned by an 
Australian resident which can easily manipulate the source of the 
income (and the residence of the direct recipient of the income) 
by utilising planning opportunities created as a result of the 
separate treatment of entities under the corporate veil doctrine. 
The CFC regime counters such manipulation by incorporating robust 
direct, indirect and constructive ownership rules that look 
through complex shareholding arrangements to the ultimate 
shareholders. By currently attributing income of a CFC to its 
Australian shareholders, the CFC rules effectively establish a 
quasi residence based source regime. This is also reflected in 
the modifications introduced in Division 7 of Part X of the Act 
(discussed at section 3.2.4. in Part IV), which ascertain the 
taxable income of the CFC as if it were derived by an Australian 
resident.
In a related and substantive sense, the CFC rules could be 
regarded as giving force to the "benefit" principle of taxation 
where a taxpayer whose economic interests have benefitted from 
protection offered by the laws of Australia is taxed on the pro 
rata share of the passive income derived by a foreign company that 
the taxpayer controls. This would also explain the policy 
rationale underlying the introduction of the active income 
exemption into the CFC rules.
4. Scope of the Thesis
To give focus to the thesis, income in the form of interest 
and dividends will be the main area of discussion. The reason for 
focusing on interest income is that traditionally interest has 
always been regarded as the classic case of passive income. 
Originally, the FTCS had contained special rules which provided a 
separate basket for interest income, offshore banking income and 
other income.23 The reason why interest income was singled out for 
separate treatment in the FTCS is that it is one of the more 
easily manipulated forms of passive income.
The reason for concentrating on dividend income is that in 
enacting the CFC regime, Australia has continued to seek to ensure 
the elimination of international double taxation although the 
methods now adopted are increasingly complex. This may be aptly 
demonstrated when considering the taxation treatment of non­
portfolio dividends24 paid by a CFC to a resident Australian 
taxpayer or by one CFC to another. Invariably, the taxation of 
dividends coupled with the CFC rules gives rise to substantial 
record keeping problems specifically, the need to keep detailed 
records and accounts showing the amount of income and tax flowing 
through the controlled group. The costs of maintaining and
23 See section 160AF(7)(a) of the Act prior to the time CFC 
rules were introduced into the Act.
24 A non-portfolio dividend is a dividend paid by a non­
resident company to a company which has a 10 per cent or greater 
voting interest in the company paying the dividend.
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administering such an extensive system impact significantly on the 
efficiency of the CFC rules in achieving their goal. Such effects 
will be discussed in Part II.
The focus of the thesis so far as other countries' CFC 
regimes are concerned will be mainly on the US since it was the 
first country to have introduced such a regime and has the most 
fully developed set of CFC rules. It is no surprise therefore, 
that the US has been the major source of the critical design 
features of Australia's new CFC regime (viz., the definition of 
"passive income" and "related party income" as well as the 
operation of the active income exemption which is at the heart of 
the new regime). It should be noted that CFC regimes also exist in 
a limited number of countries, but which is growing in number 
constantly - Canada (1972), Denmark (1995), Finland (1995), France 
(1980), Germany (1972), Hungary (1997), Indonesia (1995), Japan 
(1978), Korea (1997), New Zealand (1988), Norway (1992), Portugal 
(1995), Spain (1994), Sweden (1990), the United Kingdom (1984) and 
the US (1962).
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the US 
also have a separate regime for currently taxing portfolio 
interests held by residents in non-controlled entities.25 However, 
as this thesis is concerned with the role of the CFC rules in 
protecting the domestic tax base in relation to foreign direct 
investment income, it is beyond the scope of the thesis to discuss
25 Australia's foreign investment fund ("FIF") regime is 
generally designed to tax "portfolio interests"; whereas a CFC 
regime is designed to tax "non-portfolio interests". A "portfolio 
interest" is an interest of less than 10 per cent of the issued 
share capital and of the voting power held by the resident 
taxpayer in the non-resident company.
The two regimes may overlap in which case, as far as 
Australia's CFC rules are concerned, they shall prevail over the 
FIF rules. It should also be noted that it was always envisaged 
that the FIF regime will only operate as a backstop to the CFC 
rules which are contained in Part X of the Act: See Taxation of 
Foreign Source Income: An Information Paper (AGPS, Canberra, 1989) 
(the "FSIIP") at para 13.4 where the introduction of a FIF regime 
was first foreshadowed:
"Experiences of other countries that have adopted some form 
of accruals taxation of foreign source income show that 
passive investment funds, generally resident in low-tax 
countries, have been marketed vigorously in recent years. The 
funds are structured to avoid the control tests or the 
minimum shareholding thresholds (generally 10 per cent) 
included in the accruals tax systems so that their income is 
not subject to accruals taxation. While constructive 
ownership rules will cover cases where investments are held 
through related persons (by treating such related persons as 
one person for the purposes of the threshold requirements), 
they will not cover the case of unrelated parties - at which 
these funds are generally directed."
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the operation of the FIF regime and/or the transferor trust 
regime.26
5. Structure of Thesis
In summary, the thesis postulated in this paper is that the 
CFC regime in its major elements, protects Australia's domestic 
tax base. In seeking to prove this thesis, it will be shown that 
CFC taxation promotes international equity, efficiency but not 
necessarily simplicity, by targeting low-taxed passive income 
which is under the control of Australian shareholders but which is 
shielded from Australia's tax net by either profit shifting 
through related party transactions or accumulation abroad. The 
rationale behind such a policy drive is sufficiently clear. 
Australian businesses which have prospered within the Australian 
economy and that have invested abroad should not, on grounds of 
equity and efficiency principles, be treated any differently from 
those businesses with purely domestic operations.
The thesis comprises of four parts which aim to highlight the 
need for the CFC regime by exploring the inability of traditional 
international tax rules, including anti-avoidance measures in 
dealing with the problem of accumulation of passive investment 
income in low tax countries and the use of related party income to 
manipulate the source of income. Part I sets out the thesis which 
will be proved in this paper - that CFC rules protect Australia's 
domestic tax base from international tax avoidance by Australian 
based multinational groups. Part II will then proceed to analyze 
the policy framework for taxing foreign source income in terms of 
the economic effects of residence country taxes on foreign direct 
investment and national welfare. The discussion in this Part will 
analyse how well Australia's CFC regime promotes the three public 
finance objectives of equity, efficiency and simplicity. The 
discussion in Part III augments the discussion in Part II by 
examining the operation of Australia's traditional rules for 
taxing international flows of interest and dividend income, and 
applying the knowledge acquired in Part II to expose the 
limitations of such rules to protect Australia's domestic tax base 
from manipulation by an Australian based multinational company. 
Having established, in Parts I to III, the theoretical and 
practical necessity for CFC rules, Part IV concludes the thesis by 
examining the operation of the CFC rules and illustrating how they 
protect Australia's domestic tax base (in terms of three related 
policy objectives postulated in Part I).
6. State Of The Law
This thesis deals with the state of the law, draft 
legislation, regulations and rulings as at June 1996. However, in
26 At the same time as introducing the CFC rules the 
Australian Government also introduced the transferor trust regime 
which is designed to attribute income of a non-resident trust to 
an Australian resident who has transferred value to the non­
resident trust.
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some instances reference to developments occurring after that date 
will be included. Further, as stated in section 4. above, the 
analysis does not take into account the taxation of passive income 
other than interest and dividend income, nor the taxation of FIFs 
or transferor trusts.
14
PART II
ECONOMIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN THE TAXATION OF FOREIGN SOURCE 
INCOME
1. Policy Framework
The purpose of this Part, as noted in Part I, is to study the 
economic impact, in terms of the three public finance objectives, 
of CFC taxation on Australia's foreign direct investments. The 
arguments propounded in the extensive literature (mostly American) 
dealing with this area of taxation, conflict on the exact policy 
to be adopted in taxing foreign source income. The conflict 
largely arises from the lack of consensus and empirical evidence 
regarding the economic effects of taxation of foreign source 
income. Notwithstanding, it is readily acknowledged that 
identifying some of the economic effects of residence country 
taxes on cross-border income flows and the conflicting concerns of 
the business community and the government (including the numerous 
trade-offs resulting from implementing complex legislation to 
counter equally complex international tax avoidance techniques), 
should lead to a better understanding of international tax reforms 
and enable the parties affected by such reforms to engage in a 
process of consultation in the hope of increasing voluntary 
compliance.1
To better facilitate an understanding of the economic effects 
of residence country taxation on international income flows, it is 
useful to identify the types of investment that occur in an open 
economy. International-investment flows as they pertain to 
Australia can be divided into two separate forms being (i) foreign 
investment undertaken by Australians, and (ii) foreign investment 
in Australia. The first type of investment uses exported capital 
the second using imported capital. The main focus of this thesis
1 The New Zealand Government has openly stated that its 
approach to international tax reform in the past has focused on 
the proposed measures themselves and not on the underlying policy 
for such measures making it difficult to explain the underlying 
rationale for the Government's international tax proposals. The 
perceived gap that occurred from such an approach has first been 
addressed in a document entitled Taxing Income Across 
International Borders - A Policy Framework (Wellington, July 1991) 
but there was little feedback on that document at the time it was 
published. The policy considerations underlying international tax 
reforms were again raised but in a more concrete way in the 
discussion document on internodal taxation which was released on 
28 February 1995: see ITDD op cit., at p 7.
The US Government similarly has adopted such an approach to 
international tax reforms: see Joint Committee on Taxation, 
Description of Present-Law Tax Relating to Income Earned by U.S. 
Businesses From Foreign Operations (JCS-20-95), July 20, 1995. 
Unfortunately that document does not approach the question of 
international tax reform from a policy perspective to the same 
extent as the New Zealand document.
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is on the first type of investment, in particular foreign direct 
investment by Australians since the CFC rules are directed at 
Australian controllers of foreign companies. A form of investment 
which prima facie does not easily fit into the model of 
international investment flows is domestic investment which uses 
domestic capital. Nevertheless, any Australian taxes levied on 
cross border income flows will have a marked effect on investment 
decisions by Australians.
Clearly, tax policy can distort investment flows by 
distorting the total amount of worldwide income as well as the 
distribution of income across nations.* 2 The impact on distribution 
of worldwide income of domestic investors involves both a question 
of inter-taxpayer equity and efficiency.3 The question of inter­
taxpayer equity arises because in the interests of efficiency, the 
government should implement policies that equalise, as far as 
possible, the rate of return on imported and exported capital.
That is, residence country taxes, if they are to promote 
efficiency, should not affect residents' decisions between 
investing locally or abroad.4 Evidence will be presented below 
showing the levels of foreign investment by US and Australian 
multinationals in tax havens during the 1970s and 1980s when the 
US, and Australian Governments were experiencing substantial 
erosion of their tax bases due to international tax planning.
The distributional effect of income between nations involves 
a question of inter-nation equity and efficiency. However, the 
interaction of such policy considerations also impacts on the
An unavoidable consequence of collecting revenue through 
taxes is to reduce the actual direct return the investor achieves 
on the investment: see ITDD op cit ., at p 8.
A government's tax policies affect the distribution of 
income directly, by collecting tax from foreigners earning income 
within its borders and from residents earning income overseas and
indirectly by inducing capital movements across national borders.
4 Where the residence country which adopts a worldwide 
basis of taxation exempts foreign source income of its residents, 
an incentive for residents to invest and derive income offshore 
arises. Such a policy which obviously favours foreign investment 
over domestic investment is said to achieve "capital import 
neutrality" ("CIN"). Moreover, CIN provides a greater incentive 
for resident investors to invest in low tax jurisdictions thereby 
increasing their post-tax rate of return on their foreign 
investments. How Australian taxpayers have historically utilised 
the section 23(q) exemption for foreign source income of 
Australian residents, is most clearly and graphically illustrated 
in the facts of Spotless Services Ltd v FCT (1995) 62 FCR 244, 
where the taxpayer had invested $40 million (which arose from a 
successful public floatation of the company in Australia), in a 
Cook Islands bank in order to maximise its post-tax returns by 
taking advantage of the section 23(q) exemption and the 5% 
withholding tax rate imposed by the Cook Islands authorities.
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question of inter-taxpayer equity and efficiency. Therefore, the 
design of an international tax regime involves many judgments 
about the economic effects of taxes and the numerous trade-offs 
between efficiency and equity. There are also various practical 
issues involved such as administration of the new rules which must 
be considered. For instance, when introducing a new tax measure 
the costs of complying with such measures should not be 
prohibitively high so as to deter foreign investment altogether.5
Inefficiencies in the tax regime can result in a "deadweight 
loss" to the domestic economy where the tax regime alters the 
relative rates of return on different types of investments.6 
Unless the government fully understands the economic effects of 
its tax reforms, it can unwillingly support inefficient patterns 
of investment. In stating this proposition, governments must also 
have an understanding of the type of investors who are affected by 
its reforms and the reasons why some investors would invest abroad 
as opposed to investing in the domestic economy. However, given 
that the thesis is concerned with domestically controlled foreign 
companies, the focus of the discussion will be on the economic 
effects of taxing foreign direct investment income.
Foreign direct investors (by reason of having a higher stake 
in a foreign company than foreign portfolio investors), are 
generally more concerned with such factors as the location of 
markets, including access to new technology and skills, 
availability of resources and barriers to trade. Decisions to 
invest offshore in such a case should not, theoretically be 
influenced by residence country taxation. Such decisions should be 
based on sound economic analysis of the various alternative 
investment choices (e.g., domestic or foreign investment) 
including the structure of investment (e.g., branch7 or 
subsidiary), and the relative rates of return of -either investment 
choice. Ideally, foreign direct investment should be preferred 
over domestic investment where the relative pre-tax rates of 
return are higher offshore. Therefore, to encourage efficient use 
of domestic capital, the residence country's tax regime should not 
distort the relative rates of return by subjecting, for example, 
foreign direct investors to higher taxes than domestic investors.
A poorly designed income tax system can deter foreign 
investment and the attendant benefits of new capital, technology 
and skills that it embodies. By the same token a poorly designed 
income tax system can encourage capital investment in inefficient 
foreign venture and away from domestic investment .
Traditional economic analysis dictates that when a tax 
is imposed, the price paid by consumers is increased and the price 
received by suppliers is reduced which in turn, lowers both the 
consumer and producer surpluses by more than the amount taken away 
in tax. This reduction in the surplus is a pure loss to the 
economy which is known as the "deadweight cost" of the tax.
7 It should be noted that some countries require branches 
set up within their jurisdiction to be incorporated.
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By the same token, tax equity principles dictate that taxpayers in 
a similar economic situation should be treated similarly and thus 
pay the same tax regardless of whether it is foreign portfolio or 
foreign direct investment income.8
However, over the last two decades the proliferation of 
international tax planning utilising parent/subsidiary structures 
has had a detrimental impact on Australia's income tax base. 
Allowing the deferral of Australian taxation through the 
accumulation of funds offshore as well as transfer pricing 
activities has provided residents with an incentive to invest 
abroad, despite the fact that such investment may not have been in 
the best interests of Australia from an efficiency point of view.
In summary, the purpose of this Part is to examine the 
appropriate tax policy objectives (i . e., efficiency; equity and 
administration) that underlie taxation of foreign source income 
and to highlight the competing issues that a government must 
address when introducing a new tax regime such as the CFC regime. 
In formulating tax policies for combating manipulation of source 
and residence rules, the question whether the expansion of 
Australian foreign investment is an appropriate and effective 
means of enlarging the market shares of Australian investors 
abroad and thus beneficial to the domestic economy by increasing 
efficiency is very important.9 The importance of this issue 
primarily derives from the relative costs and benefits of foreign 
direct investment itself (i) to the capital exporting nation as a 
whole (i.e., residence country); (ii) to the particular groups and 
sectors within its economy; and (iii) also to the capital 
importing country (i.e., the source country). Among the costs are 
the short-run costs of adjustment, particularly in the balance of 
payments. Benefits to one group may be costs to another, and 
either net gains or net losses may result for the country as a
See Musgrave P B, United States Taxation of Foreign 
Investment income: Issues and Arguments (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
Law School, 1969), at pp 121-122.
Recent Australian literature on this aspect of 
international taxation is inadequate and very sparse. In contrast, 
see the detailed, theoretical work by Peggy Musgrave at Chapters 
VI to VIII; Brean D J S International Issues In Taxation: The 
Canadian Perspective (Canadian Tax Foundation, 1984) at ch 10; 
Report of the Committee of Independent Experts on Company Taxation 
(1992, Brussels: Commission of the European Communities) (the 
"Ruding Committee Report") at pp 70-78 and OECD Taxing profits in 
a Global Economy:Domestic and International Issues (OECD, Paris, 
1991), at chs 2, 5 and 6. In Australia, The Asprey Committee, op 
cit., discussed briefly such broad policy objectives when 
comparing the merits or otherwise of an exemption system and the 
credit system in the light of relief from double taxation (at 
paras 17.22 - 17.41), and recent discussion appeared in an article 
by Anderson P, "Economic Policy Considerations in the Taxation of 
Foreign Source Income" in (1988) 5 Australian Tax Forum 395.
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whole. The picture is further complicated when the interests of 
the foreign capital importing countries are considered.
Therefore, the discussion will begin with an analysis of 
revenue considerations (as this is a relevant issue impacting on 
the economic feasibility of any new tax measures, although 
extraneous for the purposes of assessing the success of the new 
international regime in protecting the domestic tax base), to be 
followed by (i) efficiency in the tax system; (ii) a discussion of 
the principles underlying inter-taxpayer equity and inter-nation 
equity; and (iii) simplicity (which generically refers to the 
costs of administration and compliance with the CFC rules), 
respectively.
2. REVENUE
Before embarking on an analysis of the impact on Australia's 
revenues from taxing foreign source income through the CFC rules, 
it is necessary to acknowledge that there is a major problem with 
determining the amount of revenue lost through transfer pricing 
and tax haven activities, in particular deferral of residence 
country taxation and the effect that that has on the domestic tax 
base.10 Therefore, the discussion will begin by outlining the 
assault on Australia's income tax base in relation to foreign 
source income caused by transfer pricing and tax haven 
activities.* 11
10 Deferral of residence country taxation on foreign source 
income must be distinguished from the exemption of foreign source 
income from domestic taxation. If the country of residence adopts 
a policy which exempts certain items of foreign source income, 
then deferral is not a concern with respect to those items. Under 
an exemption system, an item of income earned from foreign sources 
is exempt from domestic tax regardless of whether it is 
repatriated back to the country of residence or not. The exemption 
of non-portfolio dividends from the CFC rules pursuant to section 
23AJ of the Act has important consequences in this regard and will 
be pursued further in Part IV.
11 The Federal Treasurer (at the time) Mr Paul Keating, 
referred to the serious inequities and inefficiencies (i.e., 
economic distortions) caused through taxpayers utilising the 
deferral advantage of foreign source income which "can be 
exploited by Australian residents ... through transfer pricing 
practices or by giving income an artificial tax-haven source . . . 
creating more income and wealth for the beneficial owners of the 
foreign entity without their paying much or any Australian or 
other tax on the income": see CD op cit.. at para 2.2.
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2.1. Transfer Pricing Activities12
The rapid internationalisation of business organisations has 
created great scope for multinational companies to either defer or 
minimise domestic taxes and thus seriously undermine the integrity 
of the domestic tax base. By the same token such 
internationalisation has potentially created problems for the 
companies themselves as a result of exposure to multiple 
regulation. However, it would seem that such exposure has not 
discouraged companies from conducting transactions which transcend 
national boundaries by setting up either subsidiaries or branches 
in different jurisdictions to divert profits from one jurisdiction 
to another to take advantage of tax differentials between the 
various jurisdictions.
The problem of "transfer pricing"13 was first dealt with 
comprehensively in 1933 in an analytical report by Mitchell B 
Carroll who represented the US on the Fiscal Committee of the 
League of Nations. Carroll found that few tax systems prescribed 
the form of accounts or laid down the criteria for allocation of 
income between related businesses. He concluded that the 
allocation problem arose mainly in relation to the taxation of the 
local branch of a foreign-owned company. Inter-affiliate pricing 
was considered to create the possibility of "diversion of profits" 
if the transactions were not "carried on at arm's length".14
12 As the term suggests, "transfer pricing" connotes the 
setting of prices in international transactions between related 
entities or different parts of the same entity. The term also 
carries the further connotation of the use of such practices to 
shift taxable profits from one jurisdiction to another so as to 
minimise taxation in a particular jurisdiction or avoid foreign 
exchange controls, etc. However, the making of such a statement 
should be qualified to the extent that it is not in every 
situation that there is an obvious "correct" price and any 
deviation constitutes a manipulation or deviation: see Picciotto 
S, International Business Taxation: A Study in the 
Internationalization of Business Regulation (Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, London, 1992), chapter 8.
Internal transfers within multinationals of tangible and 
intangible goods, services and finance, have become a major 
element in international trade and payments. A United Nations 
study in this area found that intra-firm transactions account for 
over 30 per cent of the exports of leading economies such as 
Japan, the US and the United Kingdom. The study also found that 
such transactions were particularly significant in high-technology 
industries such as chemicals, machinery and transport equipment: 
See Picciotto op cit.. at p 171.
14 League of Nations 1932: Taxation of Foreign and National 
Enterprises "A Study of the tax systems and the methods of 
allocation of the profits of enterprises operating in more than 
one country" (Volume 1, France, Germany, Spain the UK and the
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Carroll's report resulted in a 1935 draft Convention which 
specified that where an enterprise had establishments in more than 
one state, there should be attributed to each "the net business 
income which it might be expected to derive if it were an 
independent enterprise engaged in the same or similar activities 
under the same or similar conditions"15. Although the draft 
Convention was never adopted in its original form without 
amendments, the approach to arm's length contained therein is 
essentially the same as the approach required under Articles 7, 9, 
11 and 12 of the OECD16 model tax treaty and generally under the 
UN17 model tax treaty.
The "allocation" problem can be aptly demonstrated by 
considering the following example. Parent company P, in a capital­
exporting country, E, sells semi-finished goods that it has 
manufactured in E to its wholly owned subsidiary, S, in capital­
importing country I. S, adds further processing and sells the 
finished product in I. The two countries' tax authorities, if they 
had access to all relevant data in the books of both P and S, 
might agree on a figure for the consolidated profit of the two 
companies. But they might disagree appreciably on how much of the 
profit arose in E, and how much in I. They would therefore differ 
on how much of the total profit should be taxable to P, to yield 
revenue to E's treasury, and how much should be taxable to S, to 
add to I's revenue. The dispute arises by reason of the fact that 
the two companies are treated as separate legal entities under the 
domestic laws of E and I and in accordance with international 
norms, only one country can tax a particular part of income 
derived from a transaction occurring between P and S.18
Taking the above analysis of inter-nation allocation of 
income a step further, it is not difficult to envisage situations 
where P and S may deliberately set the prices at which P sells the 
semi-finished goods to S ("transfer prices") at unreasonable 
levels, high or low, to minimise tax in one country and ceteris 
paribus, pay more tax in the other country in relation to the same 
transaction. This is particularly relevant where the difference in
USA), No. C.73.M.38, 1932 IIA 3, Geneva, at p 109.
15 Ibid.
16 OECD., Model Taxation Convention on Income and Capital 
(OECD, Paris, 1992) .
17 United Nations, Model Double Taxation Convention Between 
Developed and Developing Countries (New York: U.N., 1980) .
18 This approach to international taxation is reflected in 
the OECD MTC. For example, Article 7(1) of the MTC provides that 
business profits derived by a company operating in one Contracting 
State are taxable in that State.
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the tax rate between E and I is large.19 Generally, the aim of 
profit shifting in this case is to source the income in the low 
tax jurisdiction.20 However, there may be instances where income 
is shifted to a high tax jurisdiction so that, for example, 
foreign tax credit limits or imputation credits may be utilised.
Transfer pricing encompasses a wide range of activities. Not 
only sales of goods are involved, but also rendering of services 
by one enterprise to its affiliate, lending of money (commonly at 
zero interest charge), permission to use patented products or 
techniques or know-how at charges more or less arbitrarily set, 
and leasing of equipment or other property at internally 
determined lease charges.
In view of the importance of transfer pricing it is not 
surprising to note that some of the major trading nations have 
published rules or guidelines to be followed for major groups of 
transactions not at arm's length. Transfer pricing rules are 
generally directed at business transactions such as, sales, 
services, rentals and loans between related parties. They do not 
affect the diversion of investment income to, or the accumulation 
of profits in a related party. Moreover, such rules have not
19 For a discussion of the potential to encourage transfer 
pricing activities where tax differentials between two countries 
are large see Vann "International Developments in Tax Reform", 
Taxation Institute of Australia (8th National Convention, Sydney, 
12-15 April 1988) 77 at pp 84-86.
20 The tax benefits arising from transfer pricing may be 
illustrated by the following example reported in The House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Finance and Public 
Administration: Tax Pavers or Tax Players? A Further Report on 
the Efficiency Audit of the Australian Taxation Office: 
International Profit Shifting (AGPS: Canberra, 1989) . (the "Martin 
Committee Report") (at p 53):
An Overseas Parent Company owns an Australian Subsidiary 
Company as well as a Tax Haven Service Company. The Australian 
Subsidiary Company earned taxable profits of $200 for the relevant 
financial year. When the Australian Subsidiary Company earns 
taxable profits ($200), the Overseas Parent Company directs that 
it employ the Tax Haven Service Company. It provides such services 
as computer facilities, technical knowhow, international 
marketing, management tasks, etc. Payment for such services are 
claimed as tax deductions by the Australian Subsidiary Company 
( $100 ) .
The Australian Subsidiary Company may be charged an amount 
irrespective of the nature or worth of the services provided, or 
the subsidiary's need for such services. However, if the 
Australian Subsidiary Company had not been directed to employ the 
Tax Haven Service Company, its taxable profits would have been 
$200. However, due to direction by Overseas Parent Company to 
employ the Tax Haven Service Company, the taxable profits of the 
Australian subsidiary Company, instead, are $100. This represents 
a tax saving of $39 (i.e., $100 x 39%).
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succeeded in avoiding all disputes and uncertainty. This is 
particularly true of the US which has been the most aggressive 
nation in pursuing transfer pricing transactions.21
So far as Australia is concerned, the main potential for loss 
of revenue arises when a resident or non-resident taxpayer with 
operations in Australia contrives to shift profits by transfer 
pricing to another country and to another taxpayer which is a non­
resident .22
The potentially harmful impact of transfer pricing 
transactions on the domestic tax base recently came under scrutiny 
in the US, by the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on 
Oversight.23 The cornerstone of the hearings was a nine-month 
investigation that focused on 36 foreign-owned US distributors of 
automobiles, motorcycles, and electronics equipment. The 
investigation resulted from allegations that significant numbers 
of multinational corporations were avoiding US tax through 
artificial transfer pricing schemes.
The subcommittee examined 212 returns filed over a 10 year 
period by the 36 target foreign companies, finding that more than 
one-half of the companies paid little or no federal income tax. To 
stress the point, the subcommittee cited one example in which a 
foreign company paid US$500 in income tax on sales of US$3.5 
billion.24
21 The implementation of transfer pricing guidelines in 
Australia is discussed further in Part III.
22 A resident deriving profits through a branch overseas 
can also use transfer pricing to reduce Australian (and foreign) 
taxes on those profits. Except where the branch is in a low tax 
jurisdiction, the loss of revenue risk to Australia is small in 
such cases as the jurisdiction of the branch, being the source 
country, will have the prior right to tax, and Australia only the 
residual right to tax. Although CFC measures can apply to such a 
case, this is only a minor element of the CFC regime.
23 Tax Underpayments by U.S. Subsidiaries of Foreign
Companies: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the 
Committee on House Wavs and Means (House of Representatives, One 
Hundred and First Congress, Second Session, July 10 and 12, 1990,
Serial 101-123). In the Hearings the Subcommittee had the benefit 
of "Present Law and Certain Issues Relating to Transfer Pricing 
(Code Section 482): Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight 
of the House Committee on Ways and Means on July 10 and 12, 1990" 
prepared by the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, US 
Government Printing Office, Washington: 1990.
24 It should be noted that although the study by the House 
Ways and Means Subcommittee was more concerned with transfer 
pricing between foreign corporations and foreign controlled US 
corporations, the findings of the study are also relevant to cases 
of transfer pricing occurring between US corporations and US
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Commissioner Goldberg of the IRS testified that foreign- 
controlled businesses report significantly lower taxable income as 
a proportion of gross receipts than domestic corporations.25 The 
subcommittee's staff alleged that the primary mechanism by which 
foreign-owned companies are able to keep taxable profits at a 
minimal level is through the use of artificial transfer pricing. 
Such artificial transfer pricing schemes may also achieve the 
desired tax effect where the US corporation exports its product to 
a controlled foreign importer. In the latter case the US 
corporation would sell its products at an artificially low price 
thereby incurring a loss in the US and shifting the profit to the 
foreign importer which is usually resident in a tax haven country.
2.2. Tax Haven Activities
Most industrialised countries, over the past two decades, 
have had to deal with the problems associated with increased 
utilisation of "tax havens"26 by resident companies for tax 
minimisation purposes. Many of the advantages derived from tax 
havens relate to the use of CFCs. The most common use of CFCs it 
appears, is to facilitate deferral or minimisation of residence 
country taxation.27 At the same time it should be noted that 
domestic laws of some tax haven countries require the
controlled foreign corporations.
25 The submissions of Mr Fred Goldberg (IRS Commissioner) 
before the House Ways and Means Oversight Subcommittee, were 
reprinted in Daily Tax Report (BNA) No 133, (11 July 1990).
26 Generally, a tax haven is any country that levies little 
or no tax. This is not to say that even high-tax countries cannot 
be tax havens for particular purposes. The existence of tax breaks 
offered by listed countries (i.e., comparable tax countries) has 
prompted some commentators to refer to them as the "new tax 
havens": see Vann op cit. (1989), at p 11; and Towers S, 
"Pinpointing the CFC Problem" (1990) Vol .25, No 2, Taxation in 
Australia 102, at p 103.
The problem with defining a tax haven to a large degree has 
been circumvented by the Australian Government's decision to adopt 
a "designated comparable-tax jurisdiction approach" in its CFC 
regime. Under this approach a list of suitable countries is 
maintained and a close watch will be kept on this list in order to 
ascertain whether new and unacceptable concessions are being 
offered by those countries on the list and to issue new 
regulations which take into account the effect of such 
concessions. The list of suitable countries includes those 
countries which (i) levy direct taxation on income or profits;
(ii) have a comprehensive tax base; (iii) do not encourage 
international profit shifting by providing special tax incentives; 
and (iv) have a company income tax rate of at least 25% (see FSIIP 
op cit., at p 37).
27 See Part I at note 1 for evidence of use of CFCs to 
reduce residence country taxation.
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establishment of a subsidiary rather than a branch.28 The gravity 
of the tax haven problem is apparent from two major studies in the 
US of the utilisation of tax havens by US persons29 and the 
"Martin Committee Report" in Australia. The US has gone further 
than any nation in collecting and publishing data regarding the 
use of tax havens. Therefore, it is instructive to analyze in some 
detail the results of the US studies in this area.
In one report ( the "Gordon Report"), it was noted that "it 
is in the nature of tax havens to direct capital away from 
economically advanced countries with generally highly developed 
systems of individual and business taxation including the United 
States".30 From the data collected it was concluded that " [u]se of 
tax havens by United States persons is large and apparently 
growing."31 This conclusion was based on the evidence that between 
1968 and 1978 the data showed an increase of almost five fold in 
US direct investment in business formed in tax havens and about a 
two and a half fold increase in investment in non-tax haven 
businesses.32
The statistics produced by the Gordon Report in support of 
the above conclusion showed that in 1976, 17.6% of the total 
assets of US-owned CFCs were reported as belonging to CFCs 
incorporated in tax havens. The comparable percentage for 1972 was
28 The statutory measures introduced by the seventeen 
countries (viz., US, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Japan, 
Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, 
Korea, Indonesia, Portugal, Spain and Norway) to combat the use of 
CFCs share a common feature in that the target of such measures is 
not CFCs generally, rather it is primarily CFCs based in tax 
havens: see Arnold B J Taxation of Controlled Foreign 
Corporations: An International Comparison (1986, Canadian Tax 
Papers, No. 78) at p 72/ Sandler D Pushing The Boundaries: The 
Interaction Between Tax Treaties and Controlled Foreign Company 
Legislation (The Institute of Taxation, London, 1994); the FSIIP 
op cit. . at Chapter 1; Mangin E & Rautalahti E "Finland's New 
Controlled Foreign Corporations Legislation" (1995) 3 Bulletin for 
IFD 118; and Amat P & Monasterio P "Controlled Foreign Corporation 
Legislation" (1995) 6 Bulletin for IFD 289.
29 See R.A. Gordon, Tax Havens and Their Use bv United
States Taxpayers - An Overview, a report to the Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue, the Assistant Attorney-General (Tax Division) 
and the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury (Tax Policy) 
(Washington, DC, Department of the Treasury, January 12, 1981),
32041 (the "Gordon Report"); and United States Department of the 
Treasury, Tax Havens in the Caribbean Basin (Washington DC: US 
Government Printing Office, January 1984).
30 Ibid., at p 27.
16.4%; for 1968 it was 12.1%. Consequently, at least in this 
respect the report stated that multinational business use of 
havens had intensified by over 45% in eight years. In some 
industries, particularly in finance and insurance, CFC assets in 
the havens as a percent of similar assets in all areas were 
considerably larger.33 ~
Tax haven activities of US-controlled businesses were also 
analyzed in terms of statistics on US foreign direct investment. 
The Gordon Report was able to show that investment activity in the 
tax havens is both very substantial and growing much faster than 
similar activity in non-havens. For instance, earnings of U.S.- 
controlled businesses in the tax havens increased from $US0.5 
billion in 1968 to $US4.4 billion in 1978, an increase of 
approximately 800%. During the same period, earnings of US- 
controlled businesses in non-haven jurisdictions increased from 
$US6 billion to $US21.3 billion, only about a 250% increase. Over 
the same period, US foreign direct investment levels in the tax 
havens increased from $US4.7 billion to $US23.0 billion (almost 
400%). US foreign direct investment levels in other areas 
increased from $57.2 billion to $145.1 billion, by a little over 
150%.34
A further study has been conducted in the US of the increase 
in investment by US persons in controlled foreign enterprises in 
22 tax havens over the period 1968-1978. This has shown that 
earnings of US-controlled foreign business enterprises in tax 
havens over the period increased ninefold compared with a three 
and a half-fold increase in earnings of US controlled foreign 
business enterprises operating in non-tax havens over the same 
period.35
Although the above data is somewhat dated, it is still highly 
relevant (in the absence of similar more recent studies). Clearly,
Ibid. The tax haven areas covered by the report were the 
Bahamas, Bermuda, Costa Rica, Netherlands Antilles, British West 
Indies (other than Cayman Islands), Panama, Bahrain, Hong Kong, 
Liberia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Singapore, and Switzerland.
It is interesting to note that although Luxembourg, Singapore and 
Switzerland are characterised as tax havens in the Gordon Report, 
in the Regulations accompanying the Australian CFC legislation 
(see Schedule 10), they are characterised as "listed countries" 
(viz., Luxembourg, Switzerland and Singapore). However, schedule 9 
of the Regulations [e.g., reg. 152D(1)], sets out the list of 
circumstances (viz., concessions) in those countries which would 
effectively cause such countries to lose their "listed country" 
status with respect to such circumstances.
34 The Gordon Report op cit. . at pp 29-30.
Source: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, unpublished tabulations, and selected Data on US Direct 
Investment Abroad. 1966-78 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing 
Office).
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the conclusion to be drawn from the statistics produced by the 
Gordon Report is the proliferation of tax haven oriented 
techniques used by US corporations.36 This trend does not seem to 
have abated throughout the 1980s and 1990s.
In Australia, the Martin Committee which was set up to 
further examine the Efficiency Audit Report37 prepared by the 
Australian Audit Office on the Australian Taxation Office with 
respect to taxation of international profit shifting transactions, 
made the following comment:
"The use of tax havens by various types of taxpayers 
(individuals and firms) has been increasing over the past 
decades to the detriment of both revenue and tax morale ... 
[and] insofar as investment decisions are influenced by tax 
motives, the use of tax havens leads to decisions at variance 
with what a neutral tax system would command, and results in 
undesirable economic distortions, particularly in capital 
flows. Also, competition is being distorted between those 
taxpayers who make use of tax havens and those who do not."38
One of the submissions to the Committee was received from Mr 
G. Crough of the Transnational Corporations Research Project - the 
University of Sydney, in which Mr Crough reviewed the latest 
annual reports of 88 Australian public companies.39 From the 
information provided, the Committee identified 15 Australian 
companies with either $20m profits in tax havens or over 20 per 
cent of profits derived in tax havens. Moreover, 10.2 per cent (or 
$599.8m) of the total investments made by the 88 companies were in 
tax havens.40
Earlier, a feasibility study undertaken as part of the 
Efficiency Audit Report in 1987 identified more than 500 
Australian companies with subsidiaries in one or more tax havens. 
Of these companies, 13 had subsidiaries in five or more tax 
havens.41
36 The Gordon Report op cit., at p 33. See also Internal 
Revenue Service, "Controlled Foreign Corporations," Statistics of 
Income Bulletin (Summer 1994) at pp 89-111.
The Auditor General: Efficiency Audit Report, Australian 
Taxation Office: International Profit Shifting (AGPS: Canberra,
1987)1
38 The Martin Committee report op cit.. at p 20.
39 Ibid.. At Appendix III of the Report.
40 Ibid., at pp 62-64.
41 The Auditor General, Efficiency Audit Report, Australian
Taxation Office: International Profit Shiftincr (Canberra: AGPS,
1987)i , at para 5.3.4.
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The statistics on Australian companies' tax haven activities 
are less detailed compared with the US statistics42. Nevertheless, 
judging by the publicity that surrounded the Hearings of the 
Committee there is cause for concern regarding the extent and 
importance of tax havens to Australian businesses.43
2.3. Impact of the CFC Regime on Australia's Revenue
As far as raising revenue is concerned, most countries 
(especially capital exporting countries) exert jurisdictional 
claims to the worldwide income of their residents, but in practice 
this usually produces little tax revenue collected at home. That 
is, most foreign income which has been taxed abroad will be exempt 
from domestic taxes either directly under an exemption system or 
indirectly through the operation of the FTCS. The relatively small 
revenue collection results from the international recognition of 
the source jurisdiction's primary taxing right and tax planning to 
ensure that the domestic exemption system or the FTCS is utilised 
to the full.44 As well, the increased proliferation in tax haven 
use and transfer pricing techniques has reduced the amount of 
revenue raised from taxing foreign source income.
Tax planning can also reduce revenues from foreign source 
income of resident taxpayers by short circuiting the operation of 
the FTCS through shifting the income to a non resident company. As 
mentioned previously, the FTCS only operates when income is 
derived by the resident taxpayer, and in this case is delayed 
until the non resident repatriates the income to the resident in 
taxable form.45 For the reasons given in the previous paragraph, 
the amount of revenue at stake from taxing foreign source income
The Gordon Report comprised some 235 pages of data and 
recommendations. By contrast the data considered by the Martin 
Committee resulting from Mr Crough's report into Australian 
companies' activities in tax havens occupied 5 pages of the Martin 
Committee Report.
43 Some submissions received by the Committee claimed that 
it had decided to embark on a "witch-hunt of massive proportions", 
and that the Committee was involved in a "smear campaign targeted 
at some of Australia's largest and most reputable business 
organisations" (see the submission to the Martin Committee by Mark 
Leibler, supra). See also comments of the House of Representatives 
Standing Committee on Finance and Public Administration, made in 
the Report on an Efficiency Audit of the Australian Taxation 
Office: International Profit Shifting (AGPS: Canberra, 1989), at 
pp 78-79.
44 See also Brean op cit. , at p 131.
45 It was noted in the FSIIP op cit., (at p 45) that the 
reason why an active income exemption was not proposed in the CD 
was principally because the emphasis there was on removing in all 
cases the benefit under the FTCS of deferral of Australian 
taxation.
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is relatively smaller than that derived from taxing domestic 
source income.
Although it is difficult to obtain reliable data on the 
incidence of the revenue loss from international tax avoidance, it 
has been suggested that it is very high.46 It was estimated that 
in March 1987 foreign-owned US firms doing business in the US paid 
16-19 per cent less tax than their US counterparts.47
An important consideration for any country in devising 
taxation policy is whether the new policy can be implemented 
effectively, that is, whether it will be sufficiently effective in 
raising revenue and limiting the scope for avoidance or evasion 
which would detract substantially from its effectiveness. 
Evaluation of this criterion in an international tax sphere is 
complicated by the fact that there is much more scope for 
taxpayers to reduce or minimise their liability to taxation by 
moving assets, relocating or reorganising economic activity or 
manipulating their accounts. The opportunities for avoidance of 
domestic tax are assisted by the territorial limitations on tax 
jurisdiction (in particular enforcement jurisdiction) which limit 
the ability of the state to control such activities and to ensure 
that any new policies which are aimed at such activities are 
implemented in full. This explains the Australian Government's 
inability to predict accurately the amount of revenue it expects 
to raise directly from the CFC measures.48
Tax planning where the source of the income is changed from 
domestic to foreign and the taxpayer deriving the income is 
changed from resident to non-resident has the potential to involve 
enormous revenue losses as it involves reducing taxation on the 
major source of revenue, i.e., domestic income of resident 
taxpayers. The overall outcome in revenue terms (from implementing 
tax measures designed to minimise international tax planning), is 
that large amounts of revenue are protected from loss, rather than
46 Woellner R & Burns L, "International Information Flows - 
The Tax Implications", (1989) 6 Australian Tax Forum 143, at p 
148 .
47 Ibid.
48 See the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the Taxation 
Laws Amendment (Foreign Income) Bill 1990 (the "EM to the Bill), 
which introduced CFC rules into the Act (at p 1433 of Australian 
Income Tax: Pending Legislation (Butterworths Pty Ltd, 1990)) .
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new sources of revenue being tapped.49 Hence, it would be expected 
that additional revenues from the CFC measures will be small.50
Notwithstanding the relatively small amount of direct revenue 
raised from applying CFC rules, the ability of such rules to 
enhance the integrity of Australia's source and residence rules 
and strengthen the operation of the FTCS, goes a long way in 
making Australian passive investments relatively more attractive 
than investments abroad which could be more risky as well as more 
costly especially when the deferral advantage is removed. 
Therefore, the importance of CFC rules can only be properly 
appreciated in terms of their deterrent nature.51 CFC rules remove 
the incentive for residents to derive passive foreign investment 
income by subjecting such income to current taxation in Australia. 
Although, the direct revenue raised by the CFC rules may not 
outweigh the costs (both administrative and compliance costs), 
associated with such legislation, it is nevertheless justifiable 
on the basis that it will substantially contribute to the 
reduction of tax haven use by those corporations resident in 
capital-exporting countries, especially the erosion of revenues 
from domestic income of resident taxpayers.
3. EFFICIENCY
A tax system should not distort the efficient allocation and 
utilisation of resources. In stating this simple proposition it is 
noted that there are two senses to the notion of efficiency. One 
aspect of the efficiency principle is that an appropriate tax 
policy should be able to achieve budgetary objectives of resource 
allocation, income distribution and economic growth.
49 See also Krever R, "Australia's New Foreign Income 
Attribution System" (1989) Australian Business Law Review 253, at 
p 253 where it is stated:
"All this effort and real cost is devoted to the development 
of a tax system that, if it is working properly, should 
generate no revenue at all. That is because the CFC 
attribution system is... directed at tax-motivated 
investments in low-tax jurisdictions."
It was estimated that the likely direct revenue gain 
from CFC legislation in 1991-92 will be $85 million: see the 
Martin Committee Report op cit.. at p 75. However, the 
government's estimate for the 1993-94 financial year is much more 
conservative. In the Second Reading Speech to the Taxation Laws 
Amendment (Foreign Income) Bill 1990, Simon Crean (the Minister 
Assisting the Treasurer) referred to possible additional revenue 
of $60 - $70 million being raised in 1993-1994, after the full 
impact of the CFC measures are realised (at p 5). This is a very 
small amount in overall terms.
51 It has been noted that CFC rules are the only limitation 
on deferral: see Arnold B J, "Future Directions in International 
Tax Reform", (1988) 5 Australian Tax Forum 451, at p 457.
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Another sense of efficiency which clearly is a subset of the 
first is the concept of efficiency as defined in terms of 
neutrality with respect to consumer or business decisions. It is 
this aspect of efficiency that will be the major focus of this 
section. The Asprey Committee took the view that national economic 
efficiency is generally best served by a neutral tax system (where 
the "tax system" must be understood to refer to all the taxes, 
Australian and overseas, that bear on the operations). They noted 
that "a more equitable way of taxing foreign-source income is 
likely to be more efficient. But the emphasis in considering 
equity is on income taxation viewed in isolation from other taxes, 
whereas an appraisal in terms of efficiency must be made of the 
tax system as a whole."52
If a tax does not distort private decisions it is said to be 
"neutral". Given the close link between efficiency and neutrality 
it becomes easier to assess distortions caused by taxes. Capital 
is allocated efficiently if pre-tax marginal returns on 
alternative investments are equal. Accordingly, taxation will not 
distort allocative decisions involving investments as long as 
alternative investments are taxed at the same rate.53 Despite the 
apparent simplicity of this criterion for neutrality, the question 
takes on considerable complexity in the international realm. For 
one thing, neutrality cannot be defined unless, from the national 
perspective, one defines the alternative investments at issue, 
being domestic versus foreign investment undertaken by domestic 
investors, and those undertaken by investors abroad.
As a general rule, national interests are best served (in 
terms of efficiency), by a tax policy which does not discriminate 
between exported capital and domestic capital.54 Residence country
Asprey Committee Report op cit.. at paras 17.29-17.30.
National interests are adversely affected to the extent 
that there are certain externalities associated with Australian 
investment abroad. Efficiency will be compromised if the 
profitability of operating abroad rather than at home is affected 
by other tax differences (such as those in the area of customs 
duties), although the same amount of income tax is paid on income 
from Australian sources as on income from foreign sources. Other 
externalities include the loss of development and growth 
increasing elements customarily generated in the country of 
investment. See also Musgrave op cit. (1969), at p 99, where it is
suggested that the national interest would be best served in light 
of these externalities by tax policy that is somewhat selective 
among the various kinds of foreign investment.
54 See ITDD op cit. . at p 17. After examining the general 
principles that US tax policy should follow in the field of 
foreign investment Professor Peggy Musgrave concluded that there 
is little reason for giving tax incentives to foreign investment, 
on the basis that to do so would be contrary to the basic 
principle which should underlie US taxation of foreign investment 
income, that is, neutrality: see Musgrave op cit. . (1969), at p
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taxes should not affect residents' decisions between investing 
domestically or abroad. Achieving this outcome requires that the 
same tax treatment applies to residents deriving domestic source 
income as it does to those deriving foreign source income. Factors 
other than taxes should be decisive in determining where capital 
should be invested (e.g., labour market requirements, resource 
location and the need for foreign capital). However, these 
economic factors which are examined below, have been used by 
businesses to argue that foreign source income should be exempt 
from tax because it contributes to national growth.
In the international tax sphere two concepts of neutrality 
therefore, exist - "capital import neutrality" and "capital export 
neutrality".
3.1. Capital Import Neutrality
Capital-import neutrality ("CIN") exists when firms of all 
nations pay the same rate of tax on capital earnings in a 
particular country in which they operate. The justification for 
this policy is that domestic tax law should not discriminate among 
investors according to nationality. The most straightforward way 
for a residence country to accomplish capital import-neutrality 
with respect to investment abroad is to exempt foreign source 
income from domestic taxation. Applying the concept of capital- 
import neutrality in an Australian context, it is noted that this 
concept dictates that in order to create a competitive environment 
for Australian firms investing abroad, foreign source income
107. President Kennedy, as early as 1961, in his tax message for 
that year confirmed Musgrave's observations. He said:-
"[T]he ability to defer the payment of United States tax by 
retaining income in the subsidiary companies provides a tax 
advantage for companies operating through overseas 
subsidiaries that is not available to companies operating 
solely in the United States ...
To the extent that ... tax deferral privileges result in 
United States firms investing or locating abroad largely for 
tax reasons, the efficient allocation of international 
resources is upset, the initial drain on our already adverse 
balance of payments is never fully compensated, and profits 
are retained and reinvested abroad which would otherwise be 
invested in the United States...
[W]e can no longer afford existing tax treatment of foreign 
income."
See also the report of the Staff of the Joint Committee on 
Taxation where it was stated that foreign investment income should 
be currently taxed in the same manner as domestic income thus 
"encouraging more efficient (rather than more tax-favoured) uses 
of capital": see Staff of Joint Committee on Taxation General 
Explanation of the Tax Reform Act 1986 (1987), at pp 964-965.
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should only be taxed at the rate facing other investors in the 
host country.55
The Ruding Committee which was set up, inter alia, to 
consider whether differences in taxation among Member States of 
the EC caused major distortions with respect to investment 
decisions recommended that a country's tax regime should not 
discriminate against inward investment by foreign firms and 
individuals or foreign investment by domestic firms and 
individuals. Consistent with such recommendation, the Ruding 
Committee stated its preference for the exemption method on the 
grounds that it promoted the goals of capital import neutrality 
and administrative simplicity.56
3.1.1. Attitude of business community to CIN
The most vocal supporter of CIN is the business community.
The attitude of the Business and Industry Advisory Committee 
("BIAC") which was conveyed to the OECD Committee preparing the 
1987 Report on the use of tax havens, was highly critical of CFC- 
type legislation which was extended to cover all businesses in tax 
havens regardless of the nature of the business. The BIAC gave 
examples of situations where economic factors could be advanced 
for making use of tax havens, and where industry would regard the 
use of tax havens as legitimate provided that all the arrangements 
were operated on a commercial basis and were not artificial 
contrivances. However, the BIAC accepted that fiscal authorities 
have a proper reason for concern where transactions are carried
See also Anderson P, "Economic Policy Considerations in 
the Taxation of Foreign Source Income", in (1988) 5 Australian Tax 
Forum 395, at p 403.
See the Ruding Committee Report, op cit. . esp. at p 77 
where it was stated that the adoption by all EC countries of a 
common exemption for foreign-source income would improve capital 
export neutrality and capital import neutrality in the Community 
and that this improvement would be greater than if all countries 
adopted a common credit method.
However, some doubt is cast on this conclusion in view of the 
assumptions which the Ruding Committee adopted in testing this 
theory. For example, it was assumed that a post-tax real rate of 
return is fixed at 5%; that exchange rates are fixed; the 
inflation rate is 3.1% for all EC countries; that transnational 
investment occurs in the form of parent company establishing a 
100% owned subsidiary in the source country and that if the parent 
company supplies the funds for the subsidiary's investment, either 
by lending or by injecting new equity into the subsidiary, that it 
raises such funds in the proportion of 35% debt, 10% new share 
issues, and 55% retained earnings, and that the relevant supplier 
of funds resides in the same country as the parent. Moreover, it 
was assumed that the investment by the subsidiary is financed in 
equal proportions by its own retained earnings, injections of new 
equity from the parent, and lending by the parent (the Ruding 
Committee Report op cit., at pp 73-75).
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out at prices which cannot be justified on "arm's length" criteria 
or where profits are otherwise diverted without genuine business 
purposes or objectives.57
The BIAC submission contained the usual arguments in support 
of companies setting up in tax havens. That is, that much of the 
use of tax havens was not motivated by a desire to pay no or 
little tax so much as an economic necessity to reduce costs to a 
"bearable level" in circumstances where the laws of countries are 
"unco-ordinated". They listed instances where they felt it was 
considered useful or necessary to use tax havens. They included:
(a) Fund-raising companies for international investments - 
to raise funds competitively on international markets and 
reduce financing costs (including taxes);
(b) Subsidiary shareholding companies - to receive income 
from dispersed overseas operations in the form of dividends. 
Such companies are particularly significant in (i) avoiding 
costs and delays in repatriating funds which were destined 
only to be re-exported (ii) avoiding the high risk of 
devaluation in some source countries (iii) correcting 
misalignments between source and residence countries where 
the total tax burden varies year by year but is on average 
the same over a period of years and finally, (iv) protecting 
investment incentives offered by some source countries.58
The other features of CFC-type legislation which the BIAC 
regarded as objectionable were the compliance burden on taxpayers 
and the enforcement burdens on tax authorities resulting from the 
overly restrictive and complicated legislation required to 
effectively counteract the practice of tax haven use. The BIAC 
concluded their submission by stating that it would be more 
beneficial and fair to all taxpayers involved if specific abuses 
were singled out and legislated against. This, they argued, would 
ensure that "the cure is not worse than the disease".59
Similarly, the views of the business sector in Australia have 
understandably concentrated on the capital import neutrality 
argument. Mr Peter Fraser concisely summed up the dislike that 
most Australian businesses have to the CFC legislation.
"The reality is that our regulated labour market, the cost 
and availability of resources and our distance from export 
markets makes Australia uncompetitive. We need foreign 
capital. Our corporate tax rates are still relatively high 
and bureaucratic red tape makes the cost of carrying on 
business in Australia very high. In many cases it is simply
57 OECD Report: "Tax Havens: Measures To Prevent Abuse By 
Taxpayers" (1987), at pp 36-37.
58 Ibid. , at p 37.
59 Ibid. , at p 38 .
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not possible for Australian manufacturers to produce widgets 
at the same price as most manufacturers located in Asia, the 
United States and Europe. In many cases Australian 
manufacturers can only compete domestically because of tariff 
and non-tariff barriers to trade.
Should there be any surprise that Australian companies wish 
to establish overseas operations. The availability of cheaper 
labour and resources, as well as the proximity to markets, 
offers the initial impetus. The prospect of lower taxes, and 
tax holidays in some countries, also allows for start-up 
costs to be recovered quickly. "60
Mr Fraser also reiterated the assertion made by US 
businessmen at the time Subpart F was being introduced into the 
Code, by arguing that neutrality should be equal treatment of 
domestic investors abroad. He stated that a taxation system which 
achieves equity and neutrality when viewed only by comparing the 
position of overseas entities with other home country 
manufacturers is not a perfect system.61
The preceding analysis states that subjecting domestic firms 
operating abroad to domestic taxation slows their expansion and 
thus reduces their capacity to compete with foreign firms by 
increasing their costs. It has been observed that such an 
assertion implies the existence of economies of scale. Under the 
assumptions of economies of scale, market control is gained by the 
more rapidly expanding firm. However, some people would argue that 
this assertion alone is not sufficient to warrant exemption of 
foreign source income since it is possible to take advantage of 
economies of scale in the domestic economy. Moreover, there seems 
to be no reason why firms operating abroad could not expand out of 
borrowed funds.62
Other commentators have focused on the beneficial effects on 
the residence country's labour markets from foreign investment. It 
has been contended that the number of jobs in the residence 
country increase because the foreign subsidiaries tend to use 
domestically produced products and market acceptance of goods 
produced by the foreign subsidiary in most cases promotes 
acceptance and even sales of the domestically produced goods by 
the parent company. The argument has been articulated in a US 
context as follows:
"[T]he number of jobs in the United States is increased as a 
result of the operations of successful foreign subsidiaries, 
since (a) in many cases those subsidiaries use United States- 
produced components and other goods, (b) a large United
Fraser P "Australian Tax Haven Measures" (1989) 6
Australian Tax Forum 99, at p 102.
61 Ibid. See also Musgrave op cit.. at p 118.
62 See Musgrave o p  cit.. (1969), at pp 119-120.
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States-based infrastructure is required to manage the 
worldwide operations and (c) the market acceptance of the 
goods produced by the subsidiaries promotes greater worldwide 
acceptance and in many cases increases domestic sales of the 
same goods in and exports from the United States."63
It is contended that by increasing exports multinationals 
increase jobs in the home country. Further, it has been stated 
that the creation of unfavourable conditions for a multinational 
corporation by the residence country which cause the multinational 
to collapse its foreign affiliates and subsidiaries would lead to 
a reduction in the output levels of the residence country. This is 
because the demand for raw materials and other goods produced by 
the home country and used by the multinational's foreign 
affiliates will disappear. Such employment effects were 
highlighted in a statement made on 26 February 1973 to the Senate 
Subcommittee on International Trade, by Mr Peter Flanigan, the 
Executive Director of the Council on International Economic Policy 
and Special Assistant to the President of the US. Mr Flanigan 
referred to the creation of jobs which are linked directly to the 
creation of export markets by US multinationals.64
While the preceding discussion may have some validity in 
supporting a case for total exemption of foreign source income, 
they do not explain the statistics produced by the Gordon Report 
which indicate a marked growth in the use of tax havens by US 
corporations. Admittedly, whilst the data produced in the Gordon 
Report did not consider the factors why US firms would invest in 
tax havens, it appears that the predominance of tax haven use over 
the past three decades is substantially influenced by tax 
considerations. Most multinationals regard international tax costs
Aland R "The Treasury Report on Tax Havens - A Response" 
(1981) Vol 59 No 12 Taxes 993, at pp 1009-1010.
64 Mr Peter Flanigan in giving evidence before the Senate 
Subcommittee on International Trade said:
"[T]he 1970 Commerce Department survey indicates that about 
70 per cent of the output of foreign subsidiaries of U.S. 
companies is sold in the country where it is produced, and an 
additional 23 per cent is exported to third countries. Only 7 
per cent of the multinational corporation production returns 
as imports to the United States to compete here at home with 
domestic production .... In most of the few cases where U.S. 
and third countries are supplied by American affiliates 
abroad ... elimination of these plants would not result in 
increased U.S. output and employment, but in replacement of 
our output by foreign competitors. Such replacement would 
probably reduce U.S. employment further since foreign 
competitors would be less likely to rely on the United States 
for machinery, supplies, research or marketing 
requirements....": see Multinational Corporations: Hearings 
Before the Subcommittee on International Trade of the Senate 
Committee on Finance, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13 (1973) .
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as a significant cost impacting on their operations.65 This is not 
to say that other non-tax factors do not also play an important 
role in determining the reason for investing in tax havens. For 
example, Hong Kong is a tax haven with a substantial manufacturing 
base and low labour costs. Kuwait which is also a tax haven, has 
resources which are not otherwise available in Australia (or at 
least in the same abundance). Venezuela is another such country 
with a strong mining sector which can be of immense benefit to 
Australian companies in applying their particular skills and 
technology to earn returns which may not be available in the 
Australian market. Such examples are generally regarded as the 
exception rather than the rule since the majority of tax havens do 
not have established industries other than financial, legal and 
taxation services.
3.1.2. Australian Government's attitude to CIN
The Federal Government was mindful of the economic (i.e., 
non-tax) factors which attract Australian companies to invest in 
low tax jurisdictions. Such factors include the ability to obtain 
a supply of natural resources not available in Australia, to 
obtain low unit labour costs for labour-intensive work or to 
obtain access to certain markets.
Up until 1987, Australia had adopted an exemption method 
which was consistent with principles of capital-import neutrality. 
That is, pursuant to section 23(q) of the Act, foreign source 
income which was subject to tax in a foreign jurisdiction was 
exempt from Australian tax upon its repatriation to Australia. 
Moreover, under the section 46 rebate, inter-corporate dividends 
were effectively exempt from Australian taxation.66
At the time proposals for accruals taxation were released in 
the Consultative Document, it was apparent that the Australian 
Government was not convinced by the competition theory argument 
for promoting CIN principles. The Government was of the view that 
only tax-induced investments in low tax jurisdictions will be 
affected by the new measures, and that non-tax induced foreign 
investment should have a sufficiently high rate of return to be 
unaffected by an increase, or in some cases, imposition of
See Ernst and Young Transfer Pricing: Risk Reduction and 
Advance Pricing Agreements (Released July 18, 1995), at pp 2-3.
The section 46 rebate was available, unlike the section 
23(q) exemption, whether or not foreign tax had been paid in 
respect of such foreign source dividends. The availability of the 
section 46 rebate enabled Australian companies to receive foreign 
source dividends without suffering tax in Australia. Prior to 
limiting the section 46 rebate to payments between resident 
companies, Australian companies had a tax incentive to generate 
profits in low or zero tax countries thus infringing the 
principles of international equity and neutrality. See also Azzi 
(1994) op cit. , at p 802.
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residence country taxation.67 Moreover, there was evidence from 
the US which suggested that US multinationals do not undertake 
direct investment abroad to take advantage of cheap labour. 
Evidence from the Department of Commerce in 1970 showed that 60% 
of US multinationals were operating either in Canada or Western 
Europe.68
Since the release of the Consultative Document in 1988 the 
Government changed its policy focus and incorporated an active 
income exemption into the CFC rules. The reversal of policy 
objective can be justified on the basis that the derivation of 
active foreign source income by Australian residents does not 
undermine Australia's jurisdiction to tax Australian source income 
of Australian residents. This is because the opportunities to earn 
income of a similar nature do not or would not exist in 
Australia.69
The Federal Government acknowledged that there are legitimate 
reasons for investing offshore (e.g., to take advantage of 
favourable market conditions such as cheaper labour costs or 
better access to resources which are not available in Australia). 
Therefore, to a certain extent, the incorporation of the active 
income exemption reflects a partial acceptance of the competition 
argument for retaining tax biases in favour of foreign source 
income. That is, exempting income derived by Australian residents 
through genuine business activities offshore from the CFC regime 
does not harm the domestic tax base.
CD op cit.. at p 6. The OECD was also not convinced by 
the competition theory: see OECD report (1987) op cit.. at pp 44- 
BO. Further, many academics are not persuaded by the competition 
theory. One explanation for the non-persuasive nature of this 
theory is that firms investing overseas are in most cases 
competing in domestic capital markets, and as such, will only be 
competitive where they can offer the same rate of return as other 
firms competing in those markets: see Vann op cit.. (1989) at p 3.
Moreover, in view of the reduction in US corporate tax rates 
brought about by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, two of the leading 
commentators on US international taxation have called for the 
complete elimination of tax deferral instead of supporting the 
current state of play under Subpart F which exempts active income 
and certain other distributions from current taxation: see 
McDaniel P R & Ault H J Introduction to United States 
International Taxation (3rd revised edn) (Kluwer Law and Taxation 
Publishers, Deventer, 1989), at p 120.
See Multinational Corporations: Hearings Before the 
Subcommittee on International Trade of the Senate Committee on 
Finance, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13 (1973).
To minimise avoidance opportunities created by the 
active income exemption, the Federal Government introduced complex 
anti-abuse rules for identifying the type of income generated and 
excluding income that has benefitted from tax concessions in the 
source state: see discussion in Part IV.
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The active income exemption appears to serve Australia's 
national interests by ensuring that foreign direct investments 
generating active income are not unduly disadvantaged relative to 
other non-resident firms operating in a particular foreign 
jurisdiction. For example, given that the CFC rules of most 
countries (with the exception of New Zealand) contain an active 
income exemption, then an Australian firm operating abroad and 
currently taxed on all its income, would be at a competitive 
disadvantage vis-a-vis another firm whose home state provides for 
an exemption of its business income generated in the source state. 
However, whether the active income exemption will in fact create 
positive domestic labour market effects or improve Australia's 
chronic balance of payments problem (see section 3.2.), by for 
example, increasing the amount of foreign capital that is 
repatriated from active businesses abroad, has not been 
empirically proven. The debate in the US is still raging 33 years 
after Subpart F was first introduced into the Internal Revenue 
Code.70 Moreover, the OECD refused to accept such an argument as 
validly undermining the credibility of CFC-type legislation.
Regardless of the policy merits for promoting CIN in relation 
to active income derived by CFCs, the Federal Government's 
decision to exempt active income from CFC taxation accords with 
the international norm in this area of taxation. Therefore, since 
the introduction of the CFC rules in 1990, capital-import 
neutrality exists in relation to (i) non-portfolio dividends paid 
by listed country CFCs to Australian resident shareholders and 
(ii) genuine business income derived offshore. The ground for this 
proposition, is that foreign-source income described in (i) and 
(ii) is exempt from Australian tax. Accordingly, Australia is seen 
as an exemption country although it operates a credit system in 
respect of all other types of income.71
3.2. Capital-Export Neutrality
Capital-export neutrality ("CEN") prevails if equal pre-tax 
returns on domestic and foreign investments provide equal 
after-tax returns. This view of taxation is said to be achieved 
when foreign source income derived by domestic investors is 
currently taxed with a full credit against the domestic tax
See a report of the proceedings of the Finance Committee 
hearing set up to examine the report of the Joint Committee on 
Taxation. Description and Analysis of Present-Law Relating to 
Income Earned by U.S. Businesses From Foreign Operations (JCS-20- 
95), July 20, 1995: (1995) 5 Tax Notes International 260.
71 See also Gammie M "The Ruding Committee Report: An 
Initial Response" (The Institute for Fiscal Studies, 1992), at p 
27, where it is stated that although the UK operates a credit 
system, given the various exemptions contained in its tax system 
it is also regarded as an exemption country.
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liability of those investors for all taxes paid abroad.72 It has 
been observed that capital exporting countries are forced to 
establish capital export neutrality because of tax planning 
opportunities arising from manipulation of FTCS rules by 
multinationals.73
Logically, policies to achieve CEN or to achieve CIN need not 
be and, indeed, generally are not consistent with each other where 
low tax countries are not involved. However, for both CEN and CIN, 
the focus of policy is the overall tax rate on foreign investments 
inclusive of levies of both source and residence countries. The 
policies differ in regard to which tax rate, domestic or foreign, 
predominates: for CEN it is the domestic rate, while for CIN it is 
the foreign rates.74
Thomas Horst has developed a model in which he tests which 
view of neutrality gives rise to the optimal rate of tax on 
international investment.75 Without reproducing the formulae used 
by Horst to test this hypothesis, it is noted that where 
investment demand is very sensitive to the cost of capital, and 
savings are rather insensitive to variations in the after-tax rate 
of return, more distortions in the international allocation of 
capital are likely to be caused by adhering to a regime which 
promotes CIN as opposed to one that promotes CEN.
Conversely, where the elasticity of savings with respect to 
the after-tax rate of return is high relative to the elasticity of 
investment with regard to the cost of capital, less distortion 
would be created where CIN was promoted as the ultimate goal of 
the domestic tax system. Where the elasticities of saving and 
investment are roughly the same among countries, then the "optimal 
tax rate" on international investment income lies somewhere 
between the rates implied by full adherence to CEN and CIN.76 
However, given the uncertainty surrounding empirical estimates of 
savings and investment elasticities, the most practical solution, 
and the one which traditionally the academic literature in this 
area has tended to assume is that private savings are rather
See Anderson op cit. (1988), at p 403, and OECD (1991) 
op cit. , at p 39.
73 See Brean op cit.. especially at p 131. The OECD (1991) 
op cit. at ch 5.
74 See Anderson op  cit. (1988), at p 403, and Brean, op 
cit., at p 43.
75 T Horst, "A Note on the Optimal Taxation of 
International Investment", (1980) 44 Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 793.
76 OECD (1991) op cit. . at p 40.
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inelastic with respect to the net rate of return and that CEN is 
therefore preferable to CIN from the point of view of efficiency.77
Deferral of domestic taxes on profits of a foreign company 
which is beneficially owned by an Australian company creates a 
situation where domestic taxes on accumulated profits are lower 
than domestic taxes on repatriated profits, thus creating an 
incentive to invest abroad. That is, the deferral advantage 
produces a higher after-tax return on those accumulated profits 
than could otherwise be attained if the profits were repatriated 
to Australia or simply earned in Australia.
A tax on retained earnings which is lower than the tax on 
repatriated earnings will have both an "income" and a 
"substitution" effect on reinvestment that work in the same 
direction. It will leave a larger volume of after-tax earnings 
available for reinvestment (the income effect), and it will induce 
reinvestment rather than distribution (the substitution effect).
"In all, it seems that deferral combined with a low foreign 
tax on profits lead to a larger volume of new investment 
outflow and the reinvestment of a somewhat higher proportion 
of a larger volume of after-tax profits. The stimulus to 
capital outflow is probably not as great as that to 
reinvestment because affiliates already established abroad 
may substitute retained earnings for funds of [domestic] 
origin. 1,78
Currently taxing foreign direct investment income and related 
party income, promotes efficiency by ensuring that foreign 
investment decisions are motivated by genuine economic factors and 
not by taxation considerations which, even if only in a small way, 
hinder Australian endeavours to raise revenue to fund public* 
spending programs and thus undermine Australia's domestic tax 
base.79 However, by introducing the CFC regime which eliminates 
the deferral advantage for certain types of foreign direct 
investment (i.e., those that principally derive passive income), 
the Australian Government appears to have succumbed to pressure 
from business groups by not implementing international tax 
policies which accord fully with CEN principles.
The experience of the Australian Government, particularly 
business opposition to the proposed scope and operation of the
77 Ibid.
78 Musgrave op cit. . (1969), at p 82.
Such a policy measure reduces the inequities, 
distortions and revenue losses arising from the present law. 
Further, by ensuring that income earned by Australian 
multinationals is taxed at rates comparable to that in Australia, 
the incentives for the manipulation of transfer pricing will also 
be greatly reduced: see the CD o p  cit.. at pp 4-5.
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accruals rules foreshadowed in the CD, is not unique.80 The OECD 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs in a report produced in response to 
the BIAC submission cited above, attempted to balance revenue 
raising considerations against business attitudes. They stated 
that there is no justification for the use of tax haven companies 
to shelter income from the residence country's tax net. Moreover, 
they observed that the strong secrecy laws present in most tax 
haven countries is an inducement in itself to conduct activities 
in tax havens. In supporting CFC-type legislation, the Committee 
stressed the point that the use of tax havens itself distorts 
competition and that the BIAC and other business groups should not 
use such an argument to undermine the policy objectives underlying 
CFC-type legislation (viz., CEN and equity).81
Some doubt has also been cast on the validity of the positive 
labour market effects achieved by the deferral advantage. In a 
major study by Professor Peggy Musgrave, it was suggested that tax 
deferral resulted in a capital exporting bias which in turn 
reduced the level of income originating in the US as well as 
reducing the labour share in national income. This led Musgrave to 
conclude that there would be a substantial distributional effect 
adverse to the labour share.82 Prima facie, Australia stood to 
benefit from the capital exporting bias of other countries. 
However, the differences in the corporate tax rates between US and 
Australia (ie 34%83 and 36% respectively) are such as to eliminate 
any significant US capital export tax bias vis-a-vis investment in 
Australia.
See generally Azzi (1993) op cit. . at p 558; and 
Professor McIntyre's evidence before the Senate Committee on 
Finance hearing held in July 1995 (reproduced in Part I at 
footnote 10).
See OECD report (1987) op cit.. at pp 44-50
82 Musgrave P B "Direct Investment Abroad and the 
Multinationals: Effects on the United States Economy", submission 
prepared for the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations and 
the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate (US: 
Government Printing Office, Washington, 1975).
83 US Corporation Income Tax rates are
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taxed at a flat rate of 34%.
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However, as revealed above, resolution of the above issues 
turns on the role foreign investment plays in the domestic 
economy. Proper assessment of the economic effects of foreign 
investment may also vary in accordance with the type of industry, 
the firm, the product or service under scrutiny. Thus, it cannot 
be said with absolute conviction that foreign investment by 
Australian companies will in fact assist Australia's domestic 
employment rates by increasing the demand and appeal for 
Australian products and resources abroad.
On the other hand, by eliminating or reducing the advantage 
sought from lower foreign tax rates, the CFC rules could 
discourage capital movement abroad, at least to the extent that 
tax rate differentials affect the investment policies of 
multinational corporations. It is this factor, amongst others, 
which may improve the national balance of payments in the short 
run. The downside of this is that it could also diminish foreign 
earnings and hence repatriation of those funds which would in 
turn, diminish the potential for foreign currency claims.84 The 
rationale underlying this argument is that foreign investment 
leads to increased exports of goods, services, and labour by the 
country of residence, and when the foreign investment matures, 
dividends will be repatriated to the country of residence, thus, 
improving the balance of payments position in the long-run.
The net effect of removing the deferral advantage on the 
capital exporting country's balance of payments will ultimately 
depend upon the displacement of exports and the rate of 
repatriation of earnings. Moreover, as indicated above, there are 
too many other variables which also need to be accounted for 
before a proper study of the effect of CFC rules on the movement 
of capital may be undertaken. It is beyond the scope of this paper 
to deal with those variables but it seems unlikely that tax 
measures eliminating deferral in relation to passive income will 
have significant balance of payment effects.
From the foregoing analyses it is arguable that foreign 
investment which supplements domestic investment contributes to 
the growth of the domestic economy and that tax measures that may 
distort the flow of foreign investments would be contrary to 
national growth. However, it is suggested that since domestic 
investment could be increased by appropriate fiscal action, 
foreign investment may be a weak alternative to domestic 
investment as an "engine of growth".85 Logically, the national 
return on most capital invested abroad is lower than that on 
domestic investment. Thus, to the extent that foreign investment 
substitutes for domestic investment, it inhibits the rate of 
growth of national income.86 Therefore, by removing the incentive 
to invest abroad, the CFC rules protect the domestic tax base by
See also Azzi (1993) op cit.. at pp 559-560.
See CD op cit.. at p 33.
See Musgrave op cit.. (1969), at pp 17 and 57-58.
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making domestic investments relatively more attractive than 
foreign investments.
In summing up the discussion in this section, it is noted 
that the major departure from CEN in Australia's CFC regime occurs 
(i) where domestic corporations with foreign direct investments in 
comparable tax systems are exempt from Australian tax on dividends 
received from such investments87; (ii) exemption of active income 
(derived from direct foreign investments) and (iii) non-allowance 
of imputation credits for foreign taxes paid.88
3.3. National Neutrality
Another view of tax neutrality, "national neutrality" (which 
is also referred to as the national welfare criterion), has been 
propounded. This view of neutrality is defined as characterising a 
regime in which total returns on capital in the domestic country 
(shared between the domestic investor and the Treasury), are the 
same whether the capital is invested at home or abroad.89 Under 
this approach the domestic country's capital will be invested 
abroad up to the point at which before-tax profits at home equal 
after-tax profits abroad, thus resulting in. maximum national 
product. This result holds true because the foreign tax levied on 
foreign investment is not being received by either the domestic 
government or the investor and therefore represents a deadweight
The rationale for departure in this case has been 
explained on numerous occasions, as basically being more for the 
purpose of administrative simplicity than a concession on the part 
of the government. In a submission to the Standing Committee on 
Finance and Public Administration, Mr James Killaly (Assistant 
Commissioner, Australian Taxation Office) confirmed this by noting 
that "the s 23AJ exemption was granted on the basis that to credit 
for foreign tax levied at rates comparable to Australia's would 
have the effect that little or no Australian tax would be payable 
anyway. The effect ... is simply to reduce compliance costs. 
Because there is not much revenue at stake for Australia, we 
thought we would streamline the process....": Standing Committee 
on Finance and Public Administration: Taxation Laws Amendment 
(Foreign Income) Bill 1990 (14 December 1990), at p 45.
The Federal Government defended its intention not to 
allow imputation credits for foreign taxes paid because (i) no 
other OECD country explicitly provides imputation credits for 
foreign taxes paid; (ii) less Australian tax would be collected; 
(iii) in some cases, Australia would have to refund to 
shareholders taxes paid to foreign governments, and (iv) there is 
no evidence that it would be in Australia's economic interest to 
provide such credits: see CD op cit.. at pp 31-32.
Gumpel P "The Taxation of American Business Abroad: Is 
Further Reform needed?" (1981) 15 Journal of International Law & 
Economics 389, at p 398. The author qualifies the above definition 
by stating that to attain national neutrality, there must be no 
additional preference for domestic or foreign investment.
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loss to the home economy. A policy to promote national neutrality 
also promotes equity because it causes taxpayers with equal 
worldwide incomes to pay the same domestic taxes.90
In defining this criterion in terms of the Australian 
economy, it is noted that as both a capital importer and exporter, 
Australia should tax foreign source income as earned with a 
deduction for foreign taxes, thus discouraging foreign investment 
beyond the point of national profitability (i.e., where the net 
return on foreign investment after foreign taxes exceeds the gross 
return on domestic investment before residence country tax). Where 
this is the case then it is suggested that as far as the treatment 
of Australian residents who invest abroad is concerned "the 
'nationally efficient' as well as the revenue-maximising solution 
... [is] to allow only the deduction of foreign taxes, but then to 
give full imputation credits on all foreign-source income."91 
However, since the Federal Government has decided to adopt a 
foreign tax credit system similar to that adopted by most other 
OECD countries, it is suggested that no imputation credits should 
be granted for foreign tax paid on foreign source income.
The norm of international practice (as evident from the 
experiences of most OECD countries which adopt a credit system) is 
to incorporate elements of both CEN and CIN into the tax policy of 
capital exporting countries. That is, residents are taxed on their 
worldwide income with a credit for foreign taxes. However, the 
implication of exempting active income is that deferral of 
Australian tax is still possible in respect of such income. 
Moreover, the non-subjection of active income to current taxation 
means that the achievement of either national neutrality or CEN is 
somewhat compromised. Under the CFC rules active income will be 
subject to Australian tax only on a repatriated basis which fits 
more easily within the CIN framework.
4. EQUITY
The existence of deferral of shareholder taxation is harmful 
to national interests in that it violates the concept of inter­
taxpayer equity by allowing the resident company to pay lower 
taxes than other resident corporations earning the same amount of 
income directly through investment vehicles such as domestically 
incorporated subsidiaries or partnerships taxed on a transparent 
basis. Therefore, deferral tends to distort the allocation of 
resources in favour of investments in foreign related companies 
located in low-tax countries.
There are three aspects of equity - horizontal equity (which 
requires that taxpayers in like positions be treated alike);
90 Ibid. , at p 399 .
91 Bird R, "International Aspects of Tax Reform in 
Australia" in John G Head (editor) Australian Tax Reform in 
Retrospect and Prospect (Australian Tax Research Foundation, 1989) 
161, at p 172.
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vertical equity (which requires that those in different positions 
should be treated differently) and inter-nation equity (which 
requires that distribution of revenues between different States be 
relatively fair). The first notion of tax equity (i.e., inter­
taxpayer equity), focuses on the tax treatment of taxpayers under 
the home country's tax system and not on the source or type of 
income generated. The desirability of promoting an equitable tax 
system rests on the view that all taxpayers should bear their fair 
share of the responsibility for the costs of government. The 
second notion of equity (i.e., inter-nation equity), is more of a 
political economic concept designed to ensure the fair 
distribution of revenue between states according to the conduct of 
economic activity by taxpayers within a particular state's 
borders.
4.1. Inter-Nation Equity
Unlike horizontal and vertical equity (i.e., inter-taxpayer 
equity), the question of inter-nation equity raises the question 
of what justifies a State in imposing its taxation laws on an 
individual or a company. This question rests on the fundamental 
issue relating to a State's jurisdictional competence to levy 
taxes in the first place (i.e., source and residence principles). 
The role of double tax agreements ("DTAs") could be very 
significant in this respect, since they generally set out their 
own regime for the alleviation of international double taxation 
which arises where the source and residence countries tax the same 
income. Thus, the issue of inter-nation equity is resolved by 
whether and how the source country will tax income of its non­
residents; whereas, the issue of "inter-taxpayer" equity is 
resolved by how the residence country responds to taxes imposed by 
the source country in respect of income derived by its 
residents.92
Whether the home (i.e., residence) country allows a credit in 
respect of foreign taxes paid by its residents in the source 
country or a deduction of the same does not necessarily correspond 
with the national gain or loss that the residence country might 
experience as a result of the source country imposing tax on the 
income derived by residents of the home country. If the source 
country taxes the income earned by such taxpayers, the gain 
accruing to the home country as a nation is reduced. This is the 
issue of inter-nation equity. However, it goes without saying that 
the treatment of tax paid to the source country by the home 
country has a bearing on inter-taxpayer equity and efficiency of 
capital flows.
In terms of reaching a workable solution to inter-nation 
equity, Musgrave and Musgrave propound the view that in a world of 
parent companies and subsidiaries operating in a number of 
different jurisdictions, the distribution of tax claims among the
92 See Musgrave R A, and Musgrave P B, "Inter-nation 
equity" in Bird R and Head J (eds) Modern Fiscal Issues (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1972), at pp 68-69.
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different countries of incorporation should be provided on the 
basis that the country of incorporation is entitled to tax "only 
if it is either the country of source or the country of primary 
tax allegiance for individual shareholders owning a substantial 
proportion of the equity."93 The criteria for working out primary 
tax allegiance in Australia is contained in section 6(1)(b) of the 
Act which provides that a company which is not incorporated in 
Australia is a resident of Australia where it carries on business 
in Australia and has either its central management and control in 
Australia or its voting power is controlled by shareholders who 
are residents of Australia.
The current practice in the OECD area in relation to the 
standard of inter-nation equity is to subject foreign-owned and 
domestically-owned companies to the same corporate tax rate and to 
apply the principle of "reciprocity" (i.e., impose the same 
effective tax rate accruing to foreigners) in bilateral 
negotiations over withholding tax rates. However, it is conceded 
that international consensus on the issue of identical treatment 
versus "effective reciprocity" has not yet been reached.94
In practice, the interaction of Australia's CFC rules and the 
taxing regime established under the OECD MTC (which forms the 
basis of the 1500 DTAs that have been negotiated throughout the 
world), could give rise to inter-nation equity issues. By 
currently taxing resident shareholders who beneficially own 
passive foreign source income, CFC rules effectively establish a 
quasi residence based source rule for passive income more akin to 
the taxing regime set out in Article 7(1) (business profits) of 
the OECD MTC, than that set out in Articles 10 and 11 (dealing 
with dividend and interest income, respectively). The latter two 
Articles proceed on the basis that the source state has primary
Ibid.. at pp 78-79. This allocation rule is also adopted 
in the OECD's MTC.
As far as putting theory into practice, the July 1995 report 
prepared by the JCT contained the following comment which accords 
with the Musgrave and Musgrave notion of inter-nation equity. 
"Generally, the United States cedes primary right to tax 
income derived from sources outside the United States to 
foreign governments. Thus, the [Internal Revenue Code 1954] 
Code provides a credit against the U.S. tax imposed on 
foreign source taxable income to the extent of foreign taxes 
paid on that income. To implement properly the rules for 
computing the foreign tax credit (and for other purposes), 
the statute and regulations set forth an extensive set of 
rules to determine the source, either U.S. or foreign, of 
items of income, and to allocate and apportion items of 
expense against those categories of income." (see Joint 
Committee on Taxation. Description and Analysis of Present- 
Law Tax Rules Relating to Income Earned by U.S. Businesses 
From Foreign Operations (JCS-20-95) , July 20 1995 at p 1) .
See OECD (1991) o p  cit.. at p 37.
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right to tax dividend and interest income generated within its 
borders.
Applying the Musgrave and Musgrave model, the competing tax 
claims of the residence and source countries are resolved by 
granting the country of incorporation primary taxing rights on the 
basis that it is also the country of source. However, this 
approach does not account for the fact that the country of primary 
tax allegiance for individual shareholders owning a substantial 
proportion of the equity of the foreign company, is the home 
country of the shareholders. The dilemma caused by the interaction 
of CFC rules and DTAs, is that the latter prevail in the case of a 
direct conflict arising. Notwithstanding, it is argued on the 
basis of the economic nexus rule (in the broader sense), that the 
country of shareholder residence has a strong fiscal claim over 
dividend and interest receipts beneficially owned by shareholders 
of the foreign company. Accordingly, it is submitted that 
resolution of problems arising from the jurisdictional reach of 
Australia's CFC rules in view of the explicit taxing regime for 
passive income set up under DTAs, may require recourse to the 
mutual agreement procedure article (i.e., Article 25 of OECD MTC) 
found in most DTAs.95 Alternatively, countries which have 
introduced CFC rules could consider establishing a multilateral 
tax organisation which would perform a similar task to that 
performed by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in supervising and 
enforcing the GATT treaty via the adversarial system.
Professor Daniel Sandler on the other hand, contends that the 
operation and jurisdictional reach of CFC rules does not conflict 
with the OECD model of taxation because it is the resident 
shareholder that is assessed under the resident country's CFC 
regime and not the foreign company.96
This article institutes a mutual agreement procedure 
(reached between the Competent Authorities of both Contracting 
States) for resolving difficulties arising out of the application 
of a DTA in the broadest sense of the term.
Sandler D, Pushing The Boundaries: The Interaction 
Between Tax Treaties and Controlled Foreign Company Legislation 
(The Institute of Taxation, London, 1994), at p 72. However, Mr 
Sandler's analysis seems to ignore the fact that residence country 
taxation under the CFC rules is based on profits derived by the 
related company (i.e., the CFC) in the source country. It is this 
very scenario which commonly leads to international double 
taxation that caused the release of the OECD Model Convention. The 
state of confusion that this area of the law is currently in has 
lead to two conflicting decisions delivered by Lower Tax Courts in 
France regarding the operation and scope of the French CFC rules 
in view of France's obligations under its DTAs: see "Lower Court 
finds CFC rules incompatible with treaty obligations" in Tax New 
Service (IBFD, Amsterdam, February 1997) at pp 49-50, where the 
Lower Administrative Court of Strasbourg held that CFC rules were 
incompatible with France's obligations under the Swiss-French DTA. 
Cf., "CFC legislation compatible with treaty provisions" in Tax
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4.2. Inter-Taxpayer Equity
In terms of inter-taxpayer equity, everyone agrees that each 
taxpayer should contribute their "fair share" to the cost of 
government. But there is no such agreement about how the term 
"fair share" should be defined. There are two main theories 
propounded for evaluating the basis of equity between the 
individual taxpayer and the state: (i) the "benefit" principle (as 
propounded by Adam Smith97) , or (ii) the "sacrifice" or "ability- 
to-pay" principle (as propounded by J S Mill98) . The rationale 
underlying the "ability-to-pay" approach is that people with equal 
capacity should pay the same tax (ie "horizontal" equity), while 
people with greater ability should pay more tax (ie "vertical" 
equity). However, both theories suffer from drawbacks99.
New Service (IBFD, Amsterdam, February 1997) at p 62, where the 
Lower Administrative Court of Paris reached the opposite 
conclusion in relation to the interaction of French CFC rules with 
the Swiss-French DTA.
Smith A The Wealth of Nations, Vol 2, (JM Dent & Sons 
Ltd, London, 1958).
98 Mill J S Principles of Political Economy. (Longmans, 
Green and Co, London, 1848, 1909 reprint).
For example, what benefits are to be considered in 
relation to the first theory - "status based benefits" or 
"economic benefits"? With respect to the sacrifice theory, it is 
argued that such criterion as the moral obligation to the state to 
contribute to its revenues is not appropriate to determine the 
taxation of highly individualistic internationally mobile 
taxpayers whose activities and transactions are difficult to tie 
to a particular state or community.
In an attempt to overcome the drawbacks with the two 
approaches to inter-taxpayer equity, Vogel ("World-wide v's Source 
Taxation of Income - A Review and Réévaluation of Arguments" in 
McLure, Sinn, Musgrave, et al. Influence of Tax Differentials on 
International Competitiveness (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 
Deventer, The Netherlands, 1990), at pp 121-125) has resurrected 
the notion of "economic allegiance" as first propounded by Harding 
in 1933, where he rationalised the right of a State to impose tax 
on goods and services that are identified with the economic 
structure of the State. The "economic allegiance" theory appears 
to be an appeal to an element of benefit theory since it relies on 
the notion that an individual is bound to the State through 
participation in and enjoyment of the economic benefits provided 
by that State, whether by virtue of residence, investment, 
consumption or whatever.
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Nevertheless, the modern concept of inter-taxpayer equity 
relies upon ability-to-pay considerations,100 which generally 
states that the proportion of income people pay in taxes should 
rise with capacity to pay.101
If governments were to fully implement equitable taxation in 
line with the ability to pay principle then there would need to be 
certain adjustments and assumptions made before such an approach 
may be usefully applied.102 The problem is further exacerbated by 
the existence of tax preferences and incentives for special 
interest groups. In fact, tax preferences and incentives, coupled 
with the complexity of modern tax legislation and the often 
inadequate administrative arsenal to monitor such complex rules 
afford many opportunities for legitimate (as well as illegitimate) 
tax planning.
Whichever theory (i.e., ability-to-pay or benefit) is 
applied, it is suggested that the results under both theories 
should not differ significantly in the international arena. Either 
of the two fundamental approaches would suggest that an individual 
or corporation should be liable to tax in each country in which 
they operate to the extent of their economic involvement there. 
Inter-taxpayer equity in the international context is primarily a 
matter of horizontal equity among corporate taxpayers (who are the 
most likely group to have sufficient resources to invest 
internationally). Ultimately however, the impact of government tax 
policy targeting income derived through CFCs, affects the resident 
individual shareholders of such entities.
Furthermore, whichever method the residence country adopts to 
deal with the tax paid in the source country (i.e., whether it 
allows a credit, an exemption or a deduction in respect of foreign 
taxes paid), it should be applied consistently. Therefore, if 
policies to promote international inter-taxpayer equity and CEN 
are adopted, theoretically this would require complete elimination 
of deferral coupled with a credit in respect of foreign taxes paid 
to the source country being given to the domestic company for such 
tax as it pays against its profits earned abroad.103 This result 
should not depend on whether the investment is a direct foreign 
investment, a portfolio foreign investment or a branch.
100 The "ability-to-pay" principle was preferred by the 
Asprey Committee as the appropriate principle for identifying the 
fairness of a tax system (see Asprey Committee Report op cit. , at 
para 3.7).
101 See for example, Groenewegan P Public Finance in 
Australia: Theory and Practice. (3rd edn) (Prentice-Hall of 
Australia, Sydney, 1990), at p 117.
102 See generally, Musgrave & Musgrave Public Finance in 
Theory & Practice (5th ed) (McGraw-Hill Book Company 1990), at pp 
244-246 .
103 See also Musgrave & Musgrave (1972) op cit. . at p 79.
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Therefore, foreign subsidiary profits (gross of foreign tax) 
should be taxed as earned to the domestic parent with a credit for 
the foreign taxes paid. This is the tax treatment applied to 
foreign branches in most common law countries. However, in 
practice (taking the example of the Australian FTCS), a credit 
will only be allowed in respect of foreign taxes paid by the 
foreign subsidiary on the underlying profits derived in the source 
country where minimum shareholding requirements are met and 
therefore, portfolio foreign investments would not qualify.104 
This implies that the profits of the foreign subsidiary (like 
profits of the branch) are treated as the profits of the resident 
company (i.e., the "single entity" approach).
Given that Australia has adopted policies that largely 
promote CEN then logically imputation credits to Australian 
taxpayers should also be allowed in respect of foreign taxes paid 
on foreign source income derived by those taxpayers.105 However, 
under the Australian imputation system as set out in Part IIIAA of 
the Act, no such credits are given. The reason for this, as 
explained at footnote 88, is that such a practice would create 
major revenue losses to the Federal Government, and in some cases 
would entail the Australian Government refunding taxes paid to 
foreign governments, since the person entitled to the refund will
104 See section 160AFC of the Act. As it is beyond the scope 
of the thesis to discuss the taxation treatment of portfolio 
foreign investments, this issue will not be pursued here.
105 Canada comes close to providing full imputation credits 
on distributions out of foreign source income (see Bird op cit., 
(1989) at p 170). On 13 March 1992, Singapore introduced an 
exemption regime which broadly exempts dividends paid out of 
profits of a Singapore resident company derived and taxed abroad 
and remitted into Singapore (see s 13E of the Income Tax Act 
("SITA")). This exemption applies to income received on or after 1 
January 1991. The section 13E exemption only alleviates 
international economic double taxation as opposed to completely 
eliminating the problem. This is because the exemption does not 
fully integrate the amount of tax paid in the foreign jurisdiction 
with domestic tax payable in respect of the same income, since the 
exemption only applies to the extent that there are sufficient 
credits to offset the tax liability in respect of the dividend 
paid by the Singapore company (see subsections 13E(3) and (4) of 
the SITA).
In the UK, the Institute for Fiscal Studies has developed 
what is called the allowance for corporate equity ("ACE") system 
for dealing with the problem of surplus Advance corporation tax 
("ACT") which arises primarily by reason of the non-allowance of 
foreign taxes paid by UK parent companies with foreign 
subsidiaries for the purposes of the ACT system. For a discussion 
of how the ACE system interacts with the ACT system see Gammie M 
"The harmonisation of corporate income taxes in Europe: the Ruding 
Committee Report" (1992) Vol 13 No 2 Fiscal Studies at pp 50-55.
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be able to utilise that amount to reduce their Australian tax 
liability on their domestic source income.106
Whether Australia should grant imputation credits in respect 
of foreign taxes paid ultimately is a question of inter-nation 
equity since it directly impacts on the question of equitable
106 See the CD op cit. , at pp 31-32. For a discussion of the 
policy objectives in introducing an imputation system, see Bird op 
cit,. (1989) , at pp 168-172.
Devereux has similarly argued that unilateral relief for 
countering distortions created by the non-allowance of imputation 
credits in respect of foreign taxes paid is not a feasible 
solution, since it would effectively involve large revenue losses 
to the country providing such unilateral relief. Instead he 
suggests that multilateral relief is the appropriate method.
In pursuing this course of action, Devereux refers to the 
EC's Ruding Committee's recommendation that the treatment of 
dividends from foreign and domestic sources be given equivalent 
reliefs (i.e., recognition of foreign taxes for the purposes of 
the imputation credit system). However, he points out that this 
may not be the most practical solution since certain states 
(principally the US and Japan) do not operate imputation systems. 
Instead, they operate a classical system. His preferred solution 
is for all countries to agree on a common tax base to be applied 
to multinationals, so that world-wide income for such companies is 
computed only once.
Devereux suggests two real possibilities for implementing 
this multilateral solution, keeping in mind the revenue 
requirements of national tax authorities and the need to allocate 
such revenue equitably:
(i) the taxable profit of the multinational company so 
computed could be allocated to individual countries on some 
formula apportionment basis, where the formula is based on easily 
identifiable variables. This would provide flexibility in that 
once the income is allocated to any particular country, that 
country could then set its own tax rate and thus maintain some 
control over the revenue which it raises. It should be noted that 
the Ruding Committee Report implicitly rejected the application of 
the formula apportionment method for allocating profits between 
Member States within Europe (see Report of the Committee of 
Independent Experts on Company Taxation (1992, Brussels:
Commission of the European Communities), (the "Ruding Committee 
Report") at p 130). This has also been unanimously rejected by the 
OECD countries.
(ii) The taxable profit of the multinational could be taxed 
at a single agreed rate. The proceeds could then be divided 
between countries using some apportionment method.
Devereux seems to favour the former possibility since the 
latter would appear to encroach on the sovereignty of those 
countries adopting such a measure in the sense that it takes away 
(to some extent) their revenue raising powers with respect to 
those companies operating within a single jurisdiction: See The 
Institute for Fiscal Studies: Tax Reform for the Fourth Term 
(October 1992), at pp 25-30.
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allocation of tax revenues between the country of source and the 
country of residence. This issue in turn involves the assertion of 
jurisdiction to tax, the selection of a tax base, and the method 
of providing relief from international double taxation. In this 
respect, the role of DTAs has most significance since 
international (i.e.,juridical) double taxation could result from 
the non-recognition of foreign taxes for the purpose of the 
residence country's imputation regime. In practice, the principles 
of equity usually take a secondary role to the political processes 
that go into negotiating DTAs. It is not intended to pursue this 
aspect of the discussion further as it does not impact on the 
thesis propounded in this paper.107 Suffice to note that as part 
of Closer Economic Relations ("CER") with New Zealand the question 
of mutual recognition of imputation credits is still under review.
A similar issue of international double taxation arises in 
relation to the non-recognition of unitary taxation for the 
purposes of Australia's FTCS.108 Again it is not instructive to
107 The complex question of whether the -extension of 
imputation credits to non-residents by source countries or the 
granting of imputation credits to residents for foreign taxes paid 
by residence countries could remove distortions created by the 
non-extension of imputation credits in such circumstances, was 
recently considered by the OECD. The conclusion reached in that 
report was that the data provided no clear guidelines for 
policymakers in relation to this question. The report states that 
where alleviation of economic double taxation is granted only to 
resident but not to non-resident shareholders, foreign-owned 
corporations may face a higher cost of capital than corporations 
owned by domestic shareholders, thus creating distortions in the 
efficient allocation of capital. However, the existence of any 
distortions is predicated on the tax treatment of foreign source 
income by the residence country: See OECD (1991) o p  cit.. at p 37, 
and ch 6.
108 See section 6AB(2) (a) of the Act. The system of unitary 
taxation has been adopted in an umber of American States 
(principally, California), to overcome the ability of 
multinational corporations to manipulate the "arms-length" 
provisions designed to deal with transfer pricing by diverting 
income from high tax to low tax jurisdictions. Corporations that 
are established in the State and are part of a multinational group 
are taxable on a portion of the entire group's worldwide income 
determined in accordance with a formula usually based on payroll, 
assets and sales.
The US Supreme Court has held that the worldwide unitary tax 
method, as applied by the State of California (but since limited 
to the water's edge), was not unconstitutional: Colgate Palmolive 
v Franchise Tax Board. Judge Ruth Bader Ginsberg who delivered the 
opinion of the Court (Rehnquist C.J., Blackmun, Stevens, Kennedy, 
Scalia and Souter JJ., concurring. O'Connor J . , filed an opinion 
concurring in Ginsberg J.'s judgment in part and dissenting in 
part, in which Thomas J., joined), said that the Californian 
unitary taxation system was not unconstitutional because it was
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the aims of the thesis to pursue this issue here. Suffice to note 
that most developed nations are of the view that unitary taxation 
is not a viable alternative to the arm's length principle in 
resolving transfer pricing issues.109
In summary, Australia's CFC legislation is largely designed 
to increase horizontal equity between domestic and foreign direct 
investors without the need to establish international standards 
for promoting inter-nation equity. Unlike the application of the 
arm's length standard in resolving transfer pricing problems, the 
CFC rules by-pass the need for international acceptability by 
unilaterally establishing a separate taxing regime that targets 
resident shareholders of CFCs, and also contains explicit double 
tax relief rules which correlate attribution with distribution. 
Whether a world tax body may need to be established to minimise 
disputes arising from the broad reach of CFC rules (as more and 
more countries introduce such rules into their domestic laws), and 
the proliferation of DTAs, is an issue for future consideration.
At this stage, it is convenient to note that CFC taxation does not 
impinge on the model taxation system established under DTAs, 
because it is a tax on resident shareholders.
5. SIMPLICITY
As desirable as this policy objective may be, regretfully, 
with respect to taxation, this objective may (or will) never be 
realised. This is especially so with respect to taxation of 
international income flows. The manner in which tax legislation 
has developed is that it is formulated in most instances as a 
response (anticipatory in some instances) to tax planning 
"schemes". The more complex the arrangement or scheme the more 
complex the tax legislation devised to countervail the 
arrangement. Evidence has shown that arrangements which cross 
national boundaries are anything but straightforward. In fact, the 
CFC legislation has been unanimously referred to as one of the 
most difficult and complex pieces of legislation ever to be passed 
by an Australian parliament.110 These comments have been echoed by
"fairly apportioned, non-discriminatory, fairly related to the 
services provided by the State and ... did not result in multiple 
taxation." The US Supreme Court handed down its decision in this 
matter on 20 June 1994.
109 See the OECD's (1995) transfer pricing guidelines at 
paras 1.12-1.16.
110 Such comments were made by notable tax commentators 
presenting papers at seminars organised by the University of 
Sydney and the University of New South Wales in February 1990, on 
the draft CFC legislation.
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those persons in Treasury and the Australian Taxation Office who 
were responsible for drafting the legislation.111
There are two aspects to the objective of simplicity - 
administration and compliance. Any new tax measure should not be 
so complex as to require a brain surgeon to administer (i.e., 
enforce) it. In order for the tax office to effectively "police" 
any breaches of the new measures it must first know the effect of 
the law before it can determine whether there is in fact a breach. 
As a corollary, taxpayers who are affected by the new measures 
should not have to undertake a doctorate in tax law in order to 
determine whether they have breached any provisions of the new 
measures.
Musgrave and Musgrave concluded in the context of tax 
measures generally, that "[c]ompliance cost is substantially 
larger than administration cost".112 They estimated that in all, 
total compliance cost (for both US individuals and corporations) 
in 1980 of $US10 billion would not be surprising.1“ From a 
postal survey in August/October 1988 of 314 public companies 
throughout Australia it was estimated that the total compliance 
costs of public companies' income taxation in Australia for the 
tax year 1986/87 is between $646 million and $1,341 million, or 
11.4 to 23.7% of public companies' tax revenue of $5,650 million, 
as compared with the estimated (gross) compliance costs of UK 
corporation tax in 1986/87 of 2.2% of tax revenue.114
Professors Blumenthal and Slemrod in their most recent survey 
took the analysis of compliance costs one step further and tried 
to isolate the compliance costs associated with US companies 
deriving foreign-source income. The respondents were asked, "What 
fraction of the total compliance cost due to the federal income 
tax were due to foreign-source income?" The respondents were also
111 See a paper presented by Phil Anderson (who at the time
was a senior officer with the Treasury Department) entitled "A 
Treasury View of the Draft Legislation" - paper delivered at the 
University of Sydney, CLE Seminar - Committee for Postgraduate 
Studies on 9 February 1990. See also a paper presented by Peter 
Smith entitled "Legislative Purposes and Structure of the New 
Rules" to the University of New South Wales Taxation Business & 
Investment Law Research Centre on 19 February 1990; and Arnold op 
cit. (1986), at p 57.
112 Musgrave & Musgrave o p  cit. . at p 2 91.
113 Ibid.
114 Pope J Fayle R & Chen D L The Compliance Costs of Public
Companies' Income Taxation in Australia 1986/87 (Australian Tax 
Research Foundation, Research Study No 13, 1991), at pp iv-v. In 
that study it was also observed that public companies incur 
estimated average compliance costs of $62,604 comprising $34,120 
(55%) for computational costs and $28,484 (45%) for planning
costs.
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asked to include the expenditures of foreign affiliates resulting 
from US tax laws and to exclude expenditures incurred due to 
foreign tax laws. From the responses to this question, Blumenthal 
and Slemrod estimated that 39.2 per cent of the total compliance 
cost of federal taxes is due to foreign-source income (43.7 per 
cent for the Fortune 500 sample) .115
Despite the relatively high compliance costs for public 
companies when compared with tax revenues, it was estimated by 
Pope et al, that compliance costs per dollar of turnover fell as 
company size increased. This figure varied from just under two 
dollars for every $100 of turnover for companies with a turnover 
of over $5 million per annum to about four cents for every $100 of 
turnover for companies with a turnover of $100 million per annum 
or over.116 Blumenthal and Slemrod did not regard the Pope, Fayle 
and Chen survey as particularly informative because of the small 
number of companies surveyed.117
By contrast, the cost of federal tax administrations as 
reflected in the budget of the IRS for the fiscal year 1983 was 
$US2.7 billion, or 0.5 cent per dollar of federal tax revenue.118 
The cost of collecting tax in Australia has been estimated to be 
1.26 cents in the dollar.119
However, what the above surveys do not take into account is 
the logistical problems by taxpayers in complying with rules 
which are aimed at taxing cross-border income. Taxpayers deriving 
foreign source income must deal with differences between domestic
115 Blumenthal M, & Slemrod JB, "The Compliance Cost of 
Taxing Foreign Source Income: Its Magnitude, Determinants, and 
Policy Implications" (1995) 2 International Tax and Public Finance 
37, at pp 40-41. The survey instrument used by the authors was 
drafted with the assistance of a panel of corporate tax officers 
and had five parts. The firms surveyed were drawn from 1,672 firms 
listed in the Internal Revenue's Coordinated Examination Program 
(CEP). Because the CEP included firms with unresolved past 
filings, regardless of their current business status, a number of 
these firms were not active entities in 1992, the year under 
examination. From the 1,392 firms that were active at the time of 
survey, 365 completed surveys were received, representing a 
response rate of 27.5 percent (Ibid.. at pp 37-38).
116 Pope, Fayle & Chen op cit. , at p iv.
117 Blumenthal & Slemrod op cit. , at p 47 where it was noted 
that Pope, Fayle and Chen only surveyed sixty-seven firms with 
over 1,000 employees, and seventy-seven firms with annual turnover 
(sales) exceeding $100 million.
118 Musgrave & Musgrave o p  cit. . at p 291.
119 See Towards a World Class Tax Administration: 
Commissioner of Taxation Annual Report 1991/92 (Canberra, AGPS), 
at Appendix 6.
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and foreign tax and accounting rules that are often extensive. The 
difficulties that such differences give rise to are particularly 
significant when enforcing and complying with the active income 
exemption, which will be examined in some detail in Part IV. 
Compliance problems are also frequently exacerbated by different 
languages and the necessity to translate amounts from a foreign 
currency into the domestic currency. From a tax administrator's 
point of view, the problems of inadequately trained staff coupled 
with the complexity of the legislative provisions, make it 
extremely difficult for revenue authorities to collect tax on 
foreign source income in a fair, effective and efficient manner.
5.1. Logistical Problems of Complying and Administering Tax Rules 
Targeting Cross-Border Transactions120
Every Australian company that has entered into "related party 
international transactions" must lodge Schedule 25A with its tax 
returns.121 Essentially, Schedule 25A asks companies to detail the 
size and range of their international transactions, and to supply 
information about the type of transactions. However, there is a 
major problem with the actual information that is collected in 
Schedule 25A, in that it does not allow the ascertainment of the 
relative extent of the transactions.122
120 A whole chapter of the Gordon Report was devoted to the 
adequacy of the IRS's ability to gather information with regard to 
international transactions. The Report referred to the special 
problems which the IRS must contend with as a result of the 
complexity of the relevant Code provisions, logistical 
complications involving distance and language differences and 
procedural and political complications in foreign countries: see 
the Gordon Report op cit.. at p 180.
121 Unlike the position in the US, under Australia's self- 
assessment regime there is no special tax return which must be 
prepared by controllers of CFCs.
122 Mr Greg Crough in his opening submission to the Martin 
Committee stated:
"You can have a company saying, for example, that it has 
international related party transactions of more than $100 m. 
Those transactions could be any level of transactions, and 
you do find that in the CWIT System there are companies with 
business receipts of over $3 billion or $4 billion which have 
related party transactions of more than $100m ... So from the 
information that is going into the system from companies, 
collected on [schedule] 25A, it is very difficult from an 
audit point of view, to gauge the relative extent of those 
transactions.": see the Martin Committee Report op cit. . at p 
552 .
The CWIT (i.e., companies with international transactions) is 
an international transactions database compiled by the ATO. There 
are presently around 3,000 Australian companies which are included 
in the database.
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The Martin Committee were mindful of the shortcomings of 
Schedule 25A. They were critical of the types of information that 
is collected and also because the schedule is addressed to 
companies and assumes that individuals, partnerships and trusts do 
not conduct international activities. Consequently, the Martin 
Committee recommended that the ATO keep under review the design of 
Schedule 25A, and that it should take into account the experience 
of revenue authorities when designing forms such as Schedule 
25A.123 The experience of the US with respect to collection of 
information serves as a good illustration of the sorts of 
information that the ATO should request in respect of 
international transactions. Broadly, the information collected 
under Form 5471 which is the IRS's major source of information on 
international profit shifting and cases to do with international 
profit shifting, indicates the relative size of international 
transactions conducted.124
From the foregoing it is clear that the information reporting 
requirements for a US shareholder ("USS") which has a taxable 
interest in a foreign corporation, are substantial. Moreover, 
taxpayers face an arsenal of penalties125 if they fail to file 
properly Form 5471 on a timely basis. Much of the administrative 
burden for filing Form 5471 falls on US - based multinational
123 See Recommendations 18 and 19 in the Martin Committee 
Report op cit., at p 90. Schedule 25A was recently amended to 
increase the amount and relevance of information requested and the 
types of taxpayers who have to supply information: see Cox T 
"Australia's to require More Detailed Transfer Pricing 
Information" (1997) Tax Notes International 183.
124 The information collected in Form 5471 is much more 
comprehensive than the information collected in Schedule 25A. 
Companies filling in the form are required to provide the details 
of the transactions, the size of the transactions, who the 
transactions have been with and the countries where the 
transactions have occurred.
125 The penalty for non-compliance is set out in §7203 IRC,
which imposes both general civil and criminal penalties. 
Consequently, the failure by a USS to provide information 
requested in either Form 5471 or §6038, will be treated as a 
misdemeanour punishable by a fine not more than $25,000 ($100,000
in the case of a corporation), or imprisonment for not more than 
one year (five years in the case of violations of §60501, relating 
to cash received in a trade or business), or both. Moreover, the 
US shareholder may lose all or part of the foreign tax credit to 
which it was entitled in respect of the foreign income derived by 
the CFC. In addition, unlike the Australian provisions which 
require that company records be held for 5 years, there is no 
statute of limitations which applies to the calculation of 
earnings or profits. For instance, when a USS recognises a gain 
from the sale of a CFC's stock, §1248 requires that the CFC's 
earnings and profits be calculated for each year beginning after 
December 31, 1962, while the shareholder held the CFC's stock.
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corporations, which are required to file a separate Form 5471 each 
year for each of their CFCs. Some commentators would agree that 
the 1RS should have access to relevant books, records and 
information regarding the foreign operations of controlled 
entities in order to enable the 1RS to properly perform its audit 
function. However, they are quick to point out that the reporting 
requirements should not be "unduly burdensome".126 What 
constitutes an unduly burdensome obligation is dependent on the 
facts in each case, but generally some relevancy or materiality 
standard should be used when assessing the type of information 
which would enable the 1RS to perform its audit function.
Therefore, the ATO is at somewhat of a disadvantage in 
comparison with the 1RS in relation to the information it has in 
its database on Australian companies' international profit 
shifting activities. Moreover, reliance on information provided in 
the company's annual reports as evidence of international profit 
shifting activities is quite inadequate. Essentially the 
accounting standards, although they do give some information on 
related party transactions, do not distinguish between 
international and domestic related party transactions. Moreover, 
despite the requirement contained in section 264A (see below), it 
is noted that any requests by the ATO for documents of foreign 
subsidiaries of Australian companies are subject to the secrecy 
provisions of the relevant foreign country in which the foreign 
subsidiary is resident. This point is readily conceded by Mr 
Crough:
"The Australian Taxation Office can request companies to 
provide information about their offshore subsidiaries in 
cases such as this, but I know that a number of the audits 
are finding very great difficulties in getting that type of 
information. Indeed, that is the problem the Americans have 
identified themselves quite recently with the upsurge of 
foreign investment into the United States.
The 1RS has found great difficulty in getting the outside 
records of companies, parent companies or other subsidiaries 
outside the United States."127
5.2. Access to Information
A major difficulty with administering a tax regime which 
targets international transactions (i.e., the CFC regime) is the 
inability of revenue authorities to unilaterally gain access to 
information abroad due mainly to secrecy laws in existence in the 
foreign country. Accordingly, the legitimacy of a country's 
international tax rules is intimately linked with the ability to 
verify information pertaining to the offshore activities of its 
residents. Hence, the need for effective information gathering 
concerning international profit shifting activities, especially
Aland o p  cit. , at p 1024.
The Martin Committee report op cit., at p 556.
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those being conducted by resident taxpayers via CFCs. The 
legitimacy of the CFC rules and therefore, their ability to 
protect the domestic tax base, is intimately linked with their 
ability to compel production of a relevant CFCs financial 
statements, books and records in order to verify (and accurately 
compute) the amount of income to be attributed to the resident 
taxpayer. The operation of any new legislation may be seriously 
undermined if insufficient information is available to permit 
enforcement on a fair, uniform, and comprehensive basis.
Some of the more fundamental limitations with applying any 
policy measures directed at taxing international capital flows is 
access by the ATO to relevant and timely information. The ATO's 
powers of investigation are mainly contained in section 263 and 
264 of the Act. Under section 263 of the Act the Commissioner, or 
any officer authorised by him for that purpose, shall "at all 
times have full and free access to all buildings, places, books, 
documents and other papers" for any of the purposes of the Act, 
and may make extracts from or copies of any such books, documents 
or papers.128 The Commissioner's powers of investigation have 
taken a hammering in recent times, especially after the Full 
Federal Court decisions in FC of T v Citibank Limited129 and Allen 
Allen & Hemslev v FC of T130. It was held in both decisions that 
the doctrine of legal professional privilege applies to restrict 
the Commissioner's powers under section 263. Therefore, his powers 
to search and make copies of documents should be read as not 
referring to documents to which legal professional privilege 
attaches. It is not intended to embark on an analysis of the 
doctrine of legal professional privilege, since it is beyond the 
scope of this paper. However, a lucid discussion of this doctrine 
may be found in the Citibank case.
Other limitations on the ATO's section 263 investigation 
powers include the prohibition on "fishing expeditions". A fishing 
expedition arises where the Commissioner does not know whether or 
not the particular documents contain information which the 
Commissioner seeks, but attempts to examine them in the hope that 
they might do so: Associated Dominions Assurance Society Ptv 
Limited v John Fairfax & Sons Ptv Limited131. In addition, the 
power conferred on the Commissioner under section 263 must be used 
bona fide and for a "proper purpose". In O'Reilly (FCT) v Commr of
128 Until the insertion of subsection (3) into section 263
in 1987, section 263 was entirely passive and did not impose any 
active duty on occupiers to assist ATO investigators: see, for 
example, Smorgon v FCT 79 ATC 4039, at 4052; (1979) ATR 483, at p
497, per Mason J; and O'Reilly v Commrs of the State Bank of 
Victoria (1983) 153 CLR 1, at pp 41 and 48; 83 ATC 4156, at pp 
4158 and 4162.
129 89 ATC 4268.
130 89 ATC 4294.
131 (1955) 72 WN (NSW) 250.
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the State Bank of Victoria132 the Full Court of the High Court 
(Mason, Murphy, Brennan and Deane JJ.), held:
"Like all statutory powers, [section 263] must be used bona 
fide for the purposes for which it was conferred and that 
involves that its exercise be not excessive in the 
circumstances of the case."133
Section 264, on the other hand, gives the Commissioner a 
coercive power to require a person (whether a taxpayer or not) to 
furnish information, produce records, and attend and give evidence 
(on oath if required). However, it has been held that section 264 
only extends to documents or copies of documents already in 
existence or under the control of the recipient and does not 
support a construction that requires copies to be brought into 
existence. If it did, a serious question would arise as to whether 
section 264 was in that respect a "valid exercise of the power of 
the Commonwealth Parliament under the Australian Constitution (see 
sec. 51 (xxxi) ). 1,134
To avoid any confusion as to the operation of sections 263 
and 264 in an international context, a new section 264A has been 
inserted into the Act. This section grants the Commissioner powers 
to obtain information regarding a taxpayer's activities, where he 
has reason to believe that information relevant to the assessment 
of the taxpayer, is within the knowledge of a person outside 
Australia, is recorded in a document which is outside Australia or 
is kept by means of electronic or other device outside Australia. 
An "offshore information notice" issued under section 264A is 
designed to achieve the same result as a §982 notice under the US 
IRC. For example, an important sanction contained in section 264A 
provides that if a taxpayer refuses or fails to comply with an 
offshore information notice, then, except with the consent of the 
Commissioner, the relevant information or documents may not be 
admitted in evidence if an assessment is subsequently disputed 
before either the High Court, the Federal Court, or the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal.
In exercising his power under section 264A, the Commissioner 
is also required to ignore a taxpayer's obligations relating to 
secrecy under the law of a foreign country. It is envisaged that 
this latter requirement could lead to many disputes in the courts 
of law. Many taxpayers who are adversely affected by a section 
264A notice may have to argue denial of natural justice if it is 
beyond their control to conform with the notice at the time of 
issue, but subsequently due, say, to a change in the laws of the 
foreign country, information sought by the notice becomes
132 (1983) 153 CLR 1, at p 48; 83 ATC 4156.
133 Ibid. . at p 4162.
134 See the Full Federal Court decision in Perron 
Investments Ptv Limited & Ors v Pep. FC of T 89 ATC 5038, at p 
5043, per Lockhart J (with whom Burchett J agreed).
61
accessible. This is particularly important in view of the fact 
that unlike §982, section 264A does not contain a reasonable cause 
exception. Another ground of objection is legal professional 
privilege. However, it should be noted that pursuant to section 
264A(10) the Commissioner has the power to consent to the 
subsequent admission of documents and information which had been 
previously requested by him and not supplied by the taxpayer, as 
evidence in proceedings disputing the taxpayer's assessment. 
Moreover, pursuant to section 264A(13), the Commissioner must not 
withhold consent in any case where to do so would have the effect 
of making any tax or penalty incontestable.
Although the ATO may not compel the supply of foreign records 
pursuant to section 264A, the fact that an Australian taxpayer 
which does not furnish information requested under the section is 
precluded from subsequently relying on such information, say, 
during litigation, may act as an effective deterrent against non­
supply of such information. However, there are doubts as to the 
efficiency and practicality of such a mechanism for requiring 
production of records. Some have suggested that this is a form of 
"thuggery".135 To demand the production of foreign records without 
providing an exemption from such a demand where it is clear that 
to comply with such a demand may involve a breach of the foreign 
secrecy law, is draconian. However, such a demand is necessary 
since it ensures that resident shareholders do not shift profits 
to the tax haven and simply plead foreign secrecy law infringement 
as a defence for not complying with the residence country's 
request for information regarding such transactions.
The request for information and the taxpayer's inability to 
oblige with such a request necessarily results from the 
jurisdictional struggle between a capital-exporting country and a 
tax haven, with the investor (viz., the controlling shareholder), 
being caught in the middle and used as a lever against the tax 
haven. It involves an assessment of the likelihood that the tax 
haven will impose sanctions on the shareholder for the breach of 
its secrecy law. As an alternative, it is suggested that the 
obstacle of the secrecy laws of foreign countries may be 
circumvented by distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate 
tax haven secrecy laws. However, such an approach may be 
"hazardous" and would involve a substantial compliance burden.136 
Therefore, in furthering the interests of the residence country, 
(sometimes at the expense of the resident investor) such request 
for information provisions must necessarily be harsh and without 
concessions for the secrecy laws of tax havens.
5.3. Unilateral/Bilateral Approaches to Information Gathering
Information gathering is a difficult process to enforce 
domestically let alone internationally (despite the inclusion of 
such provisions as section 264A into the Act or §982 into the
Arnold (1986) op cit.. at p 512. 
Ibid.
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Code). Generally, the ability to unilaterally gain access to 
information abroad is restricted by (a) the limited availability 
of public information in countries having secrecy laws; (b) the 
difficulty of verifying public information that is available; (c) 
the difficulty in many cases of obtaining foreign government 
permission to conduct on-site examinations and interviews and the 
practical limitations inherent in conducting those examinations 
and interviews, where governmental and taxpayer permission has 
been obtained; and (d) the difficulty in many cases of enforcing 
summonses for books and records located abroad.137
Even where the ATO is able to have access to the records of a 
foreign subsidiary of a domestic corporation, there is still the 
problem of verification of the information presented by the 
taxpayer. In practice, verification of information is done by way 
of audit of company records. However, the main difficulty with 
this is that investigative efforts by the tax authorities of the 
residence country may be hindered because they conflict with the 
interest of the source country. This is particularly relevant in 
the case when tax havens are involved. It is suggested that there 
are two ways of dealing with this problem.138 The first is the 
unilateral measure of an extended reporting obligation for 
resident taxpayers with foreign interests. This approach has 
however, been criticised on the basis that it is considered to be 
an unacceptable extraterritorial extension of jurisdiction.139
The second possibility of verifying information is to gather 
information through bilateral140 and multilateral141 channels. Most 
of the US and Australian double tax treaties contain provisions 
for the exchange of information by the parties to carry out the
137 See The Gordon Report op cit. . at pp 197-206.
138 See the International Tax Avoidance and Evasion (OECD, 
Paris, 1987), at pp 39-48.
139 See Arnold (1986) op cit. . at p 513.
140 An important clause for facilitating the bilateral 
exchange of tax information is Article 26 of the OECD MTC which is 
similar to Article 26 of the UN MTC and the US Model Income Tax 
Convention of 1996. Article 26 effectively authorises the exchange 
of such information as is necessary for the enforcing a tax 
treaty. The term "necessary" is interpreted broadly to mean 
reasonably relevant for taxation purposes of the treaty partners. 
For a more thorough discussion of Article 26, see Wisselink A 
"International exchange of tax information between European and 
other countries" (1997) 2 EC Tax Review 108, at pp 108-111.
141 See for example, the Pacific Association of Tax 
Administrators which is an association between the Australian, US, 
Canadian and Japanese tax authorities for the purposes of 
enhancing cooperation on international tax administration matters. 
See also Wisselink op cit. , at pp 112-113 and OECD CFC Report 
(1996) op cit.. at p 90.
63
provisions of the treaties and the parties' domestic laws, but 
such provisions generally do not require either party to carry out 
administrative measures at variance with its laws or 
administrative practices or to disclose trade secrets. It is not 
unreasonable to assume that each of the treaty partners views its 
treaty obligation with regard to the information in a different 
light. This fact is highlighted by the special problems created by 
Swiss secrecy laws.142
The treaty provisions have been interpreted as permitting 
four methods of providing information. The first is a routine or 
automatic exchange of information with regard to tax law changes 
and investment income received from and withholding tax paid to 
one country by residents of the other country.143 The second is an 
exchange of information pursuant to a specific request in the 
context of a unilateral examination of a taxpayer by one country 
or a simultaneous examination in which the countries separately 
and simultaneously examine related taxpayers after the two 
countries meet to plan and coordinate the examination. The third 
is an industry-wide exchange of information defined in scope by an 
exchange of letters between the competent authorities of the two 
countries and designed to secure comprehensive data on worldwide 
industry practices and operating patterns in order to promote more 
effective audits of multinational enterprises. The fourth is a 
spontaneous exchange of information in which one country, without 
specific request, furnishes to the other country information or 
investigation that suggests or establishes non-compliance with the 
tax laws of the other country by a non-resident alien, foreign 
corporation, US citizen or domestic corporation.
With the intention of bolstering exchange of tax information, 
the ATO and the IRS in November 1990 signed an agreement which 
authorises the passing of information to revenue authorities of 
Australia and the US. The US Senate Committee on Governmental 
Affairs, Crime and Secrecy has also recommended that the US 
aggressively pursue the negotiation of multilateral treaties with 
offshore jurisdictions for the exchange of law enforcement 
information. The Committee had felt that unilateral agreements 
intended to overcome the problem of tax haven secrecy laws were 
costly time consuming and unproductive.144 However, one drawback 
with either the multilateral or bilateral approach to exchange of 
information is that joint audits will only be conducted where the 
revenue authorities in both countries believe the investigation 
will be fruitful. Furthermore, the audits must conform to the
142 See Aland op cit. . at p 1005.
143 ’ See The OECD Report (1987) op cit. . at pp 45-47.
144 The Use of Offshore Banks and Companies (Senate Report 
No. 130, 99th Cong., 1st session) (1985),at p 139.
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audit rules of both countries, which are not always fully 
compatible.145
It is logical that tax authorities are leaning towards the 
bilateral (and increasingly the multilateral) approach to 
information gathering, since the unilateral alternative may be 
more difficult to enforce and much more costly than either the 
bilateral or multilateral approach. This is because courts, 
especially, common law courts, are very reluctant to uphold any 
legislation which undermines the sovereignty of states: The Porto 
Alexandra146. Furthermore, some countries (viz., Japan and the 
United Kingdom), not just tax havens, are sensitive about 
providing information concerning a resident taxpayer to the tax 
authorities of another country unless some issue of domestic 
taxation is at stake.
Finally, it has been observed that there is a global trend to 
promote international tax enforcement actions. Technical and 
Financial assistance from international organisations, including 
the World Bank, regional development banks, the Council of Europe, 
and national governments such as the United States, have also 
helped in this initiative.147 The increasing awareness of revenue 
losses through international transactions and the ineffectiveness 
of unilateral and bilateral measures at countering such 
activities, has provided the requisite impetus for rising 
international tax enforcement and cooperation.148
6. Conclusion
Ultimately, in evaluating reform of the tax system of a 
country, proposals should be structured to achieve the "over­
riding requirement" of harmonising the tax system's intended and 
actual effects. This objective in turn requires that opportunities 
for avoidance, evasion and other manipulations be minimised.149
145 See an article which appeared on the front page of the 
Australian Financial Review on 18 April 1990.
146 [1920] P 30. See also The Government of India v Taylor 
[1955] AC 491.
147 See Zagaris B "Trends in International Tax Enforcement"
(1995) 9 Tax Management International Journal 411 at pp 418-419.
See also the multilateral convention entitled the Mutual 
Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters which entered into force 
on 1 April 1995 for Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and the US. 
The Netherlands and Belgium are signatories to this convention: 
see OECD CFC Report (1996) op cit.. at pp 90-91.
148 Ibid. , at p 424 .
149 See Mathews R "The Structure of Taxation", in The 
Politics of Taxation , John Wilkes (editor) (Hodder and Stoughton, 
1980), pp 108-112.
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The policy objectives discussed above sometimes conflict. 
However, despite such conflicts and inconsistencies, it is the 
role of any responsible government to clearly set priorities 
between the various policy options and to promote those which it 
perceives will result in maximum efficiency gains to the national 
economy thereby eliminating, as far as possible, any dead-weight 
costs. Invariably, there will be critics whatever the ultimate 
design of the system turns out to be, especially where the 
achievement of CEN may have to occur at the expense of other 
important policy objectives such as simplicity. Therefore, in the 
end it is more a political decision as to which policy objectives 
will be followed and which will be disregarded or at least 
neglected.
In assessing the relative merits of the CIN view, economic 
factors which the business community argues are important in 
influencing international tax policy were examined. It was shown 
above that CFC rules should not adversely affect the efficient 
utilisation of the residence country's capital where the tax 
incentive to invest abroad is removed in the case of foreign 
direct passive investment.
Clearly, more work is needed to determine the role of 
Australian foreign direct investment on the domestic economy and 
the effect the CFC regime would have on the international flow of 
capital. However, at this stage it appears that the international 
dimensions of the Australian Government's taxation policies are 
set at a level which promote national interests at the expense 
perhaps of international ones. This is evidenced by the fact that 
the government has adopted a credit method without extending the 
operation of the imputation credits system to foreign taxes paid.
As far as the competition theory goes, this is still very 
much an open question. Proponents of this theory have claimed 
victory in the form of the active income exemption which was 
inserted into the CFC rules after the Consultative Document was 
released. However, the Australian Government's decision to 
incorporate an active income exemption is not so much a 
capitulation to pressure from proponents of the competition theory 
as much as a policy decision that genuine business investments 
abroad did not pose a threat to national interests and therefore, 
the integrity of Australia's domestic tax base.
In terms of the thesis propounded in this paper, the 
non-subjection of active income to current taxation, does not harm 
Australia's domestic tax base in the same sense that the non­
subjection of passive income to current taxation might. It is more 
difficult to forcefully suggest that active income has been given 
an artificial foreign source where it was generated from economic 
activities conducted abroad. In fact, the host country may be the 
only jurisdiction in which such income could be derived, due, 
inter alia, to the existence of resources, technology and labour 
which are not otherwise available in Australia. This is to be 
contrasted with the position in respect of passive income which 
could just as easily be derived in Australia by investing the
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funds there as it could from investing the funds in another 
jurisdiction.
The conclusion (if any) that may be drawn from the arguments 
discussed above in relation to the removal or retention of tax 
bias in favour of active foreign source income, is that there are 
still many unresolved issues. A major issue which has occupied the 
thoughts of many commentators is defining the exact relationship 
between foreign investment and the domestic economy. Defining this 
relationship, it is observed, rests on the implicit assumption of 
whether foreign investment is a substitute for or a supplement to 
domestic investment. This is a very complex question to which 
there is no clear answer.
Therefore, it could not be stated with any conviction that 
deferral of domestic taxes in all cases (not just anti-avoidance 
cases) is harmful to the national interest in the sense that the 
revenue authorities in all cases would have been entitled to 
collect revenue where deferral of domestic tax is made possible by 
use of foreign subsidiaries (i.e., captive non-resident 
companies). Hence, the suggestion that the term deferral is value 
laden.150 Such logic can be applied to justify the Federal 
Government's decision to also exempt income which has been taxed 
in a foreign jurisdiction in a comparable way (whether it is 
active or passive income) as if it had been derived in Australia. 
This is because it is not cost efficient to subject such income to 
the FTCS since the revenue raised (if any) from such subjection 
would be minimal. Additionally, the exemption of active income 
accords with the economic nexus rule for determining the source of 
income.
Apart from the above noted exemptions from the CFC rules of 
active income and non-portfolio dividends which have been 
comparably taxed in a foreign country, few people would dispute 
the fact that CFC measures should be an integral part of the tax 
arsenal available to revenue authorities. In a country such as 
Australia which has substantial offshore investments, the CFC 
regime is one of the most powerful (if not the most powerful) 
weapon available to the Australian Taxation Office in their 
attempts at protecting the integrity of Australia's fiscal 
jurisdiction with respect to international income flows and 
therefore, the domestic tax base.
Notwithstanding, the effectiveness of CFC rules to protect 
the domestic tax base is interdependent on their capacity to 
obtain and verify information held offshore. Hence, the increasing 
popularity of bilateral and multilateral agreements for exchange 
of tax information. However, the bilateral or multilateral 
approaches have their problems. For instance, bilateral co­
operation in practice will only occur where both countries have 
entered into DTA's which usually contain clauses for the exchange
See Park W "Fiscal Jurisdiction and Accruals Basis 
Taxation Lifting the Corporate Veil to Tax Foreign Company 
Profits" (1978) Columbia Law Review 1609, at p 1610.
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of information. Australia and the US do not have DTA's with most, 
if not all, of the tax haven countries.—
151 The US has recently concluded a -number of exchange of 
information "agreements with tax-havens.— The exchange of 
information requ-ir-ed under these treat-ico is however,— limited to 
criminal activities.
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PART III
DEFINING THE INCOME TAX BASE IN RELATION TO FOREIGN SOURCE INCOME 
1. The Current Regime for Taxing Foreign Source Income
The purpose of this Part, as the title suggests, is to define 
the traditional parameters of Australia's taxation powers in 
relation to cross-border income (in particular, income derived 
from foreign direct investments), and to analyze the problems that 
have warranted introduction of the CFC regime.
As mentioned previously, Australia asserts jurisdiction to 
tax the worldwide income (i.e., both Australian and foreign source 
income) of its residents (residence principle of taxation) and the 
Australian source income of foreign persons (source principle of 
taxation). While theoretically there are no rules of public 
international law or domestic constitutional law which encroach on 
a country's legal authority to levy tax,1 the residence and source 
principles are the accepted international norms of taxation, with 
the source principle taking priority over the residence principle.
The interaction of the residence rule of Australia with the 
source rule of a foreign country which adopts similar 
international tax rules as Australia, could lead to an overlap of 
fiscal claims over the one amount of income. This could occur 
where income is derived by an Australian resident from sources in 
the foreign country. Unilateral relief from such international 
juridical double taxation (to be referred to throughout the paper 
as "international double taxation"2) is provided by Australia in 
the form of a credit for source country (i.e., foreign) taxes paid 
where the Australian resident (who is deemed to be personally 
liable and to have paid the foreign tax) is subjected to both 
source country and residence country taxation on the same amount 
of income.3
1 See M Norr, "Jurisdiction to Tax and International 
Income", (1962) 17 Tax Law Review (March), 431-462 at p 431.
Apart from the residence/source conflict alluded to 
above, international juridical double taxation can also arise in 
the following two situations: (i) where a taxpayer is regarded as 
a resident by more than one country ("dual resident"); (ii) where 
the source rules of different countries may regard income as 
having a source within its territory according to its own law 
("dual source").
3 In calculating the foreign tax credit provided in this 
case it is necessary to first calculate the foreign tax borne by 
the Australian resident and then to determine the Australian tax 
that would have been payable on the foreign source income if it 
was derived in Australia. If the foreign source income is received 
net of foreign tax then the income is grossed up by the amount of 
foreign tax paid before calculating the foreign tax credit limit. 
The credit allowed is the lesser of the foreign tax borne and the
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Bilateral relief from international double taxation is also 
provided through the network of double tax agreements ("DTAs") 
which Australia has negotiated with other nations. The tax that 
would otherwise be imposed by either the source or residence 
country may be reduced or eliminated under a relevant DTA. 
Generally, a DTA specifies that certain foreign taxes will be 
creditable for the purpose of computing residence country tax 
liability. Both bilateral and unilateral measures for relief from 
international double taxation will be examined in this Part as 
both impact on Australia's fiscal claim over the foreign source 
income of its residents.
However, the current position has not always existed. The 
first time Australia exercised "limited jurisdiction"* 4 to tax 
foreign source income of its residents was 1930. Therefore, 
tracing the development of Australia's international tax rules 
serves to highlight the changing international environment which 
the Federal Government has had to contend with since it entered 
the income tax arena in 1915. It also supports the argument 
propounded in this thesis that other measures (viz., CFC/passive 
income rules) are required to protect Australia's domestic tax 
base in view of the changing environment in which international 
transactions occur.
%
2. Defining Australia's Income Tax Base
From the above description of Australia's traditional ground 
rules it is clear that there are three income tax bases on which 
Australia can levy tax. The first two derive from the residence 
rule (i.e., Australia can tax (i) the Australian source income of 
its residents and (ii) the foreign source income of its 
residents), whereas the third derives from the source rule (i.e., 
Australia can tax the Australian source income of non-residents). 
In this thesis we will only examine the second tax base in 
relation to (a) passive income and (b) non-passive (i.e., 
business) income derived from foreign direct investments by 
Australian residents. This distinction is based on the fact that 
Australia has decided to promote capital export neutrality ("CEN") 
in relation to passive income derived from foreign direct 
investments by introducing CFC rules which currently tax residents 
on their pro rata share of such income while at the same time 
exempting active income. As will appear, identifying the 
geographical source of active as well passive income is necessary 
to ensure that the income tax bases described in this paragraph 
are properly applied in view of the operation of the FTCS which, 
inter alia, requires the ascertainment of deductions incurred in
foreign tax credit limit. The latter is the amount that would have 
been the Australian tax payable on the foreign source income of
the resident had it been derived in Australia. Hence the need to
identify the source of income (see section 3.5.2. in this Part).
4 Australia's original jurisdiction to tax foreign source 
income of its residents did not extend to foreign source 
dividends.
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relation to foreign income derived by the Australian resident 
taxpayer.
Therefore, in order to promote international equity and 
simplicity it is important that clear and strong source rules are 
in place. An appropriate statutory source rule requires 
implementation of clear guidelines which not only identify the 
source of income but also the type of income. A source rule which 
reflects the parameters of Australia's policy objectives in 
relation to passive income derived by residents from foreign 
direct investment is the economic nexus rule. This rule identifies 
the source of income (including the source of deductions incurred 
in deriving such income) to be the place where the economic 
activity generating such income is situated.* 5 The interest 
withholding source rule contained in section 128B(2) of the Act 
reflects such a source rule.6 So does the source of dividend rule 
which states that dividend income is sourced where the profit from 
which the income is paid is sourced.7 In the case of passive 
investment income, the source of profits arising from investment 
activities is where the central management and control of the 
investment vehicle is located. The source of profits made in the 
course of trading or manufacturing is where those activities are 
carried on.8
The Asprey Committee was the first Committee to 
recommend wholesale changes to Australia's tax regime including 
the implementation of statutory source rules which effectively 
reflect the economic nexus rule.
Pursuant to section 128B(2)(b) interest payments to non­
residents made by a resident (which is not an outgoing wholly
incurred by the resident in carrying on business abroad at or 
through a permanent establishment abroad) or a non-resident, 
provided the interest is wholly or in part incurred by the payer
in carrying on business in Australia at or through a permanent 
establishment in Australia will be subject to withholding tax at 
the rate declared by Parliament (currently 10%) (see section 
128B(5) of the Act).
The current rate declared by Parliament is 10%: see section 
7 (b) of the Income Tax (Dividends and Interest Withholding Tax)
Act 1974 . The 10 percent rate is applied on the gross amount of 
the income. The gross amount method has arguably been chosen on 
the basis that it approximates the revenue yield from applying 
normal rates to the net income after allowance of deductions.
7 See section 44(1)(b) of the Act.
See Esquire Nominees Limited v FCT (1973) 129 CLR 177 at
182 where Barwick CJ noted that the source of profits in applying 
section 44 (1) (b) may differ depending on the type of income 
derived.
"[A] company may make profits ... simply by investment 
... In such a case its net income from its investment 
will be its profits. Further, in my opinion, the place
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It is also noteworthy at this stage that the Commissioner, 
under Division 13 of the Act (which contains the transfer pricing 
provisions), is empowered to determine the source of income where 
he has exercised his powers of reallocation (see section 136AE). 
The significance of this power lies in the fact that the 
provisions of Division 13 are stated to override all other 
provisions of the Act (see section 136AB(1)), including explicit 
statutory source rules set out elsewhere in the Act. However, no 
such priority exists in relation to source rules stated in DTAs 
since by virtue of subsection 4(2) of the Income Tax 
(International Agreements) Act 1953. the provisions of that Act 
are paramount to any provisions contained in the Act. Generally, 
source rules contained in DTAs apply specifically to the 
particular DTA and not for the purposes of Australian law.
In summary, the aim of the discussion in this Part is to 
highlight the ineffectiveness of Australia's traditional 
international tax regime (including the anti-avoidance measures) 
in protecting the domestic tax base and the inefficiencies created 
by the manipulation of the traditional international taxation 
rules.
3. Historical Development of Australia's International Taxation 
Rules
Since the introduction of the Federal income tax in 1915, 
Australia's jurisdictional principles of taxation have been 
amended in order to account for the internationalisation of 
Australian businesses. However, before then income tax was imposed 
solely by the respective States of the Commonwealth of Australia. 
In 1932, the Ferguson Royal Commission9 was asked to consider the
where the company makes its investment income will be 
the place where it has its central management and 
control. It will, of course, be different in the case 
of a company conducting manufacturing or trading 
activities. In the case of such companies, the place 
where these activities are carried on can be seen to be 
in fact the geographical source of the profits these 
activities yield."
Royal Commission on Taxation. Reports, Vols 1-4, 1934, 
(Commonwealth of Australia, Government Printer, Canberra).
Other important Reports which have examined the need to 
reform the taxation system include: Australian Financial System. 
Final Report of the Committee of Inquiry (the "Campbell Report") 
(AGPS, Canberra, 1981); and Inflation and Taxation, Report of the 
Committee of Enquiry into Inflation and Taxation (the "Mathews 
Committee Report") (AGPS, Canberra, 1975).
One of the most influential and comprehensive reports which 
examined the tax design features of another jurisdiction (Canada) 
is the Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation (the "Carter 
Committee Report") (Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1966). That Report 
endorsed the economic definition of income as the foundation of an 
income tax system. The Committee affirmed that taxes should be
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question of harmonising State and Commonwealth taxing systems. 
Uniform legislation was recommended which led to the enactment of 
the Act, which is still the major legislation that dictates the 
taxation of income in Australia.
The Act in its original form, like its predecessor the Income 
Tax Assessment Act 1922-1934. assessed Australian source income 
and to a lesser extent assessed foreign-source income of 
Australian residents. Some of the notable tax shelter 
characteristics of the Act in its original form were the exclusion 
in section 44 of non-Australian source dividends and dividends 
from capital profits. The Act also provided for Australian tax 
rebates on business income derived abroad which was subject to 
foreign tax and a concessional rebate against Australian tax for 
income derived by UK residents (Division 17 of the Act) .10
3.1. Taxation of Dividends Introduced
In 1941, section 44(1) of the Act which is the principal 
provision dealing with the taxation of dividends was amended.* 11 
Broadly, the amendment had the effect that foreign source 
dividends of Australian residents were made subject to Australian 
income tax whether or not they were subject to income tax in 
another country. Pursuant to a further amendment to section 
44(1),12 an allowance for foreign tax paid on the dividends 
derived by an individual, was given by way of a deduction. This 
deduction was replaced in 194713 by a credit of the amount of the 
foreign tax, the credit being available against Australian tax on 
the dividends.14 The credit was available under section 45 of the
allocated according to the changes in the economic power of 
individuals and families (see Vol 3 at pp 35 and 54).
10 It is noteworthy that the Income Tax Assessment Act 1915
was a remarkably brief document being only 22 pages in length. It 
limited tax to Australian source income, (s. 10) and exempted 
interest on Commonwealth bonds issued for the purpose of the War 
Loan Act (No. 1) 1915. (s 11(e)): see Fayle R D, "Controlling
Abusive Tax Shelters" (1985) Australian Tax Forum 53, at pp 56-57.
11 The amendment to section 44 was inserted into the Act by 
virtue of section 7 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1941, No. 58 
(which commenced on 31 December 1941).
12 This further amendment was inserted into the Act by
virtue of section 7 of the Income Tax Assessment Act (No. 2) 1942.
No. 50 (which commenced on 6 October 1942).
13 This amendment was inserted into the Act by virtue of 
section 7 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1947, No. 11.
14 The history of amendments to section 44 (1) was obtained
from Gunn JAL, Berger OE & Maas M, Gunn's Commonwealth Income Tax 
Law and Practice, 7th edition, (Butterworths, 1963), [1203-1299].
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Act, which was repealed at the time the Government introduced the 
FTCS into the Act on 1 July 1987.
Where the dividends were derived by an Australian resident 
company, the foreign source dividends were effectively exempt from 
Australian tax. Under section 46 of the Act, the recipient company 
was allowed a tax rebate of the amount of the Australian tax on 
the intra-corporate dividends. The section 46 rebate15 was 
available, unlike the section 23(q) exemption, whether or not 
foreign tax had been paid in respect of such foreign source 
dividends. The availability of the section 46 rebate merely 
encouraged Australian companies to generate profits in low or zero 
tax countries thus infringing the principles of international 
equity and neutrality by distributing such profits as dividends.
In 1959 Australia introduced a dividend withholding tax 
regime, so that dividends from whatever source became subject to 
Australian tax in the form of a withholding tax when paid to non­
residents by Australian resident companies. In 1968 this regime 
was extended to interest paid to non-residents, where it was paid 
by Australian residents or by non residents carrying on business 
in Australia. Prior to the introduction of the dividend 
withholding tax regime, Australia had a form of interest 
withholding tax regime which made a company paying interest to a 
non-resident (or "absentee") liable to pay income tax in respect 
of the interest payable.16
Notwithstanding the purpose of withholding tax provisions, it 
will be shown below that such provisions are easily circumvented 
primarily because they operate when a resident has made a payment 
(of interest or dividends) to a non-resident. The ability to 
manipulate the residence rule (discussed in section 4.3. below) 
means that this threshold requirement is easily avoided.17 Hence, 
the further need for CFC/passive income regime to combat revenue
15 The section 46 rebate was designed to prevent profits
from being subjected to multi-tiered taxation where dividends pass 
through several companies before flowing to individual 
shareholders: The Treasurer, "Second Reading Speech in relation to 
the Income Tax Assessment Bill (No. 2) 1940" (1940) Parliamentary
Debates 191 at p 192. A similar provision to section 46 was 
contained in section 16AB of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1922 - 
1934 .
16 See section 20(2) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1922- 
1934. which on 31 August 1936 was incorporated into the original 
version of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 as section 125(1) 
and (2), where, inter alia, the term "interest payable" was 
replaced with "interest paid or credited".
17 Withholding tax avoidance was targeted by the Federal 
Government in the 1996 Budget which contained measures to counter 
schemes that utilise tax exempt entities to avoid withholding tax: 
see Tax New Service (IBFD Publications, Amsterdam, 1996).
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leakage caused by avoidance of withholding taxes by manipulation 
of the residence rule.
3.2. Exchange Controls Introduced
The existence of the section 23(q) exemption provided 
opportunities to minimise or avoid Australian tax. For example, if 
an investor derived income, other than dividends, from a foreign 
jurisdiction which imposed little tax (and not covered by a DTA) 
on that income, then it was exempt from subjection to Australian 
tax by virtue of section 23(q) of the Act. Moreover, the Federal 
Government by "freeing up" the tight exchange controls in December 
1983 had created another window of opportunity for Australian 
investors to avoid or minimise Australian tax.
Prior to that date it was necessary to obtain a tax clearance 
certificate under Part IV of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 
(the "TAA 1953") before Australian residents could enter into an 
act or thing with a foreign element (particularly where the 
foreign element was a designated tax haven country) .18
While the exchange controls may have been effective in 
preventing the abuse of tax havens by Australian residents 
directly transferring funds or assets offshore, they were 
ineffective in preventing indirect transfer of funds and assets 
(i.e., those funds and assets which were already outside 
Australia). With the deregulation of the financial and foreign 
exchange markets in December 1983, exchange controls became 
redundant. Manipulation of the withholding tax provisions and the
18 For a discussion of the now repealed exchange controls 
see Azzi (1994) o p  cit. . at pp 803-804.
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freer exchange control,19 further undermined the integrity of 
Australia's domestic tax base.
However, a signal event in the countering of tax avoidance 
was the introduction of the general anti-avoidance measure, Part 
IVA, into the Act in 1981 to replace its antiquated and arguably 
lame predecessor, section 260 of the Act.20
3.3. General Anti-Avoidance Regime (Part IVA) Introduced
Part IVA was enacted in 1981 following a series of decisions 
by the High Court which had placed severe limitations on the scope 
of section 260. Part IVA attempts to overcome the deficiency and 
shortcomings of section 260 (most significant of which is the 
choice principle21) by describing the types of "schemes" to which
19 As far as transfers of cash are involved the Cash 
Transaction Reports Act (1988) ("CTR Act") has since 1 July 1990 
replaced the exchange controls. Generally, an obligation to report 
to the Director of the Cash Transactions Reports Agency 
(established under section 35 of CTR Act) is imposed on:
(a) A "cash dealer" (i.e., financial institutions, insurers, 
securities dealers, futures brokers and trustees of unit 
trusts - see section 3(1) CTR Act) who is a party to a 
transaction involving the transfer of currency of not 
less than A$10,000;
(b) persons transferring Australian currency or "foreign 
currency" (i.e., currency of a foreign country - section 
3(1) CTR Act) out of Australia or into Australia - where 
in either case the amount is not less than A$5,000; and
(c) persons other than banks who receive Australian or 
foreign currency valued at not less than A$5,000 
transferred from outside Australia (see section 15(5)
CTR Act).
Despite the overly optimistic view of the effectiveness of 
CTR Act in facilitating the administration and enforcement of 
taxation laws (see Second Reading Speech by the Minister of 
Justice, Senator Tate), it is noted that the CTR Act suffers from 
the same drawbacks as those prevalent with the exchange controls. 
They cannot effectively deal with indirect transfers. Moreover, in 
the case of tax haven abuses by Australian resident companies, 
rarely, if ever, is cash actually transferred. More commonly, 
international transaction merely involve a series of journal 
entries.
20 The Martin Committee noted that Part IVA represents a 
powerful, if untested, weapon in the Commissioner's armoury to 
fight international profit shifting practices. They went on to 
recommend that the Commissioner should, in an appropriate 
international profit shifting test case, invoke the provisions of 
Part IVA: The Martin Committee Report op cit.. at p 96.
21 Under the choice principle a taxpayer is entitled to 
enter into a transaction which is specifically provided for in the 
Act and the validity of that transaction (which is entered into
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it will apply. From an analysis of the provisions of Part IVA it 
is evident that the following considerations are necessary when 
evaluating whether a particular transaction is caught by Part IVA:
(1) Is there a "scheme"?
(2) Has a taxpayer obtained a "tax benefit" as a result of 
the scheme?
(3) Did the taxpayer enter into the scheme for the purpose 
of obtaining the tax benefit?
Section 177A defines a "scheme" in very wide terms to mean 
"any agreement, arrangement, understanding, promise or undertaking 
whether express or implied and whether or not enforceable ... and 
any scheme, plan, proposal, action, course of action or course of 
conduct". The width of this definition is implicitly extended by 
the operation of section 177B(1) which, on the face of it, places 
a restriction on the operation of the "choice principle" by 
providing that subject to certain exceptions "nothing in the 
provisions of this Act ... shall be taken to limit the operation 
of this Part".22
Recently the Full Court of the High Court23 delivered a 
unanimous decision in Commissioner of Taxation v Peabody.24 The 
decision represents the first time the High Court has commented in 
any detail on Part IVA since its introduction in 1981. Without 
embarking on a detailed account of the facts which are somewhat 
complicated, it is sufficient to note that the Full Court observed 
that the Commissioner does not have to identify a scheme prior to 
making a Part IVA determination as long as, on the objective 
facts, a scheme exists and a relevant tax benefit in connection 
with that scheme exists. Moreover, the Full Court were of the view 
that once the Commissioner has identified a scheme to which Part 
IVA applies, he may nevertheless proceed further and identify 
narrower schemes as meeting the relevant requirement.25
Under section 177C a "tax benefit" is defined to include a 
benefit which is obtained by an amount not being included in the
for the purpose of obtaining a tax advantage) is not affected by 
section 260: W P Keigherv Ptv Ltd v FCT (1957) 100 CLR 66. See 
also Barwick CJ's judgment in FCT v Westrarders Ptv Ltd 80 ATC 
4357 at 4359, where his Honour said that the taxpayer's "freedom 
to choose the form of transaction into which he shall enter is 
basic to the maintenance of a free society."
Reference should also be made to section 177C(2) which 
limits the operation of the "choice principle" to certain 
situations.
Mason C.J., Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and
McHugh JJ.
24
25
(1994) 28 ATR 344. 
Ibid., at p 351.
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assessable income of the taxpayer which would have been, or might 
reasonably have been, expected to be included if the scheme had 
not been entered into. The definition also includes a deduction 
being allowable to the taxpayer where the whole or a part of that 
deduction would not have been allowable, or might reasonably be 
expected not to have been allowable, to the taxpayer if the scheme 
had not been entered into. Further, section 177D lists eight 
criteria for determining whether a scheme was created for the 
purpose of deriving a tax benefit. Basically, the criteria listed 
seek to examine the substance rather than the form of the scheme; 
the manner in which the scheme was entered into and the result 
achieved by the scheme.26
If any of the criteria set out in section 177D(b) are 
satisfied, then the Commissioner under section 177F may 
reconstruct the taxpayer's accounts. For example, the Commissioner 
may cancel the tax benefit and assess the taxpayer to a higher 
charge of income tax which would counter the effect of the 
scheme.27
Despite the Martin Committee's expressed faith in the ability 
of Part IVA to protect Australia's fiscal jurisdiction it would
26 The High Court in Peabody's case qualified their 
comments by observing that the concept of a scheme is not so 
narrow as to include a part of a scheme. Their Honours said (28 
ATR 344 at 352):
"... it is possible, despite the very wide definition of a 
scheme, to conceive of a set of circumstances which 
constitute only part of a scheme and not a scheme in itself. 
That will occur where the circumstances are incapable of 
standing on their own without being 'robbed of all practical 
meaning' [see Inland Revenue Commissioners v Brebner [1967] 2
AC 18 at 27]. In that event it is not possible in our view to 
say that those circumstances constitute a scheme rather than 
part of a scheme merely because of the provision made by ss. 
177D and 177A. The fact that the relevant purpose under s. 
177D may be the purpose or dominant purpose under s. 177A(5) 
of a person who carries out only part of the scheme is 
insufficient to enable part of a scheme to be regarded as a 
scheme on its own. That, of course, does not mean that if 
part of a scheme may be identified as a scheme in itself the 
Commissioner is precluded from relying upon it as well as the 
wider scheme."
27 The importance of identifying the correct taxpayer in 
determining whether it had received a tax benefit cannot be 
overstated. The Commissioner considered that Mrs Peabody obtained 
a tax benefit in connection with a scheme for the purposes of Part 
IVA. However, their Honours in the High Court were of the view 
that the fatal difficulty faced by the Commissioner in making that 
submission was not in establishing that a tax benefit was 
obtained by the conversion of K's shares into worthless "Z" class 
shares, but in establishing that the tax benefit was obtained by 
Mrs Peabody: (28 ATR 344 at 354).
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not apply to cross-border transactions which involve the 
investment of funds abroad in a related foreign company. Support 
for this proposition may be gleaned from the requirement that the 
person must have entered into a scheme for the sole or dominant 
purpose of obtaining a "tax benefit" before the provisions of Part 
IVA may be invoked.28 Where the sole or dominant purpose of the 
"scheme" is non-tax related (viz., for purposes of equity 
injection), then the mere fact that the manner in which the scheme 
or arrangement was implemented will arguably not attract the 
provisions of Part IVA. Moreover, it is doubtful whether Part IVA 
would negate the tax benefit derived from withholding tax 
avoidance schemes because withholding taxes are a final tax (see 
section 128D), and therefore are outside the normal "assessable 
income less allowable deductions" approach of the rest of the Act. 
Thus, no "tax benefit" as that term is defined in section 177C(1) 
could be said to arise in relation to withholding tax avoidance 
schemes.29
The issue of whether Part IVA would apply in relation to a 
transfer pricing type of scheme is as yet untested in Australia. 
Notwithstanding, the Australian Government were sufficiently 
concerned by the revenue leakage caused through inter-affiliate 
pricing, that they introduced a separate transfer pricing regime.
3.4. Transfer Pricing Regime Introduced
In the year following the introduction of Part IVA, the 
Treasurer introduced Division 13 into the Act which was enacted to 
strike at arrangements entered into after 27 May 1981, where 
profits would be shifted out of Australia, either by transfer 
pricing or any other means, the object of such arrangements being 
to reduce Australian source income of the taxpayer or to increase 
the allowable deductions of the taxpayer.30
28 The definition of "scheme" in section 177A, arguably, 
does not include mere non-repatriation of offshore funds.
29 See Fayle (1985) op cit.. at p 64.
This general view of the purpose of Division 13 was 
confirmed recently by the Commissioner in TR 92/11 (which was 
released on 1 October 1992), where it is stated at para 28 that 
".the primary purpose of Division 13 is to redress a situation 
where Australian revenue is denied its fair share of tax because 
of the non-arm's length nature of some transactions."
At para 36, the Commissioner goes on to note that the scope 
of Division 13 is "not limited to cases where profits that would 
have arisen to an Australian entity are moved offshore to another 
entity. It would apply equally to cases where the Australian 
entity does not receive offshore income that would ordinarily be 
expected to be received in an arm's length transaction."
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The provisions of Division 13 authorise the Commissioner to 
reallocate income arising from an "international agreement"31 
where there is no consideration (or insufficient consideration) 
for the agreement, where he is satisfied that the parties were not 
dealing at "arm's length" and the consideration was not the arm's 
length consideration. If these requirements are satisfied, then 
"consideration" equal to the "arm's length consideration"32 in 
respect of the supply shall be deemed to be the consideration 
received or receivable by the taxpayer in respect of the supply.33
It may be gleaned from the foregoing paragraph that the crux 
of the operation of Division 13 is limited to instances involving 
the supply or acquisition of "property"34 by two or more parties 
not dealing at "arm's length". Where there is supply or 
acquisition of property then the principle of "arm's length" comes 
into play, which is a transactional approach, whereby transactions 
are priced and the values aggregated to determine taxable income.
31 The requirement of the existence of an ” international 
agreement" effectively ensures that only transactions which are 
connected with Australia and have an international element (cf., § 
482 of the Code which covers both international and purely 
domestic transfer pricing) come within the ambit of Div 13. An 
"international agreement" is said to exist where:
"(a) a non-resident supplied or acquired property under the 
agreement otherwise than in connection with a business 
carried on in Australia by the non-resident at or 
through a permanent establishment of the non-resident in 
Australia/ or
(b) a resident carrying on a business outside Australia
supplied or acquired property under the agreement, being 
property supplied or acquired in connection with the 
business": section 136AC of the Act.
Further, such terms as "agreement", "property", "supply" and 
"acquire" are all given extended meanings in the Division.
The term "permanent establishment" bears its general meaning 
in the definition section of the Act, section 6.
32 The term "arm's length consideration" is defined in 
subsection 136AA(3)(d) as "a reference to the consideration that 
might reasonably be expected to have been received or receivable 
as consideration in respect of the supply if the property had been 
supplied under an agreement between independent parties dealing at 
arm's length with each other in relation to the supply".
33 Section 136AD(1) of the Act.
34 It is not intended to discuss the scope of the 
definition of "property" contained in Division 13 and in what 
instances "property" is supplied or acquired. For a discussion of 
this nature see Smith M "Specific Legislative Responses to 
International Transfer Pricing - A Trans-Tasman Comparison" (1990) 
1 Revenue Law Journal 10, at pp 14-15.
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The Commissioner can impute or create income where this is 
necessary to give effect to the arm's length principle. However, 
before the Commissioner is entitled to do that, he must be 
satisfied that any two or more parties to the international 
agreement were not dealing at arm's length with each other.35 He 
may have regard to any connection between the parties or any other 
relevant circumstances in determining if parties were dealing with 
each other at arm's length.36
Once satisfied that the parties were not dealing with each 
other at arm's length, the Commissioner must then turn to consider 
whether property is:
The expression "not dealing with each other at arm's 
length" is distinguishable from the expression "not at arm's 
length": Barnsdall v FC of T 88 ATC 4565, at p 4568; per Davies J 
where his Honour said that:
"[the] term should not be read as if the words 'dealing with' 
were not present. The Commissioner is required to be 
satisfied not merely of a connection between a taxpayer and 
the person to whom the taxpayer transferred, but also of the 
fact that they were not dealing with each other at arm's 
length. A finding as to a connection between the parties is 
simply a step in the course of reasoning and will not be 
determinative unless it leads to the ultimate conclusion."
Section 136AD(1) (b) . Cf., the more specific language 
found in Article 9(1) of the OECD Model Treaty (OECD, Paris, 1992) 
which provides that:
"Where:
(a) an enterprise of a Contracting State participates 
directly or indirectly in the management, control, or 
capital of an enterprise of the other Contracting State, 
or
(b) the same persons participate directly or indirectly in 
the management, control, or capital of an enterprise of 
a Contracting State and an enterprise of the other 
Contracting State,
and in either case conditions are made or imposed between the 
two enterprises in their commercial or financial relations 
which differ from those which would be made between 
independent enterprises, then any profits which would, but 
for those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, 
but, by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, may 
be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed 
accordingly."
By seeking to adjust profits by reference to the conditions 
that would have existed between two independent parties in 
comparable transactions and comparable circumstances, the arm's 
length principle adopts the separate entity approach. In 
justifying such an approach, the OECD argued that the separate 
entity approach shifts the focus on the transaction occurring 
between the two entities: see "Transfer Pricing Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations" (OECD, Paris, 
July 1995), (the "1995 Report"), at para 1.6.
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(i) supplied under an international agreement at no 
consideration, or for a consideration which is less th^n 
the "arm's length consideration"37 respectively; or
(ii) acquired under an international agreement for a 
consideration which exceeds the arm's length 
consideration.38
If either (i) or (ii) above are satisfied, the Commissioner 
must39 then determine the relevant subsections to apply.40 Upon 
making such determination, the "arm's length consideration" is 
then deemed to apply in respect of the acquisition. The concept of 
arm's length consideration was primarily devised to deal with the 
problems that arise from treating members of the one economic unit 
(i.e., the MNE group) as separate entities.41 The most obvious 
problem being the need to allocate expenses and income between the 
two parties in relation to the particular transaction. Related to 
this problem is the allocational difficulties that arise where two 
States assert jurisdiction over the one transaction, thereby 
giving rise to international double taxation. That is, which State 
has the larger and more significant claim over the one transaction 
between the two related parties.42
The decision whether the actual consideration equates with 
the "arm's length consideration" is an objective determination and 
therefore, not within the discretion of the Commissioner. This 
observation is confirmed by the fact that under subsection 
136AD(4) the Commissioner has power to set an arm's length 
consideration where he is otherwise unable to ascertain it.
The circuitous definition of "arm's length consideration" 
contained in section 136AA(3)(d) is not helpful in resolving 
transfer pricing disputes, and therefore, it is necessary to 
resort to the Explanatory Memorandum ("EM") to the Assessment
Section 136AD(2) and (1)(c).
38 Section 136AD (3) .
It should be noted that Division 13 is only .applicable 
where the Commissioner formally determines that it is applicable 
To that end the Commissioner has a discretion whether or not to 
apply Division 13 to make a transfer pricing determination. This 
is so even where the particular transaction in question prima 
facie, breaches the provisions of Division 13 of the Act.
40 Sections 136AD(1)(d); (2)(d); and (3)(d). See also
paragraphs 8(b) and (c) of Taxation Ruling TR 94/14.
41 See discussion at section 2.1. in Part II, supra.
42 The country of economic allegiance test (discussed 
further below) will not generally be helpful because in some 
instances (e.g., transactions involving transfer of intangibles) 
it is very difficult to define exactly to which country the 
parties owe their economic allegiance.
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Amendment Bill 1982 (which introduced Division 13 into the Act). 
The EM made specific mention of three methods which could be used 
in determining arm's length consideration: (a) the comparable 
uncontrolled price method; (b) the resale price method; and (c) 
the cost-plus method. However, it was recognised that the arm's 
length principle should not be confined to these three methods. 
Where comparables were not easily found, the Treasurer indicated 
that other methods might need to be used. Subsequently, the Martin 
Committee recommended that the Australian Tax Office (ATO) study 
transfer pricing developments in the US (where measures to counter 
transfer pricing activities are set out in the regulations 
accompanying §4 82 of the Code) .43
In 1968 the US issued §482 final regulations and at the same 
time began a campaign to assure that the rest of the world would 
adopt the arm's length principle. This effort culminated in the 
OECD releasing three reports on transfer pricing.44 Subsequently, 
the 1968 regulations were revised and in 1986 the "commensurate 
with income" standard was added to §482.45 In 1994, final
43 See Martin Committee Report op cit., Recommendations 14 
and 15 at para 8.2.11.
44 See "Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises" 
Report (OECD, Paris, 1979), (the "1979 Report"); "Transfer Pricing 
and Multinational Enterprises: The Three Taxation Issues" Report 
(OECD, Paris, 1984), (the "1984 Report") and the 1995 Report op 
cit. See also Wright D R, Understanding The New U.S. Transfer 
Pricing Rules (CCH Inc., Chicago, 1993) at pp 13-14.
45 The "commensurate-with-income" (also known as the
"super-royalty") addition was a response to the US Tax Court 
decision in Eli Lilly & Co v Commissioner of Internal Revenue. 84 
TC 996 (1985). The IRS, in lobbying Congress to pass the super­
royalty legislation reached the conclusion that the existing §482 
regulations did not allow the imposition of royalty rates high 
enough to properly compensate the US developer of the product for 
the transfer of the patent right (an intangible property) in 
respect of that very valuable property: see Wright op cit., at pp 
14-16 .
Under the super-royalty addition to §482, a taxpayer 
transferring or licensing intangible property to a related party 
must charge a fee that is adequate to produce income that is 
"commensurate with the income attributable to the intangible." The 
intent of the "commensurate with income" standard is to require 
taxpayers to charge more for the use of intangible property having 
a high profit potential than would result under the arm's length 
standard, since the arm's length standard, as traditionally 
interpreted, would set a price based on the facts known or 
knowable at the time of the transfer, whereas the "commensurate 
with income" standard requires a charge based upon the actual 
profits that the related party obtains from its exploitation of 
the intangible property : see McIntyre M J The International 
Income Tax Rules of the United States (Butterworths, 1989), at p 
5-27 .
83
regulations to §482 were issued. These regulations more closely 
resembled OECD guidelines by adopting a best method approach when 
applying the arm's length standards.46 The OECD guidelines 
establish a preference for the comparable uncontrolled price 
method. However, the guidelines stress that the method selected 
should be the most appropriate in the circumstances.47
The US developments have had considerable influence on the 
ATO. Taxation Ruling TR 94/14, which was issued on 31 May 1994, is 
regarded as a landmark taxation ruling on transfer pricing in 
Australia. It provides that the Commissioner will normally adopt a 
transfer pricing method that is recognised internationally48 and 
that is appropriate under the circumstances.49 Moreover, some of 
the language in TR 94/14 regarding choosing a transfer pricing 
method is strikingly similar to the approach in the final §482 
regulations issued in 1994 (which in turn is similar to the OECD 
guidelines) .50
However, given the purpose of the thesis, it is intended to 
provide an illustration of profit shifting which results in profit 
reduction by means of interest payments (and correspondingly, 
interest income). This should assist in demonstrating the
46 The best pricing method is defined in regs. §1.482- 
lT(b) (2) (iii) (A) as the method that provides the most accurate 
measure of an arm's length result under the facts and 
circumstances of the transaction under review.
47 See the 1995 Report at paras 1.15-1.17, 1.69; and the 
1979 Report at paras 46-47.
48 What is an internationally recognised transfer pricing 
method has become a controversial issue since the alleged 
"abandonment" by the US of the arm's length principle with the 
passage of the super-royalty addition to §482 which incorporates a 
"commensurate with income" test: see Wright op cit., at p 29.
49 See Taxation Ruling TR 94/14 at para 86.
For example, at para 87 of TR 94/14, it is stated that 
in determining the most appropriate method "the Commissioner is 
under no obligation to accept the particular method chosen by 
companies unless, on an objective analysis, it produces the most 
accurate calculation of the arm's length consideration in the 
particular case". If we turn to the US regulations, it is noted in 
regs. §1.482-lT(b)(2)(iii)(A) that the best pricing method is 
defined as the method that provides the most accurate measure of 
an arm's length result under the facts and circumstances of the 
transaction under review. If we turn to the OECD guidelines, it is 
noted that although a hierarchy of pricing methods is not 
established, nevertheless, it is stated that the method selected 
should be the most appropriate in the circumstances (see the 1979 
Report at paras 46-47) .
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viability of profit shifting to tax haven countries in light of 
the provisions of Division 13.51
Example: ACo, an Australian resident company enters into a loan
agreement with FCo, a related company resident in Hong 
Kong. The agreement provides that in return for the use 
of the funds supplied by ACo, FCo will provide 
management services in relation to ACo's offshore 
activities. It is assumed that (i) ACo initially 
borrowed the funds at commercial rates in Australia; and 
(ii) ACo historically derived assessable income from its 
offshore investments.
From the foregoing example it can be seen that ACo would be 
entitled to claim a deduction under section 51(1) of the Act in 
respect of the interest it pays on the borrowed funds, since 
arguably it necessarily incurred that amount "in carrying on a 
business for the purpose of gaining or producing assessable 
income". In other words, had it not been for the interest free 
loan ACo would have had to pay an amount to FCo representing a 
management fee. The amount of the fee would certainly have been 
deductible in the hands of ACo. It is highly unlikely that the 
Commissioner would be able to attack this international agreement 
under Division 13 to deny the interest deduction to ACo, since 
arguably, the consideration for the interest free loan (viz., the 
provision of management services) should be sufficient 
consideration in terms of arm's length criteria, although both ACo 
and FCo are clearly "related". It is a difficult task for the 
Commissioner to refute that the benefit derived by ACo from the 
management services provided by FCo correspond with the interest 
payments made by ACo in respect of which they are claiming a 
deduction.
c
On the other hand, should the Commissioner be satisfied that 
the above transaction breaches Division 13 in that the related 
parties were not dealing with each other at arm's length, a
51 The Martin Committee was concerned at the legal means 
which Australian residents were utilising to give Australian 
income an artificial foreign source thereby undermining the 
domestic tax base. They commented (see Martin Committee Report op 
cit., at pp 78-79):
"Companies, and indeed partnerships and individuals, who, 
because of the availability of and accessibility to tax 
havens, are able to minimise their tax place a greater burden 
on others. There is a need to restore the balance with regard 
to taxation. It is not between the corporate sector and the 
individual but rather those who are able to organise their 
affairs to be tax effective and those who cannot or chose not 
to so organise their affairs. The methods adopted have in 
general been legal. The Committee is not in a position to say 
otherwise, but what is called into question is the impact 
that such methods have on the share of the taxation burden. 
The Committee concludes that tax havens have provided the 
opportunity for a shifting of the taxation burden."
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further difficulty would arise in relation to the application of 
the transfer pricing methodology in determining the arm's length 
consideration which ACo is to be imputed with paying for the 
management services provided by FCo. This is particularly 
significant where the services provided by FCo can only be 
utilised by ACo. That is, there is no independent market for the 
type of management service provided by FCo. For example, what is 
the arm's length price for FCo advising ACo on how to lobby 
certain political parties in Hong Kong in order for ACo to receive 
preferential treatment in Hong Kong?52
The facts in the above example demonstrate that ACo and FCo 
were not dealing with each other at arm's length in relation to 
the interest free loan, nevertheless the benefit conferred on ACo 
from FCo's provision of management services in relation to its 
offshore activities are arguably sufficient to constitute arm's 
length consideration.53
At the same time as reaping the benefits of the interest 
deduction, it is not inconceivable that FCo would use the interest 
free loan to derive income by investing the funds with a non­
resident financial institution. The income derived by FCo, 
although beneficially owned by ACo would not, prior to the 
introduction of the CFC regime, have been subject to Australian 
taxation. Therefore, ACo could instruct FCo to simply keep the 
profits offshore until such time as it is advantageous, from a tax 
point of view, to repatriate the funds to Australia.
Clearly, the combination of the allocation problem (discussed 
in Part II) and the concept of "arm's length" have caused the most
The Commissioner in TR 94/14 states (at para 51) that he 
will not apply Division 13 where he is satisfied that the 
contribution of funds represented by a loan should be treated as 
an equity investment. In practice, this could provide related 
parties with a real possibility of avoiding the application of 
Division 13 (see para 60 for factors that the Commissioner will 
take into account in determining whether a particular loan 
agreement should be treated as equity).
It is not envisaged that Taxation Ruling TR 94/14 would 
affect this result. Support for this proposition is drawn from 
paragraph 7(f) which lists instances where the Commissioner 
regards income to have been shifted offshore under an 
international agreement. One such instance is where income that 
should have been derived in Australia (had the agreement been at 
arm's length) is shifted offshore. Clearly, the agreement between 
ACo and FCo described above does not violate this requirement 
since the consideration for the interest free loan (i.e., the 
management services) is sufficient consideration, and historically 
ACo has always derived foreign income. Further, it is stated that 
the mere fact that two parties to an agreement are associated will 
not be determinative in concluding that they were not dealing at 
arm's length (para 7(g)).
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problems in applying the transfer pricing rules contained in 
Division 13.54 This is further exacerbated by the fact that to 
date, the expression "arm's length consideration" has not received 
substantial judicial attention in Australia. The uncertainty 
regarding the scope and operation of Division 13, as with §482 of 
the Code, will invariably have a detrimental effect on the 
efficiency of transactions, which would ultimately result in 
feelings of bad faith permeating between the taxation authorities 
and taxpayers.55
The current state of play in relation to Australia's transfer 
pricing rules is particularly alarming given the significance of 
transfer pricing in enabling Australian residents to give related 
party income an artificial foreign source thereby undermining 
Australia's domestic tax base. The deluge of rulings being 
released by the Commissioner is also particularly alarming if for 
no other reason than the number of pages which these rulings 
occupy.56 Moreover, it is not expected that taxpayers will be able
54 It is readily acknowledged that the threshold problem of 
access to relevant information to make pricing determinations 
poses a more basic problem than the administrative problems with 
arm's length determination discussed above. In some cases, 
relevant information is not furnished by the taxpayer to the 
examining agent. In other cases, long delays are experienced by 
agents in receiving information, and in most cases without 
explanation for the delays. Further, evidence before the IRS and 
Treasury Department seemed to indicate that experience has shown 
that the vast majority of taxpayers, when asked, are unable to 
provide an explanation of how their intercompany pricing was 
established: see Treasury Department and Internal Revenue Service. 
A Study of Intercompany Pricing; Section 482. (Washington DC.: 
Internal Revenue Service), (Discussion Draft, 1988), (the "White 
Paper"), at p 17.
See Kaplan R "Perspectives on International Tax 
Compliance & Enforcement: Transfer Pricing in the US" (1989) 6 
Australian Tax Forum 423, at p 454.
The ATO on 29 September 1995 released 3 further draft 
rulings totalling 392 pages relating to transfer pricing: see (i) 
Draft Taxation Ruling TR 95/D22 (a 184 page draft ruling which 
sets out the principles to be applied in selecting and applying a 
transfer pricing methodology); (ii) Draft Taxation Ruling TR 
95/D23 (a 160 page draft ruling which provides guidelines on the 
application of certain concepts outlined in TR 94/14) and (iii) 
Draft Taxation ruling TR 95/D24 (a 48 page draft ruling providing 
guidelines on the imposition and remission of penalties where 
Division 13 or the associated parties article in Australia's DTAs 
have been applied). These rulings are discussed in Azzi J "Tax 
Office Issues Three Draft Rulings on Transfer Pricing" (1996) 1 
Asia Pacific Tax Bulletin 12. See also TR 95/D29, TR 95/D30 and TR 
95/D31 which are discussed in Azzi J "Correlative Adjustments to 
Relieve Double Taxation Arising from an Adjustment by a Foreign 
Tax Administration" (1996) 4 Asia Pacific Tax Bulletin 127.
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to understand the complex issues covered in each ruling without 
the assistance of tax advisers.This would invariably have a 
serious impact on the cost efficiency of transactions by 
substantially increasing compliance costs which would have a 
larger impact on smaller firms than the large MNEs which can more 
easily absorb such costs.
3.5. Unilateral Relief Measures Introduced 
3.5.1. The FTCS prior to 1987
The Australian Comprehensive FTCS was enacted by the Taxation 
Laws Amendment (Foreign Tax Credits) Act, 1986, and became 
operative from 1 July 1987. The Amendment Act introduced a new 
Division 18 of Part III of the Act, which principally contains the 
FTC provisions that replaced the section 23(q) exemption. In 
addition, sections 46 and 46A were amended by the Amendment Act to 
withdraw the inter-corporate dividend rebate that arose when an 
Australian resident company receives dividends from a non-resident 
company. An indirect foreign tax credit was incorporated to 
rectify the bias against foreign investments created by the repeal 
of section 23(q)57 and the limitation imposed on the operation of 
section 46.58
In broad terms section 23(q) exempted income (other than 
dividends59) , or profit or gains of a capital nature, from tax in 
Australia in the hands of a resident where they were derived from 
sources out of Australia and Papua New Guinea, and that income60
Another explanation for extending the FTCS to corporate 
taxes paid on underlying profits was to equalise the tax burdens 
of domestic companies deriving income from an offshore non­
portfolio investment in a company with those deriving income from 
foreign branch operations.: see E.A., Owens The Foreign Tax Credit 
(Cambridge, Harvard Law School, 1961), at p 93.
58 The withdrawal of the section 46 rebate for dividends 
paid by a non-resident company was part of the general policy of 
broadening the income tax base so as to include foreign source 
income derived by Australian resident taxpayers: see Burns L., 
"Taxation of Distributions of Foreign Companies" a paper presented 
on 9 February 1990 at the University of Sydney, Continuing Legal 
Education 1990 Seminar entitled Taxation of Foreign Income - 
Controlled Foreign Companies and Trusts at p 2.
59 In the case of dividends received by individuals, a 
foreign tax credit system was already in operation under section 
45 of the Act. On the other hand, in the case of companies, the 
operation of the section 46 rebate meant that intra-company 
dividends were exempt whether they were Australian source or ex- 
Australian source.
60 Section 23(q) did not apply to certain classes of 
foreign source income:
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or those profits or gains were not exempt from tax in the country 
where the income was, or the profits or gains were, derived. In 
addition, the Commissioner was required to be satisfied, inter 
alia, that where there was a liability for tax in the country 
where the income or the profits or gains were derived, the tax had 
been or would be paid.
The exemption system is still maintained in limited 
circumstances, viz, in respect of employment income or similar 
remuneration received by Australian residents holding an office or 
employment outside the country (see sections 23AF and 23 AG which 
will not be discussed in this paper).
An exemption system now also applies, since the introduction 
of the CFC measures, in respect of income (especially dividend 
income) which has been taxed at comparatively similar corporate 
tax rates as those that apply in Australia. It is anticipated that 
this exemption will cover the majority of Australia's overseas 
investments. The exemption operates with effect from 1 July 1990 
being the date of operation of the CFC rules (see sections 23AH 
23AI and 23AJ) . Section 23AH operates to exempt foreign branch 
profits of Australian companies, where the company carried on 
business in a listed country through a permanent establishment. 
Section 23AI (which is not a true exemption - discussed further at 
section 5.1. in Part IV), is designed to reconcile attribution 
with distribution by exempting income which has been previously 
attributed under the CFC rules. Section 23AJ (discussed further at 
section 5.3. in Part IV), provides an exemption for non-portfolio 
dividends received by Australian resident companies where the 
dividend has been comparatively taxed.
In terms of the policy objectives discussed in Part II, it is 
noted that the section 23(q) exemption promoted capital import 
neutrality ("CIN") by completely eliminating international double 
taxation in respect of the classes of income, profit or gains to 
which it applied because only one jurisdiction was imposing tax 
(i.e., the foreign country) subject, of course, to the premise 
that tax was paid or would be paid on the foreign source income, 
profit or gains in the foreign country. However, despite its 
apparent simplicity, the major flaw with this form of relief 
against double taxation was its potential to discriminate between 
residents earning foreign source income and those earning domestic 
source income. To the extent that foreign taxes were lower than 
domestic taxes, resident taxpayers deriving foreign source income 
that was exempt from domestic tax were treated more favourably 
than other residents. Therefore, there was a real incentive for
(a) dividends and income attributable to dividends as 
defined by section 6B of the Act:
(b) interest and royalties (and income attributable to them) 
which had been subject to tax at source at a reduced 
rate by virtue of a DTA;
(c) non-employment income from Papua-New Guinea sources; and
(d) certain income from films and trading ships which 
enjoyed special tax concessions.
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residents to invest in foreign countries with lower tax rates 
(i.e., tax havens), thus creating inefficiencies by offending the 
concepts of CEN and international equity.61
For these reasons it is generally recognised that the credit 
method is theoretically the best method for eliminating 
international double taxation.62 The FTCS was preferred over the 
exemption system on the basis of equity and on the basis that the 
former has some basis in efficiency. More importantly, the 
Government envisaged the FTCS as the first stage of its major 
reform program to develop a comprehensive regime for the taxation 
of foreign source income, especially to deal with the growing 
problem of the use of tax havens to derive such income. However, 
the Australian Government never envisaged that the FTCS alone 
could deal with the tax haven problem.
3.5.2. The operation of the FTCS
Under the FTCS a credit is available to an Australian 
resident company under section 160AF for "direct" taxes which it 
is deemed to have "paid" and for which it is "personally liable" 
on dividends received from foreign companies. By setting a credit 
limit equal to the Australian tax payable on the foreign income, 
section 160AF effectively provides for the calculation of the 
credit limit on a worldwide basis (i.e., on the basis of the 
taxpayer's total foreign income). Further, it is Australian 
domestic law which is applied to determine whether the income is 
foreign sourced or Australian sourced.63
In calculating the credit limit, foreign income which has not 
been subject to tax in the foreign jurisdiction is included in 
aggregate foreign income.64 The practical effect of a worldwide 
basis of calculating the foreign tax credit available to an 
Australian resident taxpayer is that excess credits arising from 
income in high-tax countries can be set off against the Australian
61 The Asprey Committee commented:
"In the case of exemption under section 23(q), the equity 
objective is defeated principally because it involves a 
taxpayer's income being split and the graduated Australian 
rates being applied to the Australian-source income and not 
to the whole of the taxpayer's income." (at para 17.24) .
62 Cf Bird op cit. , (1989) at p 167, where he states that
the problem with the credit method is that "it is not nearly as 
good from the 'national' perspective which guides tax policy in 
most other areas as a system of current taxation of foreign- 
source income with deduction for foreign taxes would be." However, 
the learned author readily concedes that the credit method is 
clearly superior to the exemption method.
This may include relevant provisions of a DTA which has 
been adopted as part of Australian law.
64 See Taxation Ruling IT 2507.
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tax due on income from low-tax countries. This allows for tax 
planning which is not otherwise available to US resident companies 
since US FTCS contains complex "look-through" and multi-basket 
rules the objective of which is to ensure that income which has 
been subjected to high foreign taxes is not used to offset income 
which is subject to low foreign taxes.65
The indirect credit is designed to take into account the 
effective rate of corporate tax (i.e., foreign underlying tax) on 
dividends paid by a "related"66 foreign company. The "indirect 
foreign tax credit" permitted against the domestic tax on 
dividends from foreign corporations for the foreign taxes paid by
65 The US FTCS contains a number of "look-through" rules 
which are designed to pierce the corporate veil of foreign 
entities to fit receipts from such entities into the various 
baskets of §904(d) of the Code according to the nature of the 
income derived, and to ensure that domestic source income is not 
transformed into foreign source income.
Eight separate baskets (or categories/classes of income). The 
separate baskets created under §904(d) of the Code:
• Passive income
• High withholding tax interest income.
• Financial services income.
• Shipping income.
• Dividend income from non-controlled §902 corporations.
• Dividend income from Domestic International Sales 
Corporation (DISC).
• Foreign trade income of a Foreign Sales Corporation 
(FSC).
• Distributions from an FSC.
A foreign company is related to an Australian company if 
(i) both companies are members of a group of companies and (ii) 
the Australian company has (either directly or through one or more 
interposed companies, whether or not group companies) a voting 
interest of at least 5% of the voting power of the foreign 
company: section 160AFB(2).
Both companies will be deemed members of a group if the 
Australian company has a voting interest in the foreign company of 
at least 10% of the voting power of that company: section 
16OAFB(1) . The second requirement is that the Australian company 
must have a voting interest of at least 5% of the voting power of 
each foreign company in the group.
In order to be related to a foreign company, the Australian 
company must hold a voting interest of at least 10% of the voting 
power of the first tier foreign company and at least 5% of the 
voting power of the second and lower tier foreign companies. The 
5% requirement is satisfied by multiplying the various interests 
that each of the companies hold in the chain: section 160AFB(3).
Therefore, credit for underlying tax is available for 
unlimited tiers of related foreign companies subject to certain 
minimum shareholding requirements. Once these requirements are met 
then section 160AFC(1) treats the Australian company and the 
related foreign companies as members of a "dividend series".
91
those foreign corporations, is available for unlimited tiers of 
related foreign companies, subject to 10% minimum shareholding 
requirements being satisfied.67 However, excess FTCs could not be 
carried back or forward, although they could be transferred within 
company groups.68 The position since the introduction of the CFC 
rules is that excess credits can be carried forward for 5 years.
The indirect credit will only achieve its goal of promoting 
international equity and efficiency if the profits of the foreign 
company are taxed currently in Australia in the same way as branch 
profits are taxed. The reason for this being that the separate 
treatment of a related foreign company from its Australian parent 
means that it can defer payment of Australian tax altogether by 
not repatriating its profits to the Australian company. Moreover, 
there is a logical inconsistency in having a direct foreign tax 
credit which treats the foreign company as a separate entity from 
its Australian related company and an indirect credit which 
"looks-through" the structure by consolidating the group's 
profits.69
A major problem with the FTCS relates to the rules that 
should be adopted for determining the source of income. Resolution 
of this problem requires the discussion of detailed, technical and 
highly complicated legislative provisions principally contained in 
Division 18 of Part III of the Act, which is beyond the scope of
Cf §902 of the Internal Revenue Code 1954 (US) (the 
"Code"), which provides an indirect foreign tax credit for up to 3 
tiers of foreign companies.
The Australian definition of "group", it has been suggested, 
sets a new standard of generosity (see Deutsch R "Foreign Tax 
Credits" (1987) 4 Australian Tax Forum 161, at p 180).
68 Under the former provisions of section 160AFE,
applicable for income years 1987/88-1989/90 (i.e., prior to the
introduction of the CFC regime), an Australian company (the 
"credit company") which, in relation to a class of income, has 
excess credit, could transfer a specified amount of the excess 
credit to another Australian company (the "income company") for 
its use in the current year provided:
• the income company has, in the current year, derived 
income of the same class to which the transferable 
excess credit relates;
• the income company is a "group company" in relation to 
the credit company in the current year; and
• both companies agree in writing to the transfer on or 
before the date of lodgment of the income company's 
current year return.
The effect of the definition of "group company" in section 
160AFE(2) is that as a general rule, the two companies (i.e., 
credit company and income company) must have 100% common 
beneficial ownership during the whole of the year of income.
69 See Arnold (1986) op cit.. at pp 103-110.
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this paper.70 Despite these technical problems which are not 
addressed in the CFC regime, a further problem with the FTCS is 
that it is not a stand alone provision in the assault on the use 
of tax havens by Australians to store passive investment income. 
Australians who have overseas investments could defer subjection 
to Australian tax and thus the FTCS simply by interposing a 
foreign subsidiary in a low-tax country in which the income could 
be accumulated. Hence, the Federal Government's announced 
intention at the time proposals for the FTCS were put forward that 
an anti-tax haven regime also be proposed.71
3.6. Bilateral Relief Measures
As mentioned earlier, the exercise of Australia's fiscal 
jurisdiction is limited by the terms of any applicable DTA. Tax 
treaties are "agreements between two nations that seek to 
harmonize their respective tax systems, prevent double taxation of 
their citizens' income, and provide special incentives for 
bilateral investment."72 In addition, DTAs are viewed as serving 
an anti-evasion role which is facilitated by the exchange of 
information article contained in most DTAs (which are based on 
Article 26 of the OECD Model Tax Convention 1992).73 As well, DTAs 
are designed to ensure the fair distribution of revenue between 
the two Contracting States. This is particularly significant in 
light of the rule found in many legal systems around the world 
which states that the courts of one sovereign State will not 
enforce the revenue laws of another sovereign State.74
The design of Australia's DTAs is based on the model produced 
by the OECD (the "OECD MTC") .75 Moreover, special articles have 
been inserted or modified in order to take into account the 
special economic conditions that may exist between the relevant
For a detailed analysis of the FTCS see Deutsch R 
"Foreign Tax Credits" (1987) 4 Australian Tax Forum 161; and Vann 
Company Tax Reform (1988), at ch 17.
71 See Draft White Paper op cit.. at pp 230-233.
72 Kaplan R L Federal Income Taxation of International 
Transactions: Principles. Planning and Policy (West Publishing 
Co., St. Paul, Minn., 1988), at p 332.
See the Martin Committee Report op cit. . at p 105. For a 
thorough discussion of the operation of exchange of information 
provisions in bilateral and multilateral treaties see Wisselink A 
"International exchange of tax information between European and 
other countries" (1997) 2 EC Tax Review 108.
74 See for example, Government of India. Ministry of 
Finance (Revenue Division) v Taylor [1955] AC 491 (esp., at 514).
75 The basic structure of the Convention is described at pp 
12-14 of the OECD Model Double Taxation Convention On Income And 
Capital (Paris, 1992) .
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countries negotiating each treaty. Generally, DTAs negotiated 
between developed countries have served to smooth off some of the 
rough edges remaining under (i) worldwide taxation with credit for 
foreign taxes paid and (ii) taxation of domestic sourced income.
For the purpose of eliminating double taxation, the OECD MTC 
establishes two categories of rules. First, in the case of a 
number of items of income and capital, an exclusive right to tax 
is conferred on one of the Contracting States. As a general rule, 
this exclusive right to tax is conferred on the State of 
residence. In the case of other items of income and capital, the 
right to tax is not an exclusive one. In the case of interest and 
dividends, a limited right to tax is given to the source State 
subject to the second category of rules under which the residence 
State provides relief (either in the form of an exemption or a 
credit) so as to avoid double taxation.
Although the manner in which DTAs relieve international 
double taxation varies between individual treaties, there are, 
nevertheless certain characteristics present in each. Each DTA 
provides for modification of domestic laws by: (i) declaring that 
taxing rights over certain classes of income (e.g., business 
income where there is no permanent establishment in the source 
State) will be reserved entirely to the country of residence; (ii) 
declaring that certain other income (e.g., income from real 
property - article 6 of the Australia/US DTA) may be taxed in the 
host country in which the income has its source (with the 
residence country providing relief in the form of either an 
exemption or foreign tax credit for host country taxes paid);
(iii) declaring that persons who are residents of both Contracting 
States under their domestic laws, are to be treated as a resident 
of one only, although this applies only for the purpose of 
implementing the DTA and not for domestic law purposes; and (iv) 
providing rules whereby the source of particular items of income 
can be determined thus avoiding the dual source conflict.76
The relief against international double taxation in a DTA 
does not alleviate problems associated with definitions. Even 
where such central terms as "residence" and "source" are 
defined,77 there may nevertheless be a conflict between the
Moreover, the "Mutual agreement procedure" article 
(e.g., Article 24(1) of the Australia/US DTA) provides for the 
taxation authorities of the two Contracting States to grant relief 
(on a mutually agreeable basis) where a taxpayer is able to 
demonstrate actual or potential subjection to taxation contrary to 
the provisions of the DTA.
77 See for example Article 4(1) of the OECD MTC which 
provides that:
"... the term 'resident of a Contracting State' means 
any person, who, under the laws of that State, is liable 
to tax therein by reason of his domicile, residence, 
place of management or any other criterion of a similar 
nature. But this term does not include any person who is
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domestic residence rules of the two Contracting States. As noted 
in the preceding paragraph, it is possible that a taxpayer may be 
characterised as a resident of both States (i.e., dual 
resident),78 Hence, the importance of defining the term 
"resident". The same reasoning applies in the case of source of 
income where DTAs effectively establish commonly applied source 
rules. Notwithstanding the approach adopted in the OECD MTC (viz., 
the incorporation of a tie-breaker clause79), to deal with the 
dual resident problem, it provides little assistance to the 
taxpayer where the country of residence applies its CFC rules to
liable to tax in that State in respect only of income 
from sources in that State or capital situated therein."
For example, under section 6(1)(b) of the Act, a company 
which is not incorporated in Australia or has its central 
management and control there, may nevertheless be characterised as 
a resident of Australia where it carries on business in Australia 
and is controlled by Australian shareholders.
The second part of this definition fits within the definition 
of a CFC (see section 340 of the Act). To satisfy the "carrying on 
business" test it is necessary to refer to the High Court's 
decision in Thiel v FCT (1990) 21 ATR 531, at 534-35; 538-36; 543- 
49) where the High Court held that a person will be deemed to 
carry on an enterprise in Australia (for the purposes of the 
Australia/Swiss DTA) and to derive business profits where he 
engages in a single isolated activity (e.g. sale of shares in an 
Australian company) which gives rise to profits in a business-like 
manner and not necessarily from the conduct of a business.
Therefore, it is arguable that the activities of a CFC which 
invests in Australian companies by buying and selling shares could 
constitute the carrying on of business in Australia thereby 
invoking the third limb of the test of residency of a company in 
section 6(1)(b). Thus deeming the CFC to be also resident in 
Australia: see also Azzi J "Proposed Amendments to Controlled 
Foreign Corporation Rules" (1995) Asia-Pacific Tax Bulletin 314 
esp. notes 15 and 18.
79 In the case of corporations, the policy adopted in the 
OECD MTC "tie-breaker clause" (which is present in most of 
Australia's DTAs except for the Japan/Australia DTA and the 
•US/Australia DTA [which only contains a tie-breaker clause for 
individuals]), is to deem sole residence to be the place of 
"effective management" which has a similar meaning as the term 
"central management and control" found in section 6(1) of the Act. 
Consequently, relief from double taxation resulting from the 
imposition of tax on a dual resident is ordinarily granted by the 
country of residence as determined under the "tie-breaker" clause 
of the relevant DTA.
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currently tax resident shareholders on their pro rata share of the 
CFCs income.80
Where however, a DTA contains special rules relating to 
source of income (as with other definitions contained in DTAs) 
which may differ from the explicit statutory rules prescribed in 
the Act, then pursuant to section 4(2) of the Income Tax 
(International Agreements) Act 1954. the DTA rule will prevail. 
Generally, the DTA source rule does not differ substantially from 
the applicable domestic source rule. Further, while most of the 
DTAs contain source rules applicable for the purposes of the DTA, 
the residual rule that the domestic source rules of the country 
concerned will apply in the absence of a specific treaty 
stipulation can have potentially wide-reaching effects for the 
Contracting States and the taxpayer involved.81 The residual rule 
could effectively lead to international double taxation since both 
Contracting States could assert fiscal jurisdiction in respect of 
the same income derived by the taxpayer thereby defeating the 
purpose of the DTA. The OECD MTC deals with such a problem by 
giving the country of residence exclusive taxing rights in respect 
of income which comes within the residual rule.82
Despite the perceived role and operation of DTAs in 
alleviating international double taxation, the theory behind DTAs 
has come under increasing attack.83 It is observed that the 
problem of accumulation of profits in tax havens is not affected 
by the existing treaties, since Australia has only negotiated DTAs 
with other non-tax haven countries. Accordingly, they cannot 
maintain the integrity of the domestic base in relation to 
subsidiaries of Australian companies operating in tax haven 
countries through the exchange of information provision
The tie-breaker clause will arguably not operate where 
the relevant non-resident company is a CFC in relation to the 
Australian resident company and is deemed to have "carried on" 
business in Australia under the extended definition of that term 
in Thiel' s case: see Azzi (1995) op cit.. esp. at footnote 15 and 
18 .
81 See Hamilton RL., & Deutsch RL., Guidebook to Australian 
International Taxation (Legal Books, 1993) at p 6-10.
82 See Article 21 of the 1992 OECD MTC. A similar article 
has been incorporated into some of Australia's DTAs. For instance: 
Article 21 of the Australia/US DTA, Article 21 of the 
Australia/Canada DTA, Article 16A of the Australia/Singapore DTA, 
Article 22 of the Australia/Sweden DTA, Article 21 of the 
Australia/Denmark DTA, Article 23 of the Australia/Ireland DTA, 
Article 22 of the Australia/Korea DTA and Article 21 of 
Australia/Norway DTA.
83 See Vann R J "Foreign Treaties: Schizophrenia Rules" 
(1991) Vol 25 No 10 Taxation in Australia 724.
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However unhelpful, costly and irrelevant DTAs have become, 
their importance lies mainly in their international acceptability 
(some 1500 bilateral treaties based on the OECD MTC have been 
negotiated worldwide). Such an international consensus, in turn, 
promotes international trade and investment by giving investors 
confidence that they will not be subject to double taxation on 
their cross border transactions. Notwithstanding, DTAs (whether 
based on the UN or the OECD model) have generally been less than 
successful in upholding the integrity of the domestic tax base of 
small open economies whose interests are generally compromised by 
their lack of resources and bargaining power to counter 
international tax evasion.84
3.7. CFC Regime Introduced
The policy rationale for anti-tax haven legislation 
originated in the Draft White Paper and the proposals for such 
legislation were foreshadowed in the Consultative Document (the 
"CD"), which was released by the Treasurer as part of his May 1988 
Economic Statement. The measures foreshadowed by the Treasurer in 
the CD were similar, in some respects (and wider in other respects 
- i.e., the CD proposals did not contain an active income 
exemption or a control rule) to the CFC or accruals legislation 
which some of our most important trading partners had introduced 
at the time (i.e., Canada, France, Japan, New Zealand, the UK and 
the US).
The proposals outlined in the CD were designed to currently 
tax interests held by Australian residents in non-resident 
companies where the foreign company derives income in a low-tax 
country or that income has benefited from a designated tax 
concession in another country. The proposals as they originally 
stood got around the need for a foreign investment fund ("FIF") 
regime since all interests held in a foreign company were subject 
to accruals taxation. However, portfolio interests held by 
Australian residents in public foreign companies (listed on 
recognised stock exchanges) were exempt under the proposals. An 
exemption similar to the current section 23AJ exemption was 
contained in the CD proposals which exempted non-portfolio 
dividends which have been taxed at a comparable rate to the 
Australian tax rate.
As shown in Part II, business community response to the CD 
proposals was generally unfavourable. It was argued that the 
proposals could seriously undermine Australian investments abroad. 
The Federal Government then released the FSIIP which addressed 
some of the arguments against the CD proposals put forward by the 
business community. In particular, the policy options set out in 
the FSIIP contained a control rule whereby only Australian 
shareholders who held a non-portfolio interest and controlled a
84 For a discussion of some of the limitations on taxation 
of international income flows by small open economies see Huber B 
"Optimal Capital Income Taxes and Capital Controls in Small Open 
Economies" (1997) International Tax and Public Finance 7.
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foreign entity were subject to the CFC rules. In acceding to the 
business community's demands, the Federal Government also 
introduced an active income exemption in the FSIIP. Australian 
taxpayers who satisfied the relevant criteria for assessability 
under the CFC rules were exempt from those measures where less 
than 5% of the gross turnover (of the CFC) did not constitute 
tainted (i.e., passive) income. Another major deviation from the 
CD proposals, was the introduction of a schedule of designated 
listed countries which taxed income at comparable rates to 
Australia.
The proposals contained in the FSIIP were eventually set out 
in Taxation Laws Amendment (Foreign Income) Bill 1990 (the "Bill") 
which was passed by both Houses of Parliament and on 8 January 
1991, received Royal assent, and was incorporated into the Act on 
that date.85 At the same time the Federal Government introduced 
Division 6AAA into the Act which currently taxed certain non­
resident trust estates (in a similar way that CFCs are taxed), 
where funds are transferred to the foreign trust at less than full 
market value. Discussion of the transferor trust provisions 
contained in Division 6AAA will not be undertaken in this paper.
However, not all of the announced changes were included in 
the CFC regime. Some of the amendments introduced subsequently 
into the Act have been the result of close monitoring of avoidance 
techniques that are being developed to frustrate the intent of the 
measures, as well as to take into account the introduction of FIF 
rules into the Act which occurred on 1 January 1993. Already, the
The CFC rules are now contained in Part X of the Act. 
However, it should be noted that the introduction of the Bill had 
not been uncontroversial. Some commentators have criticised such 
rules on the basis that they do not allow for the fact that 
offshore entities may pay tax through a myriad means other than 
the direct imposition of an income tax (e.g., sales tax or VAT or 
customs duty which are not included in the income tax base for the 
purposes of comparing the tax rates of the foreign jurisdiction 
with the Australian income tax rate). The exposure of such 
entities to an income tax at a rate comparable to that levied in 
Australia is the sole criteria adopted by Treasury in determining 
whether an Australian taxpayer is exposed to the new rules: see 
generally, Clemens T "Outline of the Foreign Source Income Rules", 
a paper presented to The University of New South Wales - CLE 
Seminar on 19 November 1990, at p 3.
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Federal Government has passed additional amending Bills86 which 
further refine the CFC rules originally contained in the Bill.
The new measures for the taxation of foreign source income 
were not introduced as part of a revenue-raising exercise, but 
rather as an attempt to tax all foreign source income either in 
Australia, or if taxed overseas at a comparable foreign rate of 
tax.87 The basic structure of the CFC legislation is that (i) 
foreign source income (calculated according to Australian tax law) 
will only be attributed to residents with a substantial interest 
of 10% or more in a foreign company ("attribution rule"); (ii) 
only the income of a CFC will be subject to attribution ("control 
test); (iii) the operation of the attribution test varies 
according to the residency status of the CFC ("jurisdictional 
coverage"); and (iv) the operation of the attribution test further 
depends on the type of income derived by the CFC ("active income 
exemption").
By removing the tax benefit that would have accrued to a 
resident taxpayer from accumulating passive funds offshore, the 
CFC rules effectively increase the attractiveness of domestic 
investments over direct passive foreign investments by reducing 
the after-tax returns for such investments. Foreign investments 
also entail costs and risks associated with operating in a foreign 
jurisdiction which are not present in the investors country of 
residence because of the asymmetric information associated with 
international capital mobility.88 In fact, the taxing regime
Taxation Laws Amendment Bill (No 6) 1990. which received 
Royal Assent on 24 April 1991; Taxation Laws Amendment Bill (No 2) 
1991, which received Royal Assent on 27 June 1991; Taxation Laws 
Amendment Bill (No 3) 1991. which received Royal Assent on 24
December 1991; Taxation Laws Amendment Bill (No 4) 1991, which
received Royal Assent on 25 May 1992; Taxation Laws Amendment Bill 
(No 2) 1992. which received Royal Assent on 30 June 1992; and
Taxation Laws Amendment Bill (No 2) 1993. which received Royal
Assent on 9 June 1993.
See FSIIP op cit.. at p 3. In articulating this policy 
the Government has, it is submitted, over-stated the effect of the 
new CFC measures where it said that the CFC measures will address 
the tax deferral problem where CFCs are used to shelter income 
from Australian tax by accumulating it in low-tax or tax free 
jurisdictions: (see the Explanatory Memorandum to the Income Tax 
Assessment Amendment (Foreign Investment) Bill 1992 at p 1). For 
example, under the de minimis exemption contained in section 
385(4) of the Act, CFCs which pass the active income exemption 
will still be able to shelter their passive income in a low-tax 
country so long as it does not constitute more than 5% of gross 
turnover.
See Gordon R H & Bovenberg AL "Why is Capital So 
Immobile? Possible Explanations and Implications for Capital 
Income Taxation" (1996) American Economic Review 1057. See also 
Beaumont J's judgment in FCT v Spotless Services Ltd (1995) 62 FCR
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established under Australia's CFC rules (which exempt active 
income) is arguably entirely consistent with the allocation of 
taxing rights set out in Article 7 of the OECD MTC whereby the 
country of source is given primary rights of taxation over 
business profits derived from a permanent establishment there.89
3.8. FIF Regime Introduced
The third major piece of legislation90 introduced by the 
Federal Government in its program to develop a comprehensive 
regime for taxing foreign source income (announced in the 
Government's 1991-92 Budget), is the FIF regime. The FIF rules 
were designed to currently tax portfolio interests held by 
Australian residents in a FIF.91 In effect the FIF regime was 
introduced to act as a backstop to the CFC regime which only taxed 
non-portfolio controlling interests held by Australian 
shareholders in a CFC.
The necessary initiating legislation for this program was the 
Income Tax Assessment Amendment (Foreign Investment) Bill 1992 
(the "FIF Bill"), which was introduced into Federal Parliament on 
25 June 1992. The measures contained in the FIF Bill aimed to tax 
Australian residents' interests in FIFs and foreign life assurance 
policies ("FLPs"). In order to overcome the application of the FIF 
measures in circumstances that were considered to be 
inappropriate, a number of exemptions from the FIF measures were 
incorporated into the Bill.92 With regard to the exemption
244 at 270 and Cooper J at 285.
89 Article 7(1) of the OECD MTC provides:
"The profits of an enterprise of a Contracting State 
shall be taxable only in that State unless the 
enterprise carries on business in the other Contracting 
State through a permanent establishment situated 
therein. If the enterprise carries on business as 
aforesaid, the profits of the enterprise may be taxed in 
the other State but only so much of them as is 
attributable to that permanent establishment."
The first, as noted previously, being the FTCS and the 
second, the CFC regime.
91 See section 483 of the Act which widely defines the term 
"interest in a FIF", to include shares held by banks as 
substitutes for debt (i.e., eligible financed shares); options, 
convertible notes or other instruments which confer "an 
entitlement to acquire" (which is defined in section 475 of the 
Act) a share.
Some of the more significant exemptions applied where:
• the foreign company is principally engaged in active 
businesses;
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applicable to Australian residents with investments in entities 
engaged in "active business", the FIF Bill contained a "white 
list" of businesses which were to be regarded as active for the 
purpose of this exemption.
Subsequent to the introduction of the FIF Bill the Government 
announced a major review of the FIF Bill and that submissions 
could be made to Professor Brian Arnold who was appointed to 
consider the FIF Bill and to make recommendations to the Federal 
Government. Arnold's report (released on 9 October 1992), endorsed 
the fundamental policy approach adopted by the Government in the 
FIF Bill and acknowledged the need for such measures. The report 
contained 52 recommendations. The Government agreed to immediately 
implement 37 of them. Of the 15 recommendations not addressed by 
the Federal Government, eight are still under review while the 
Government has decided not to proceed with the remaining seven.93 
However, most of those recommendations covered complex areas where 
Professor Arnold recommended further study rather than immediate 
action.94
• the FIF interest is in certain public listed and widely 
held investments in the banking, insurance, and real 
estate industries;
• the Australian resident taxpayer holds FIF interests as 
trading stock and elects to bring all FIF interests that 
are trading stock to account at market value; and
• the Australian resident taxpayer is an Australian 
resident natural person who holds a direct interest in a 
FIF and the total value of the Australian resident's 
interests in foreign companies, trusts and foreign life
• policies does not exceed $A50,000 at the end of the 
Australian resident's income year.
See The Treasurer's Press Release No. 153 (released on 9 
October 1992), which sets out the 37 recommendations agreed to by 
the Government and the remaining recommendations under review.
94 Many of the recommendations generally were designed to 
streamline the operation of the FIF measures with a view to 
reducing administration and compliance costs and did not require 
any alteration to the fundamental policy and structure of the 
approach contained in the FIF Bill. The recommendations were 
fairly minor and technical in nature, except for:
(a) the recommendations to switch back to a 'black list' of 
activities to be taxed under the FIF measures, and
(b) the treatment of losses on a more favourable basis than 
previously contemplated.
The black list was inserted to cover certain investment, real 
estate, financial services, banking and insurance businesses. It 
is these activities that the Government saw as posing the greatest 
risk of tax avoidance. The Government also acknowledges that the 
white and black list are conceptually equivalent, however, the 
practical advantages of operating a short, stable black list had 
persuaded the Government to adopt that approach: The Treasurer's 
Press Release No. 153. at p 2.
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4. Source and residence Rules In Australia and Their Problems
The objective of the discussion in this section is to analyse 
the operation of Australia's traditional taxation rules by 
focusing on how they apply to interest and dividend income arising 
from cross-border transactions. This exercise is warranted in view 
of the discussion in section 3. above which examined the 
chronological evolution of Australia's international tax regime.
In the course of that discussion, it was clear that Australia's 
general and specific anti-avoidance rules, were largely powerless 
to counter deferral of residence country taxation. By examining 
the operation of Australia's fundamental taxing powers (viz., 
source and residence rules), it will become apparent that a 
CFC/passive income regime is warranted to ensure the integrity of 
such rules in view of the corporate veil doctrine and the limited 
operation of the FTCS.
The separate treatment of the relevant entity from its 
beneficial owners enables the owners to defer subjection to 
Australian tax by merely accumulating the income in an offshore 
entity. As for related party income (and deductions), the source 
rule can be easily manipulated to give income an artificial 
foreign source by manipulating internal transfer prices thereby 
avoiding Australian taxation on such income.95 Again, this is made 
possible by the acknowledgement of the separate entity doctrine in 
Australia's traditional international tax rules.96
4.1. The Source Rule
As noted previously, Australia asserts jurisdiction to tax 
the domestic and the foreign source income derived by its 
residents.97 Taxation on this basis therefore requires some rules 
for determining source in light of unilateral measures to 
alleviate international double taxation. Explicit rules for 
determining the source of passive income in accordance with 
residence of the payer were first recommended by the Asprey 
Committee in 1975 as a means of protecting Australia's domestic
This is so even where, as noted previously, Division 13 
contains its source rules which are invoked by virtue of the re­
allocation of income and deduction powers granted to the 
Commissioner of Taxation: see section 136AE(1) of the Act.
96 See Azzi (1994) op cit.
97 Section 25(1) (a) of the Act provides:
"The assessable income of a taxpayer shall include - 
(a) where the taxpayer is a resident ... 
the gross income derived directly or indirectly from all 
sources whether in or out of Australia and ... which is not 
exempt income ...."
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tax base from tax haven abuse by Australian companies.98 The 
Asprey Committee's calls for reform of the Australian tax system 
(particularly its source regime), remained unheeded until 1985 
when the Labor Government initiated a major overhaul of the tax 
system based on many of the Asprey Committee's recommendations 
(including the introduction of a capital gains tax). The 
Treasurer, at the time, however merely promised implementation of 
explicit source rules.99
Many of the shortcomings with the existing source regime (in 
view of the rapid internationalisation of Australian companies 
over the last two decades), are symptomatic of the uncertainty 
surrounding its operation, which depends to a large extent on 
judge made law. There are only a few judicial pronouncements on 
the determination of source of income with the most famous and 
often cited decision being the High Court dictum in Nathan v 
FCT.100 In that case it was held that ultimately the question of 
source is a "practical hard matter of fact".101 Understandably, 
this dictum has not proved very helpful. Much reliance must 
therefore be placed upon principles developed in subsequent case 
law for determining the geographical source of income. In 
determining the source of income, courts have concentrated on the 
type of income derived and the form rather than the substance of 
the transaction. However, as a general statement, it is true to 
say that despite the lack of real guidance offered by Isaacs J's 
dictum in Nathan's case, courts in recent years have tended to 
place a greater emphasis on substance over form in the 
determination of source of income, especially where there is an
overt tax avoidance purpose underlying the derivation of
• 102 income.
98 In concluding their observations, the Committee 
recommended that the tests for origin of interest income for 
purposes of withholding tax should in general be adopted as the 
tests of source for purposes of tax by assessment (at para 
17.A25). Moreover, the Asprey Committee had recommended that tax 
by assessment should apply on, for example, interest paid by a 
permanent establishment abroad of an Australian resident when the 
interest is received by a tax-haven company or a tax-haven trust: 
See The Asprey Committee Report op cit.. at pp 263-266.
The Treasurer's Economic Statement of 19 September 1985 
(AGPS: Canberra, 1985), at p 66.
100 (1918) 25 CLR 183.
101 Ibid. , at p 189, per Isaacs J.
102 See for example Cliffs International Inc, v FCT 85 ATC 
4374; Thorpe Nominees Ptv Ltd v FCT 88 ATC 4886. Cf. , the decision 
of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia in FCT v 
Spotless Services Limited (1995) 62 FCR 244, where the Court 
unanimously held that source of income arising from a scheme 
entered into for a tax avoidance purpose is the country where the 
investment vehicle was incorporated (i.e., the tax haven): see
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In line with the stated scope of the thesis, source rules 
pertaining to interest and dividend income will be discussed.103 A 
discussion of this nature will generally serve two purposes.
First, it will facilitate a comparative analysis of the 
traditional source of interest and dividend income rules found 
throughout the Act and those deemed to arise by virtue of the 
operation of the CFC regime (to be discussed more fully in Part 
IV). Secondly, the discussion will serve to highlight the 
shortcomings of the traditional source rules for passive income. 
The analysis of source of interest rules to follow immediately 
below will proceed by firstly examining explicit statutory 
provisions contained in the Act. The discussion will then analyze 
explicit rules contained in the US/Australia DTA. The final part 
of the discussion will examine the judicial decisions dealing with 
source of interest income.
4.1.1. Source of interest
As a matter of policy and practice, interest income which is 
the product of economic activity in Australia should have an 
Australian source. The justification for this line of reasoning is 
based on the "benefit" principle discussed in Part II.104 The non­
resident captive company would generally not have been able to 
generate the income in the first place if it were not for the 
funds invested by the resident upon which interest is paid.105 A
Azzi J "The Need for Further Reform of Australia's Tax Rules in 
View of the Spotless Decision" (1996) 4 Bulletin for International 
Fiscal Documentation 164.
103 A more comprehensive discussion of source rules 
pertaining to other types of income may be found in Magney T 
"Source of Income", Tenth Taxation Convention of the New South 
Wales Division of the Taxation Institute of Australia (May, 1978), 
1 .
As far as royalty income is concerned, section 6C of the 
Act reflects the economic nexus rule by deeming the source of 
royalty income to be Australia in circumstances where there might 
otherwise be non-Australian source. Moreover section 6CA operates 
in conjunction with Div 3B of Pt VI of the Act to ensure that 
income of non-residents from natural resources in Australia will 
be treated as having a source in Australia.
However, it should be noted that the definition of "foreign 
income" in the Act is such that any statutory provisions which 
give a source in Australia to the particular income (such as 
sections 6C and 6CA) are irrelevant since foreign income is not 
defined in the Act as the converse of Australian source income: 
see section 6AB(1) of the Act which provides that "A reference in 
this Act to foreign income is a reference to income derived from 
sources in a foreign country or foreign countries."
105 Cf. . Arnold (1986) op cit. , at p 452 where he argues 
that the characterisation of interest income should depend upon 
the use to which the lent funds are put.
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manifestation of the economic nexus principle is the residence 
based source rule which correlates the source of income with the 
residency of the payer. However, due to the highly passive nature 
of interest income, the place where the payer is resident doe not 
always correspond with the place where the indebtedness on which 
the interest was borne. Therefore, modifications are necessary to 
ensure the bona fides of such a rule. As will be shown in Part IV, 
by attributing interest income derived by a foreign company to its 
resident controllers, the CFC rules create a quasi statutory 
residence based source rule which correlates the source of 
interest income with the residence of the beneficial owners of 
such income.
The first explicit statutory example of a provision which 
applies a residence based source rule is sub-section 25(2) of 
the Act.106 Pursuant to that section interest paid upon money 
secured by the mortgage of any property in Australia is deemed to 
have an Australian source, except where the interest is paid to a 
non-resident in respect of company debentures which are issued 
outside Australia and the interest payment also occurs abroad.107 
The source rule resulting from the operation of sub-section 25(2), 
is arguably not incompatible with the generally accepted economic 
nexus principle. This is because the loan upon which interest 
income is payable would not have been granted had it not been for 
the security provided. Therefore, the interest income producing 
activity is arguably Australia (being the place where the 
mortgaged property is situated).108 However, the source rule
106 The subsection provides:
"Interest (except interest paid outside Australia to a 
non-resident on debentures issued outside Australia by a 
company) upon money secured by mortgage over any property in 
Australia shall be deemed to be derived from a source in 
Australia."
It is clear from decided cases on sub-section 25(2) that it 
is not necessary that repayment of the principal be secured by 
mortgage of property wholly situated in Australia. A majority of 
the High Court (Latham CJ, Starke, Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ, 
with Rich J dissenting) in Broken Hill South Limited (Public 
Officer) v Commissioner of Taxation for New South Wales (1937) 56
CLR 337, held that the words "interest upon money secured upon 
mortgage of any property in [New South Wales]" in section 4 of the 
Income Tax Management Act must be given their natural meaning and 
were not limited to cases where the only security was a mortgage 
of property in New South Wales.
107 The Asprey Committee were unsure as to whether this 
exception meant that such interest income is deemed to have a 
foreign source or whether other general rules relating to source 
would apply: see the Asprey Committee Report op cit., at para
17.A24.
108 See also Thorpe Nominees Ptv Ltd v FCT (1988) 19 ATR
1834, where Lockhart J (with whom Sheppard and Burchett JJ agreed) 
held that consideration received under an agreement entered into
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provided in sub-section 25(2) is one sided to the extent that it 
only deals with Australian source and does not have any effect on 
the operation of the FTCS since "foreign income" is not defined in 
the Act as income which does not have an Australian source.109
Another statutory source rule which is of limited application 
(in terms of protecting Australia's claims over the foreign source 
income of its residents), are the interest withholding tax 
rules.110 This rule which is contained in section 128B(2) of the 
Act, is of limited use since it only applies to the payment of 
interest by an Australian resident to a non-resident. Where 
withholding tax applies, the person receiving the interest is not 
subject to further tax by assessment.111 Where section 128B 
applies then the Australian resident payer is obliged to deduct 
(on behalf of the non-resident recipient), withholding tax where
in Switzerland, nominating an Australian company to exercise 
option agreements entered into in New South Wales and granted over 
land in New South Wales, was Australian source income.
109 Cf. , the statutory source rule for interest income set 
out in §861(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code 1954 (the "Code"), 
which provides that an interest payment generally has its source 
in the country where the person obligated to make the payment 
resides. However, interest income shall be deemed to have a 
foreign source where it is received from:
(1) Foreign branches of domestic banks and savings and 
loan associations which are engaged in the commercial 
banking business (see §861 (a) (1) (B)) ; and
(2) Domestic persons who derived at least 80% of their
gross income during the preceding three years from the 
"active conduct of a trade or business" outside the US (see 
§861 (a) (1) (A) , (c) (1) ) .
The 80% test is applied to the three-year period as an 
aggregate, rather than year by year. Also, where the recipient is 
a "related person" (which includes any person owning, "directly or 
indirectly" at least 10% of the stock of the payer: §§861(c) (2) (B) 
and 954(d)(3)) to the payer, only the actual foreign percentage of 
the interest is treated as foreign source income: §861 (c) (2) (A) of 
the Code.
110 In 1975 the Asprey Committee had observed that because 
"ability-to-pay" considerations did not feature when imposing tax 
on Australian-origin income of non-residents, the tax can be a 
simple tax imposed at flat rates. The Committee approved the use 
of withholding tax where such a tax can be conveniently 
administered: Asprey Committee op cit., at pp 264-265.
Where the interest payment is made by an Australian resident 
to a tax-haven company or tax-haven trust, the Committee 
recommended that a special rate of withholding tax be applied to 
such interest payments (at pp 264-266).
111 See section 128D of the Act.
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the payee has a foreign address or has authorised payment of the 
interest at a place outside Australia.112
By making reference to the carrying on of business at or 
through a permanent establishment in Australia, section 128B 
infers that the interest income must have been generated by 
economic activity in Australia and therefore, the person who 
derives the interest income is liable to pay income tax upon that 
income.113 To that extent, section 128B is a quasi-source rule 
since it provides that interest income for withholding tax 
purposes will have an Australian source if it was generated by 
economic activity in Australia. However, like section 25(2), it is 
not applicable for the purposes of the FTCS, since it only applies 
to determine whether interest income is Australian source.
The explicit interest source rule contained in Australia's 
DTAs is also designed to reflect the economic nexus rule. Article 
11(7) of the Australia/US DTA is based on Article 11(5) of the 
OECD MTC interest Article.114 The source rule contained in Article 
11(7) will normally be invoked for foreign tax credit purposes 
where generally a payment of interest occurs between an Australian 
resident person and a US resident or vice versa. Article 27(1) (a) 
of the Australia/US DTA further provides that income derived by a
112 See section 221YL(2A) of the Act.
113 Section 128B(2) (b) could be easily avoided, for example, 
by simply arranging for the non-resident lender to pay the funds 
to an overseas permanent establishment of an Australian resident 
company which then on-lends the funds to the ultimate Australian 
resident borrower. The interest paid by the Australian resident 
would be paid to another resident and therefore outside the scope 
of section 128B. To alleviate the avoidance opportunities that 
could arise, Parliament passed section 128B(2A). To be caught by 
section 128B(2A) the interest (i) must not be an outgoing wholly 
incurred by the resident payer in a business carried on outside 
Australia at or through a permanent establishment there; or (ii) 
paid by a non-resident and is an outgoing wholly or partly 
incurred by the non-resident payer in carrying on business in 
Australia through a permanent establishment in Australia.
114 Article 11(7) of the Australia/US DTA provides that:
"[ijnterest shall be treated as income from sources in a 
Contracting Statie when the payer is that State itself or a 
political subdivision or local authority of that State or a 
person who is a resident of that State for the purposes of 
its tax. Where, however, the person paying the interest, 
whether he is a resident of one of the Contracting States or 
not, has in one of the Contracting States or outside both 
Contracting States a permanent establishment or fixed base in 
connection with which the indebtedness on which the interest 
is paid was incurred, and such interest is borne by such 
permanent establishment or fixed base, then such interest 
shall be deemed to have its source in the State in which the 
permanent establishment or fixed base is situated."
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resident of the US which may be taxed in Australia (e.g., because 
of the source rule contained in Article 11(7)), shall for the 
purposes of the Convention and the income tax law of Australia be 
deemed to be from sources in Australia. Effectively, Article 
27(1)(a) incorporates the source rule contained in Article 11(7) 
into Australia's domestic tax laws, where the conditions set out 
in that Article are satisfied (i.e., the parties to the 
transaction giving rise to the derivation of interest income are 
residents of Australia and the US). Outside that context, it is 
necessary to resort to principles developed at case law.
Where the payer, for example, is a resident of Australia and 
the recipient is a resident of the US, then the source of interest 
income is determined by the residence status of the payer company 
pursuant to Article 11(7). Where, on the other hand, the payer 
incurs a debt in respect of a permanent establishment (which 
either exists in one of the Contracting States or outside both of 
the Contracting States), then such interest is deemed to have a 
source where the permanent establishment is situated. However, as 
with the explicit statutory interest income source rule in section 
128B, the source rule in Article 11(7) can be easily manipulated 
as it effectively reproduces the same economic nexus rule.
The manipulation can take two main forms. Where the lending 
occurs between related parties (e.g., finance company structure), 
the residence of the parties can be easily controlled by the 
lender by incorporating the lender or borrower in a tax haven. 
Secondly, manipulation of the interest source rule can be achieved 
by simple investment choice. Funds can be deposited in an 
Australian resident bank or a tax haven bank.115 That is, the 
mobility of loan capital in the absence of exchange controls 
leaves it up to the investor/lender to choose where interest is 
sourced. This form of manipulation is addressed in the CFC rules 
(e.g., section 456) which are discussed in Part IV.
Apart from the explicit statutory and treaty rules above, the 
dominant factor in determining the source of interest income under 
principles established by case law, is the "originating cause" of 
the obligation to pay the interest. According to Watermeyer CJ in 
Commissioner for IR v Lever Bros and Unilever Ltd116, the 
originating cause is the "provision of credit". That is, the 
"service which the lender performs for the borrower in return for 
which the borrower pays him interest".117 This rule was applied by
115 This was the choice the Australian investors faced in 
the FCT v Spotless Services Limited (1995) 62 FCR 244; and in 
their desire to maximise their after-tax returns, the taxpayers 
had opted for investment in a tax haven bank where the interest 
remitted to Australia was exempt from Australian tax under section 
23(q) of the Act and was only subject to 5% Cook Islands 
withholding tax.
116 (1946) SAfPC 1.
117 Ibid. , at 4 .
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the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Commissioner of IR v N .V . 
Phillips Gloeilampenf abrieken118 where it was held that the source 
of the interest income was the actual giving of the credit which 
was made under an agreement entered into in the Netherlands. The 
High Court of Australia had held, some thirty-three years before 
that the source of interest income was the country in which the 
agreement was made: Studebaker Corporation of Australasia Limited 
v Commissioner of Taxation for New South Wales.119
Clearly, these rules are also easily manipulated by simply 
drafting and concluding the relevant agreement in a foreign 
jurisdiction.120 Given the ease with which judge made source rules 
can be manipulated and the uncertainty in applying such rules in 
various circumstances, the Asprey Committee recommended the 
adoption of a source of interest income rule based on the 
residence of the debtor but with more emphasis on the economic 
activity which produced funds to pay the interest.121 The 
rationale for implementing such a source rule will be examined in 
section 4.2. below.
4.1.2. Source of dividends
There are a number of explicit statutory source rules for 
dividend income which also reflect the economic nexus rule. One 
such rule is contained in section 44 (1) (b) of the Act which 
attributes the source of dividends to the source of the profits 
from which those dividends are paid. However, section 44 (1) is 
expressed to be subject to section 128D which provides that income 
is exempt from further assessment if it falls within the ambit of 
any of the withholding tax provisions in Division 11A of Part III 
of the Act. This general rule of exclusion applies whether the 
income is assessable as to withholding tax or is exempt from 
withholding tax by virtue of the exemptions set out in Division 
1 1 A .
Section 128B(1) sets out the circumstances in which dividends 
derived by a non-resident are liable to withholding tax within the 
ambit of Division 11A. In order for the section to be invoked the 
dividend must be paid by a resident company to a non-resident,
118 (1954) 5 AITR 158 (especially the decision of Gresson P 
at 163). In the same case, North J (with Hay J agreeing) held that 
the place where the credit is provided is the place of contracting 
(i.e., the loan agreement).
119 (1921) 29 CLR 225 at p 233.
120 The Australian lawyers advising the promoters of the
Cook Islands investment scheme warned potential Australian 
investors from executing any documents evidencing the deposit of 
funds in a Cook Islands bank in Australia: see FCT v Spotless 
Services Limited (1995) 62 FCR 244.
121 See the Asprey Committee Report op cit. , at para 17.A25.
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subject to certain exemptions (e.g., payment of fully franked 
dividends to a non-resident122) , which are set out in section 
128B(3). Where this occurs a withholding tax at the rate declared 
by Parliament (currently thirty per cent) is levied on the gross 
dividend without regard to the source of the profits from which 
the dividend is paid.
Some relief from section 128B(1) is provided in Australia's 
network of DTAs. For example, Article 10(2) of the Australia/US 
DTA provides that tax charged by the source country on the payment 
of dividends shall not exceed fifteen per cent, which does not 
apply if the dividends are derived through a permanent 
establishment. However, unlike Article 11(7) of the Australia/US 
DTA, Article 10 does not contain an explicit sourcing rule. 
Nevertheless, the effect of Article 27(1) is that dividends will 
be sourced in the country of residence of the payer company. 
Similarly, section 18 of the Income Tax (International Agreements) 
Act 1953 also provides that source of dividends for taxing and 
foreign tax credit purposes under DTAs is determined by the 
residence of the company paying the dividends. By virtue of 
subsection 4(2) of the International Agreements Act, the taxing 
regime established by section 18 and Australia's DTAs DTA takes 
precedence over the tax regime established under Australia's 
domestic law (e.g., sections 128B(1) and 44(1)(b)), to the extent 
that the latter conflict with the former.
Outside the withholding tax provisions, section 44 of the Act 
contains the regime under which dividends are taxed. Pursuant to 
section 44 (1) (a) , a resident shareholder is taxed on dividends 
paid to it whatever the source of the profits out of which the 
dividend is paid. Section 44 (1) (b) on the other hand, provides 
that a non-resident shareholder is taxed on dividends the source 
of profits of which is Australia.123 The latter applies regardless
122 See section 128B(3) (ga) of the Act.
123 The High Court in Parke Davis & Co v FCT (1959) 101 CLR 
521, unanimously decided that section 44(1)(b) was to be treated 
as explaining the operation of section 23(r) (which exempts income 
from tax where it is derived by a non-resident wholly out of 
Australia) in the case of a dividend. In reaching this conclusion 
the High Court affirmed the constitutional validity of section
44(1)(b). Dixon CJ in giving the decision of the court said at 
534 :
"... it is quite plain that the territorial jurisdiction of 
Australia to enact s 44(1)(b) ... was based on the derivation
from sources in Australia of the profits which are taxed.
Once that is seen to be the basis for assessment under s 
44 (1), the Australian Commonwealth was at that time perfectly 
at liberty to proceed to tax those profits in the hands of 
any person to whom they were distributed by any means however 
circuitous."
The result produced by section 44 (1) (b) is reflected in the 
High Court's decision in Esquire Nominees Limited v FCT (1973) 129 
CLR 177.
110
of whether the company paying the dividend is a resident or non­
resident .
Therefore, as long as the profits from which the dividend is 
paid are sourced in Australia, then dividends paid by one non­
resident company to another non-resident company may effectively 
be caught by section 44(1)(b). This section operates to assess one 
of the non-resident companies to tax (subject of course, to any 
enforcement difficulties that may be encountered and any DTAs 
which modify this position). The High Court decision in Parke 
Davis & Co v FCT illustrates this point.124 In that case, a US 
resident company which carried on business throughout the world as 
a manufacturing chemist, received an informal liquidation 
distribution (deemed a dividend by virtue of section 47 of the 
Act) from its subsidiary which was also a non-resident for 
Australian tax purposes. The subsidiary company had carried on 
business in Australia for a period of 10 months. The High Court 
unanimously held that the US parent company was assessable to tax 
pursuant to section 44 (1) (b) in respect of the deemed dividend 
paid to it by its subsidiary. The court was satisfied that the 
dividend was derived from sources in Australia and therefore, 
section 44(1) (b) operated to preclude the exemption from 
Australian tax provided under section 23(r) of the Act. In 
reaching their conclusion, the High Court rejected the taxpayer's 
submission that the source of dividends is determined by the situs 
of the share register and that the relevant source rule in this 
case is the source of profits from which the dividend is paid.
Notwithstanding the Parke Davis decision, the source of 
dividend rule established by section 44(1) (b) becomes difficult to 
operate where a dividend is paid by a company out of a dividend 
received by it. This is because it has been held that the source 
of dividend income paid from a passive investment is the situs 
where the central management and control of the payer company is 
located.125 Reliance on central management and control is 
necessitated by the fact that the source rule set out in section 
44(1)(b) does not trace the dividend payment back to the original 
payer. By simply ensuring that the place of management and control
124 (1959) 101 CLR 521. It should be noted that the 
operation of section 44 (1) (b) is subject to the operation of the 
dividend Article in Australia's DTAs. Therefore, the decision of 
the High Court in Parke Davis is no longer applicable to US 
companies in light of the combined operation of section 18 of the 
Income Tax (International Agreements) Act 1953 and Article 27(1) 
of the Australia/US DTA which modify Australia's domestic law with 
respect to the taxation of dividends flowing from Australia to the 
US. If the same facts in the Parke Davis case were to arise now, 
then the deemed dividends paid from sources in Australia would 
escape liability to Australian tax since the source of the 
dividends would become the place of residence of the payer company 
(which is the US) pursuant to the Australia/US DTA.
125 See Esquire Nominees Limited v FCT (1973) 129 CLR 177,
at 182 per Barwick CJ.
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is located offshore the recipient company can effectively minimise 
or avoid Australian taxation in respect of dividends which 
originated in Australia. This is obviously an unsatisfactory 
result and one which offends against the principles of CEN.126
The Asprey Committee were mindful of the enforcement problems 
associated with determining source of dividends paid through a 
chain of companies, based on the situs of the economic activity 
generating the profits out of which the dividends are paid. 
Accordingly, the Committee recommended a residence based source 
rule which attributes the source of dividends paid through a chain 
of companies to the residence of the company paying the original 
dividend.127 However, as will be seen from the discussion (to 
follow) on the residence rule, without robust look through rules, 
the residence rule for companies is easily manipulated, thus 
thwarting the effective enforcement of a residence based source 
rule.
Apart from the tracing of dividend payment problem, section 
44 suffers from other drawbacks. For instance, there is no scope 
for section 44(1) (a) to apply if funds are simply accumulated 
offshore, since no dividend would have been paid or received. 
Moreover, section 44(1) (a) would not apply where "nimble 
dividends1,128 are paid since arguably they would not fit the term 
"dividend" in section 6(1) of the Act, which defines a dividend to 
be a distribution of profits. There are also many other 
difficulties associated with applying section 44(1) (b) , apart from 
the enforcement problem encountered with applying the section in 
relation to dividends paid by non-resident companies. As noted 
previously, the operation of section 44(1) (b) is limited by virtue
126 The fact that the dividend source rule set out in 
section 44(1)(b) does not trace indirect dividends through 
shareholdings means that it is subject to manipulation both in 
respect of outgoing and incoming dividends. For example, by 
channelling dividends from a company which is resident in a tax 
haven through to a company in a comparable tax jurisdiction which 
ultimately pays the dividend (along with other amounts which have 
suffered foreign tax at a comparable rate to that of Australia), 
to the Australian resident shareholders, adverse Australian tax 
consequences can be substantially avoided under the FTCS.
127 See the Asprey Committee Report op cit. , at para 17.A23.
128 See Ammonia Soda Co Ltd v Chamberlain [1918] 1 Ch 266,
where the court sanctioned a payment of dividend from current 
earnings, despite the fact that the company had prior year losses. 
The court allowed the payment in this case, because it was held 
that dividends paid out of current earnings would not impair the 
capital of the company. See also Marra Developments Ltd v B W Rofe 
[1977] 2 NSWLR 616 at 630. Cf., the definition of "dividend" in
§316 of the Code which includes a distribution of cash or property 
made out of the current or accumulated profits of the corporation. 
The definition would include a deemed dividend under Subpart F of 
the Code per §956.
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of section 128D. The effect of this limitation is to exclude from 
section 44(1) (b) dividends which are unfranked and subject to 
withholding tax, or dividends which are franked but are exempt 
from withholding tax by virtue of section 128B(3)(ga).
Accordingly, the discussion in Part IV will show how the CFC 
rules overcome the problem associated with defining what 
constitutes a dividend by examining the operation of the disguised 
profit distribution rule (viz., section 47A), which is 
strengthened by the existence of robust look through rules for 
tracing beneficial ownership of the dividend and a wide 
attribution rule (contained in sections 458 and 459). The latter 
attribution rule being designed to catch dividend payments between 
CFCs which also overcomes the enforcement limitation inherent to 
section 44 (1) (b) by attributing the dividend income to the 
Australian resident controllers.
However, before proceeding to discuss the scope and operation 
of the CFC rules, it is first intended to complete the discussion 
of Australia's traditional international tax rules by expounding 
on the benefits of having a general statutory source regime, to be 
followed by a discussion of Australia's residence of company 
rules.
4.2. Policy Reasons for Implementing Statutory Source Rules
The conclusion to be drawn from the above analysis of 
interest and dividend income source rules, is that they are flawed 
because of the uncertainty surrounding their operation. For 
instance, the major problem with the judge made law approach to 
determining source of income is that each case i£ to be considered 
on its facts. This is a highly impractical and costly method of 
enforcing a fundamental principle of taxation which impacts upon a 
great number of transactions. The uncertainty created .by 
ineffective source rules erodes Australia's domestic tax base by 
undermining Australia's ability to assert its fiscal jurisdiction 
over international transactions which are economically connected 
with Australia. As a result tax planning activities flourish.
Implementation of statutory residence based source rules 
would arguably add certainty and improve the effectiveness of 
Australia's existing policy options for dealing with international 
transactions which seek to minimise residence country taxation. In 
theory, statutory source rules should provide adequate guidance 
for taxpayers and tax administrators to enable the determination 
of the source of income and to allow income from each income tax 
base to be measured accurately.129
Comprehensive source rules which provide for accurate 
measurement of income, as well as adding certainty also serve a 
number of other purposes. They can minimise manipulation of the 
foreign tax credit limit and also largely alleviate the transfer 
pricing problem created by foreign based multinationals shifting
See ITDD op cit.. at p 31.
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deductions onshore. Most developed nations including Australia 
have introduced thin capitalisation rules to counter this 
possibility in relation to interest deductions. Such rules operate 
to generally limit the amount of interest deductions that a 
resident company can claim in respect of funds injected by its 
foreign controllers.130
The US has implemented the most comprehensive statutory 
source rules compared with other OECD countries. In general, the 
US sets out rules for determining US source income depending on 
the type of income being derived (see §861 of the Code) and income 
which does not fall within that definition is deemed foreign 
source income (see §862 of the Code). The source rules of income 
contained in §§ 861-865 of the Code cover substantially all items 
of income, and those not expressly mentioned have their source 
determined by finding the closest analogy to items expressly dealt 
with by the Code, considering the nature of the item, the nature 
of the economic activity that generates it and the location of the 
property to which it is related.
Despite the theoretical soundness of the US approach (which 
also reflects the Asprey Committee recommendations), in an 
increasingly integrated world of commerce, it is extremely 
difficult to determine what economic connections with a country 
are sufficient to justify taxation in that country. Such a 
development significantly impacts on the ability to enforce 
residence based source rules. Accordingly, an alternative 
statutory source rule may be required to bolster the economic 
activity test. For instance, the incorporation of a clause similar 
to a "limitation on benefits" clause that the US and most other 
OECD countries have incorporated into their more recent DTAs, 
could serve such a purpose.131 In effect, the limitations clause
The US also relies on interest fungibility rules 
(contained in Reg. 1.861-8), which require a foreign corporation 
engaged in a trade or business, to classify and value its 
worldwide assets and liabilities for the purpose of calculating 
the amount of interest expense that it can claim as a deduction in 
the US.
Article 22 of the US Model Income Tax Convention of 20 
September 1996, sets forth a series of objective tests designed to 
determine the intent of a taxpayer in entering into a particular 
business transaction. One such test is the "active trade or 
business test" under paragraph 3 of Article 22. This test seeks to 
identify the business purpose for entering into a particular 
transaction. The assumption underlying paragraph 3 is:
"... that a third country resident that establishes a 
"substantial" operation in the other State and that derives 
income from a similar activity in the United States would not 
do so primarily to avail itself of the benefits of the 
Treaty; it is presumed in such a case that the investor had a 
valid business purpose for investing in the other State, and 
that the link between that trade or business and the U.S. 
activity that generates the treaty-benefitted income
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is an anti-avoidance measure designed to counter the benefit 
derived from "treaty shopping"132 by applying "substance-over­
form" principle.133 The assumption underlying such a clause being 
the desire to ensure that only residents of the Contracting States 
benefit from the treaty.
Regardless of the source of income test adopted, Professor 
McIntyre observes that source rules should be designed to achieve 
three goals - (i) the elimination of double taxation; (ii) the
elimination of "undertaxation"; and (iii) the distribution of tax 
jurisdiction over income among sovereign governments in some 
mutually agreeable fashion.134 McIntyre suggests that whichever 
test is preferred, the following guidelines should always be borne 
in mind. They are:135
(i) The source rules should be as simple for the tax authorities 
to apply as possible. In particular, source rules applicable to 
foreign taxpayers should not depend for their application on 
detailed factual inquiries or on refined accounting judgments. The 
need for simplicity stems from the fact that many source rules in
manifests a business purpose for placing the U.S. investments 
in the entity in the other State. It is considered unlikely 
that the investor would incur the expense of establishing a 
substantial trade or business in the other State simply to 
obtain the benefits of the Convention." (see Technical 
Explanation to the US Model Income Tax Convention of 1996) .
132 "Treaty shopping" is a term of art used to denote the 
re-structuring of financial arrangements to take advantage of 
favourable clauses in DTAs to effectively reduce.the amount of tax 
payable.
133 As mentioned previously, Article 22 of the US Model 
Income Tax Convention sets forth a number of objective tests to 
determine the entitlement of a resident to treaty benefits. The 
structure of the Article is as follows: Paragraph 1 states the 
general rule that only residents are entitled to benefits of the 
treaty; Paragraph 2 lists a series of attributes of a resident of 
a Contracting State, including a "stock exchange test" (see 
paragraph 2 (c)) which is designed to ascertain whether the stock 
of a company is substantially and regularly traded in a treaty 
country's stock exchange. Paragraph 3 provides that, with respect 
to a person not entitled to benefits under paragraph 2, benefits 
nonetheless .may be granted to that person with regard to certain 
types of income (e.g., active income). Paragraph 4 provides that 
benefits also may be granted if the competent authority of the 
State from which benefits are claimed determines that it is 
appropriate to provide benefits in that case. Paragraph 5 defines 
the term "recognized stock exchange" as used in paragraph 2(c).
134 McIntyre, o p  cit. . (1989) at p 3-65.
135 This part of the analysis is based on the analysis in
McIntyre, op cit.. (1989) at pp 3-66 to 3-70.
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the US, such as the rules defining the source of dividends and 
interest are tantamount to withholding rules as they apply to 
foreign taxpayers.
(ii) A government should not unilaterally adopt a source rule that 
it would find objectionable if adopted by another sovereign 
government, as this would be incompatible with the goal of a 
mutually agreeable sharing of tax jurisdiction. Where a sovereign 
has "look-through" rules to take away the incentive of its 
domestic taxpayers for shifting investment income to a foreign 
jurisdiction or increasing foreign tax credits, then there is no 
reason to impose complex rules on foreigners. Accordingly 
neutrality in this context does not require that foreign taxpayers 
and domestic taxpayers be subject to identical source rules.
(iii) To the extent feasible, income with an economic nexus with 
more than one country should be sourced in a country that is 
inclined to subject the income to taxation. This would reduce the 
risk of undertaxation, thereby promoting fairness and economic 
efficiency.
(iv) Finally McIntyre suggests that the application of source 
rules should be under the control of sovereign governments and not 
taxpayers, except to the extent that they have a choice where to 
conduct their economic activities giving rise to income. Without 
this control, he notes, the actual or deemed agreement among 
sovereign governments over the sharing of possible tax revenues 
will not be implemented as taxpayers, having control over source 
rules, would be able to manipulate source rules so as to minimise 
their exposure to any particular country's tax rules.
In conclusion, introducing clear, simple and transparent 
guidelines for identifying the type of income derived (which 
includes identifying the person who has derived such income), 
would add certainty and efficiency to the domestic rules aimed at 
determining the source of income arising from international 
transactions. By removing the uncertainty surrounding the 
application of judge made laws, residence based statutory source 
rules could arguably substantially reduce tax planning (similar to 
that which occurred in the Spotless case) and therefore, curtail 
erosion of the domestic tax base caused by shifting income 
offshore to escape residence country taxation. The US approach, 
including the drawing of analogies (where the type of income is 
not easily ascertained), could be useful in this regard. But what 
is equally important is that any reforms to the source rule should 
be accompanied by reforms to the residence rule to ensure that 
manipulation of one rule does not avoid the operation of the other 
rule. Residence based source rules which correlate the source of 
income with the residence of the payer fall squarely into this 
category.
4.3. The Residence Rule
One of the most important provisions defining the income tax 
base in relation to foreign source income is section 25(1) of the
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Act.136 It states that residents are taxed on their world-wide 
income. A resident of Australia in relation to a company is 
defined in section 6(1) of the Act, as follows:
"(b) A company which is incorporated in Australia, or which, 
not being incorporated in Australia, carries on business in 
Australia, and has either its central management and control 
in Australia, or its voting power controlled by shareholders 
who are residents of Australia."
From the above definition, it is clear that incorporation in 
Australia is decisive of a company's residence. However, the 
"incorporation" test is only one test of residency for 
companies.137 Where a company is not incorporated in Australia, 
then the question arises as to whether the company which carries 
on business in Australia, has its "central management and 
control"138 in Australia or its voting power is controlled by 
shareholders who are resident in Australia.
The underlying policy for the incorporation test is that a 
company which owes its existence to the law of a country should be 
subject to that country's tax system on the worldwide income it 
derives. By the same token, the rationale for the "central 
management and control" test is that if the company's 
manifestations of its existence in ultimate decision making take 
place under the protection of the law of a country, then the 
income derived from its worldwide activities should also be
136 See Parson R W Income Taxation in Australia: Principles 
of Income, Deductibility and Tax Accounting (The Law Book Company 
Limited, Sydney, 1985) at p 4.
137 Under US residency rules, a company will be 
characterised as a US company where it is simply a corporation 
which is "created or organised in the United States or under the 
law of the United States or of any State": §7701(a)(4) of the 
Code. Where it is not so created or organised then it is deemed to 
be a foreign corporation. Under §11 of the Code tax is imposed on 
the taxable income of every domestic US corporation for each 
taxable year.
The US incorporation test is said to maintain neutrality of 
taxation between foreign investors: see E A Owens, International 
Aspects of U.S. Income Taxation: Cases and Materials 
(International Tax Program, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Mass., 
1980) , at p 11/43 .
138 For a discussion on the distinction between "management"
and "control", and the various definitions of control see the 
judgment of the majority (Stephen, Mason and Wilson JJ) in FCT v 
Commonwealth Aluminium Corporation Limited (1980) 143 CLR 646, at
658-661.
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subject to that country's tax regime.139 Support for the 
requirement that the company whose central management and'control 
is in Australia must also be carrying on business in Australia is 
drawn from the economic nexus rule.
The rationale for the third limb of the residency test draws 
support from the provisions of Subpart F of the Code and with the 
suggestion of the Asprey Committee that the central management and 
control test should have a wider scope where the company is 
incorporated in a tax haven.140 Further, Australian companies 
"should not be able to shed their subjection to tax on their 
world-wide incomes by operating through a corporate entity. 1,141
Despite the policy justifications for incorporating the three 
tests of residency, in practice such rules have proved to be 
ineffective in countering tax haven and transfer pricing 
activities. Since the decision in Malayan Shipping Co. Ltd v 
FCT142 all that must be shown for the purposes of establishing 
residence of a company is that the central management and control 
of the company is situated in a particular country. It has also 
been held that a company will be treated as carrying on business 
in a country by reason of the fact that its central management and 
control is there.143 The central management and control of a 
company will be in Australia if there is some part of the superior 
or directing authority (or mind) of the company in Australia. The 
directing authority test being satisfied where the affairs of the 
company are controlled and the centre of its trading is in 
Australia.144
The Asprey Committee were anxious not to extend the meaning 
of the "central management and control" concept beyond the formal 
proceedings of the boardroom. Such an extension would, the 
Committee observed, increase the likelihood of a company being 
resident in both Australia and a foreign country beyond what may
139 Vann & Parsons, "The Foreign Tax Credit and Reform of 
International Taxation", (1986) 3 Australian Tax Forum 131, at p 
148 .
140 See also Asprey Committee Report op cit. . at p 255.
141 Vann & Parsons op cit.. at p 148.
142 (1946) 71 CLR 156. In this case, Williams J held that a
Singapore company set up by an Australian resident (who was really 
in charge) had an Australian residence on the basis that the 
company's central management and control was situated in 
Australia. This is despite the fact that two Singaporean persons 
were appointed as directors and met outside Australia.
143 De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v Howe [1906] AC 4 55.
144 Koitaki Para Rubber Estates Ltd v FCT (1940) 64 CLR 15,
at 19; per Dixon J. See also De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v 
Howe [1906] AC 455.
118
be regarded as the internationally acceptable norm. However, the 
Committee suggested that such an extension would be appropriate 
where the company is incorporated in a tax haven. For this 
purpose, the Committee recommended that tax haven countries be 
either identified in the Act or, preferably, in regulations.145
Subsequent to the decision in the Malayan Shipping case, the 
High Court arguably took a different approach in the Esquire 
Nominees case.146 One of the questions raised was whether the 
taxpayer company whose directors were residents of Norfolk Island 
and who held all the meetings of the company there, was resident 
in Australia. The Commissioner contended that as the taxpayer 
habitually responded to advice from Australian accountants, it 
should be characterised as resident in Australia. In rejecting the 
Commissioner's contention, Gibbs J (at first instance) held that 
habitually responding to instructions formulated in Australia is 
not sufficient evidence that the taxpayer is resident in 
Australia.147 In reaching this conclusion, his Honour stated that 
he believed that if the directors had been instructed to do 
something improper or inadvisable they would not have done it. 
Gibbs J was of the view that although the Australian accountants 
had "power to exert influence, and perhaps strong influence" on 
the company, they nonetheless did not "control" the company. 
Accordingly, actual management and control of the company and thus 
its residence was in Norfolk Island.148 Gibbs J's judgment on this 
point was upheld by the Full Court of the High Court.149
The precise meaning of the phrase "management" and "control" 
of a company is uncertain since there has been no specific 
judicial consideration of this phrase. The majority judges in FCT 
v Commonwealth Aluminium Corporation Ltd150 concluded that the 
term "controlled" (as it appeared in the now repealed section 
136(a) of the Act) referred to de facto control of the business of 
the company, and that control and management are not synonymous 
terms. Each may be in different hands. Their Honours went on to 
explain that such a distinction did not necessarily lead to the 
conclusion that directors of the company are to be treated as 
managers and the shareholders as controllers of the company in all
145 Asprey Committee Report op cit. . at p 255.
146 (1973) 129 CLR 177. The taxpayer appealed from the 
decision of Gibbs J to the Full Court of the High Court, which 
reversed Gibbs J's judgment but approved his findings in relation 
to residence, reported at (1974) 4 ATR 75.
147 Ibid. , at pp 185- 186.
148 Ibid. , at p 186 .
149 Per Barwick CJ and Menzies J (1974) 4 ATR 75 at 77, 85.
150 (1980) 143 CLR 646.
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cases.151 These terms are traditionally treated as a single 
concept, and hence it is possible to infer that control in the 
context of section 6(1) also refers to de facto control of the 
business of the company rather than actual control of the company 
itself.
There have been numerous judicial decisions that have 
examined such concepts as "control of a company" and "controlling 
interest" - viz., Mendes v Commr. of Probate Duties (Vic) ;152 
Kolotex Hosiery (Australia) Ptv Ltd v FCT;153 W P Keigherv Ptv Ltd 
v FCT;154 British American Tobacco Company Ltd v I R Commrs;155 and 
Barclays Bank Ltd v I R Commrs.156 However, the majority of the 
judges in the Commonwealth Aluminium case noted that most of these 
cases were of little assistance since they reflect, in varying 
degrees, the different notion of capacity to control which is not 
an element that is prevalent for the purposes of section 136(a). 
Their Honours remarked that control of a company for the purposes 
of section 136(a) may be inferred from the existence of a power to 
control its business.157
It has been suggested that the reasoning of the majority 
judges in the Commonwealth Aluminium case represents a softening 
of approach from the Esquire Nominees case.158 Notwithstanding, 
the concept of de facto control as applied in the Commonwea11h 
Aluminium case would not arguably overcome the power of veto 
reservation that Gibbs J expressed in the Esquire Nominees case. 
After all, the duty of directors under Australian company law is 
to the company itself and not to its accountants.
151 Ibid. , at 659 (per Stephen, Mason and Wilson JJ) , where 
it was stated that the word "controlled" when used passively in 
its ordinary meaning refers to de facto control rather than 
capacity to control. Their Honours said (at 661):
" [Section] 136(a) in speaking of de facto control is ... 
aimed, though not exclusively, at a situation in which the 
business is controlled by a non-resident, not being the 
person who carries on the business, with the consequence that 
the person who carries on the business becomes liable to pay 
income tax under the section."
152 (19 6 7) 122 CLR 152.
153 (19 7 5) 132 CLR 535.
154 (1957) 100 CLR 66.
155 [1943] AC 335.
156 (1961) AC 509.
157 (1980) 143 CLR 646 at 659. See also British American 
Tobacco Company Ltd v I R Commrs [1943] AC 335, at p 339.
See Waincymer op cit., at p 350.
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The uncertainty surrounding the precise scope of the central 
management and control concept has given rise to tax planning 
activities along the same lines as the taxpayer in the Esquire 
Nominees case. Effectively, this has allowed offshore subsidiaries 
to argue that they are not necessarily resident in the country of 
their holding company. Consequently, it is not difficult to 
understand why the Esquire Nominees decision has been attributed 
with inspiring many corporations to set up offshore subsidiaries 
to engage in business in low tax countries and not to repatriate a 
significant part of their profits to Australia. The extent of 
international planning activities based on Esquire Nominees has 
led one commentator to suggest that the CFC regime was introduced 
to counter deferral of Australian tax arising from that 
decision.159
The third test of residency set out in section 6(1)(b), 
treats a company as being a "resident of Australia" where it has 
"its voting power controlled by shareholders who are residents of 
Australia". This test also suffers from the same fate as the test 
in the second limb of the definition. Not only is the precise 
meaning of the phrase "control of voting power" uncertain, but 
also this test is easily avoided by shareholders either simply 
refraining from voting or giving a non-resident person a proxy to 
vote.160 The High Court in the Commonwealth Aluminium case were at 
pains to point out that it is not very helpful to suggest that it 
is the shareholders who ordinarily control the business and the 
business activities of the company.161 This is confirmed by the 
definition of a resident company in section 6(1) which refers to 
voting power being controlled by shareholders as opposed to 
shareholders controlling the company itself. In this regard, the 
decision of the High Court in the Mendes case may be of relevance.
It was held in the Mendes case that control of voting power 
(in a different context to the third test of residency set out in 
section 6 (1)) refers to "direct" control (or "de facto" control) 
of the voting power and not indirect or practical control.162 
Moreover, "voting power" means voting power in a general meeting 
of the company and includes the whole of the voting power 
exercisable by members of the company, not just that attached to
159 Ibid.
160 See Vann (1989), op cit. , at p 10.
161 (1980) 143 CLR 646 at 659.
162 See Mendes v Commissioner of Probate Duties (Vic) (1967) 
122 CLR 152, where Kitto J said (at 162):
"... a Company A, which by virtue of its voting power in a 
general meeting of Company B controls that company, has a 
controlling interest in Company C if Company B holds the 
majority of votes in the general meeting of Company C."
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shares.163 The inference to be drawn from this interpretation is 
that a substance over form approach should be adopted in 
determining control of the voting power in a company. However, the 
Mendes decision could arguably be invoked to undermine the 
capacity of the substance over form approach to pierce the 
corporate veil to look through a corporate structure to the 
indirect ownership of the company to see exactly who controls the 
voting power in that company.
Moreover, the decision in Patcorp Investments Ltd & Ors v 
FCT164 (which states that a person who was not entered on the 
register of shareholders but was the beneficial owner of shares 
could not be described as a "shareholder") has enabled tax 
planning in the form of manipulation of the residency of 
shareholders. This is achieved by beneficial owners of a company 
nominating non-resident nominees to exercise voting power on their 
behalf. Such a scheme will be effective in altering the residency 
status of a company since the third limb (as with the second limb) 
of the residency test set out in section 6(1) does not look 
through to the residence status of the ultimate owners (or 
ultimate managers) of the company.
Other problems arise when determining the residency status of 
individual shareholders. For this purpose it is necessary to 
resort to the statutory rules expounded in section 6(1) for 
residency of individual persons and companies. It will not serve 
our purpose to discuss the residency tests for individuals set out 
in section 6(1)(a) of the Act. Suffice to note that the complex 
rules contained in section 6(1)(a) may be circumvented relatively 
easily. For instance, it has been held that an individual does not 
have to be permanently resident in a foreign country before he or 
she will be regarded as a non-resident of Australia.165
In summary therefore, it is clear that the place of 
incorporation or seat of management tests fail to respond to 
modern economic realities. The place of incorporation of a company 
and the location of its head office and seat of management and
163 Kolotex Hosiery (Australia) Ptv Ltd v FCT (1975) 132 CLR
535. Gibbs J commented at 571:
"... 'the voting power in the company' is the voting power 
exercisable by members of the company ... I am unable to 
agree that the words are restricted in their meaning to 
voting power attached to or carried by shares. The words are 
quite general, and in their natural meaning would include all 
voting power that may be exercised in the company, however 
conferred."
164 (1976) 140 CLR 247.
165 See FCT v Applegate 79 ATC 4307, at 4314, per Northrop 
J, where the taxpayer was away for 2 years. See also FCT v Jenkins 
82 ATC 4098; where the Queensland Supreme Court held that the 
taxpayer who had been away for only 18 months had a "permanent 
place of abode outside Australia".
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control are all largely within the control of the beneficial 
owners of the company which may not necessarily be its direct 
shareholders. Moreover, without look through rules, the residency 
of the controlling shareholders is very easily manipulated. 
Manipulation of the residency rule is primarily achieved by reason 
of the corporate veil doctrine. This has enabled Australian 
resident taxpayers to successfully incorporate a foreign company 
and effectively control it from Australia thus avoiding or 
deferring Australia's tax net.
Hence the justification for the thesis propounded in this 
paper, which is, that another regime - the CFC/passive income 
regime is necessary in order to protect Australia's domestic tax 
base. As far as upholding the integrity of the second and third 
limbs of the residence rule, it will be shown that the CFC rules 
achieve this by incorporating comprehensive direct and indirect 
control tracing rules which look-through the corporate veil to the 
ultimate beneficial owners of the CFC. The definition of a CFC set 
out in section 340 incorporates two broad concepts of control: 
control in the strict sense and control in the economic sense 
(both of which are examined more thoroughly in Part IV).
5. Conclusion
By tracing the historical development of Australia's 
international taxation rules, it was shown that Australia's 
international tax and anti-avoidance rules have been less than 
successful in countering the deferral problem arising from 
transfer pricing and the accumulation of funds abroad. 
Notwithstanding, the Commissioner of Taxation has indicated that 
such traditional rules will serve to bolster the overreaching 
operation of the CFC rules.166
The deferral problem caused by the accumulation of profits in 
tax havens is also not affected by existing treaties since non­
repatriation means that international double taxation does not 
arise. Further, Australia has not negotiated DTAs with tax haven 
countries. Therefore, DTAs do not play a role in upholding 
Australia's traditional source and residence rules, at least as 
far as tax havens are concerned. In fact, it was shown the network 
of treaties could undermine traditional international tax rules by 
subordinating the domestic law to the operation of the treaty 
provisions.
Moreover, unlike the arm's length standard (which is set out 
in the associated persons article found all DTAs), there is no 
need to reach an internationally acceptable position when applying 
CFC rules in relation to passive income. Thus, it is argued that 
CFC rules cost less to enforce (both from a taxpayers' and tax 
authorities' point of view) than the arm's length standard, and 
are more effective in unilaterally protecting Australia's domestic 
tax base in relation to international tax abuses.
See the Martin Committee Report, op cit.. at p 107.
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With regards to unilateral measures for relieving 
international double taxation, where residence country tax is 
deferred by non-repatriation of funds, then there is no need to 
relieve international double taxation. It is only when the foreign 
source income is distributed to the resident shareholders that 
double international taxation could arise under the worldwide 
basis of taxation. The Federal Government was aware of the 
inability of the FTCS to counter deferral by accumulation of 
profits abroad, and at the time proposals for its implementation 
were being announced, proposals for anti-tax haven legislation 
were being foreshadowed.
Turning to worldwide basis of taxation, it is noted that this 
can be justified on the basis of equity, neutrality and revenue. 
This form of taxation also raises the most amount of revenue to 
finance government expenditures.167 In theory, the residence rule 
promotes CEN by subjecting taxpayers to Australian income tax on 
their worldwide income. However, the interaction of the separate 
entity approach and the Esquire Nominees case meant that both 
source and residence rules are easily manipulated. A tax-induced 
incentive for foreign direct investment was being created. This 
was contrary to the Federal Government's expressed intentions in 
announcing the repeal of the section 23(q) exemption in 1985, 
which were to increase efficiency and fairness in the Australian 
economy.
Even«where a formalised regime of residence based source 
rules for passive income is implemented, this would only be 
effective if manipulations of the residence rule are also 
addressed. The corporate veil doctrine has enabled Australian 
companies to incorporate foreign subsidiaries to intercept foreign 
source income for the purpose of deferring Australian shareholder 
taxation. The ability to defer shareholder taxation causes 
inefficiencies in investment behaviour by creating tax biases in 
favour of foreign investment. The manipulation of source rules 
also creates tax benefits under the FTCS by allowing inflation or 
deflation of profits resulting from related party transactions. 
This has provided a significant tax incentive to source income 
(and a disincentive to remit to Australia) , in low-tax countries 
especially tax havens.
If we turn to judge made source rules, it is noted that the 
source of profits generated by a foreign investment entity which 
is managed and controlled by an Australian investor is Australia 
(i.e., where the central management and control is located). 
However, this test is particularly difficult to enforce in 
relation to dividend payments through a chain of companies given 
the lack of look through rules which trace beneficial ownership by 
ascertaining direct, indirect and constructive ownership of the 
payer company. Moreover, the fact that the question of control at 
general law is invariably a matter of degree gives rise to further 
enforcement problems in practice. Hence, the need for a CFC regime 
where the existence of control is determined by reference to
See McIntyre op cit. (1989), at p 1-9.
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actual as well as objective and subjective de facto control with 
robust tracing rules to counter manipulations.
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PART IV
HOW THE CFC RULES PROTECT THE DOMESTIC TAX BASE
1. Introduction
The discussion in Part III highlighted the shortcomings of 
the FTCS, DTAs and the traditional source or residence rules in 
countering the deferral problem. It was shown that the corporate 
veil doctrine allowed Australian resident shareholders to shield 
income in a foreign subsidiary (e.g., a non-resident captive 
company) thereby avoiding Australia's fiscal jurisdiction. As was 
also shown in Part III, the deferral problem is generally not 
affected by the provisions of Part IVA or Division 13 of the Act. 
The general anti-avoidance provisions of Part IVA do not 
effectively operate where there is a commercial purpose to the 
scheme entered into by the taxpayer. This is the case even where a 
part of that scheme may have been the obtaining of a tax benefit.1
In relation to the assault on Australia's domestic tax base 
from transfer pricing activities, the combination of the 
allocation problem, the problems associated with defining arm's 
length price and the enforcement difficulties have rendered 
Division 13 virtually inoperable. The agreement between ACo, an 
Australian resident company and FCo, a related Hong Kong resident 
company, provided a classic illustration of the shortcomings of 
both anti-avoidance regimes. The fact that the international 
agreement between ACo and FCo could be justified on a commercial 
basis meant that neither the provisions of Division 13 nor Part 
IVA were effective in stopping the profit shifting in that case.
Therefore, as the thesis in this paper suggests, another 
regime - viz., the CFC regime, is required to stop the erosion in 
Australia's domestic tax base caused by manipulation of residence 
and source rules. For instance, by currently attributing foreign 
income of a CFC to its domestic controllers, Australia's CFC rules 
overcome one of two major obstacles impeding the effective 
operation of Australia's existing residence-based source regime 
for passive income - i.e, the corporate veil doctrine.2 CFC rules
1 See FCT v Peabody (1994) 28 ATR 344 at 352.
2 For example, as mentioned in Part III, without CFC 
rules, dividend income received by a controlled foreign entity 
from another foreign entity, would escape Australian taxation 
under section 23(r) because ordinarily it would be income derived 
by a non-resident from ex-Australian sources. The fact that the 
non-resident is taken to have derived the income, is a well 
established principle at general law. Therefore, by currently 
taxing the resident controller on such income, the Australian CFC 
rules overcome the jurisdictional limitations of section 23(r) by 
ignoring the fiction of the separate entity and applying the same 
tax treatment afforded dividends under domestic law. For example,
126
do this by implementing very strong look through rules that pierce 
the corporate veil to divine the ultimate owners of such income.
The other major obstacle common to both regimes and which has 
caused welfare losses in most open economies (particularly small 
ones* 3) , is the ineffective enforcement of domestic tax rules in 
relation to cross-border transactions. Hence, one reason for 
introducing a minimum threshold requirement into the CFC rules - 
i.e., to reduce administration costs by confining their operation 
to a small group of shareholders (i.e., those who can compel 
distribution). Another reason for excluding minority shareholders, 
is a matter of fairness. The complexity of CFC rules reflects the 
complexity of international transactions which in turn, creates a 
very heavy compliance burden especially on minority shareholders 
who are relatively powerless to compel production of books of the 
foreign company let alone distribution.
In view of the above, it is asserted that CFC rules create 
their own source regime. This assertion is largely based on the 
analysis in footnote 2 (above) and on the fact that tainted income 
of a CFC which is attributed to the Australian taxpayer, is 
calculated on a gross (i.e., pre-foreign tax) basis with a 
deduction for the foreign tax paid instead of the gross-up and 
credit method provided under the FTCS.4 However, because the 
adjustments to foreign income of a CFC are merely notional, 
Australia's CFC rules merely create a quasi statutory residence- 
based (QRB) source regime.5 The fundamental principle upon which 
the QRB regime is based being the presence of Australian control 
of a closely held foreign entity.6
for the purposes of section 44(1) (b) , dividends received by a non­
resident will be sourced in Australia where the profits (from 
which the dividends were paid), were generated from the conduct of 
passive investments that are centrally managed and controlled by 
an Australian resident: see Esquire Nominees case (1973) 129 CLR
177 at 182 per Barwick CJ.
See Huber "Optimal Capital Income Taxes and Capital 
Controls in Small Open Economies" (1997) International Tax and 
Public Finance 7.
4 The treatment of foreign taxes under the CFC rules can 
be likened, for example, to the input tax deduction for the amount 
of goods and services tax (GST) paid in respect of goods and 
services that have been acquired for the principal purpose of 
making taxable supplies (viz., goods and services that are subject 
to GST): see sections, 2(1), 8 and 20(2) of New Zealand's Goods 
and Services Act 1985.
5 See sections 389, 392 and 393 of the Act.
In the case of dividends received by an eligible CFC 
from another group company, special assumptions are made in 
calculating the amount of notional deduction allowed to the 
Australian taxpayer in relation to such dividends. They are that:
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Further, by not taxing income generated from genuine business 
activities conducted outside Australia, the CFC rules in effect 
adhere to the commonly accepted principles of inter-nation equity 
of allocating revenue from international transactions. This 
principle dictates that income generated from economic activities 
conducted in a particular state should be taxed there. Put another 
way, it is argued that Australia's CFC rules promote national 
efficiency to the extent that they discourage tax-induced passive 
investments abroad by reducing avoidance opportunities associated 
with deferral and foreign tax credit limitations. Based on the 
discussion in Part II (at 3.1.2.), it is submitted that such 
capital could have been invested more wisely and productively at 
home. This is a particularly significant observation in view of 
the increased internationalisation (partly due to a decline in 
transaction costs) of Australian businesses over the past two 
decades which has virtually rendered residence based taxation 
ineffectual.(i) *7
1.1. How the CFC Regime Operates: A Broad Overview
A CFC/passive income regime therefore, provides small open 
economies like Australia, with a qualitative (viz., passive/active 
distinction) as well as a quantitative tool for indirectly 
controlling capital outflows without the need for direct capital 
and exchange controls (of the type discouraged by multilateral 
organisations such as the WTO and the IMF) .8 Moreover, CFC 
taxation (with exemption for active income) does not offend 
against the political economic order for taxing international 
income flows stipulated in the OECD, UN and US Model Tax 
Conventions. These conventions acknowledge the primacy of the home 
country's taxing rights over mobile/passive income while
(i) the dividend is a non-portfolio dividend; (ii) the Australian 
controller is a company; and (iii) the dividend is received from a 
company "related" to the Australian taxpayer (see also section 
160AFB [discussed in Part III, section 3.5.2.] which provides that 
to be related, two companies must be group companies and the 
Australian company must hold 5% of the voting rights of the 
foreign company).
See discussion in Part III and Azzi (1994) and (1996) op  
cit. For an economist's perspective on the status quo with regards 
to residence based taxation see Keen M "The Welfare Economics of 
Tax Co-ordination in the European Community: A Survey" (1993) 14
Fiscal studies 15 esp., at pp 27-32., and also Huizinga H and 
Nielsen S B A Welfare Comparison of International Tax Regimes with
Cross-Ownership of Firms" (W/P 1997-14) (Economic Policy Research 
Unit, Copenhagen Business School, Copenhagen Denmark), at p 14.
It has been observed that in view of the increasing 
mobility of capital due to changes in policy and decreasing
transaction costs, the availability of capital income taxation is
an important one for tax policy in today's world economy: Huizinga
and Nielsen op cit. . at p 1.
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acknowledging the primacy of the economic nexus rule for business 
profits.
In an effort to stem the assault on its residence and source 
rules, the US was the first country to introduce CFC rules in 1962 
when it enacted Subpart F9 and §1248.10 The forerunner to Subpart 
F and §1248, were the Foreign Personal Holding Companies ("FPHC") 
provisions contained in §§551-557 which were introduced in 1939.* 11 
Under the FPHC rules, a US shareholder12 ("USS") in a closely held 
foreign corporation which realises substantial amounts of passive 
income is taxed directly on the corporation's undistributed 
income.13 Broadly, the CFC measures of Australia and the US (as 
well as the 15 other countries that have introduced such rules)
In general, the provisions of Subpart F are directed at 
the use of foreign corporations (CFCs) which are used to 
accumulate certain types of income in a "foreign base company" 
located in a jurisdiction with little or no tax. As will become 
more evident from the discussion to follow, the Subpart F 
treatment of income derived by the foreign base company (i.e., 
"foreign base company income") distinguishes between deferral of 
US taxation in foreign operations engaged in active businesses 
(e.g., manufacturing operations, etc) and deferral in respect of 
passive income resulting from a manipulation of US tax rules. 
Therefore, pursuant to Subpart F rules, deferral of US taxation is 
curtailed for CFCs operating in certain tax havens. On the other 
hand, deferral of US taxation is generally allowed where the CFC 
is engaged in active or genuine business.
10 The effect of §1248 is to transform the capital gain 
made by a US shareholder in a CFC through the disposition of stock 
in the CFC into ordinary income to the extent of the shareholder's 
share of the CFC's earnings and profits accumulated after 1962.
11 Historically, the FPHC rules prevailed over Subpart F 
rules, however, by an amendment introduced in 1984, foreign 
entities falling within the operation of Subpart F were removed 
from the operation of the FPHC rules. Accordingly, since 1984,
FPHC rules have become subordinate to the operation of Subpart F 
provisions: see §951(d).
12 A USS is defined in §951 (b) of the Code as a "United 
States person" who owns directly, indirectly, or constructively 
10% or more of the total combined voting power of all classes of 
stock entitled to vote of a foreign corporation. A "United States 
person" is, in turn, defined to mean a citizen or resident of the 
US, a domestic partnership, a domestic.corporation and any estate 
or trust (other than a foreign estate or trust). (See §957(c) and 
§7701(a) (30)) .
13 For a fuller discussion of the FPHC rules see Isenbergh 
J International Taxation: U.S. Taxation of Foreign Taxpayers and 
Foreign Income (Little, Brown and Company, 1990) at chapter 24, 
(2nd edition, 1996, at ch 36), and McDaniel & Ault op cit.,
(1989), at pp 127-129 and McIntyre op cit. (1989), at ch 6.
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operate by currently taxing the resident taxpayer on its pro rata 
share of the profits "derived"14 by the controlled foreign entity 
in the foreign (i.e., source) country. Another common feature of 
the CFC regimes of most nations, is the income which they target - 
viz., low-taxed passive income. However, New Zealand's CFC rules 
(and to a lesser extent, Sweden15) apply to all (i.e., active and 
passive) income derived by the CFC.
Taxing undistributed profits of a resident company on a 
current basis is the generally accepted and applied practice of 
company taxation in a residence country like Australia and the US. 
However, currently taxing the domestic parent company on the 
undistributed earnings of its subsidiary offends against the 
general notions of domestic principles of company taxation which 
treat the subsidiary company as a separate entity from its parent 
company. As a means of rectifying such discordance, the CFC 
regimes of the 17 nations which have established CFC regimes, only 
operate to attribute the earnings of the foreign corporation to 
its domestic shareholders where such shareholders are able to 
compel dividend distributions if they were so included (i.e., they 
"control" the foreign corporation).16 Establishment of this power 
requires implementation of comprehensive tracing of ownership 
rules (also referred to as look-through rules).
However, administrative problems generally arise when 
enforcing tax measures which "look-through" corporate structures, 
in particular, complex multinational corporate structures. 
Operating such comprehensive rules in practice, gives rise to many 
enforcement and compliance problems. For instance, constructive 
ownership rules which deem a resident taxpayer to own shares in a 
foreign corporation owned by related persons (i.e., associates), 
require detailed rules setting out how close the connection 
between persons must be before the deeming provisions are invoked. 
The relatively high cost of compliance and administration 
associated with the CFC tax rules, is a direct consequence of the 
complex nature of cross-border transactions occurring between 
controlled companies. For example, without comprehensive look 
through rules that trace the indirect and constructive ownership
14 The term "derived", as it appears in the above context, . 
is used in the legal sense when it is applied in relation to the 
controlled foreign entity; and does not preclude the use of the 
term in the beneficial ownership sense when applied in relation to 
the Australian controllers of the foreign entity.
15 Strictly speaking, Sweden does not provide an active 
income exemption in its CFC rules, it does. However, its CFC 
rules provide an exemption for a CFC controlled by resident 
taxpayers where the CFC derives income in a foreign jurisdiction 
which has a comparable corporate tax system to that of Sweden or a 
treaty country.
’16 See FSIIP op  cit.. at p 30. See also §§957 and 958 of
the Code; see also Kaplan op cit. (1988), at p 217.
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of a company to identify genuine control, the CFC rules would be 
susceptible to abuse by fragmentation of shareholdings.
Notwithstanding the compliance and enforcement problems, a 
measure of relief is provided in Australia's CFC rules by testing 
for the existence of control within a small group of shareholders 
(viz., 5 or fewer resident shareholders).17 As mentioned 
previously, a further measure of relief (provided also in the CFC 
rules of almost all the other countries), is the requirement of a 
minimum direct shareholding when determining whether the separate 
members of the controlling group should be attributed with the 
income of the CFC. The internationally accepted minimum 
shareholding requirement is 10 per cent.18
Therefore, it can be gleaned from the above that the 
integrity of Australia's CFC rules intricately depends on 
establishing the existence of control, as well as the effective 
operation of the exemptions provided in the Act. For instance, the 
active income test is designed to ensure that passive low taxed 
income is not characterised as active income and thus exempt from 
Australian taxation. Effective implementation of this exemption 
requires strong anti-abuse provisions which attribute income with 
the economic activity that generated it - a function that transfer 
pricing rules are designed to achieve. Moreover, the presence of 
strong anti-abuse rules reduces the cost effectiveness of pursuing 
inefficient tax driven schemes abroad. This is because the 
overreaching effect of CFC taxation extends shareholder taxation 
to foreign direct investments that would otherwise have gone 
untaxed.
2. Structure of Discussion in Part IV
In view of the thesis postulated, the discussion below will 
specifically examine how Australia's CFC rules achieve the three 
policy objectives described in Part I: (i) eliminate deferral of 
Australian tax in relation to interest and dividend income; (ii) 
support the transfer pricing rules; and (iii) strengthen the FTCS.
The analysis to follow in section 3. will seek to prove the 
anti-deferral capability of Australia's CFC rules by examining the 
scope and operation of the control rule in order to establish the 
existence of a CFC. Without the requisite control, the CFC rules 
will not be invoked. The discussion will then examine the rules 
for calculating the attribution percentage held by an Australian 
taxpayer in the CFC (i.e., the pro rata rule). Unlike the control 
rule (which deems control in certain instances), the pro rata rule
The US, Canada and New Zealand also adopt this approach.
18 The CFC rules of Germany and Norway do not require the 
domestic shareholder to own a non-portfolio interest in the CFC 
before income of the CFC could be attributed to them. It should 
also be noted that by virtue of a 1992 amendment, the non­
portfolio minimum shareholding requirement in Japan's CFC rules 
was reduced to 5%.
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operates on the basis of actual interests held by the Australian 
taxpayer in the relevant CFC. This will be followed with an 
analysis of the income attribution rule which provides detailed 
guidelines for computing the amount of tainted income to be 
attributed to the Australian controllers. Essentially, 
attributable income (e.g., interest and dividend income) is 
calculated in accordance with Australian tax law.19 Special 
modifications are introduced in order to facilitate the notional 
treatment of the CFC as an Australian resident.
The combined operation of the three rules discussed in the 
immediately preceding paragraph eliminates deferral of Australian 
taxation in relation to low-taxed passive income (i.e., tainted 
income), by attributing (on a current basis), the pro rata share 
of the CFC's attributable income to the Australian taxpayers 
(i.e., attributable taxpayers). However, given that Australia's 
CFC rules differentiate between CFCs based in low tax countries 
(unlisted countries) and those based in countries with comparable 
tax systems to Australia (i.e., listed countries), it is firstly 
intended to examine the jurisdictional approach (viz., designated 
comparable-tax jurisdictions approach) underpinning the CFC 
regime. As will appear, the jurisdictional approach affects both 
the type and the amount of income attributed.
How the CFC rules achieve the second policy objective (viz., 
backstopping transfer pricing) is pursued in section 4. A 
discussion of this nature requires an analysis of the major 
exemption from the CFC rules for active income which result in 
deferral of such income. The existence of such an exemption 
provides scope for abuse of the system inter alia, through 
transfer pricing activities which, if not countered, could lead to 
serious revenue leakage.20 The integrity of the CFC rules would be 
seriously compromised if the system allowed manipulations of the 
active income exemption to prevail. The discussion in this section 
will also focus on the disguised repatriation rule of section 47A 
which is directed inter alia, at profit distributions disguised as 
property transfers for less than market value.
Examination of how the CFC rules achieve the third objective 
(viz., strengthen the FTCS), is undertaken in section 5. The
19 The amount included in the attributable taxpayer's 
assessable income is computed by multiplying the amount of 
attributable income of the CFC with the attribution percentage 
ascertained under the pro rata rule.
20 Concerned with the revenue leakage caused by the
application of the active income test where a CFC has entered into 
non-arm's length transaction, the Federal Government introduced an 
amendment in 1995 designed to allow the Commissioner to make 
adjustments (that reflect arm's length prices) to the amount of 
gross turnover recorded in the accounts of the CFC: see section 
434(3) discussed in Azzi J "Proposed Amendments to the Controlled 
Foreign Corporation Rules" (1995) 11 Asia Pacific Tax Bulletin 314
at pp 317-318.
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discussion in this section proceeds by examining the operation of 
attributed tax accounts designed to uphold the integrity of the 
exemption from CFC taxation for previously attributed income while 
at the same time alleviating double taxation by correlating 
attribution with distribution. This is followed by an analysis of 
the exemption provided for comparably taxed "non-portfolio 
dividends"21 under section 23AJ and the rules provided to ensure 
that the exemption is not manipulated to short circuit the 
operation of the FTCS. The discussion then turns to briefly 
examine some of the adjustments made to the FTCS in order to 
ensure that it operates efficiently in view of the current basis 
of taxation established under the CFC regime. The special 
treatment of interest and losses is also examined in view of the 
tax planning opportunities arising under the FTCS for such highly 
mobile income.
Section 6 contains the conclusion to Part IV. As well as 
being a summary of the observations and analyses regarding the 
operation of Australia's CFC rules, the comments made in this 
section will also serve to confirm the conclusions reached in the 
previous Parts.
3. How the CFC Regime Eliminates Deferral of Australian Tax in 
Relation to Foreign Source Passive Income
As noted in section 2. above, before embarking on a 
discussion of the three rules that together operate to realise the 
first policy objective of the CFC rules, it is intended to firstly 
discuss the jurisdictional reach of Australia's CFC rules since 
the amounts of tainted income attributed to the Australian 
controlling shareholders largely depend on the residency status of 
the eligible CFC. For instance, Australian CFC rules contain a de 
minimis exemption which only operates to exempt certain amounts of 
tainted income derived by a listed country CFC.
21 A "non-portfolio dividend" is defined in section 317 to 
correspond with the 10% threshold requirement in section 361 
(discussed below), and means a dividend paid by a non-resident 
company which has a 10% or greater voting interest in the company 
paying the dividend. "Voting interest" is taken to have the same 
meaning as in section 160AFB of the Act which broadly, refers to 
beneficial ownership of shares in a company that carry an 
unfettered right to vote on a poll at, or arising out of, a 
general meeting of the company as regards all questions that can 
be submitted to such a poll.
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3.1. The Jurisdictional Reach of Australia's CFC rules22
The approach adopted in the Australian CFC rules, unlike the 
"transactional" approach adopted in Subpart F, operates around the 
concept of "listed" and "unlisted" countries.23 This approach is 
commonly known as the "designated comparable-tax jurisdictions" 
approach under which income sourced in those countries that have a 
comparable tax system to that of Australia will generally be 
exempt from the CFC measures. This approach has the added
22 On 24 December 1996, an Information Paper outlining
significant changes to the jurisdictional approach underlying the 
CFC rules was released by the Treasurer (see "Proposed changes to 
CFC, FIF and tax sparing provisions" TNS-77 (1997) (IBFD 
Publications, Amsterdam)). Subsequently, on 4 September 1997, the 
Treasurer introduced Taxation Laws Amendment (Foreign Income 
Measures) Bill 1997 (" Foreign Income Bill 1997"), into the House
of Representatives. However, given that the legislation (which 
breaches the cut-off date for this thesis) had not become law at 
the time of revision of this thesis, it is merely intended to 
briefly examine some of the more fundamental changes proposed.
First, the Foreign Income Bill 1997 proposes to modify the 
use of the list of countries contained in Schedule 10 of the 
Income Tax Regulations (i.e., countries with comparable tax 
systems to Australia). The new list will be known as the "limited- 
exemption listed countries" and used for the purposes of 
exemptions from the FTCS (e.g., section 23AJ of the Act). Second, 
a smaller list of truly comparable countries (referred to as 
"broad-exemption listed countries") with CFC rules similar in 
scope to the Australian rules has also be drawn up. This list will 
be used for the purposes of exempting amounts from accruals 
taxation under the CFC and transferor trust rules. The countries 
included in this list (viz., Canada, France, Germany, Japan, New 
Zealand, UK and the US) were selected because they have robust 
international tax rules that operate to subject income arising in 
their borders to the full rate of tax.
23 The transactional approach focuses on the income earned 
by the CFC (i.e., all the tainted income of a CFC is attributed 
with no express attempt to differentiate between CFCs located in 
high-tax or low-tax jurisdictions). On the other hand, the entity 
or jurisdictional approach as well as looking at the nature of the 
income earned by the CFC looks at other factqrs such as the tax 
rate in the country in which the CFC is resident and the 
corporation's activities. The Federal Government decided that the 
entity approach be adopted on the basis that compliance 
difficulties for taxpayers would be reduced: see FSIIP op cit. , at 
para 4.9.
Of the countries that have introduced CFC legislation, two 
adopt a transactional approach (US and Canada) and the others 
adopt an entity approach: see Arnold o p  cit.(1988), at pp 448-449, 
OECD (1996) op cit. , at 309, and Sandler op cit. . at pp 134-139.
It should also be noted that the countries that use the entity 
approach also use the designated jurisdiction approach.
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advantage of minimising the need to determine corporate residence 
because a company that is not vulnerable in any jurisdiction to 
tax, is treated as a resident in a low tax jurisdiction (whether 
this is in fact so).24 The exemption from the CFC rules, granted 
with respect to income which has been comparably taxed in a 
foreign jurisdiction, is merely an acknowledgment by the 
Australian Government that to subject such income to current 
taxation is not efficient from an administrative point of view. 
That is, subjecting such income to current taxation would create 
unnecessary compliance burdens without any substantial revenue 
gains.
As noted above, a "listed country" is a country that has a 
tax system which is generally comparable to Australia's.25 A list 
of these countries is contained in Statutory Rules 1991 No. 20 
notified in the Commonwealth of Australia Gazette on 20 February 
1991. An unlisted country is a country that is not listed in those 
rules. What constitutes a comparable tax system is controlled by 
the Federal Government to the extent that it has indicated that it 
will revise its rules in line with changes in the tax systems of 
those countries listed in those rules.26 Generally, the criteria
See section 333(1)(b) of the Act. to follow. See also 
Prebble J The Taxation of Controlled Foreign Corporations 
(Victoria University of Wellington, Institute of Policy Studies, 
1987) esp., at p 47.
25 See also section 320 which contains definitions of 
"listed" and "unlisted" countries. Listed countries are declared 
in Regulations. It is interesting to note that the Regulations may 
declare only part of a foreign country to be a listed country. An 
unlisted country, on the other hand, will be any foreign country 
that is not a listed country and may also include a colony, 
territory or protectorate of another foreign country.
Once the Foreign Income Bill 1997 becomes law, then section 
320 will be modified to incorporate the new terminology of "broad- 
exemption listed countries" and "limited-exemption listed 
countries". Both these terms will fall within the general 
definition of "listed country" (see proposed section 320 of the 
Foreign Income Bill 1997), except that amounts derived by CFCs in 
the broad-exemption countries will generally be exempt from both 
accruals taxation and taxation on repatriation to Australia. By 
contrast, amounts derived from limited exemption countries will 
generally accord with the current treatment for listed countries, 
except that the exemption from accruals taxation will no longer be 
available for amounts of tainted income that have been taxed by 
that country: see paras 3.11. to 3.19. of Draft Explanatory 
Memorandum for Taxation Laws Amendment (Foreign Income Measures) 
Bill 1997 ("DEM").
26 The amendments foreshadowed in the Foreign Income Bill 
1997, will clarify many of the uncertainties surrounding the 
treatment of states emerging from the dissolution of 
Czechoslovakia, the USSR and Yugoslavia as well as the status of 
Hong Kong post handover to China and Vietnam (post economic
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for determining whether a particular country's tax system is 
comparable with Australia's are whether (i) direct taxation is 
levied on income or profits; (ii) the tax base is comprehensive; 
(iii) the particular tax jurisdiction offers special tax 
incentives which would introduce a non-neutrality into Australia's 
tax system and (iv) the company income tax rate is at least 25%.27
The designated comparable-tax jurisdictions approach was 
preferred by the government over the original approach proposed in 
the Consultative Document (viz., "designated low-tax 
jurisdictions"), on the basis that more countries are covered 
because under, the designated low-tax jurisdictions approach only 
those countries that impose little or no tax are targeted whereas, 
under the former approach only those tax systems of the highest 
integrity are listed with the remaining jurisdictions constituting 
unlisted countries.28 This approach is administratively simpler to 
maintain, since from a total of around 210 tax jurisdictions, only 
61 countries have been identified as being suitable for listing. 
This means that income from the other 149 jurisdictions will 
remain largely subject to the CFC measures. The drawback however, 
with this approach is the likely time to be taken in determining 
whether a particular country or an entity of a listed country 
(which was not originally listed) is suitable for listing. This is 
so despite the fact that amendments to the list will be made by 
means of subordinate legislation (e.g., in the Income Tax 
Regulations) rather than in the Act proper.
The jurisdictional coverage of the CFC rules is similar to 
the two-part format used in the United Kingdom's list of 
designated jurisdictions.29 By contrast, the jurisdictional 
coverage of Subpart F is much broader since Subpart F generally 
applies to attribute the income of a CFC to the USS regardless of 
the residency status of the CFC. Congress did however, provide a 
"high tax" exception in §954(b)(4) (as amended by §1221(d) of Tax 
reform Act of 1986 ("TRA 1986")), which retains deferral for 
certain income.30 Under this exception, if a taxpayer can
reforms): see DEM at Chapter 6.
27 See FSIIP op cit.. at p 36-37.
28 Ibid. , at p 35.
29 Once the Foreign Income Bill becomes law, the 
jurisdictional approach of Australia's CFC rules (particularly, 
the broad-exemption listed countries) will more closely resemble 
the jurisdictional approach of New Zealand's CFC rules, in 
particular, the list of "Excluded Countries" set out in Schedule 
3, Part A of the Income Tax Act 1994. New Zealand's list of 
excluded countries however, does not include France but instead 
includes Norway.
Prior to the amendments introduced in TRA of 1986,
§954(b)(4) effectively provided a partial exemption from 
attribution in respect of FBCI received by a USS where it was
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establish to the satisfaction of the Secretary of Treasury that an 
item of income which otherwise would be tainted income (viz., 
foreign base company ("FBCI") income or insurance income) was 
subject to an effective tax rate greater than 90% of the maximum 
US corporate tax rate,31 that income item is not included in the 
determination of Subpart F income of a USS for the year.32
Although the "high tax exception" is conceptually relatively 
simple, since it compares the "effective rate of foreign tax paid" 
by a CFC on an item of income with the US tax rate payable on the 
same item of income, it may nevertheless require more resources to 
administer than maintaining a list of some 61 listed countries.
The only equivalent to the "high tax exception" in Australia's CFC 
measures is to be found in the criteria for including a certain 
country on the list of comparable tax jurisdictions which, inter 
alia, require that the tax rate for company income in the relevant 
foreign country be at least 25%.
The purpose of the high tax exception (as with the listed 
country approach adopted in the Australian rules) is to exclude 
from current taxation income which may have been routed through a 
related foreign corporation but with no residence country tax
established to the satisfaction of the Secretary of the Treasury 
that a CFC was not created for the purpose of achieving a 
"substantial reduction of income taxes". An exemption based on the 
motives of the taxpayer is still found in the UK CFC rules.
31 It should be noted that the taxes referred to in
§954(b)(4) are not limited to US taxes, but extend to income, war 
profits or excess profits or similar taxes of any jurisdiction. 
Further it should be noted that an election needs to be made by a 
controlling USS under §954(b)(4) and Reg §1.954-IT(d)(5) to 
exclude the income from computation of Subpart F income: Reg.
§1.954 -IT(d) (ii) .
32 The effective rate at which taxes are imposed on an item 
of income is:-
(i) the amount of income taxes paid or accrued (or deemed 
paid or accrued) with respect to the "item of income" 
determined under Reg §1.954-1(d)(3), divided by
(ii) the item of net foreign base company income determined 
under Reg §1.954-1(d)(4) (discussed above): Reg
§1.954 -1 (d) (2) .
Determination of the amount of income taxes paid or accrued 
under Reg §1.954-1(d)(3) differs depending on whether the item of 
income is (i) "income other than passive FPHC income", or (ii) 
"income that is passive FPHC". The amount of income taxes paid or 
accrued under para (i) is the amount of foreign taxes that would 
be deemed paid under §960 which provides a foreign tax credit in 
respect of deemed Subpart F dividend distributions. For this 
purpose, the amounts that would be deemed paid under §960 (see 
later), shall be determined separately with respect to each CFC 
and without regard to the §904(a) limitation: Reg §1.954- 
1(d) (3) (i) .
137
advantage being gained thereby. This can also have the effect of 
denying the benefit of an exclusion from tax provided by a foreign 
country. A similar result is achieved in Australia's CFC rules in 
relation to "designated concession income"33 ("DCI"), which is 
introduced into the Act to ensure that income receipts of a listed 
country CFC that are exempt or subject to a reduced rate of tax in 
the listed country, are characterised as tainted income and thus 
subject to attribution.34
The income tax regulations specify the types of income or 
profits that are regarded as DCI.35 For example, regulation 
152D(1)(a) was introduced to overcome the possibility of an 
Australian taxpayer taking advantage of the concessional tax 
treatment provided by New Zealand (which is a listed country), 
with respect to capital gains derived by an entity in that 
jurisdiction.36 As will appear, characterising an item of income
33 The term designated concession income ("DCI") is defined 
in section 317 in relation to a particular listed country, to mean 
income or profits of a kind specified in the regulations, where 
either:
(a) foreign tax imposed by a tax law of a listed country is 
not payable in respect of the income or profits because 
of a particular feature, or
(b) foreign tax imposed by a tax law of the listed country 
is payable in respect of the income or profits but there 
is a feature in relation to that tax; and
in either case, the feature is of a kind specified in 
the regulations.
34 Income or profits will be regarded as being subject to a 
"reduction of tax" if, under the law of the particular listed 
country, a decree, proclamation, instrument or direction issued by 
a competent authority in that country states inter alia, that the 
income or profits are either (i) exempt from tax; (ii) subject to 
a concessional rate of tax; (iii) not required to be used as a 
basis for determining taxable liability in the source country or 
(iv) subject to any form of tax benefit that has the effect of 
reducing the amount of tax otherwise payable: reg. 152C(1).
Interest income or royalties which have been subject to 
withholding tax (or another tax at an equivalent rate) in a 
relevant listed country (being either the country where the CFC is 
established or the country where a permanent establishment is 
located), do not constitute DCI: reg. 152D(5).
36 The types of income or profits which are specified in 
the regulations, are broadly:
• capital gains which are exempt from tax in the relevant 
listed country;
• offshore income which is subject to a reduction of tax 
in the relevant listed country;
• interest income which is subject to a reduction of tax 
in the relevant listed country;
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as DCI effectively denies the Australian shareholder, the benefit 
of the tax concession provided by the listed country and the 
benefit of the exclusion from attribution contained in the de 
minimis exemption under section 385(4). Similar treatment is 
provided under Subpart F. To that extent the designated concession 
approach of the Australian rules reflects a partial transactional 
approach, or more appropriately, a "hybrid" jurisdictional 
approach.
Given that the de minimis exemption only applies in relation 
to CFCs resident in listed countries, it is necessary to ascertain 
the residency status of the particular entity deriving the 
attributable income before examining the operation of the de 
minimis exemption. The first thing to note about the residency 
tests set out in Part X, is that it is necessary to firstly 
determine whether the CFC is a resident of a particular listed 
country or a Part X Australian resident.37 If the company is 
neither, then the company will be treated as a resident of an 
unlisted country and thus will not be able to claim entitlement to 
the de minimis exemption.38
3.1.1. When is a CFC resident in a listed country
To be "a resident of a listed country" a foreign company must 
satisfy both tests set out in section 332.39 Effectively, section
• royalties which are subject to a reduction of tax in the 
relevant listed country;
• shipping income which is subject to a reduction of tax 
in the relevant listed country;
• income or profits which are subject to a reduction of 
tax in the relevant listed country pursuant to a 
specifically designated tax concession.
In Regulation 1521, it is specified that for the 
purposes of the definition of DCI, features of a kind referred to 
in reg 152D(1) are features in relation to foreign tax imposed by 
a tax law of a listed country.
See section 333(1) of the Act. A company is a Part X 
Australian resident if it satisfies the test of Australian 
corporate residence in section 6(1): section 317. If however, the 
company is a resident of both Australia and another country with 
which Australia has a double tax treaty and a tiebreaker provision 
in a DTA assigns residence to the Treaty Partner, then section 317 
provides that the tiebreaker provision has the effect for the CFC 
rules that the foreign company is a resident solely of the foreign 
country.
38 See sections 333(1) (b) and 384 of the Act.
39 As with section 320, the Foreign Income Bill 1997 
proposes to amend section 332 in line with the new jurisdictional 
approach of broad-exemption and limited-exemption listed 
countries. The Bill also introduces a new section 332A which sets 
out the conditions for when a company is characterised as a
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332 provides that to be treated as a resident of a listed country, 
a foreign company must be treated as a resident for the purposes 
of the tax law of that particular listed country, and not be an 
Australian resident. Once it is established that the company is 
not a resident of a particular listed country or an Australian 
resident, it is then necessary to determine whether, inter alia, 
the particular company is incorporated in the unlisted country,40 
or the company's management and control is solely or principally 
located in the unlisted country of residence.41 These latter rules 
accord with the first two tests for ascertaining the residency 
status of a company under section 6(1)(b) of the Act. However, the 
one major advantage that the CFC rules have over the traditional 
residence rule in section 6(1)(b), is their ability to resort to 
extensive look-through rules (discussed at 3.2. below) to 
establish whether tests of residency have been satisfied.
3.1.2. De minimis exemption
The de minimis exemption was inserted into the CFC rules in 
order to provide some leeway for listed country CFCs that are 
principally engaged in deriving active income to also derive some 
passive investment income without jeopardising their exemption 
from the CFC rules.42 It is readily acknowledged in the real world 
of international trade and commerce that international businesses 
can earn substantial profits merely through exchange rate 
fluctuations which may not be taxable in the listed country, thus 
constituting tainted income for the purposes of the CFC rules. 
Accordingly, the de minimis exemption contained in section 385(4) 
provides that if amounts included in the attributable income of 
the CFC fall under a threshold, they will be exempt from being 
included in the attributable income of an eligible CFC. The fact 
that this exemption is only available in respect of listed country 
CFCs is consistent with the jurisdictional coverage of the CFC 
rules which are designed to tax tainted income derived from 
foreign direct investments in low tax jurisdictions, since such 
investments pose the greatest threat to Australia's domestic tax 
base.
resident of a particular limited-exemption listed country. 
Broadly, the conditions are that the company is neither a broad- 
exemption listed country, nor an Australian resident and is 
treated as resident for the purposes of the tax law of the 
particular limited-exemption country.
40 Section 333 (2) (c) (ii) (B) .
41 Section 333(2) (c) (iii) (B) .
42 This exemption has been described as being reminiscent 
of the force of attraction rule adopted in many DTAs. Under this 
rule, interest, dividends, and royalties are taxed by the 
jurisdiction in which the permanent establishment deriving such 
income is located: Prebble op cit.. at p 21.
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Amounts included under section 385(2)(a) (viz., tainted 
income which has not been subject to tax in a listed country43), 
will be exempt from attribution where the sum of the amounts of 
adjusted tainted income; and income or profits from sources 
outside the listed country that are not subject to tax in the 
listed country or in another listed country,44 do not exceed the 
lesser of $50,000 or 5% of the gross income of the CFC for the 
eligible period. However, regardless of whether the CFC derives a 
certain minimum amount of EDC income, the de minimis exemption is 
not available in respect of certain amounts (viz., trusts and 
partnership income) included in a listed country CFC's notional 
assessable income.45 Such an exclusion may be justified on the 
basis that partnerships and trusts in this case are used merely as 
conduit entities through which income is passed and that there is 
not a convincing commercial reason why a company structure could 
not be utilised to achieve the same result.46
43 Section 385(2) (a) (i) includes in the "notional 
assessable income" of a listed country CFC which fails the active 
income test, adjusted tainted income that is also eligible 
designated concession income ("EDCI"). Effectively, active income 
derived by a listed country CFC but which has been concessionally 
taxed in the foreign country, will constitute adjusted tainted 
income (see 3.4.1. below).
EDCI in relation to a listed country in relation to a 
particular period (i.e., income period) is defined in section 317, 
to mean DCI that is (i) not subject to tax in another listed 
country, or (ii) subject to tax in another listed country and is 
DCI in relation to that other listed country.
44 See section 385(2) (a) (ii) which characterises as 
notional assessable income and therefore, liable to attribution, 
amounts that are not EDCI, not treated as derived in sources of a 
listed country and not subject to tax in the listed country or any 
other listed country. Proposals contained in the Foreign Income 
Bill 1997 modify this subsection to bring into line with the new 
jurisdictional approach by also including income that is not 
subject to tax in a broad-exemption listed country: see proposed 
section 385(2A).
45 See section 385(2) (b) , (c) or (d) of the Act.
46 Related to this justification is the difficulty 
encountered in dissecting tainted income from non-tainted income 
in the case of a partnership or a trust in light of the fact that 
the income in both cases is calculated on a net basis as if the 
partnership or trust were an Australian resident taxpayer. There 
is no provision in the Act which actually imposes tax on 
partnerships or trusts. By including attributed income in the net 
income of the partnership or trust (see section 90 and 95 
respectively), section 460 effectively treats the partnership or 
trust as an attributable taxpayer in a notional sense only. The 
actual attributable taxpayers are, in the case of a partnership, 
the partners; and in the case of a trust, the beneficiaries or the 
trustee depending on the application of Division 6 of Part III of
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Subpart F also contains a de minimis rule which provides that 
if a CFC's "foreign base company income"47 and gross insurance 
income is less than the lesser of 5% of gross income or $US1 
million, then no part of the CFC's income is treated as foreign 
base company income (excluding foreign base company oil-related 
income) or insurance income for the year.48 As mentioned 
previously, the operation of the US de minimis exemption does not 
depend on whether the CFC is resident in a listed or unlisted 
country since the US adopts a transactional approach in its 
Subpart F provisions. Consequently, all foreign corporations 
"controlled" by a USS will benefit from such an exemption where 
they satisfy the threshold requirements set out in §954(b).
A de maximis rule is also provided in Subpart F. Pursuant to 
this rule, where more than 70% of the CFC's gross income 
(including otherwise exempt manufacturing income), consists of 
foreign base company income or insurance income, all of the CFC's 
income is treated as foreign base company income or insurance 
income and must be included in the income of the USS as a deemed 
distribution for the year.49 For example, if a CFC has foreign 
base company income of $75,000 and active income of $25,000, then 
the entire $100,000 will be subject to tax under Subpart F. The 
active income will, for the purposes of the 70% de maximis rule, 
be recharacterised as either foreign base company income or 
insurance income, whichever is more appropriate.50
the Act.
("FBCI") 
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
Section 954(a) IRC defines foreign base company income 
for any taxable year as the sum of : 
foreign personal holding company ("FPHC income") (which 
generally includes income of a passive nature - viz., 
interest and dividend income); 
foreign base company sales income; 
foreign base company services income; 
foreign base company shipping income ; 
foreign base company oil related income.
48 See §954(b)(3)(A) of the Code. Items of gross FBCI that 
are excluded from attribution because of the de minimis exemption 
may nevertheless be subject to characterisation as adjusted net 
FBCI (or other categories of income included in the computation of 
Subpart F income) for the taxable year under the rules of §952 (c) : 
Reg §1.954-1(b)(3).
49 Section 954(b)(3)(B). It should be noted that items 
included in adjusted gross FBCI because of the de maximis rule, 
and are included in Subpart F income under §952 do not reduce 
amounts that, under §952 (c), are subject to recharacterisation in 
later years on account of deficits in prior years: Reg.
§1.954-1 (3) .
General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, at p
991 .
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Therefore, only where a CFC's foreign base company income 
exceeds 5% (or $lm) but is less than 70% of its total income is 
the corporation's total income subject to being characterised as 
either tainted income or good income. In this situation, only the 
tainted income is attributed to the USS of the CFC. Some 
commentators have quite validly questioned the theoretical 
justification for a de maximis rule. If a CFC has more than 30% 
untainted income, the income is exempt from Subpart F; however, if 
it has less than 30% good income, that income is nevertheless 
treated as tainted income. Consequently, it is concluded that if 
good income should not be allowed to shelter tainted income, 
consistency requires that tainted income should not taint good 
income.51 This unsatisfactory position has been addressed in a tax 
reconciliation bill released by the House Ways and Means Committee 
on September 14, 1995. A new rule introduced in that bill 
coordinates the high tax exception and the de maximis 70% full- 
inclusion rule. The amendment which is set forth in Reg. §1.954- 
1(d)(6), is effective for taxable years of CFCs beginning after 6 
November 19 95.52
Turning to the issue of the monetary limit imposed under 
section 385(4) of the Act, it is submitted that the $50,000 
ceiling is unreasonably low. Admittedly, Australian entities which 
own at least a 10% interest in foreign companies that generate 
large amounts of turnover are small in number when compared with 
their US counterparts. However, a ceiling of such a small amount 
as $50,000 seems to be unreasonable in view of the fact that large 
paper profits appearing in the accounts of multinational groups 
could have been derived in a one off transaction, for example, 
simply by taking advantage of favourable exchange rate 
fluctuations. In this respect the monetary ceiling of $US1 million 
provided under §954(b) of the Code (or at least $500,000) would be 
the preferable approach.
In summary, the jurisdictional coverage of Australia's CFC 
rules (which will be further modified once the Foreign Income Bill 
receives Royal Assent), depends on the residency status of the 
relevant CFC. This in turn affects the amount to be attributed to 
the Australian shareholders of that CFC. Consequently, the 
concepts of DCI and EDCI were introduced to ensure that tainted 
profits (defined in section 386(1) as passive income, tainted 
sales income and tainted services income), that have not been 
subject to tax, are not routed through a listed country and paid
51 See Arnold (1986), op cit. at p 396.
The example used to illustrate the operation of the new 
coordination rule proceeds with a CFC which has FBCI of $155 ($5
in the form of dividends and $150 in the form of interest). The 
CFC also has $45 of non-FBCI. The old 70% de maximis rule would 
apply to include the $45 into the CFC's FBCI since the $155 FBCI 
derived by the CFC exceeds 70% of total gross income of the CFC of 
$200. However, where the interest income qualifies for the high- 
tax exception and an election is made, then under the new 
amendment the $45 non-FBCI is excluded from Subpart F income.
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as exempt dividends under section 23AJ.53 Further, in a measure 
designed to reduce compliance costs and to reflect the modern day 
realities of international trade, a de minimis exemption is 
provided thus allowing listed country CFCs to derive some tainted 
income (viz., either $50,000 or 5% of the gross turnover of the 
CFC, whichever is lesser) .
3.2. The Control Rule
The aim of the discussion in this section is to examine the 
look-through capabilities of Australia's CFC rules in ascertaining 
the existence of a CFC. A discussion of this nature logically 
follows from the discussion in the immediately preceding section 
because the residency status of a CFC (which, after all, is merely 
a foreign company), significantly impacts on the scope of the CFC 
measures generally. Once the requisite conditions for establishing 
the existence of a CFC have been examined, it is then necessary to 
consider whether any Australian shareholders are to be attributed 
with the income of that CFC. Consideration of this issue requires 
analysis of the actual interests held by the relevant shareholders 
and the type of income derived by the CFC. This task will be 
undertaken in sections 3.3. and 3.4. respectively, below.
As the term suggests, a CFC is a foreign company that is 
"controlled" by resident shareholders. The existence of control, 
as mentioned previously, is imperative given the overreaching 
effect of the CFC rules and given that such rules are designed to 
operate when the domestic shareholder can compel dividend 
distribution (but chooses not to). Consequently, the discussion in 
this section will examine the provisions of the Act which expound 
on when a foreign company is deemed to be controlled by Australian 
shareholders and thus constitute a CFC. For the purposes of 
comparison, it is instructive to examine the measures for 
ascertaining the existence of control under Subpart F which, as 
will appear, apply a slightly different threshold requirement to 
that applied in Australia. More importantly however, the US 
provisions provide some judicial guidance for determining when 
control exists. It is this latter aspect which potentially may 
prove to be of greatest benefit to the Australian taxpayer and Tax 
Commissioner alike in view of the distinct lack of Australian 
judicial pronouncements on this highly complex area of the law.
The rules dealing with the question of "control" for the 
purposes of the Australian regime are contained in sections 339 to 
355 of the Act. The test for determining if a company is a CFC are 
contained in section 340 which provides that a company is a CFC at
The exemption under section 23AJ is provided because the 
profits out of which the dividend is paid would, in general, have 
been taxed in the listed country at the country's normal company 
tax rate. This exemption from attribution reflects a policy which 
was outlined in the Consultative Document, to exempt non-portfolio 
dividends received from comparable-tax countries, so removing the 
compliance burden of the FTCS in cases where little or no revenue 
would be raised.
144
a particular time if, at that time, the company is a resident of a 
listed country or of an unlisted country and at that time:
(a) there is a group of five or fewer Australian 1% entities 
whose associate-inclusive control interests in the 
company is not less than 50%;
(b) there is a single Australian entity (the "assumed 
controller") whose associate-inclusive control interest 
in the company is not less than 40%; and the 
Commissioner is not satisfied that the company is 
controlled by a group of entities not including the 
assumed controller or any of its associates; or
(c) at that time, the company is controlled by a group of 
five or fewer Australian entities, either alone or 
together with associates.
The underlined terms in the preceding paragraphs are 
themselves the subject of definitions and may be summarised as 
broadly requiring consideration to be given to (i) the residency 
of the company (discussed in section 3.1. above); (ii) the extent 
to which the company is "controlled" by Australian entities ; and 
(iii) the time at which the measurement is to be made (which 
largely impacts on arrangements to avoid the CFC rules).
As far as the control requirement is concerned, it is noted 
that there are two broad aspects to the concept of control - (i)
control in the "strict" sense - which looks at the aggregate 
interests held by a group of resident shareholders to see whether 
it is equal to or exceeds 50%, and (ii)-control in the "economic" 
sense - which looks at interests of a single resident shareholder 
or a group of resident shareholders who own less than 50% of the 
company and thus do not control it in the strict sense. The 
economic test for control comprises of two further tests. The 
first test contained in paragraph (b) above is referred to as the 
"objective de facto test"; whereas, the second test contained in 
paragraph (c) is referred to as the "subjective de facto test".54 
Further, when testing for control, the three tests set out above 
are to be applied sequentially. That is, the circumstances should 
be examined to test whether the conditions set for the strict 
control test are satisfied, before the other tests are examined.
3.2.1. The strict control test
The strict control test is consistent with the Finnish, 
Spanish, Swedish and Norwegian approaches to defining control, 
with the consequence that 50:50 joint ventures will be caught.55
54 See FSIIP op cit. . at pp 19 and 22.
55 The CFC rules of the other countries define control as 
holding more than 50% of certain interest in a non-resident 
company (see FSIIP op cit.. at p 20, Arnold op cit. (1986), and 
OECD (1996) op cit. . at pp 294-295).
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By contrast, the US "control" threshold contained in §957(a) of 
the Code requires that more than 50% of the total combined voting 
power of all classes of stock entitled to vote,56 or the total 
value of stock of such corporation, be owned directly or 
indirectly,57 or owned constructively,58 by a USS on any day during 
the taxable year of such foreign corporation.59 The rationale for 
adopting a different threshold requirement in the Australian CFC 
rules is that the Australian requirement minimises avoidance 
possibilities.60 For example, it is possible for a 50:50 joint 
venture to be formed with no tie-breaker clause which would 
ordinarily operate where the joint venturers have reached an 
impasse. The absence of a tie-breaker clause would effectively 
avoid the operation of the strict control rule in §957(a), but not 
that in section 340(a).
Another difference between the Australian and the US CFC 
provisions is that under section 340(a) it is necessary to 
consolidate the ownership of "not less than 50%" of either the 
total paid-up share capital or the voting power of the foreign
See §957(a), Reg. §1.957(a) (1995). This is referred to
as the "voting control test" (see McIntyre (1989) (looseleaf) op 
cit.. at 6-16). This test is also satisfied where USSs have the 
power to elect, appoint, or replace a person who has powers akin 
to those traditionally enjoyed by a board of directors of a 
domestic corporation: see example 4 contained in Reg. §§1.957-1(c) 
and -1(b) (1) (iii) (1995) .
57 See §958 (a) of the Code.
58 See §958 (b) of the Code.
Section 957 also contains special rules in respect of 
foreign companies deriving income from the insurance of US risks: 
§§953, 957(b) and Reg §1.951-2. However, given the scope of the
discussion, this aspect of determining what constitutes a CFC (see 
also §957 (c) and (d) , and Reg §1.957-3 and 1.957-4) will not be 
discussed.
Under the strict control rule contained in §957(a), 
where a US citizen owns 2% of the company's voting stock they are 
not considered a USS and their 2% will not be counted in 
determining whether "the more than 50%" standard has been reached. 
To illustrate the inflexibility of such a rule, an example is 
provided of eleven Americans, each with a 9.1% share in the stock 
of the corporation. In such an example there would not 
theoretically be a CFC, since none of the Americans owns the 10% 
needed to be a USS: See Kaplan op cit. (1988), at p 218.
The concept of the "Australian 1% entity", on the other hand, 
would effectively overcome the 2% dilemma, since entities with 
only 1% interest in the CFC may be counted in certain 
circumstances, in determining whether it is a CFC: see section 
361(b) discussed later.
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corporation in 5 or fewer Australian 1% entities,61 whereas under 
the strict control test contained in §957(a), no such aggregation 
is necessary.62 The aggregation exercise can be a double-edged 
sword because it avoids the possibility of a minority shareholder 
outside the controlling group of being caught by the CFC rules 
(thus reducing compliance costs), but at the same time it gives 
rise to definitional problems discussed immediately below.
The definition of the term "group" contained in section 
340(a) extends the ordinary meaning of group beyond a number of 
entities (whether they are associated or acting together or not) 
to include one entity alone.63 Such a broad definition of group 
may raise difficulties of interpretation in that it could have the 
unintended effect of expanding the ambit of the strict control 
test. The question which arises as a result of the inclusive 
nature of the definition of group is whether as well as 
contemplating entities acting in concert with each other, the term 
group also contemplates entities which are associated with each 
other. Alternatively, there is some doubt as to whether entities 
that are not associated, but are acting in concert, can be members 
of a group. For this aspect of the problem it is necessary to turn 
to the definition of "associate" contained in section 318, which 
provides, inter alia, that associates of a company ("primary 
company") include an entity ("controlling entity") which either 
alone or together with other entities, (i) "sufficiently 
influences"64 the primary entity; or (ii) holds a majority voting 
interest in the primary entity.
61 The term "Australian 1% entity" is defined in section 
317 to mean an Australian entity (see also section 336) whose 
associate-inclusive control interest (viz., direct and indirect 
shareholdings) in the CFC is at least 1%.
62 However, the US has the foreign personal holding 
companies ("FPHC") rules which often overlap with the Subpart F 
rules and apply to corporations controlled by five or fewer US 
citizens, more than 60% (50% after the first taxation year) of 
whose gross income is passive income. Subpart F is to take 
precedence over FPHC rules in the case of overlap: see §951(d) of 
the Code.
63 See section 317 of the Act.
64 "[A] company is sufficiently influenced by an entity or 
entities if the company or its directors, are accustomed or under 
an obligation (whether formal or informal), or might reasonably be 
expected, to act in accordance with the directions, instructions 
or wishes of the entity or entities ...": section 318(5)(b). The 
influence by an entity or entities may take the form of 
instructions, wishes or directions conveyed either directly or 
indirectly to the company or its directors: Explanatory Memorandum 
accompanying the Taxation Laws Amendment (Foreign Income Bill)
1990 (the "EM"), at p 1634. The EM cited throughout this chapter 
is as reproduced in Australian Income Tax: Pending Legislation 
(Butterworths Pty Ltd, Sydney, 1990).
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The context within which the phrase "group" is used in 
paragraph (a) of section 340 militates against expanding the 
definition of the term "group" to correspond to the definition of 
"associate" in section 318. Support for this proposition may be 
gleaned from the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the Taxation 
Laws Amendment (Foreign Income Bill) 1990 (the "EM"), where it is 
stated that the question of control existing will be one of "fact 
to be answered according to the circumstances of each case."65 
Further, the reference within section 340(a) to
"associate-inclusive control interests", suggests that it is at 
that level where it is appropriate to consider the definition of 
associate.66
Having identified some of the problems with applying the 
strict control test in practice and the difference in approach 
between Australia and the US (in terms of the level of interest 
required before control is said to exist), it is now appropriate 
to consider what interests are taken into account when testing for 
the existence of control. This question turns on the concept of 
"associate-inclusive control interest" which is defined in section 
349 in such a manner as to aggregate the Australian entity's (or 
its associates') direct and indirect control interests in the 
foreign company. The aggregation of an Australian entity's direct, 
indirect and related interests in a foreign company is designed to 
minimise avoidance of the control rule.
Direct control interest
Unlike the US the definition of direct control (in §957 of 
the Code), Australia's CFC rules extend the definition beyond 
control based on the value or quantity of shares held by the USS 
in the relevant CFC. Pursuant to section 350(1), an entity will 
hold a direct control interest in a company equal to the 
percentage that the entity holds or is "entitled to acquire", of 
the rights to paid-up capital, voting rights, distribution of 
capital or profits on a winding-up or otherwise. Section 350(1) 
concludes by providing that if different percentages are 
applicable to these, then the greater or greatest of those 
percentages is the one which will be applicable. It has been 
observed that the extended definition of control appears 
reasonable and justified because domestic shareholders who are 
entitled to 50% or more of the relevant entity's distributable 
income (or assets on liquidation), can also take advantage of the 
deferral benefit.67
By relying on the concept of "entitlement to acquire" paid-up 
capital, the Australian CFC rules avoid the practical difficulties
65 See EM to the Bill at p 1656.
66 See Gelski R "Operation of the Control Test" a paper 
presented to The University of New South Wales -Taxation Business 
& Investment Law Research Centre on 23 February 1990, at p 4.
67 OECD (1996) op cit. . at p 296.
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associated with term "value of stock" (see the second limb of 
§957). This is because further definitions as to what factors may 
be used in determining the value of stock are not required when 
applying section 350.68 However, the use of the term "entitled to 
acquire" leads to other difficulties.69 For instance, it has been 
held that the ordinary meaning of the term "entitled" contemplates 
that a person must be either entitled in possession or entitled in 
person.70 Furthermore, section 350(2) provides that where there 
are differing percentages of the total rights to vote or to 
participate in decision-making as between differing types of 
decision making, the relevant percentage to take into account will 
be the highest of those percentages. The obvious question which 
must be addressed in relation to this provision is what rights 
will constitute "control" where an Australian entity, or five or 
fewer Australian entities and their associates hold 50% or more of
For example, §552(a) and Reg §1.551(3)(c) make it clear 
that the value of stock may be based on the corporation's net 
worth, earning capacity, any appreciation in the assets, and any 
other relevant factors.
The phrase "entitled to acquire" is defined in section 
322, which provides:
"For the purposes of this Part, an entity is entitled to 
acquire anything that the entity is absolutely or 
contingently entitled to acquire, whether because of any 
constituent document of a company, the exercise of any right 
or option or for any other reason."
In the Will of Borger [1912] VLR 310, especially at p 
313. The phrase "entitled to acquire" was also found in the 
recently repealed section 11 of the Companies (Acquisition of 
Shares) Code ("CASA"), which prohibited a person from acquiring 
more than 20% of shares in a company. The concept of "entitlement" 
to the shares was critical to the prohibition and there have been 
numerous Supreme Court cases which have considered the point.
Other cases have considered the phrase but in other contexts the 
most famous cases being the High Court decision in W.P. Keiaherv 
Ptv Ltd v FC of T (1957) 100 CLR 66 at pp 84-9, and Mendes v 
Commissioner of Probate Duties (Vic) (1967) 122 CLR 152 at pp 
161-4 .
A very lucid discussion of this concept is found, for 
example, in Ford Company Law (5th ed) (Butterworths Pty Limited, 
1990) , at chapter 20 (which was authored by Austin, R P) . See also 
an article by Hartnel A, in (1988) 6 Companies and Securities- Law
Journal 169/ and Sullivan B, "Operation of the Control Test and 
Attributable Taxpayers", in a paper presented on 15-17 June 1990, 
University of New South Wales - Taxation Business & Investment Law 
Research Centre.
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the shares of any particular class of shares issued by a foreign 
company.71
A further definition of direct control interest is contained 
in section 350(6) which essentially reproduces the "subjective de 
facto" control test (discussed below). Pursuant to section 350(6), 
while a company is controlled by a group of 5 or fewer Australian 
entities, either alone or together with associates, each 
Australian entity in that group of 5 or fewer Australian entities 
holds a direct control interest in the company equal to 100%. The 
possibility of double counting of direct control interests under 
section 350(1) and (6) is circumvented by section 350(7) which 
provides that where subsection (6) applies subsection (1) is 
deemed not to apply.
Indirect control interest
The need look-through indirect shareholdings is clear in 
light of the corporate veil doctrine which has enabled many 
Australian companies to indirectly control a foreign company 
without invoking the second and/or third limb of the test of 
residency in section 6(1)(b) of the Act. Accordingly, section 
352(2) provides that an interposed entity is not to be taken into 
account in calculating an indirect control interest unless the 
entity is a CFE.72 This requirement is largely based on the rules 
for tracing indirect interests contained in the United Kingdom CFC 
rules.73
A hypothetical example is propounded where an Australian 
shareholder owns, say, 50% of "A class" shares in a foreign 
company in which there are five classes of shares each 
representing 20% of the total shares in the company, and no other 
Australian shareholders. The A Class shares merely give rise to a 
power of veto, namely, the right to prevent the body of 
shareholders from changing the rights attaching to the A Class 
shares without consent of the holder of such shares. One 
commentator has suggested that this right will not amount to the 
holding of the requisite percentage of the total rights of 
shareholders to participate in decision-making concerning the 
constituent document of the company: see Gelski op cit. . at p 7.
72 A controlled foreign entity ("CFE") is defined in 
section 339 as a (i) CFC; (ii) controlled foreign partnership 
("CFP") or (iii) controlled foreign trust ("CFT"). A CFP is in 
turn defined in section 341 to mean a partnership which is not an 
Australian partnership and where at least one of the partners is a 
CFE. A CFT is defined in section 342 as a non-Australian trust 
where there is an eligible transferor in respect of the trust and 
there is a group of 5 or fewer Australian 1% entities whose 
associate-inclusive control interests in the trust is not less 
than 50%.
The indirect control rules are contained in sections 749 
and 840 of the Income and Corporations Taxes Act 1988. Under these 
provisions a United Kingdom resident is deemed to own all the
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Once it is established that the interposed entity is a CFC, 
then indirect control interests are calculated by multiplying the 
"control tracing interest" that the Australian shareholder holds 
in the interposed entity by the control tracing interest that the 
interposed entity holds in the foreign company under scrutiny.74
Therefore, the indirect interest rules seek to get around 
arrangements which artificially decrease the Australian entity's 
proportionate interest in the relevant foreign company by 
resorting to the "control tracing interest" rules which look- 
through interposed entities (e.g., CFCs) to determine existence of 
indirect control of a lower tier company. Section 353(1) provides 
that at a particular time, an Australian entity holds a "control 
tracing interest" in a company equal to the direct control 
interest held by an interposed entity in the company at that time. 
In view of the requirement in section 352 that indirect control 
interest can only be traced through interposed entities that are 
CFCs, it becomes necessary to resort to either of the three tests 
in section 340 to determine whether the interposed entity is a CFC 
in relation to the Australian shareholder. Once this is 
established, section 353(2) then operates to deem the "control 
tracing interest" held by the Australian entity in the company to 
be 100% where the interposed entity holds (on aggregate) a direct 
control interest in that company of "not less than 50%".
The following example should adequately illustrate the 
operation of section 353(2). Assume a domestic shareholder (Ausco) 
owns 100% of the voting shares in Forco 1 which in turn owns 51% 
of the voting shares in Forco 2. Given that Forco 1 is a CFC in 
relation to Ausco, then it is possible to trace through the 
control interests held by that entity to determine whether Ausco 
indirectly controls Forco 2. Based on the criteria tests set out 
in section 340 for the existence of a CFC, there is little doubt 
that Forco 2 would be regarded as a CFC in relation to Ausco. In 
fact, the facts in the example used reveal that Ausco's 
"associate-inclusive control interest" (see sections 340(a) or 
(b)) in Forco 2 is not less than 50%. In such a circumstance,
Ausco is deemed to hold a 100% control tracing interest in Forco
2.75
This is to be contrasted with the US indirect ownership rule 
contained in §958(a)(2) which provides that stock owned directly
shares of any foreign corporation that are owned by a foreign 
corporation controlled by the United Kingdom resident.
74 Where there is more than one entity interposed between 
the Australian entity and the company being tested, the indirect 
control interest is calculated by multiplying out the respective 
control tracing interests down the chain: section 352(3).
75 The 100% deemed entitlement provision set out in section 
353(2) is similar to the deeming provision found in §958(b) for 
the purposes of establishing constructive ownership of a CFC (see 
later).
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or indirectly, by or for a foreign corporation, shall be 
considered to be owned proportionately by its shareholders, 
partners or beneficiaries. Stock considered to be owned by reason 
of the application of paragraph (2) shall be treated as actually 
owned by the shareholder. Therefore, a USS which owns 70% of the 
stock in CFC1, which in turn owns 90% of the stock in CFC2, is 
treated as owning 63% (i.e., 70% of 90%) of CFC2. However, the US 
provisions create a chain of ownership rule where attribution 
under the rule stops with the first US person in the chain of 
ownership running from the foreign entity. The short-circuit in 
the chain of ownership rule caused by the introduction of a US 
person could arguably give rise to tax planning opportunities 
involving the US FTCS, in particular, the possible granting of tax 
credits to the associated US person.76
The calculation of indirect control interests under the 
Australian CFC rules reflects the modern day reality of 
multinational corporate structures where the domestic shareholder 
(viz., parent company) substantially influences the decision 
making process in interposed and other lower-tier CFEs in the 
corporate chain, by effectively controlling the exercise of 
shareholder-decision making rights.77 The necessity to trace 
indirect control through CFEs is based on considerations of 
fairness in view of the fact that the CFC rules are designed to 
operate where the domestic shareholder can compel dividend 
distribution.78 The aggregation of direct and indirect interests 
also serves to counter manipulation of the CFC rules through the 
dilution of direct shareholding without the accompanying dilution 
of effective control. The constructive ownership rules (discussed 
below) are also very important in upholding the integrity of the 
CFC rules and ensuring that the manipulation of the residence rule 
along the lines of the Patcorp and Esquire Nominees cases 
(discussed in Part III at 4.3.), are no longer possible under the 
CFC rules.
76 It must be noted that in determining a person's 
proportionate interest in a foreign corporation, any arrangement 
which artificially decreases a US person's proportionate interest 
will not be recognised: Regulation §§1.951-1 and 1.957-1.
77 See also OECD (1996) op cit. . at p 295.
The requirement to trace through CFEs avoids the unfair 
consequence, for example, that could arise where a domestic 
shareholder who holds a 30% direct interest in Forco 1 and 35% 
direct interest in Forco 2, is deemed to own 53% (i.e., 35 + (30% 
x 60%)) of Forco 2 (and therefore, be attributed with 
undistributed income of Forco 2), because Forco 1 has a 60% 
interest in Forco 2. This result is unfair because the domestic 
shareholder does not control (in the strict or economic sense) 
either Forco 1 or Forco 2. See also Arnold (1986) op cit.. at p 
419 .
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Constructive ownership rules
The constructive ownership rules were foreshadowed in the 
FSIIP where it was stated that they would, along with the direct 
and indirect control interests, minimise avoidance of the 
application of the control rule. The constructive ownership rules 
derive from the term "associate-inclusive control interest" in 
section 340 and impute an Australian entity, for certain limited 
purposes, with the interest held by associates in a foreign 
company. The definition of "associates" in section 318 is designed 
in a way which incorporates those entities that, by reason of 
family or business connections, might appropriately be regarded as 
associates of a company. Therefore, unlike indirect control, 
constructive ownership can be traced through the family or 
business connection which may either be natural persons, 
companies, trustees or partnerships.79 A company will be 
associated with another entity if, inter alia, (i) that entity is 
a partner of the company or a partnership in which the company is 
a partner, (ii) another entity, either acting alone or another 
entity sufficiently influences the company (primary company), or 
(iii) another company that is sufficiently influenced by the 
primary company.80
The constructive ownership rules contained in Subpart F are 
similar to the Australian rules although, reliance on this concept 
in Subpart F is principally designed to ascertain whether a US 
person is a USS or is "related" to the CFC. Section 958(b) 
provides rules for determining when stock is constructively owned 
by a US person as a USS within the meaning of §951(b). The section 
adopts the main ownership provisions of §318 of the Code, with 
some modifications. In general, §318 provides that an individual 
is to be considered as owning the stock owned directly or 
indirectly by certain relatives (e.g., spouse children, 
grandchildren and parents).81 Partners and beneficiaries are to be 
considered as owning the stock owned either directly or indirectly 
by or for the partnership or trust estate.82 Shareholders owning 
10% or more of the stock in a corporation are imputed (on a pro
79 See subsections 318(1), (2), (3) and (4) respectively.
An entity or entities will have sufficient influence 
over a company or its directors because of obligation (whether 
formal or informal) or custom, where it is reasonably expected 
that the company or its directors will act on such instructions: 
section 318(6)(b).
81 See §318 (a) (1) .
82 See §318 (a) (2) .
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rata basis) with the corporations' stock holdings in the CFC.83 
Where however, a partnership, trust or corporation owns directly 
or indirectly more than 50% of the total combined voting power of 
all classes of stock entitled to vote of a corporation, it is to 
be considered as owning all the stock entitled to vote.84
The US constructive ownership rules (like their Australian 
equivalent) apply only for the purpose of determining whether a 
foreign corporation is controlled by resident taxpayers or whether 
the minimum ownership requirement is satisfied. They do not apply 
to determine the amount of the undistributed income of a CFC to be 
attributed to a taxpayer. The lack of attribution to a USS where 
it constructively owns 100% of the stock of an eligible CFC 
corresponds with the attribution rule under sections 361(1) (b) and 
362 (discussed below), which together, require the relevant 
Australian entity to have a specific interest in the CFC before 
attribution of the CFC's income will occur. Notwithstanding, the 
concept of constructive ownership is very important in deterring 
avoidance of the control through fragmentation of shareholdings.
3.2.2. Objective de facto control test
The test for control in paragraph (b) of section 340 is based 
on the assumption that a single Australian entity (i.e., "assumed 
controller") whose associate-inclusive control interest in a 
foreign company is 40% or more, in fact controls the company. The 
rationale for adopting a reasonably high interest requirement 
(i.e., 40%) is that since the de facto control test is to be used 
in conjunction with the strict control test it can be fairly 
conservative.85 However, the assumed controller will not be taken
83 See §318(a)(2), §958(b)(3). Where a shareholder owns 
more than 50% in value of the stock in another corporation, the 
first mentioned corporation is considered as owning the stock 
owned by the shareholder: see regulation §1.958-2 (f) (2) which 
provides that the rule which attributes the largest total 
percentage of stock to the person to whom a determination is being 
made will be applied where the stock may be considered as owned 
under more than one of the rules or by more than one person.
84 See section 958(b)(2). The example in Regulation 
§1.958-2(f) (2) provides an illustration of how this deeming 
provision operates:
Example: US person C owns 10% of stock in foreign corporation N, 
which in turn owns 60% of stock in foreign corporation S. Under 
Regulation §1.958-2 (c) (1) (iii) and Regulation §1.958-2 (c) (2) , N 
corporation is considered as owning 100% of the stock in S 
corporation, and C is considered as owning 10% of the stock in S 
corporation. Thus, for purposes of determining whether C is a US 
shareholder with respect to S corporation, the attribution rules 
of Regulations §§1.958-2 (c) (1) (iii) and 1.958-2 (c) (2) are used 
inasmuch as C owns a larger total percentage of the stock of S 
corporation under such rules.
85 FSIIP op cit. . at p 22.
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to control the foreign company if the company is controlled by an 
entity (or collectively by a number of entities) other than (or 
not including) the assumed controller or any of its associates.
For example, it was remarked in the EM that where an Australian 
entity holds 45% of all the interest in a foreign company and a 
single unassociated foreign entity held the other 55% of the 
interests in the company, the test for control under paragraph (b) 
would generally not be satisfied. This approach would seem to be 
consistent with the view taken by the US courts in relation to 
§§957 and 958 (see below).
To minimise manipulation of the objective de facto control 
test, a shareholder's interest in a non-resident company will be 
determined by the aggregation of direct, indirect and related 
control tracing interests held by associates of the shareholder. 
The tracing rules along with the constructive ownership rules 
should go a long way towards limiting the extent to which 
taxpayers can circumvent the control rule, but will not solve the 
avoidance problem entirely. The problem involves a number of 
issues, and indirect and associated interests in the foreign 
company are only one aspect of the problem. Another aspect of the 
problem involves the time at which the interests in the foreign 
company are measured (i.e., at the end of the statutory accounting 
period of the company). The concept of "statutory accounting 
period" and the general anti-avoidance provisions of Part IVA 
(which were discussed in Part III at 3.3.) should go a long way in 
addressing the possibilities for avoiding the operation of the CFC 
rules.
The term "statutory accounting period of the company" which 
appears throughout Part X is defined in section 319.86 The section 
seeks to impose upon a company a set of rules for determining its 
accounting period for the purposes of Part X. The philosophy 
behind this approach is to minimise opportunities for avoiding the 
operation of Part X, while at the same time ensuring that the 
system is simpler to comply with by not requiring Australian 
taxpayers to measure their interests in the foreign company every 
day or on some averaged basis, but rather on an annual basis. This 
is particularly relevant in the context of the control test where 
a non-resident company will be a CFC if the control tests are 
satisfied at the end of its accounting year.87 The general anti-
Section 319 defines the term "statutory accounting 
period of a company" to mean a period of twelve months ending on 
30 June. However, a company may, with the consent of the 
Commissioner, adopt a substituted accounting period.
Under §951(a), income derived by a CFC will be included 
in the income of a USS only if the CFC is a CFC for an 
uninterrupted period of 30 days or more during any taxable year. 
Further, the introduction in 1989 of §898 ensures that the 
opportunity to delay the inclusion of income by mismatching the 
taxable year of the CFC with that of its dominant USS was reduced: 
see also Reg. §§ 1.898-1, 2, issued in 1993 and discussed in 
Isenbergh (2nd edition) op cit.. at para. 39.3.
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avoidance provisions of Part IVA would operate in conjunction with 
section 319 to prevent taxpayers circumventing the control rule by 
disposing of interests before the day of measurement and 
repurchasing them after that day.88
3.2.3. Subjective de facto control test
The test in section 340 (c) provides that a company will be a 
CFC if it is controlled by a group of five or fewer Australian 
entities. Whether a group of five or fewer Australian entities 
controls a foreign company will be a question of fact to be 
answered according to the circumstances of each case. Moreover, 
unlike the strict control test, the subjective de facto test does 
not require the group to comprise Australian 1% entities. Thus, 
for the purposes of section 340(c), the Australian entities do not 
have to have any shareholding or direct ownership interest in the 
company whose status is being ascertained. However, under the 
attribution rule discussed below, companies which are included in 
the group but which are not Australian 1% entities will not be 
attributable taxpayers by virtue of section 361(1)(b)(ii). There 
is no equivalent to the subjective de facto control test in any of 
the rules of the other nations which have introduced CFC rules.89
The concept of "control"
The concept of "control" is critical for the test under 
paragraphs (b) and (c) of section 340, however, such term is not 
defined in the legislation. The EM and FSIIP make it reasonably 
clear that the term refers to actual control rather than the 
ability or capacity to control. It is generally accepted that the 
subjective element of the de facto control test will be of wide 
potential application and possibly more than a little difficult to 
predict. This observation is based on the range of circumstances 
set out in the FSIIP which indicate when the de facto control test 
may be triggered. One such circumstance is where there are 
arrangements which affect the interests of, or the rights held by, 
the other shareholders. Such "arrangements" arguably could fall 
short of direct power to control but which, in fact, do deliver 
control.90 The definition of "group" in section 318 also could 
arguably be relied upon to extend the scope of the concept of the 
de facto control tests beyond actual control.
Ultimately, in view of the lack of Australian case law on the 
subject, the Commissioner of Taxation may have to resort to the US 
cases dealing with the question of de facto control, when 
exercising his discretion to determine whether there is requisite
See the FSIIP op cit.. at p 24; and FCT v Gulland (1985) 
160 CLR 55.
89 FSIIP op cit.. at p 24; and for countries that have 
introduced CFC rules after the date of release of the FSIIP (i.e., 
1989), generally see OECD CFC Report o p  cit.. at pp 294-295.
90 Ibid.
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control before determining that a CFC exists. By the same token, 
an assumed controller may find some support in those US cases to 
show that it does not "control" a CFC within the meaning of that 
term in section 340(b).
De facto control at US general law
The crux of the US approach is that substance over form is 
the preferred approach in applying the control provisions of §§957 
and 958.91 The courts have similarly expounded such views. The US 
Court of Appeals in Garlock Inc v Commissioner92 held that "it is 
real voting power and not the mere mechanical number of votes 
which Congress was concerned with [in enacting Subpart F]". The 
same Court in Kraus v Commissioner93 held that in determining 
whether "real" voting power was surrendered by means of creation 
and splitting of preferred stock, the "actualities" stressed in 
Treasury Regulation §1-957-1(b)(2) must be looked at. The court 
emphasised the need to "look behind the facade" to determine 
whether a real transfer of voting power to the preferred 
stockholders took place, or whether the purpose of the arrangement
91 See Reg. §1.957-(1) (b) (2) which states that mere 
ownership of shares does not of itself dictate where control of 
the foreign corporation rests. It provides that:
"[a]ny arrangement to shift formal voting power away from 
United States shareholders of a foreign corporation will not 
be given effect if in reality voting power is retained. The 
mere ownership of stock entitled to vote does not by itself 
mean that the shareholder owning such stock had the voting 
power of such stock for the purposes of section 957. For 
example, if there is any agreement, whether express or 
implied, that any shareholder will not vote his stock or will 
vote it only in a specified manner, or that shareholders 
owning stock having no more than 50 per cent of the total 
combined voting power will exercise voting power normally 
possessed by a majority of stockholders, then the nominal 
ownership of the voting power will be disregarded in 
determining which shareholders actually hold such voting 
power, and this determination will be made on the basis of 
such agreement."
9^ 489 F 2d 197 (1973) at pp 201-202. The court there
referred to the example provided in Regulation §1.957-1(2) (b) 
(cited above). See also Kolotex Hosiery (Australia) Ptv Ltd v FCT 
(1975) 132 CLR 535 at 571, where Gibbs J said that voting power in 
the company is not restricted to voting power attached to or 
carried by shares and includes all voting power exercised in the 
company however, conferred.
93 4 9 0 F 2d 898 (1974), at pp 900-901.
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was simply to avoid the appearance of the foreign corporation as a 
"CFC" .94
Whether the approach of the US Tax Courts in Garlock and 
Kraus would overcome the Esquire Nominees point in relation to the 
exercise of the power of veto is yet to be tested in the 
Australian courts.95 Ironically, the substance over form approach 
could be relied upon to argue that the foreign company is 
ultimately controlled by those directors who have a power of veto 
over decisions made by the de facto directors. That is, the 
directors of a foreign company, depending on the circumstances of 
the case, could in substance be regarded as the ultimate 
controllers of the company if there was scope for arguing that 
they would not implement directives (issued by the Australian de 
facto controllers) which are improper or inadvisable for the 
purposes of the company. It is not clear what kind of evidence a 
court of law would consider persuasive in upholding this type of 
argument. An insight of the type of evidence that a court may find 
persuasive in resolving this issue can be gained from the facts of 
and the US courts' decisions in CCA Inc and Koehring.
The taxpayers in CCA Inc v Commissioner96 (who were also 
USSs) were successful in their attempt to decontrol a foreign 
corporation. CCA Inc (the "taxpayer"), a US corporation 
established a wholly owned Swiss corporation. The taxpayer became 
concerned about the possible adverse effects of the newly 
introduced Subpart F on its ability to defer income with respect 
to its European operations. Accordingly, CCA Inc sought to 
decontrol its Swiss corporation by transferring all its shares to 
a wholly owned Netherlands Antilles company, and had the Swiss 
company issue a new preferred stock with 50% of the voting power 
to unrelated parties who were not USSs. Thereafter, the 
shareholders of the Swiss company comprised non-related persons 
holding 800 cumulative preference shares and a Netherlands 
Antilles subsidiary of CCA holding 800 ordinary shares. Each share 
had the same par value and carried with it the right to vote.
94 Ibid at p 901. Mulligan J in concluding that the 
taxpayers (who were USSs) never surrendered any real voting power 
said (at p 902) :
"... it defies credulity that the taxpayers who owned 100% of 
[the foreign corporation], a corporation which at the end of 
the fiscal year 1962 had a net worth in excess of $250,000, 
and was then making annual profits in excess of $225,000, 
would surrender 50% of the control of their corporation to 
new shareholders who were making a capital contribution of 
SFrl00,000, less than $25,000."
See Gibbs J's reservations expressed in Esquire Nominees 
Limited v FCT (1973) 129 CLR 177 at 185-186 where his Honour did
not regard as persuasive the fact that the taxpayer habitually 
responded to instructions formulated in Australia.
96 64 TC 137 (1976) .
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The Articles of Incorporation of the Swiss company were 
amended to provide for a ten member board of administrators, one 
half of whom were to be nominated by the ordinary shareholders and 
the other half to be nominated by the preference shareholders. The 
chairman did not have a casting vote. The preference shares 
carried a 6% cumulative preferential dividend.
After a comprehensive analysis of the evidence, Wiles J (in 
the US Tax Court) held that the taxpayers had divested themselves 
of meaningful voting power in the wholly owned Swiss subsidiary.
He found no evidence of any agreements, whether oral or written, 
between the parties with respect to the manner in which the 
preference shareholders would vote their stock.97 He distinguished 
the facts of the present case from those in Kraus' case in that 
the preferred shareholders in the latter case had no "real 
opportunity to alter the course of events".98
On 28 June 1982, the US Internal Revenue Service announced 
that it no longer acquiesces in the decision of the Tax Court in 
CCA Inc v Commissioner.99 The need for such a drastic action is 
questionable in the light of the important decision of the US
Cf., the findings of the Court in Kraus' case, where 
Mulligan J said that all "the new preferred stockholders were 
carefully selected, moreover, so that no rocking of the corporate 
boat could be anticipated" (490 F 2d 898 (1974), at 902-903) .
64 TC 137 (1974), at 151. Wiles J concluded ( at p 153): 
"The aggregate effect of the factors considered above 
indicates that the old CCA did divest itself of dominion and 
control of AG [the Swiss subsidiary]. There were no 
substantial restrictions placed upon the preferred stock that 
were not also placed upon the common stock. Nor were there 
any provisions made whereby old CCA would reacquire the stock 
of the preferred shareholders should they desire to sell the 
stock ... The preferred stock was sold to nonrelated 
shareholders whose representatives at the shareholders 
meetings and the board of the directors took an active part 
in the consideration of AG's business. Old CCA retained no 
significant strings which could have been used by it to 
require the preferred shareholders to vote with it regarding 
AG's business. This is in sharp contrast to the ... [Kraus 
case]. We recognise that, as in the Kraus case, the amount 
paid by the preferred shareholders for their stock was less 
than 50 per cent of the net worth of AG. This fact alone, in 
the light of other factors present in this case, is not 
sufficient to classify AG as a controlled foreign 
corporation."
99 1 9 8 2 - 28 IRB 5.
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Court of Appeals in Koehring Company v US,100 which purported to 
confine the scope of the CCA Inc case.
The facts in Koehring's case are somewhat involved; however, 
for present purposes it is sufficient to merely convey the 
essential facts of the case. In 1959 Koehring acquired a wholly 
owned Panamanian subsidiary, KOS. In 1963, concerned about the 
adverse effects of Subpart F, Koehring entered into an arrangement 
with an English corporation, NC, under which voting control of KOS 
was transferred to NC. Subsequently, NC acquired 44,000 shares of 
8% cumulative voting preferred stock with a par value of $10 per 
share. This represented 55% of the outstanding KOS stock entitled 
to a vote. Koehring retained 36,000 voting shares of $10 par value 
common stock, representing the remaining 45% of the voting shares.
At the time of the sale, NC and Koehring enjoyed a long 
standing relationship. Further, after NC acquired majority control 
of KOS there were remarkably few changes in KOS operations. NC did 
not attempt to replace existing management, which was closely 
identified with Koehring, with executives more loyal to NC. KOS 
continued to sell only Koehring products until 1967, when it began 
selling a few NC products on a trial basis at the suggestion of 
Koehring's president. No NC directors were authorised to draw 
cheques on behalf of KOS. Moreover, NC referred to its control 
over KOS as being "nominal" in the minutes of the Board of 
Directors meeting on September 11, 1963. ,
Upon reviewing the above facts and other facts such as the 
existence of a reciprocal arrangement whereby Koehring provided 
funds indirectly to NC to enable NC to take up its investment in 
KOS, Harlington Wood Jr, J., found the existence of an implied 
agreement between Koehring and NC which evidenced an intention on 
the part of Koehring not to divest itself of operating control of 
KOS.101 The Judge was not persuaded by submissions on behalf of 
Koehring stating that there were genuine commercial reasons for 
entering into the arrangement with NC. He said (at footnote 5):
"Koehring's concern with the tax consequences of Subpart F 
was manifest even before that section was enacted. Moreover, 
the record is replete with evidence which demonstrates that, 
even if there were some business reasons for [NC] to make an 
investment in KOS, the transaction was timed and structured 
the way that it was largely because of Koehring's desire to 
avoid the tax consequences of Subpart F."
It appears that the result of the above decisions and the 
withdrawing by the IRS of its acquiescence to the CCA Inc decision
100 583 F 2d 313. At footnote 13, Harlington Wood Jr, J 
stated:
"We do not mean to imply that we would necessarily agree with 
the tax court's analysis in CCA Inc if a similar situation were 
presented to us."
101 Ibid, at pp 320-321.
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has created serious concern as to what exactly a USS would have to 
do to decontrol a foreign subsidiary without giving up complete 
financial interest in the company as a shareholder. Perhaps the 
courts' overly broad interpretation of Subpart F could be put down 
to a desire to ensure that the operation of Subpart F is not 
circumvented where there are no justifiable commercial reasons for 
attempting to decontrol a foreign subsidiary apart from avoiding 
the adverse tax effects of Subpart F.
The effect of the above cases and the examples provided in 
the FSIIP would appear to make it very difficult for Australian 
shareholders to effectively divest their interests in a foreign 
company in the case where control would re-vest with the 
Australian shareholder upon the happening of a defaulting event. 
However, the correctness of the approach adopted in the US cases 
is not beyond doubt. Professor Kaplan, for instance, argues that 
the court in Koehring's case was too quick to dismiss the fact 
that Koehring had installed as co-owner an unrelated company, a 
competitor even. He notes the court's observation where it said 
that NC was unlikely to exercise its control of KOS 
antagonistically to Koehring's interests and asks whether 
"antagonism" is the standard that foreign shareholders must 
satisfy to be deemed in "control".102
Despite the above analysis of the US courts' interpretation 
of the concept of de facto control, it is submitted that the 
decision in CCA Inc's case may nevertheless prove to be a 
stumbling block for the ATO, so far as it can be relied upon to 
support the resident taxpayer's claim that it had effectively 
divested 50% of its control in the foreign corporation. Harlington 
Wood Jr, J., was at pains to distinguish the facts in the case 
before him from those of CCA Inc. He found that Koehring's attempt 
to divest itself of operating control of KOS was done pursuant to 
an agreement; whereas in CCA Inc, no such agreement existed.
Capacity to control
There are a number of cases which have looked at the question 
of control in Australia, but unlike the US cases, none has 
examined the issue in the context of the CFC rules. Therefore, it 
is not very instructive to analyse the Australian cases in any 
great detail since they only prove what has already been stated 
and that is, that capacity to control does not arguably constitute 
requisite control for the purposes of the CFC rules.
The landmark cases dealing with the question of control in 
Australia are Keicrherv's case and Mendes' case. After considering 
the latter two cases, as well as Re The News Corporation 
Limited,103 one commentator concluded that the words of section 
340(c) are limited to presently existing control, and would not 
catch situations where a person may exercise rights so as to move
Kaplan op cit. (1988), at pp 242-243. 
(1987) 70 ALR 419.
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into a position of exercising control.104 Support for this 
conclusion is also drawn from the judgment of the majority in FCT 
v Commonwealth Aluminium Corporation Ltd.105
In Mendes' case, the issue of "control" arose as follows. The 
question before the court was whether a company was "controlled" 
by a deceased up to the date of his death within the terms of 
section 7(2) (b)106 of the Probate Duty Act 1962 (Vic) . If it were 
to be held that the company was so controlled then section 7 would 
cause an issue which was made by the company to the deceased's son 
to be a gift which formed part of the property of the deceased at 
the time of his death for Victorian probate duty purposes.
Prior to the issue of the shares, the company had an issued 
capital of nine ordinary shares of which the deceased held five 
and the son held four. The shares issued to the son comprised 
20,000 "B" shares issued in September 1959 and 12,750 "B" shares 
issued in February 1961. Under article 3 (ii), the "B" shares 
carried very restricted rights in that the holder of the "B" 
shares was not entitled to notice of or to attend and vote either 
by person or proxy at general meetings of the company, unless the 
business of the meeting was concerned with the consideration of a 
resolution for reducing the capital or for sale of the undertaking 
of the company, or for winding up the company or for varying or 
abrogating any of the rights attached to the "B" shares.
In noting the four triggering events which conferred upon the 
"B" shares power to vote, Kitto, Taylor and Windeyer JJ in the 
High Court held that the deceased had not controlled the company, 
since he did not control the company in respect of the four events 
noted in the immediately preceding paragraph. Kitto J (with whom 
Taylor J agreed), referred to the term a "company which was
104 Sullivan B "Operations of the Control Test and 
Attributable Taxpayers", a paper presented to The University of 
New South Wales -Taxation Business & Investment Law Research 
Centre on 15-16 June 1990, at p 23.
105 (19 8 0) 143 CLR 646, at 659.
106 Section 7(2) (b) provided:
"Where a company which was controlled by the deceased had at 
any time since the coming into force of the Administration 
and Probate (Estates) Act 1951 issued shares or debentures to 
any person other than the deceased otherwise than for a full 
consideration in money ... the shares or debentures so 
issued shall be deemed to have been property the subject- 
matter of a gift by the deceased and the person to whom the 
shares or debentures were issued shall not be deemed to have 
assumed bona fide possession and enjoyment of the subject- 
matter of the gift so long as the company was controlled by 
the deceased and any dividends or interest declared or paid 
in respect of any such shares or debenture ... shall be 
deemed to have been property the subject-matter of a gift by 
the deceased."
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controlled by the deceased" (as it appears in the Probate Duty 
Act); and stated that the context suggests strongly that what 
sub-s (2)(b) means by the company having been controlled by the 
deceased is that the deceased's shareholding carried with it the 
power to out-vote all opposition in the company.107 By using the 
term "company" in that context his Honour was referring to the 
"corporation aggregate itself as distinguished from the board of 
directors which acts for it in the management of its affairs".108
From the foregoing analysis of Kitto J's decision in Mendes' 
case, a strong argument may be mounted in favour of the view that 
the concept of "control" in section 340(c) means actual control 
and does not extend to capacity to control. However, some doubt 
may nevertheless remain given the ambiguous nature of the control 
test contained therein, and the precedents set by the US cases. If 
an Australian court of law were to be asked to determine the scope 
of the strict control test, then pursuant to section 15AB of the 
Acts Interpretation Act 1901, the court may refer to extraneous 
material for the purposes of construction. In such a case it would 
seem only logical that the court should refer to the examples set 
out in the FSIIP. If this were the case then section 340(c) may 
have the unintended effect of catching options to acquire shares 
which ordinarily would fall into the realm of entitlement to 
acquire.
However, the fact that there are some doubts as to the scope 
of the term control in section 340 (c), means that the Commissioner 
may have to resort to case law, particularly, the US cases which 
are more to the point. This could ultimately mean that the costs 
of complying with and enforcing the CFC rules would be substantial 
as any contentious issues that may arise will need to be litigated 
in order that any ambiguity surrounding the scope of section 
34 0 (c) may be resolved. However, it is commonly accepted that 
litigation is the least efficient route for resolving tax issues 
since it can be extremely costly and time consuming. The release 
of five major transfer pricing rulings since 1992 is testimony to 
the complexity of transfer pricing transactions.109 Based on 
experiences with transfer pricing, it is envisaged that the 
Commissioner will have to adopt a similar approach in ensuring 
that the CFC rules are complied with in this era of self 
assessment. This could substantially add to the costs of 
enforcement and compliance.
American jurisprudence in this area would tend to support the 
view that an Australian shareholder will find it difficult to 
avoid the operation of section 340(c) where it attempts to divest
107 (1967) 122 CLR 152, at 160.
108 Ibid.
109 The impetus behind these rulings is to clarify and to 
provide guidelines on some of the basic concepts underlying the 
operation of Division 13 transfer pricing provisions (see Taxation 
Ruling TR 94/14 at paras 1 and 2).
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control in a foreign entity by selling its controlling interest in 
that entity while at the same time entering into some form of 
reciprocal arrangement (with an unrelated third party purchaser), 
where it could ultimately influence the activities of the foreign 
entity. The US Court of Appeal in Koehring' s case in adopting a 
substance over form approach, stressed the fact that the taxpayer 
had failed to successfully divest its control in KOS for the 
purposes of Subpart F because such divestment was made under a 
reciprocal agreement which ensured that the unrelated purchaser 
would not exercise its voting power in KOS "antagonistically".
This approach is taken even further when examining Mulligan J's 
decision in Kraus' case, where he pointed out that one of the 
reasons why the taxpayer had failed to effectively divest its 
control in the foreign subsidiary was because the new purchasers 
of the preferred stock were carefully selected so that "no rocking 
of the corporate boat could be anticipated".
•
However, the applicability of US cases in Australia, largely 
depends on whether Australian courts are prepared to steer away 
from the approach adopted by the High Court in the Esquire 
Nominees case. The likelihood of this occurring would also depend 
on how Australian cases dealing with the question of control in 
other contexts are interpreted by a modern day court asked to look 
at the question in the context of the CFC rules. Prima facie, the 
approach of the US courts extends beyond the approach adopted by 
Australian courts since the "power of veto" test in Esquire 
Nominees and the requirement expounded by the High Court in Mendes 
that to control a company a shareholder must control the 
triggering events which may entitle the shareholder to vote, could 
still prove to be a stumbling block for the Commissioner.
Nevertheless, the broad scope of section 340(c) (as 
interpreted through the US authorities) combined with the equally 
broad scope of the control tracing interests set out in section 
353 (2) (b) and (c) and the general anti-avoidance provisions of 
Part IVA, should ensure that manipulation of the residence rule 
via the corporate veil doctrine is minimised if not completely 
eliminated. By providing look-through rules which ignore the 
fiction of corporate structures, the control rule effectively 
eliminates the deferral problem caused by the use of foreign 
incorporated companies to intercept income that would otherwise be 
derived by the controlling Australian shareholders and be taxed to 
them. Coupled with the attribution rule (discussed below), the 
control rule will enable the Commissioner to attribute passive 
income derived by a non-resident company to the beneficial owners 
of that income - i.e., the Australian controlling shareholders. 
Consequently, Australia's domestic tax base is protected in 
relation to any arrangements or schemes which the Australian 
controlling shareholders may attempt to enter into in order to 
disguise their beneficial ownership of foreign subsidiaries. This 
is particularly the case where there is no commercial basis for 
entering into such an arrangement in the first place.
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3.3. The Pro Rata Rule
Having identified that a CFC exists, the next step is to 
identify whether the amount of income derived by the relevant CFC 
and which is not repatriated to Australia could be attributed to 
an Australian resident taxpayer. The operation of Australia's CFC 
rules revolves around the notion of "attributable taxpayer" and 
"attribution percentage" which in turn impact on the operation of 
section 456 - i.e., the major provision for attributing tainted 
income to Australian shareholders. An amount of undistributed 
income will only be attributed to an Australian controller who is 
an attributable taxpayer in relation to the eligible CFC and who 
holds an attribution percentage in the CFC.
3.3.1. Attributable taxpayer
Section 361 sets out a number of tests designed to help 
determine (i) whether or not an Australian entity is an 
"attributable taxpayer" and therefore, subject to the CFC rules 
and (ii) the percentage interest which the Australian entity has 
in the CFC and, therefore, the amount of income that will be 
attributed to it. These tests are designed to link in to the 
control rule in section 340 discussed above.
The first test for determining whether an Australian entity 
is an "attributable taxpayer" in relation to a CFC, is contained 
in section 361(1) (a) which provides that an Australian entity will 
be an attributable taxpayer where the entity has an "associate- 
inclusive control interest"110 in a CFC of at least 10%. The 
policy behind the 10% or more threshold requirement is that this 
is the minimum requirement for enabling the shareholder, with the 
co-operation of the other controlling shareholders, to obtain the 
necessary information for calculating a CFC's attributable income, 
thus minimising the costs of compliance with the new rules.* 111 A 
similar threshold requirement is contained in Subpart F in 
relation to the definition of a USS (see definition of USS above). 
A portfolio investment, on the other hand (i.e., those which fail 
to satisfy the 10% threshold requirement) are exclusively dealt 
with by the FIF rules which will not be discussed in this thesis.
An exception to the above test is contained in section 
361(1) (b) (iii) , which provides that an Australian entity will be 
an attributable taxpayer in relation to a CFC where the relevant 
CFC "is controlled" by a group of five or fewer Australian 
entities, either alone or together with associates. This concept 
of "control" is commonly referred to as the "subjective de facto 
control test". The policy behind this exception is to ensure that 
an Australian entity which fails the 10% threshold, but
110 This term is used extensively throughout Part X, and in 
addition to helping determine whether an Australian entity is an
"attributable taxpayer", that term is relevant in determining 
whether an entity is a CFC, or an Australian 1% entity.
111 The FSIIP op cit. , at p 30.
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nevertheless "effectively controls" the CFC does not escape from 
being characterised as an attributable taxpayer. Theoretically, 
under the exception to the 10% threshold requirement, an 
Australian entity may be characterised as an attributable taxpayer 
notwithstanding that it only holds a 1% or less associate- 
inclusive attribution interest in the CFC. While this exception 
has the effect that attribution may be required where there is 
only a very small shareholding in a CFC, unless the Australian 
entity has a specific interest in the CFC, there will be no 
requirement to attribute.112 Nevertheless, by linking the 
definition of "attributable taxpayer" with the look-through rules 
in section 340, income which is beneficially owned by Australian 
taxpayers will be attributed to them in accordance with their 
attribution percentage.
3.3.2. Attribution percentage
Once it has been determined that an Australian entity is an 
attributable taxpayer in relation to a CFC, it is necessary to 
determine the proportion (or "attribution percentage") of the 
CFC's attributable income on which the attributable taxpayer will 
be subject to Australian tax. Section 362 determines the amount of 
income which an attributable taxpayer may be required to attribute 
inter alia, under section 456 and thus include in its assessable 
income.
The attribution percentage is defined in section 362(1) to be 
the sum of (a) the attributable taxpayer's "direct attribution 
interest", and (b) the aggregate of the attributable taxpayer's 
indirect attribution interests in the CFC. The rules for 
determining an entity's direct attribution interest (contained in 
section 356) are generally the same as those for determining the 
entity's direct control interest in a CFC (contained in section 
350). That is, the direct attribution interest of an entity in a 
CFC is equal to the greatest of the percentages which the entity 
holds or is entitled to hold,113 inter alia, (i) in the paid up 
share capital of the CFC, (ii) the right to vote in the CFC, (iii) 
the right to distributions of capital or profits on a winding-up 
of the CFC, or (iv) the right to distributions of capital or 
profits, otherwise than on a winding-up.
The rules for calculating an entity's indirect attribution 
interest in a CFC are contained in section 357 which, broadly, 
traces the indirect interests that the entity has in a CFC through 
an interposed entity. This is done by multiplying the "attribution 
tracing interest" which the Australian entity holds in the 
interposed entity (which is a CFE) with the attribution tracing
112 See section 362. See also FSIIP op cit. . at pp 30-31, 
and Wachtel M H The New Corporate International Tax Regime 
(Butterworths Pty Ltd, 1991), at p 800,202.
113 This is similar to the requirements established under 
reg. §1.958-2 (f) (2) where a USS owns more than 50% of the stock of 
another corporation (see above).
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interest in the ultimate CFC.114 This multiplication process may 
be extended to any number of interposed entities.115
In an attempt to ensure that the operation of the attribution 
rule accords with internationally accepted norms for worldwide 
taxation, the calculation of an attributable taxpayer's 
attribution percentage differs from the calculation of that 
entity's associate-inclusive control interests (for the purposes 
of determining the existence of a CFC) to the extent that there 
are no special deeming rules, in the case of attribution 
interests, which would operate to deem an entity to have a greater 
interest than that which it actually has. That is, before 
attributable income is attributed to an Australian taxpayer, 
including an Australian 1% entity, the relevant Australian entity 
must own a specific interest in the CFC.116
The main attribution provision under Subpart F is §951(a), 
which provides that if a person is a CFC for an uninterrupted 
period of thirty days or more during any taxable year, then each 
USS of that corporation is required to report as a dividend (i) 
"his pro rata share ... of the corporation's Subpart F income";
(ii) "his pro rata share ... of the corporation's increase in 
earnings invested in United States property" (emphasis added). In 
1993 a third category was included as a §951 (a) amount117 - the 
shareholder's pro rata share of the corporation's earnings 
invested in excess passive assets for the year.118 It has been
114 The "attribution tracing interest" in a CFC is the 
direct attribution interest which is held by an entity in the CFC 
calculated in accordance with section 356: section 358.
115 See section 357(5) .
116 The determination of the entity's direct attribution 
interest in a CFC is normally made at the end of the entity's 
accounting period, or at the time that a dividend is paid by a CFC 
to another CFC. Where, for example, the CFC is being wound up, 
then section 356(2) provides special rules for determining the 
entity's direct attribution interest in a CFC.
117 The Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, H.R. 2264,
§13231 (effective for years beginning after 30 September 1993).
118 See §951 (a) (1) (C) which refers to amounts determined 
under §956A(a).
Section 956A provides rules for calculating the amount 
of earnings from excess passive assets that are currently taxable 
in the hands of the USS. These amounts are the lesser of the USS's 
pro rata share of:
(a) *the excess of the CFC's "excess passive assets" over the
amounts of earnings and profits previously included in 
the USS's income as excess passive assets, or
(b) the "applicable earnings" of the CFC after taking into 
account investments in US property.
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noted by one commentator, that this amendment considerably 
enlarges the reach of Subpart F because it extends to income that 
previously enjoyed deferral.119 Effectively, a USS's pro rata 
share of a CFC's Subpart F income is the amount that would have 
been received by the shareholder if the corporation had 
distributed its Subpart F income on the last day on which it was a 
CFC less any dividend distributions (during the taxable year) 
received by any person other than a USS (who held the stock in 
respect of which distribution would have been made to a USS) .120
3.4. The Attribution Rule
Having established the requirements for attribution under the 
pro rata rule and the circumstances where a CFC is said to exist 
under the control rule (which in turn lead to an examination of 
principles developed at general law in ascertaining the existence 
of control for the purposes of accruals taxation), it is now 
necessary to examine the rules for determining the amount of 
undistributed tainted income that may be attributed to the 
Australian controllers. This exercise is necessitated by section 
456 which is one of the most important sections underpinning the 
operation of the attribution rule.121 The section provides that 
the attributable taxpayer's attribution percentage of the 
"attributable income" of a CFC (for a statutory accounting 
period), is to be included in the assessable income of the 
Australian taxpayer for the year of income in which the end of the 
CFC's statutory period occurs. Hence the need to determine whether 
the CFC has attributable income (.for a statutory accounting 
period), having already established the existence of the other 
criteria stipulated in section 456 (viz., CFC, attributable 
taxpayer and attribution percentage) .
The term "excess passive ’assets" is the amount by which 
the CFC's passive assets exceed 25% of its total assets, measured 
on an adjusted basis: §956A(c)(1). "Applicable earnings" are the 
sum of current earnings and earnings accumulated after September 
1993 (i.e., "post-93 earnings") reduced by post-93 earnings that
have already been included in the USS's income as investments in 
US property (see §956) or excess passive assets: §956A(b).
119 See Isenbergh (2nd ed) o p  cit. . at para 41.8.
120 Section 951(a) (2) (A) and (B) respectively. Professor 
Isenbergh notes that the amount by which the USS pro rata share is 
reduced, is limited to the amount of dividend that would have been 
received if the prior distribution had been an amount of Subpart F 
income proportional to the part of the year during which the USS 
did not own the stock: see Isenbergh (2nd ed) op cit. . at para 
39.4.
121 Attribution of income under section 456 will, generally 
constitute the largest amount of income attributed under the CFC 
rules because the other attribution provisions (viz., sections 
457, 458 and 459) are very specialised.
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However, before proceeding to examine the operation of the 
attribution rule, it is perhaps useful at this stage to briefly 
recapitulate on the operation of Australia's CFC rules. By doing 
so, it should become more apparent that the realisation of capital 
export neutrality (of the type promoted in Australia's CFC rules), 
fundamentally depends on the effective operation of the 
attribution rule. As was noted previously, Australia's CFC rules 
(and those of the other countries except for New Zealand and to a 
lesser extent Sweden), distinguish between active and passive 
income.122 Further, the designated comparable-tax jurisdictions 
approach (which underpins Australia's CFC rules), targets those 
jurisdictions where tax avoidance is greatest (i.e., unlisted 
countries), while at the same time easing the compliance burden 
for Australian controllers of listed county CFCs by, for instance, 
exempting non-portfolio dividend paid by CFCs in those countries.
3.4.1. Amounts that may constitute attributable income
The attributable income of a CFC is the amount calculated in 
accordance with the provisions of Division 7 of Part X which in 
effect requires inclusion of the gross amount of income arising 
from certain transactions, to be reduced by deductions incurred in 
producing such income. 123 Specifically, section 381 sets out the 
conditions which must be satisfied before a taxpayer is required 
to calculate the attributable income of a CFC. The requirement to 
calculate attributable income will generally arise where the 
relevant foreign company is a CFC and there are one or more 
attributable taxpayers in relation to the company. Where these 
requirements exist then the CFC will be called the "eligible CFC" 
for the purposes of Division 7 and the attributable income of the 
eligible CFC must be calculated separately for each attributable 
taxpayer (called the "eligible taxpayer").124
122 Passive income is defined to include dividend income and 
interest income (see section 446 (1) (a) and (d) respectively) .
123 See section 317. A similar computation rule is provided 
in the US under Subpart F where Subpart F income of a CFC is 
taxable as a deemed dividend to the USS under §951(a)(1)(A)(i). 
Section 952(a) then defines Subpart F income to include for 
example, FBC income is defined as certain amounts of gross income 
less deductions and exclusions properly allocated to such income: 
§954(b) (5) and reg. §1.954-l(a) (5) and reg. §1.954-l(c) and (d) . 
FBC income comprises, inter alia, FPHC income which relevantly 
includes interest and dividend income: §954 (c) . FBC income
124 See section 381 of the Act. The need to separately 
calculate the attributable income of attributable taxpayers stems, 
for example, from the fact that different taxpayers may be 
entitled to different reliefs under the Act. For example, two 
different attributable taxpayers may not both choose (or be 
eligible) to exercise the election available under section 160ZZO 
of the Act which allows for the rollover of capital gains in 
certain situations.
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Further, in applying the rules for calculating the amount of 
notional assessable income (which is the term used generically to 
denote tainted income of the eligible CFC), certain other 
assumptions need to be made. For instance, section 383 provides 
that whether a CFC is a resident of either a listed country or an 
unlisted country, it is to be assumed that the company was a 
taxpayer that was a resident of Australia for the whole of its 
statutory accounting period, and that the statutory accounting 
period of the CFC was a year of income. The need for such an 
assumption is introduced for practical purposes given that 
Australia's fiscal powers traditionally, cannot be asserted in 
respect of the CFC - a non resident which prima facie derives 
foreign source income.125
Section 160ZZO provides for optional roll-over relief (ie 
deferral) in respect of capital gains tax liability where there is 
a disposal of an asset by one company to another company which is 
a group company in relation to the transferor company. A company 
will be a group company for the purposes of section 160ZZO if 
either the transferor or transferee company is a wholly owned 
subsidiary of the other or the transferor and transferee companies 
are wholly owned subsidiaries of a common holding company (see 
section 160ZZO(3), (4), (5) and (6)). Therefore, 100% ownership is
required for roll-over relief, whereas a percentage less than that 
is required for the existence of CFC.
The ability to utilise the roll-over relief provision set out 
in section 160ZZO in respect of a disposal by the eligible CFC is 
made possible by section 419. This modifies the operation of the 
roll-over provision in section 160ZZO so as to allow CFCs some 
scope to restructure their affairs without incurring an Australian 
capital gains tax liability. The Foreign Income Bill 1997 includes 
proposals designed to allow an attributable taxpayer to make an 
election for roll-over relief on behalf of the eligible CFC. 
Currently, such election is to be made by the CFC because the 
election is to apply equally to all attributable taxpayers: see 
sections 421 and 438(3A) of the Act. See also para 4.39 of the EM 
to the Foreign Income Bill.
The purpose for making similar assumptions under the UK 
CFC rules was recently considered by Millet LJ (with whom Beldam 
and Otton LJJ agreed), in the Court of Appeal decision in Bricom 
Holdings Ltd v IRC [1997] STC 1179. His Lordship said (at 1194) : 
"In the present case the purpose for which the 
assumptions are required is self-evident. A controlled 
foreign company is ex hypothesi resident outside the 
United Kingdom. As a non-resident, it will not normally 
be subject to United Kingdom corporations tax and will 
have made no claim to relief from such tax. The 
computation of the profits on which corporation tax is 
chargeable, therefore, involves ascertaining a 
hypothetical amount, that is to say the amount which 
would have represented the amount of such profits if the 
controlled foreign company had been resident in the 
United Kingdom and had made all necessary claims for 
relief. The assumptions ... are substituted for the
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It is also important to note that the requirement to 
calculate the attributable income of a company is based on a 
notional calculation and only arises if the company is a CFC at 
the end of a statutory accounting period. Consequently, if it were 
not for the definition of "statutory accounting period of a 
company" (discussed above), and the expressed intention to rely on 
the general anti-avoidance provisions in the Act, it would be 
possible to avoid the requirement to calculate the attributable 
income of the taxpayer if a company was a CFC for part of the 
eligible period and ceases to be a CFC prior to the end of that 
period.126
The EM makes it clear that the calculation of the 
attributable income of a CFC will be based on Australian tax law, 
effectively treating the CFC (subject to certain exceptions) as if 
it were an Australian resident. However, as mentioned previously, 
in order to compute the amount of attributable income, certain 
basic assumptions are made.127 These assumptions will enable a 
"notional" calculation of the taxable income of a CFC. Precedent 
for such an approach is found for example, in section 90 (which 
defines such terms as 'exempt income', 'net income' and 
'partnership loss' in relation to a partnership for the purposes 
of Division 5 of Part III of the Act, as if the partnership were a 
taxpayer who was a resident of Australia).128 Moreover, the income 
to be taken into account in calculating attributable income will 
depend upon whether the CFC is a resident of a listed country or 
an unlisted country.129 It will also be dependent on whether or 
not the CFC passes the active income test (discussed in section 4. 
below).
actual facts."
126 By testing to see whether a person (which includes a 
company) was a CFC for an uninterrupted period of 30 days during 
any taxable year, the US Subpart F rules avoid the necessity to 
have to resort to general anti-avoidance provisions (which do not 
exist in the US). See also §898 introduced in 1989 discussed 
above.
127 Section 383 (c) further provides that Australian tax law 
is modified in accordance with Subdivisions B to D of Division 7.
128 Again, a similar precedent arises in the context of 
taxation of trusts as set out in Division 6 of Part III of the 
Act. Section 95 defines such terms as "exempt income" and "net 
income" in relation to a trust as if the trustee were a taxpayer 
who was a resident of Australia.
129 Under the US "transactional approach", there is no need 
to test for the residency status of the CFC because it is the 
nature of the income earned by the CFC that is of primary 
importance. The jurisdiction in which the CFC operates is 
irrelevant. However, this latter statement must be qualified to 
the extent that the US rules also contain a "high-tax" exception 
under §954(b)(4) discussed at 3.1. above and 5.3. below.
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Attributable income of a CFC resident in an unlisted country
The first assumption to be made when ascertaining the amount 
of attributable income derived by an unlisted country CFC (which 
has not passed the active income test), is that such amount is to 
be referred to as "notional assessable income".130 Accordingly, 
where a CFC, which is a resident of an unlisted country fails to 
pass the active income test (the "AIT"), the attributable income 
under section 384(2)(a), is the amount that would have been the 
taxable income if the CFC was a resident of Australia and its 
"adjusted tainted income" and trust income were its only income 
derived.131 As the term suggests, "adjusted tainted income" 
implies the making of adjustments to tainted income. These 
adjustments are set out in Subdivisions B to E of Division 7 
(discussed at 3.4.3. below).
The amounts that are "adjusted tainted income"132 are 
determined under section 386 (which applies to amounts included as 
notional assessable income of listed and unlisted country CFCs), 
and include passive income (defined in section 446 to include 
dividend and tainted interest income); tainted sales income
130 See section 384(1) of the Act. Proposed section 
384(2)(aa) introduced in the Foreign Income Bill 1997, will 
provide a further assumption for amounts derived by a CFC resident 
in a limited-exemption listed country from sources outside that 
country. The assumption corresponds with the assumption provided 
in section 385(2)(a)(ii) currently (discussed below) and will 
therefore, deem as notional assessable income, an amount that is 
not adjusted tainted income, is not derived from sources within 
the CFC's country of residence and is not subject to tax in a 
listed country: see new section 384(2)(aa).
131 In this context, the use of the term "derived" extends 
to cover all amounts that accrue to the CFC during the period in 
question and, where appropriate, will include a nil amount (EM at 
p 1708) .
132 It should be noted that although the definition of 
adjusted tainted income includes passive income, tainted sales 
income and tainted services income, these amounts are however, 
subject to certain modifications before they can be described as 
adjusted tainted income. The necessary modifications are 
prescribed in section 386(2). These are adjustments to amounts 
included in passive income under section 446 in respect of:
• the disposal of tainted assets
• the disposal of tainted commodity investments, and
• certain currency exchange fluctuations.
Whereas the relevant paragraphs of section 446 include only 
the net amounts of income arising from such transactions in 
passive income, section 386(2) modifies the relevant provisions to 
include the gross amounts resulting from such transactions in 
adjusted tainted income. This is necessitated by the fact that the 
calculation of taxable income is carried out on a gross basis.
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(defined in section 447); or tainted services income (defined in 
section 448) .133
However, whether or not an unlisted country CFC passes the 
active income test, under section 384(2) the amount of notional 
assessable income shall also include the amount that would have 
been taxable income of the CFC assuming that the CFC were a 
resident of Australia and the only amounts included in the 
"notional assessable income" of the CFC were attributable income 
of a transferor trust estate (i.e., amounts which are included in 
the CFC's assessable income under the transferor trust 
measures134) , net income of a trust estate (calculated under 
Division 6 of Part III of the Act135), amounts of FIF income,136 and
133 Cf. . definition of "Subpart F income" in §952 (a) (1) - (5) 
of the Code which defines Subpart F income as the sum of (i) 
insurance income, (ii) foreign base company income, (iii) income 
attributable to compliance with an international boycott, (iv) 
illegal payments made to an official, employee, or agent of a 
foreign government (foreign bribe income), and (v) income arising 
in certain unfriendly foreign countries.
134 See section 102AAZD which broadly applies where an 
entity has transferred property or services to a non-resident 
trust estate in circumstances where the income of the trust is not 
otherwise subject to Australian taxation.
135 There would appear to be two situations where the trust 
provisions contained in Division 6 may apply to include an amount 
in a CFC's notional assessable income. The first is where the CFC 
is deemed to be presently entitled to a share of the income of a 
foreign trust estate under section 96B(2), in which case section 
97 will operate to include a share of the income (calculated under 
section 96C) in the CFC's notional assessable income. The second 
situation is where an amount distributed by the trustee of a trust 
estate has not previously been subject to Australian tax and is 
assessable under section 99B.
The deemed entitlement rules set out in sections 96B and 96C 
were introduced into Division 6 to create a quasi-attribution 
mechanism where a taxpayer has an interest (including an interest 
that is to arise at a future time or is contingent on the 
happening of an event) in a non-resident trust, then the taxpayer 
is taken to be:
• a beneficiary of the trust estate,
• presently entitled to a share of the income of the trust 
estate for the year, and
• not under a legal disability (see section 96B(2)).
The taxpayer's share of the net income of the trust estate is 
calculated in accordance with section 96C of the Act.
136 See section 384(2) (ca) . It is not intended here to 
embark on a discussion of the determination of income of a FIF. 
Suffice to note that there are three possible methods of 
calculating the amount of income to be included in assessable 
income of a taxpayer with an interest in a FIF (see section
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net income of a partnership (calculated under Division 5 of Part 
III of the Act137) . The requirement to include amounts derived by 
trusts and partnerships in notional assessable income implies that 
such entities, being mere conduits, are used for tax avoidance 
purposes and therefore, should not be allowed to divert or reduce 
the assessable income attributed to the Australian shareholders. 
Inclusion of FIF amounts is necessitated by the fact that the FIF 
rules are subordinated to the operation of the CFC rules.
The broad effect of section 384(2)(a) is to include any 
"tainted" income in the attributable income of a CFC which fails 
the AIT and is not therefore regarded as carrying on an active 
business. Given that the other categories of income which are 
included in the unlisted country CFC's notional assessable income 
are somewhat specialised, it follows that, in the majority of 
cases, where an unlisted country CFC fails the AIT, its total 
income will be included as notional assessable income. However, by 
the same token, where an unlisted country CFC passes the AIT, no 
amount will be included in the CFC's notional assessable income, 
and therefore in its attributable income, for the relevant year 
(see 4.1. below).
Attributable income of a CFC resident in a listed country
Section 385, like section 384 above, contains certain 
assumptions which must be made when calculating the attributable 
income of an eligible CFC which is resident in a listed country. 
However, it should be noted that the inclusion of amounts under
534(2)). These methods are:
1. the market value ("MV") method;
2. the deemed rate of return method ("DROR"); and
3. the calculation method.
137 The CFC will only be required to include an amount in 
relation to a partnership in its notional assessable income under 
Division 5 if those provisions would apply on the assumption that 
the net income of the partnership included only the following 
amounts:
•. if the CFC does not pass the AIT, amounts that would be 
included if the partnership derived only adjusted 
tainted income;
• amounts included under section 102AAZD as modified by 
Subdivision B to D of Part X
• amounts included under Division 6 as so modified.
These provisions are designed to reflect the fact that a 
partnership is merely a look-through entity under Australian 
income tax laws and therefore seek to determine whether the 
income derived by the partnership falls within one of the 
categories of notional assessable income found in section 
384(2)(a), (b) and (c). Note however, that under section
384(2)(d)(i) it is irrelevant whether or not the partnership 
passes or fails the AIT.
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section 385 (unlike the inclusion of amounts under section 384), 
is subject to the de minimis exemption discussed above.
Where the eligible CFC that is a resident of a listed country- 
does not pass the AIT, the attributable income of the CFC for a 
particular accounting period will be the taxable income of the CFC 
(assuming the CFC is a resident of Australia) and will broadly 
include six potential categories of notional assessable income.
The first category which will most likely be encountered in 
practice where the CFC fails to pass the AIT, is "adjusted tainted 
income" which is also EDCI in relation to the listed country or 
any other country.138 Consequently, an amount of income derived by 
a listed country CFC but which has been concessionally taxed or 
exempt from tax and designated in the Income Tax Regulations (see 
3.1. above), is generally characterised as EDC income (viz., 
adjusted tainted income) and is subject to attribution under 
section 385(2)(a)(i). However, special concession is made in the 
Income Tax Regulations for income that has not been subject to tax 
because the tax laws of a listed (developing) country exempt such 
income as part of an overall economic programme designed to 
encourage foreign investment in vital industries.139 Consequently, 
profits (viz., offshore income, interest income, royalties or 
shipping income) derived by a listed country CFC and which have 
benefited from a "tax holiday" in a particular listed country, 
will not be treated as DCI where a DTA deems the taxes foregone to 
have been paid. Therefore, that income is "tax spared".140 The tax 
sparing relief is usually contained in the elimination of double 
taxation Article in some of Australia's DTAs and takes the form of 
a credit for the taxes foregone by the host state.141
138 Adjusted tainted income for a listed country CFC is 
defined in the same way as for an unlisted country CFCs and 
relevantly includes dividend income and tainted interest income: 
see sections 386 and 446(1) (a) and (d) .
139 For example, in a measure aimed at increasing the 
manufacturing base in Singapore (after its expulsion from 
Federation with Malaysia), the Government introduced the Economic 
Expansion Incentives (Relief from Income Tax) Act (EEIA). The EEIA 
granted tax holidays (of between 5 to 10 years) to manufacturing 
companies (of any nationality) setting up production in "pioneer 
areas", as well as those exporting goods from Singapore. See also 
Fordham M, Developing Singapore - Tax Incentives for Investment 
and Expansion (Longman Singapore Publishers, 1988) ; and South-East 
Asian Tax Handbook (IBFD Publications, Amsterdam, 1997) .
140 See regs. 152D(1), (4) and 152H.
141 See, for example, Article 24(2) (a) of the 
Australia/India DTA. Tax sparing provisions are also found in 
other DTAs between Australia and Fiji, Kiribati, Sri Lanka, Papua 
New Guinea, Thailand, China, Malta, Korea, Malaysia and Singapore. 
In contrast, the US has consistently rejected proposals by foreign 
countries to provide tax sparing relief on the basis that it would 
offend against capital export neutrality: see Description and
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The remaining five categories of income are included in the 
listed country CFC's notional assessable income regardless of 
whether it passes the AIT or not. The second category of income 
consists of certain amounts which are not derived from sources in 
the CFC's country of residence and which are not "subject to tax" 
in any listed country.142 The attribution of low-taxed amounts 
derived by a listed country CFC from sources outside its country 
of residence protects the integrity of the section 23AJ exemption 
for non-portfolio dividends by ensuring that such amounts are 
taxed at some point prior to repatriation to Australia.143 The 
last four categories of income correspond with the four categories 
of income which are included in the notional assessable income of 
an unlisted country CFC (e.g., amounts included under the trust 
and partnership provisions in the Act).
Where a particular item of income or profit is derived by an 
entity, it is taken to be subject to tax in a listed country in a 
particular tax accounting period if "foreign tax" (other than a 
"withholding-type tax"144) is payable under a tax law on that item 
because it is included in the tax base of that law for the tax 
accounting period.145 Items of income on which tax is imposed or 
levied will be taken to have been included in the "tax base" of a 
listed country.146 Therefore, to satisfy the subject to tax test, 
"foreign tax" only needs to be payable rather than to have been 
paid, whereas items that are exempt from tax in the listed country 
would not fall within that country's tax base. Moreover, in order 
to spare taxpayers from potential double taxation, the subject to 
tax test is not applied strictly. An item of income or profit may 
be deemed subject to tax when in fact, the actual amount of
Analysis of Present-Law Tax Rules Relating to Income Earned by 
U.S. Businesses from Foreign Operations (JCT Reports on Foreign 
Tax Issues for Finance Hearing) (JCS-20-95) at I.A.4.d. and 
II.C.2.
142 Section 385(2) (a) (ii) of the Act.
143 However, with the introduction of the Foreign Income 
Bill 1997, modifications are also necessary to ensure that the 
exemption from CFC taxation for broad-exemption listed countries 
is not extended to an amount which has only suffered tax in a 
limited-exemption listed country: see proposed section 385(2A) and 
EM to the Foreign Income Bill at paras 6.38-6.43.
144 The reference to"withholding-type tax" covers the 
traditional withholding tax levied on non-residents in relation to 
interest, dividend and royalty payments.
145 Section 324(1) (a) of the Act.
146 See the EM at p 1640.
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foreign tax is paid in a subsequent tax accounting period.147 By 
so deeming, section 324 ensures that the taxpayer does not suffer 
financially because of the difference in the tax assessment 
practice of the Australian Revenue and that of the listed country.
Nevertheless, there is a potentially significant problem with 
the "subject to tax" test in relation to companies with carry 
forward losses. Such companies may not meet the test under section 
324 where the losses reduce the tax payable to zero. Assistance in 
this regard may be gained from case law on the now repealed 
section 23(q) exemption. The critical question that courts were 
concerned with under section 23(q) was whether the income was 
exempt from taxation in the foreign country where the income was 
sourced. Whether or not income was exempt from tax was tested 
according to Australian standards. It was held that income is 
exempt from tax if it is not included in the equivalent of the 
Australian concept of assessable income.148 On that basis it can 
be argued that where carry-forward losses negate any tax liability 
arising in the source country, then the subject to tax test should 
be satisfied.149 This is in direct contrast to the strict 
requirement for the granting of a credit under the FTCS where a 
credit under section 160AF is only granted in relation to foreign 
taxes paid and for which the taxpayer was personally liable.
The possible confusion arising from the operation of the 
"subject to tax" test in relation to losses could lead to 
significant welfare losses. Such losses would arise if, for 
example, the Commissioner of Taxation applies a strict 
interpretation of the test by allowing foreign losses (which 
reduce a listed country CFC's tax liability to nil) to negate the 
benefit of the section to resident taxpayers (viz., non­
characterisation as EDCI) in view of the non-allowance of 
consolidation of CFC losses. Such an action will invariably lead 
to costly litigation as taxpayers seek to dispute the validity of 
such a limited interpretation of section 324. A better option, 
given the ATO's recent successes with Part IVA in the courts, 
would be to apply the provisions of Part IVA (instead) to strike 
down any tax benefit that the taxpayer may have obtained from 
creating losses in the CFC. The Martin Committee had also 
envisaged the possibility of applying Part IVA to international 
transactions between related parties.
147 This could arise, for instance, where a provision of a 
law of a listed country declares that tax shall be paid upon 
receipt (or derivation) of the item of income: see sections 6AB(2) 
and 324(1)(b) of the Act.
148 Mutual Life and Citizens' Assurance Co Ltd v FCT (1959) 
102 CLR 29.
149 See also the recent Federal Court decision which held 
that a nil assessment is a tax assessment for the purposes of the 
Act: Ryan v FCT (decision of Spender J, handed down on 25 July 
1997). The ATO has appealed this decision: see Weekly Tax Bulletin 
(Australian Tax Practice, Issue No. 40) at para 1118.
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3.4.2. What amounts are included in adjusted tainted income
Given that the notional assessable income of both a listed 
country and an unlisted country CFC includes adjusted tainted 
income, it is necessary at this stage to examine what constitutes 
adjusted tainted income. As noted above, section 446 provides an 
exhaustive definition of passive income which is intended to cover 
income of a kind that can be easily "diverted" to related offshore 
entities. The types of income included in this category broadly 
mirror the types of income included in the first category of FPHC 
income (viz., dividends, interest150, rents, royalties and 
annuities).151 However, FPHC income is only one of five categories 
of income comprising "FBC income". The other categories being FBC 
sales income, FBC services income, FBC shipping income and FBC oil 
related income.152 The concept of FBC income is a net concept 
because it is defined as gross income less deductions and 
exclusions properly allocable to such income.153 The exclusions 
pertain to income items that are not likely to involve serious tax 
avoidance or else to have been received by the CFC in the ordinary 
course of its business are generally excluded from being 
characterised as FPHC income.
For instance, FPHC income excludes dividends and interest 
from a related person which (i) is created or organised under the 
laws of the same foreign country under which the CFC is created or 
organised; and (ii) has a substantial part of its trade or
150 For the purposes of computing FPHC income "interest" is 
given a very wide meaning and includes:
"amounts that are treated as ordinary income, original issue 
discount or interest income (including original issue 
discount and interest on a tax-exempt obligation) by reason 
of §§482, 483, 868(d), 1273, 1274, 1276, 1281, 1286, 1288,
7872 and the regulations thereunder, or as interest or 
original issue discount income by reason of any other 
provision of law": Regulation §1.954-2(a) (4) (i) (1995) .
151 The other categories of income that constitute FPHC 
income also correspond with the definition of passive income under 
section 446. They are (i) gains or losses from certain property 
transactions; (ii) net gains from transactions in commodities;
(iii) foreign currency gains or losses; and (iv) interest 
equivalent to interest.
152 See §954 (d) - (g) of the Code. The term "foreign base 
company" is not defined in the Code, however, it usually denotes a 
company established in a tax haven for little or no economic or 
business reasons. The classic example being a distribution centre 
through which goods manufactured in the residence state are 
transshipped or sold, either to the ultimate purchaser, or to 
related distribution centres.
153 See §§954 (c), 954(b)(5) and regs. §§1.954-1 (a) (5) and 
1.954-1(c) and (d).
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business located in such same foreign country.154 No such 
exceptions exist in the definition of dividend and interest income 
in section 446.155 Therefore, the amount of interest and dividend 
income characterised as passive income under section 446 may 
differ substantially from the amount tainted income characterised 
as FPHC income.156
In view of the scope of this thesis (stated in Part I), the 
primary focus of the following discussion will be adjusted tainted
154 See §954 (c) (3) (A) (i) of the IRC. A substantial part of 
the assets of the payer will be considered used in a trade or 
business located in its country of incorporation only if, for each 
quarter during such taxable year, the average value (as of the 
beginning and end of the quarter) of its assets which are used in 
the trade or business and are located in such country constitutes 
over 50 per cent of the average value (as of the beginning and end 
of the quarter) of all the assets of the payer (including assets 
not used in a trade or business): reg §1.954-2(b)(3)(iv).
The location of tangible property (other than inventory and 
similar property) used in a trade or business will, in general, be 
considered located in the country in which it is physically 
located: Regulation §1.954-2(b)(3)(vi). Exception to this general 
rule is where tangible personal property is intended for use in 
the payer's country of incorporation, but is temporarily located 
elsewhere. In that case, the country of incorporation will be 
considered to be the situs of property: reg. §1.9542- 
2 (b) (3) (vi) (B) .
On the other hand, the location of intangible property (other 
than inventory or similar property and debt instruments) used in a 
trade or business will, in general, be based on the site of the 
activities conducted by the payer during the current year in 
connection with using or exploiting that property: reg. §1.954- 
2(b) (3) (vii) .
155 Proposals have however, been introduced in the Foreign 
Income Bill 1997 to exclude from the transfer pricing rules 
transfers between related parties in the same broad-exemption 
listed country when calculating the attributable income of a CFC 
(see proposed section 400(aa)). The purpose for introducing this 
amendment is twofold. First, the transfer would likely be taxed by 
the broad-exemption listed country which has been so designated 
because of its robust international tax rules. Second, by so 
excluding such transfers, compliance costs are reduced.
156 Another reason for the difference, may also stem from 
the difference in jurisdictional approach adopted in Australia's 
CFC regime (i.e., hybrid jurisdictional approach) and that adopted 
in Subpart F (i.e., transactional approach). Under the hybrid 
jurisdictional approach, dividends are not included in the 
attributable income of the receiving CFC because they may have 
been a distribution of income that has been subject to tax in a 
listed country or in Australia or which has been attributed to the 
Australian shareholders of the paying company.
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income under the passive income category - i.e., tainted interest 
income and dividends.
Tainted interest income
Tainted interest income is defined to mean interest or 
"payment in the nature of interest" (e.g.; factoring income) .157 
There is no definition of the term "a payment in the nature of 
interest" to be found in the CFC rules, although the FSIIP gave 
examples of the types of transactions caught by that term (e.g., 
loan commitment fees, income from buying and selling receivables 
and discounts on securities).158 However, the example of discount 
on securities provided in the FSIIP, could give rise to some 
difficulties in Australia in view of the decision of Gummow J in 
FCT v Hurley Holdings (NSW) Ptv Ltd where his Honour noted that 
discount in respect of an accommodation bill is not to be 
classified in the same way as interest upon a loan.159 
Accordingly, it is submitted that this term should be 
comprehensively defined in the Act. Assistance to perform this 
task could be gained from the US definition of the term "income 
equivalent to interest" (which is included as FPHC income) .160
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 significantly broadened the scope 
of Subpart F by removing inter alia, the exception for FPHC income
157 See section 446 (1) (d) . The term tainted interest income 
is defined in section 317 to mean:
"(a) interest or a payment in the nature of interest; or
(b) an amount that, if the company were a resident within 
the meaning of section 6, would be included in the 
assessable income under Div 16E of Part III [i.e. 
qualifying securities]; or
(c) factoring income;
but does not include offshore banking income within the 
meaning of Division 18 of Part III."
The term "factoring income" is defined in section 317 to mean 
"income derived from carrying on a business of factoring".
However, there is no definition of the term "factoring" in Part X 
or in the Act generally and it will bear its ordinary meaning.
158 See FSIIP o p  cit. . at para 4'. 20.
159 89 ATC 5033, at p 5035. Moreover, there are a number of
cases which support the proposition that a discount is not 
interest per se: Willingale v International Commercial Bank Ltd 
[1978] 1 All ER 754; Re Securitibank Ltd (No 2) [1978] 2 NZLR 136
and the Hurley Holdings case.
160 The expression "income equivalent to interest" is 
defined in Reg. §1.954-2(h), to include:
(i) An investment in which the payments reflect the time 
value of money; and
(ii) Transactions in which the payments are in substance for 
the use or forbearance of money, but are not generally 
treated as interest.
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received by banking or insurance companies161 and including, 
income "equivalent to interest".162 The categories of income that 
could constitute interest income under the extended definition 
generally cover transactions providing liquidity (in exchange for 
a time premium), or some obvious form of financing.163 However, it 
should be noted that income from factoring the accounts receivable 
of a related person are characterised as interest income and not 
income equivalent to interest.164 Characterisation of income 
rules, in turn, facilitate the operation of the income ordering 
rule set out in reg. §1.954-(a) (2) (ii),165 and the deduction rule 
set out in §954(b)(5) which requires that any interest paid by a 
CFC to a USS or any related CFC is to be allocated first to the 
corporations' FPHC income.166 In general, it is the substance of 
the transaction which governs the character of income derived.167
161 Cf. , the exclusion from Australia's CFC rules for 
tainted interest income derived by a subsidiary of an Australian 
Financial Institution (i.e., bank) where the subsidiary is solely 
or principally engaged in the business of financial 
intermediation: section 449. See also Arnold (1986) o p  cit. . at p 
451.
162 See §954 (c) (1) (E) of the Code.
163 See reg. §1.954-2 (h) (1) (i) where it is stated payments 
which predominantly reflect the time value of money will 
constitute income equivalent to interest. See also Isenbergh 
(1996) op cit.. at para 40.14 and McIntyre op cit., (looseleaf) at 
6-37a.
164 See §864 (d) (1) and (6) and reg. §1.954-2 (h) (3) (ii) . 
Related party factoring income typically is income obtained by a 
CFC after acquiring (from its parent company) a trade or service 
receivable at a discount. Income will generally arise in the hands 
of the CFC when the face value of the receivable is paid. Non- 
related party factoring income (other than amounts treated as 
interest under §954(d)(1) and (6)) is treated as income equivalent 
to interest: see reg. §1.954-2(h)(4).
165 This rule dictates that within the class of FPHC income, 
characterisation as one of the items specifically enumerated in 
§954 (c) (1) (A) (viz., dividends, interest, rents, royalties or 
annuities) prevails over others, followed by characterisation as 
income equivalent to interest under §954 (c) (1) (E) , and so forth.
166 The US deduction rule differs from the Australian 
deduction rule set out in section 426 which stipulates that 
notional allowable deductions (not just interest) are to be 
applied first against notional assessable income of the same class 
with the excess remaining being applied against active income or 
other exempt income: section 426(a)(i) and (ii). For this purpose, 
interest income constitutes a single class: section 424(1) (a) of 
the Act.
167 Reg. §1.954-1(e)(1).
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Apart from the difficulties arising from the lack of 
statutory guidelines for determining the circumstances when a 
payment in the nature of interest is said to arise, there are also 
compliance problems associated with attribution of tainted 
interest income under Australia's CFC rules. As will be seen from 
the discussion relating to the calculation of losses (see 3.4.3. 
and 5.8. below), interest is classed as a separate category (from 
passive income) in calculating the amount of losses that are 
deductible against notional assessable income and foreign 
assessable income for the purposes of the FTCS.168 The policy 
reason behind this apparent deviation is that interest is more 
susceptible to abuse than other passive income.169 Professor 
McIntyre provides another more cynical explanation for the lack of 
coordination, which he states "is due to political constraints and 
late-night sessions, not to the foolishness of drafters."170 
Therefore, taxpayers deriving tainted interest income will have to 
maintain at least two separate accounts, one showing the movement 
in interest income, and the other showing the amount of passive 
income derived.
dividends
Adjusted tainted income also includes dividends as that term 
is defined in section 6 of the Act.171 For present purposes, it is 
not intended to embark on a major discussion of the subtleties 
arising from the general law and statutory definitions of 
dividend.172 Suffice to note that a distinction must be made 
between distributions of profit (from which dividends are payable) 
and returns on capital. Accordingly, the definition in section 6 
prescribes three categories of distribution which are dividends - 
any distribution made by the company to any of its shareholders 
whether in money or other property; any distribution credited by 
the company to any of its shareholders as shareholders; the paid 
up value of shares issued to the extent to which the paid up value 
represents a capitalisation of profits. The statutory definition 
then lists three categories of distribution which are not included 
as dividends - amounts paid out of a genuine share premium
168 See sections 424(1) (a) and 160AFD(8), respectively.
169 See also a paper presented on 19 February 1990, to the 
University of New South Wales - Taxation Business & Investment Law 
Research Centre, by Kevin Pose entitled, "Repatriations, Companies 
and the New Legislation: Section 79D and Other Issues", at pp 4-6.
McIntyre op cit. (1988), at p 447.
Section 446(1) (a) .
For fuller discussion on what constitutes dividends for 
purposes of the Act, see Woellner, Vella and Burns Australian 
Taxation Law (5th ed, 1994) at chapter 19 and Cooper, Krever Vann 
Income Taxation: Commentary and Materials (LBC, Sydney, 1989) at 
chapter 18.
170
171
172
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account; return of capital and reversionary bonus on a life 
assurance policy.
In terms of the inclusionary categories of distribution that 
constitute a payment of dividends, principles developed at general 
law must be resorted to in order to determine whether the 
distribution is made from profits or capital. This discussion is 
pursued further in section 4.3.3. below in relation to disguised 
distributions that are deemed dividends under section 47A. Where, 
on the other hand, dividends are paid by an unlisted country CFC 
to a listed country CFC, then special attribution rules under 
section 458 are invoked, in certain instances, to include such 
payments in the assessable income of the attributable taxpayer. 
These rules are discussed at 4.2.4. below.
However, it should be noted that in as much as the term 
"dividend" takes its meaning from section 6 of the Act, the 
quantum of the dividend amount (or any other amount) attributed is 
limited by the operation of sections 434 and 435. Generally, only 
amounts shown in the recognised accounts of a company will be 
taken into account. Other amounts of prima facie dividends 
included as passive income, are unit trust dividends paid by a 
corporate unit trust and a liquidator's distribution which by 
section 47 of the Act is deemed to be a dividend paid to 
shareholders out of profits.173
Therefore, in summary the broad definition of interest and 
dividend income in section 446 should ensure that both types of 
income are not manipulated to undermine the integrity of the AIT 
(to be discussed immediately below). For example, it is noted that 
tainted interest income will include interest which is incidental 
to the carrying on of an active business (e.g., excess funds put 
on short term deposit or income arising from a hire purchase 
agreement for financing property acquisition174) . The philosophy 
in subjecting such income to Australian current taxation is that 
by its highly mobile nature it could just as easily have been 
invested and derived in Australia, and as a result, would have 
suffered Australian tax. Notwithstanding, it is envisaged that the 
lack of statutory guidance with regards to what constitutes an 
amount in the nature of interest, and the separate class of 
interest income created in the CFC rules, will increase 
compliance costs and cause an increase in litigation as taxpayers 
and tax officials try to establish the exact scope of this 
category of income.
See section 446 (1) (b) and (c) of the Act
See section 441 (1) of the Act.
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3.4.3. Calculating attributable income amounts
Having discussed the character of income (viz., passive 
income175) that is attributable to the attributable taxpayer, it 
is now necessary to examine some of the more important 
modifications required when computing the amount of income (viz., 
tainted interest and dividends) to be attributed to the Australian 
controllers. As will appear, some of the modifications to be 
discussed below also support the assertion made in Part I and the 
introduction to this Part - viz., that the CFC rules protect 
Australia's residence and source rules by attributing the 
Australian resident shareholder with undistributed tainted income 
of an eligible CFC, thus creating quasi-residence based source 
rules for such income.
As mentioned previously, under section 456 an attributable 
taxpayer is required to include in its assessable income its pro 
rata share of an eligible CFC's attributable income for a 
statutory accounting period.176 The calculation of the CFC's 
income is determined by the rules set out in Subdivisions B to E 
of Division 7 of Part X, which modify existing Australian tax law. 
The general thrust of such modifications is to ensure that the 
CFC's taxable income is the amount that would be its taxable 
income if one assumed that it were an Australian resident and that 
it only derived certain types of income. Hence the term notional 
assessable income which denotes a hypothetical amount as opposed 
to a real amount.177
The application of Australian income computational rules is 
necessitated because the eligible CFC is a non-resident and will 
not normally be liable to Australian company tax and will have
175 The discussion of the other categories of income that 
constitute adjusted tainted income - viz., tainted sales and 
tainted services income will be discussed in section 4. below.
176 By contrast, pursuant to §951 (a) (1) (A) (i) of the Code, 
an amount of income referred to as "Subpart F income" is taxable 
as a deemed dividend to the USS. Subpart F income comprises of 
five categories of income, being (i) insurance income, (ii) FBC 
income, (iii) income attributable to compliance with an 
international boycott, (iv) bribery amounts paid to foreign 
officials, and (v) income arising in certain unfriendly countries: 
§952(a) (1) (-(5) of the Code.
177 It has been held that a statutory hypothesis must not be 
carried further than its legislative purpose requires: Polvdor Ltd 
and RSO Records Inc v Harlequin Record Shop Ltd and Simons Records 
Ltd [1980] 1 CMLR 669 at 673 per Sir Robert Megarry V-C; Bricom
Holdings Ltd [1997] STC 1179 at 1193-1194 per Millett LJ (with 
whom Beldam and Otton LJJ agreed).
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made no claim to relief from such tax.178 Administratively, 
applying Australian rules when calculating attributable income of 
the CFC, obviates the need to understand income tax system of 
foreign jurisdiction in which the CFC is resident. This in turn 
ameliorates the administrative costs of operating the attribution 
rule and ensures that the eligible CFC does not receive 
concessional treatment where none was intended.179 By doing so, 
the computational rules also prevent double taxation of the same 
income.
The purpose of the modifications in Subdivisions B to E can 
best be explained on the basis that they provide a set of rules 
for calculating the taxable income of a CFC in accordance with the 
rules for calculating "taxable income"180 of a resident 
taxpayer.181 Therefore, where for example, the taxpayer is 
entitled to claim a deduction for an amount of bad debts written 
off (under either the general deduction provision of section 51(1) 
or the specific deduction rule in section 63), then such an amount 
would constitute a notional allowable deduction of the eligible 
CFC if the conditions set out in section 399A are met.182 The 
conditions in section 399A are very similar to those stipulated in 
sections 51 or 63, which deny deduction for expenses incurred in 
relation to exempt income. However, unlike section 51(1), section 
399A(c) contains an apportionment formula which seeks to exclude
178 See section 23 (r) of the Act. See also the Bricom 
Holdings case [1997] STC 1179.
179 This method of calculating attributable income of a CFC 
is consistent with the requirements of most countries with CFC 
legislation as well as the method for calculating the income of 
branches under the FTCS. However, Japan's CFC rules do not require 
the taxpayer to recalculate income in accordance with domestic tax 
law (see Arnold (1986) op cit.. at p 281).
180 The taxable income of a resident is determined by 
subtracting allowable deductions from assessable income. The 
excess remaining is referred to as taxable income: see section 
6(1) of the Act. This treatment correlates with the manner in 
which FBC income is calculated under Subpart F where the 1995 
regulations to §954 refer to "adjusted net FBC income": reg.
§1.954-1 (a) (5) .
181 The calculation of attributable income according to a 
modified version of Australian taxation law was referred to as the 
"branch-equivalent" approach in the Consultative Document because 
income of foreign branches is determined according to Australian 
taxation law (the CD op cit., at p 22). However, unlike a branch, 
the subsidiary is a separate legal entity which therefore, makes 
the term partly inaccurate.
182 Effectively, a deduction for a bad debt is allowed where 
the debt was written off by the taxpayer in the ordinary course of 
a money-lending business.
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amounts that were incurred in relation to the derivation of exempt 
income.
Notional allowable deduction for taxes paid
One of the most important modifications to be made when 
calculating the amount of notional assessable income stipulates 
that foreign or Australian tax paid in respect of amounts included 
in notional assessable income constitutes a "notional allowable 
deduction" from the notional assessable income.183 Ascertainment 
of both these amounts enables the calculation of taxable income of 
the CFC.184 In fact, sections 392 and 393 introduce separate rules 
which deviate substantially from the general treatment of foreign 
taxes paid on foreign income under the FTCS. The deduction regime 
for foreign tax paid, differs from the regime established under 
the FTCS for a number of reasons. First, the regime merely 
provides a set of rules for computing hypothetical amounts - i.e, 
notional income and notional deductions. However, given that the 
amount attributed under section 456 is the taxable income of the 
CFC, then the hypothetical amount in effect becomes a tangible 
amount.
Second, unlike attribution under the CFC rules (which is 
based on accruals or current taxation), the FTCS operates on a 
receipt basis. Third, as the name suggests, under the FTCS an 
Australian resident taxpayer is entitled to a credit for foreign 
taxes which the taxpayer was personally liable for, and paid. 
However, because of the limitation on the amount of credit 
available (viz., up to the amount of Australian tax payable), the 
amount of the foreign source income included in the Australian 
taxpayer's assessable income is grossed-up (pursuant to section 
6AC) for the amount of foreign tax paid. Consequently, the gross- 
up amount available under section 6AC needs to be ignored when 
calculating the CFC's attributable income.185 However, in many
183 See section 393 of the Act. Similarly, in the US
§954(b)(5) reduces each of the categories of income that together 
comprise FBC income (viz., interest and dividends) by the 
deductions "properly allocable" to such income, which includes 
taxes.
184 See section 382(2) of the Act.
185 Other amounts that are ignored for the purposes of 
calculating attributable income (which is taxable income), include 
listed country non-portfolio dividends that are exempt under 
section 23AJ; listed country branch profits exempt under section
23AH; previously attributed income which is exempt under section 
23AI; amounts included in assessable income as a result of a 
transfer pricing adjustment and amounts subject to withholding 
tax: see section 389(a).
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cases, income derived by a CFC will be "notional exempt 
income".186 For instance, sections 402-404 specifically deem 
certain amounts (which may otherwise be notional assessable 
income) to be notional exempt income. The general rule is that 
amounts derived by a CFC which are not characterised as notional 
assessable income are treated as notional exempt income.187
Therefore, where notional assessable income of a CFC includes 
foreign income the question of relief from foreign and Australian 
taxes is dealt with by sections 392 and 393. Pursuant to section 
392(1) amounts included in the notional assessable income of the 
CFC are amounts before payment of foreign or Australian tax. Where 
the CFC is entitled to a deduction for underlying tax deemed paid 
in relation to a dividend received, the amount of notional 
assessable income is the amount of the dividend grossed-up by the 
foreign tax deemed paid.188
Under section 393, a "deduction" for foreign or Australian 
tax paid will only be allowed where the amount in respect of which 
the tax relates has been included in the notional assessable 
income of the CFC, and only in respect of the year in which it is 
so included.189 In this way, relief from double taxation is 
provided. Consequently, the relief provided by sections 392 and
For example, in most cases, income derived by a CFC from 
sources in Australia will be treated as notional exempt income 
under section 402(2) (a), being an amount included in the actual 
rather than notional assessable income of the CFC.
187 See section 384(1) (b) for unlisted country CFCs and 
section 385(1) (b) for listed country CFCs.
188 See section 392(2) . To qualify for a deduction for 
underlying tax:
• the notional assessable income of the CFC must include a 
non-portfolio dividend;
• the attributable taxpayer must be a company; and
• the CFC must be taken by virtue of section 160AFC to 
have paid, and to have been personally liable for, an 
amount of foreign tax in respect of the dividend 
provided the attributable taxpayer is related to each of 
the companies in the group: section 2 93(2) .
189 Where the attributable taxpayer has a non-portfolio 
interest in the CFC (as determined under section 160AFB - 
discussed in Part III at 3.5.2.), the amount attributed under 
section 456 is grossed up by the foreign and Australian tax 
deducted under section 393: see section 6AC(3). Relief from double 
taxation is then provided under section 160AFCA in the form of a 
credit (see 5.5.2. below). However, where the Australian taxpayer 
has less 10% interest in the CFC (as may be the case under the 
subjective de facto control test), then relief in the form of a 
deduction under section 393 is only available for foreign taxes 
paid.
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393 is by way of gross-up and deduction which is to be contrasted 
with the relief under 160AF of gross-up and credit.
The effect of such a relief mechanism is to deny any 
deduction for foreign taxes paid in respect of notional exempt 
income. This is a particularly harsh result given that under 
section'385 and sections 402-404, amounts which are exempt from 
Australian tax for example, under sections 23AH to 23AJ, are 
treated as notional exempt income. Thus, sections 23AH to 23AJ are 
disregarded in calculating attributable income. Consequently, 
where a CFC derives dividend income which is notional exempt 
income because it has been paid out of previously attributed 
income (see section 23AI), a deduction under section 393 for 
dividend withholding tax paid by the CFC in respect of such 
dividend is not available. Further, as will be shown below, a 
credit for such a tax will not be available to the attributable 
taxpayer under section 160AFCA because the credit is only allowed 
for foreign taxes deducted under section 393.
A problem with the structure of section 393(1) is the 
requirement to link taxes to amounts of notional assessable 
income. This, it has been suggested imposes greater compliance 
burdens since the attributable taxpayer will need to assign the 
tax paid to particular items of notional assessable income.190 
Nevertheless, the gross-up and deduction mechanism for relief of 
international double taxation provided by sections 392 and 393 is 
preferable, from a national perspective, to either the exemption 
or credit methods. However, it is readily acknowledged that merely 
permitting the deduction of foreign taxes (like any other cost of 
earning income) from taxable income before computing the domestic 
tax due on income derived from abroad would clearly be 
insufficient to provide full relief from international double 
taxation. Unless the foreign rate of tax is zero, the combined tax 
burden, foreign and domestic, would always be higher on subsidiary 
income than on income derived from purely domestic operations.191 
This result is not completely inconsistent with the policy 
parameters set by the Federal Government which was to remove any 
tax-induced incentive to invest abroad in the case where the CFC 
rules apply.
Reduction of disposal consideration where attributed income
is not distributed
An adjustment is provided in section 401 to the consideration 
received by a CFC in respect of disposal of an interest in an 
"attribution account entity" (e.g, a CFC)192 where income and
190 See Burns op cit. . at pp 152-157.
191 See Bird (1989) op cit. . at p 164.
192 Section 363 defines an "attribution account entity" as 
either a company that is not a Part X Australian resident; a 
partnership or a trust. Essentially, an attribution account entity 
is an entity in respect of which a resident taxpayer is to
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profits of the CFC have been attributed to a taxpayer but have not 
yet been distributed. The adjustment is based on the assumption 
that the share price for the attribution account entity reflects a 
premium for future dividends payable out of the undistributed 
previously attributed earnings. Overall, the adjustment is 
designed to alleviate international double taxation that could 
arise where the Australian taxpayer disposes of shares in a CFC 
which itself had an interest in previously attributed income that 
has not been distributed.
Given that the modifications to attributable income are 
designed to exclude amounts exempt under various provisions of the 
Act (viz., exempting receipts193), correspondingly, section 401 
sets out to identify the amount of consideration received in 
respect of the disposal which represents exempting receipts of the 
CFC. This process is facilitated by reliance on the concept of 
"interest in an attribution account entity".194 That term is 
defined in section 401(7) to broadly mean an interest or an 
entitlement to acquire shares in the foreign entity (whether it be 
a company, partnership or trust). Once this is established, then 
section 401(1) (b) stipulates that immediately before the disposal 
takes place, there is an "attribution surplus"195 in the accounts 
of the entity (or other entities in the chain) being disposed of.
Accordingly, where the requirements of section 401(a) and (b) 
are satisfied, then, pursuant to section 401(c), in calculating 
the attributable income of the CFC disposing of its interest or
maintain an attribution account in order to trace distributions of 
attributed income which may, in certain circumstances be exempt 
from Australian tax.
193 An exempting receipt, for example, is the amount of 
dividend which is exempt under section 23AJ. Therefore, where the 
payment of a non-portfolio dividend produces an "attribution 
debit" or a "FIF attribution debit" for the paying company, then 
any amount in excess of the sum of the attribution debit or FIF 
attribution debit, is an exempting receipt: see sections 377, 378 
and 379 (for unlisted country CFCs), and section 380 for listed 
country CFCs. The amount of the dividend up to the amount of the 
attribution debit is exempt under section 23AI.
194 See section 401(1) (a) .
195 An attribution surplus is the excess of attribution 
credits over attribution debits: section 370. Pursuant to section 
401(5), an attribution credit arises, for example, whenever 
undistributed amounts are attributed to the Australian taxpayer 
under section 456: section 371 () (ab) . By the same token, an 
attribution debit generally arises whenever there is a payment out 
of previously attributed income which has been subject to 
Australian tax and at the time of payment, there was an 
attribution surplus in the accounts of the payer: section 372(1). 
The amount of the debit is the lesser of the attribution surplus 
or the amount of payment: section 372(2).
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part of its interest in the attribution account entity, the 
consideration is to be reduced by the "grossed-up amount of the 
attribution surplus". Effectively, this amount is designed to 
reconcile attribution with distribution and thus alleviate the 
possibility of double attribution. For instance, the grossed-up 
amount of the attribution surplus is broadly defined in section 
401(3)(a) to be an amount which represents the pro rata share of 
the taxpayer's interest in the CFC making the dividend payment. 
However, to ensure that the adjustment provided in section 401 is 
not unduly utilised, anti-avoidance measures are introduced to 
minimise the amount by which the consideration is to be 
reduced.196
Notional exempt income
The modifications to Australian tax law introduced by 
sections 402 - 404 serve a dual purpose by ensuring that the CFC's 
taxable income is the amount that would be its taxable income if 
it was assumed to be an Australian resident and at the same time 
operating to ensure that double taxation of the same income is 
avoided.
Section 402 identifies certain receipts that, for the purpose 
of calculating the attributable income of a CFC, shall not form 
part of the notional assessable income of the CFC - i.e., notional 
exempt income. Broadly, the theory underlying such exclusions is 
that income of a CFC which has been subject to tax at Australian 
rates or comparable rates either in Australia or a listed country 
should not then be included in the calculation of attributable 
income of a CFC and included in the attributable taxpayer's 
assessable income.
There are six types of income identified in section 402 (2) 
which will be notional exempt income when received by the CFC. The 
treatment of the following amounts as notionally exempt income can 
be taken to mean that such amounts do not create substantial tax 
avoidance opportunities because they have borne tax at comparable 
rates as that which is applicable in Australia. In addition, 
characterisation of comparably taxed amounts as exempt income 
accords with the jurisdictional approach underlying Australia's 
CFC rules which generally exempts income derived by CFCs 
established in comparable-tax jurisdictions (see 3.1. above).
Some of the categories of income listed in the section 
include:
(a) amounts which are included in the CFC's assessable 
income;197
196 See for example, section 401(3) (c) which provides that 
the reduction amount cannot exceed the amount of consideration.
197 Section 402(2) (a) .
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(b) a franked dividend paid by a company resident in 
Australia;198
(c) the "exempting profits percentage" of a non-portfolio 
dividend paid to the CFC;199
(d) a non-portfolio dividend (other than a widely 
distributed finance share dividend or a transitional 
finance share dividend200) paid by a CFC resident in an 
unlisted country to another CFC/201 and
(e) distribution payments which are deemed to be dividends 
under section 47A (see later at 4.3.), where the
198 Section 402 (2) (b) . It is noted that to the extent a 
franked dividend is paid, it has borne the full Australian 
corporate tax rate. Accordingly, to avoid double taxation, such 
receipts are excluded from attributable income of the CFC.
199 Section 402(2) (c) . The term exempting profits percentage 
is the percentage of "exempting receipts" to distributable 
profits: see section 378 and 379. Exempting receipts of an 
unlisted country CFC include (a) receipts (derived from carrying 
on business in a listed country through a permanent establishment) 
that have been included in the assessable income of the company 
for Australian tax purposes, or have borne tax in a listed country 
other than as EDC income; (b) non-portfolio dividends paid to the 
CFC by a listed country CFC; (c) non-portfolio dividends paid to 
the CFC by another company to the extent to which those dividends 
are paid out of exempting receipts; and (d) franked dividends 
received from Australian resident companies: see section 377.
Section 317 defines "distributable profits" broadly to 
include amounts that would be available for distribution by the 
company by way of dividends if any resolution or constituent 
documents of the company restricting the availability of profits 
for distribution in that way were disregarded.
200 A "widely distributed finance share" is defined in 
section 327A to broadly mean shares which are issued to the public 
under share based financing arrangements and have debt 
characteristics (e.g., preference share). A "widely distributed 
finance share dividend" is a dividend in respect of a "widely 
distributed finance share" (see section 317). It is noted that 
such dividends are excluded from notional exempt income because 
they are notional allowable deductions to a CFC which pays them 
(see section 394).
Broadly, "transitional finance shares" are finance shares 
issued by a company to another closely associated company which 
has issued widely distributed finance shares (see section 327B).
201 Section 402(2) (d) . The deeming of non-portfolio 
dividends paid by an unlisted country CFC to another CFC as 
notional exempt income, is necessitated by the fact that such 
amounts are attributed under section 458 (see later at 4.2.4.).
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eligible taxpayer is an attributable taxpayer in 
relation the payer and recipient CFCs.202
Moreover, section 402(3) deems certain other dividends paid 
to either a listed or an unlisted country CFC to be notional 
exempt income of the CFC. In order to alleviate double taxation in 
such circumstances section 402(3) provides that amounts previously 
attributed to the attributable taxpayer under section 456 will be 
treated as notional exempt income of the eligible CFC. Where this 
is the case, a dividend (whether or not it is a non-portfolio 
dividend) paid to the eligible CFC will be excluded from the 
notional assessable income of the CFC for the eligible period to 
the extent that the dividend can be traced directly or indirectly 
through one or more interposed non-resident companies, trust 
estates or partnerships, to the amounts that were previously 
attributed.
There are three conditions that must be satisfied before the 
exclusion contained in section 402(3) is invoked. The first is 
that a dividend is paid. The second is that there be at least a 
part of the dividend that would be included in notional assessable 
income of the CFC for the period if the exclusion in section 
402(3) were not to be taken into account. The third is that the 
payment of the dividend must result in an "attribution debit"203 
in respect of the company paying the dividend in respect of the 
attributable taxpayer making the calculation of attributable 
income. Similarly, section 402(4) operates to alleviate double 
taxation in the case where a taxpayer has previously been subject 
to tax under the FIF measures and a distribution is made to a CFC 
for which the taxpayer is required to calculate the attributable 
income of the eligible CFC.
The section 402 exclusions apply whether the eligible CFC is 
a resident of a listed or an unlisted country. 204 To that extent 
it would seem that the "entity approach" adopted in the CFC 
measures is abandoned in favour of a modified "transactional 
approach" similar to that adopted in Subpart F. The primary reason 
why this is only a modified transaction approach is because the 
exclusions set out in section 402 are not intended to operate with 
respect to dividends paid between CFCs resident in unlisted 
countries.
202 Section 402(2) (da) . By an amendment introduced in 1992,
a sixth category.of notional assessable income was added. This was 
amounts derived by a FIF that is authorised to carry on life 
insurance business: section 402(2A).
203 Broadly, an "attribution debit" will arise where there 
is a payment out of income which has been attributed to the 
Australian shareholder and subject to Australian tax through the 
accruals tax system (section 372). The payment, to the extent of 
the debit, will be excluded from assessable income by section 
23AI.
204 See section 402(1).
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Section 403 provides two further exemptions. The first 
exemption arises in respect of amounts derived by an unlisted 
country CFC which is carrying on business through a permanent 
establishment in a listed country, provided the income is subject 
to tax and is not DCI. 205 The second exemption arises in respect 
of non-portfolio dividends paid to the CFC by a company resident 
in a listed country. 206 Finally, an exclusion is provided by 
section 404 where a listed country CFC receives a dividend from a 
company which is resident in a listed country.
The operation of the exclusions in section 402-404 are 
consistent with the policy parameters intended for the CFC regime. 
For example, treating the whole of a non-portfolio dividend which 
is paid by an unlisted country CFC as notional exempt income (for 
the purposes of calculating the attributable income of the CFC 
receiving the dividend) is not inconsistent with the general 
policy of eliminating deferral in cases of passive income. This is 
because such a receipt, as will be seen below, is attributed to 
the Australian controllers under section 458.
Deductibility of Losses
Generally, in calculating the attributable income of a CFC, 
losses incurred in a previous year will be taken into account.207 
However, previous year losses incurred by a CFC can only be offset 
in calculating the attributable income of a listed (or unlisted) 
country CFC if the CFC was a resident of a listed (or unlisted) 
country in the previous year. 208 The extent to which prior year 
losses may be used to offset current year's income of the CFC will 
be calculated in accordance with rules that are similar to those 
that apply for resident taxpayers under the Act for previous
205 Section 403 (a) .
Section 403(b). The exclusion in section 403(b) is 
consistent with the general approach adopted in the CFC rules 
which is to exempt from Australian tax non-portfolio dividends 
paid by a listed country CFC (see section 23AJ).
See section 431, which also governs the utilisation of 
those losses by providing that the losses are to be utilised in a 
particular order - viz., first against active income or income 
which is exempt under the de minimis exemption (referred to as 
"sometimes-exempt income" per section 425); then against the same 
class of notional assessable income to which the loss relates: 
section 431(2) .
See section 431(4)(a) and (b) of the Act. However, with 
the proposed changes (introduced in the Foreign Income Bill 1997) 
to the jurisdictional approach underlying the CFC regime (viz., 
broad-exemption listed and limited-exemption listed countries), 
will require changes to section 431(4): see new section 
431(4),(4A),(4B) and (4C) which are designed to preserve a CFC's 
prior year losses if the CFC is treated as changing residence 
solely as a result of changes to the list of countries.
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years' losses in respect of foreign income. Thus, consistent with 
section 160AFD losses will be created on a class of income basis 
(e.g., interest income, modified passive income, offshore banking 
income, etc). Broadly, the loss for each class of income will be 
the excess of the notional allowable deductions of that class over 
the notional assessable income of that same class, 209 and any 
excess remaining is then applied against the same class of active 
income or the same class of income which is exempt by virtue of 
the de minimis exemption.210
The quarantining of notional assessable income and notional 
allowable deductions in Subdivision D of Division 7 (comprising 
section 424 to 431), is basically an anti-avoidance measure. At 
the purely domestic level, considerable tax planning is possible 
in view of the fact that assessable income and allowable 
deductions are generally calculated on a global basis. Such 
treatment has enabled domestic taxpayers who carry on a number of 
business activities to claim allowable deductions incurred in 
respect of one activity against assessable income derived in 
respect of another business activity. Hence, minimising their 
total tax liability.
As noted above, in devising the quarantining rule, the 
Federal Government opted for a class of income and a per CFC 
formula for calculating revenue losses generated by a CFC.211 The 
effect of such quarantining rule is that allowable deductions that 
relate to amounts that fall into one of the classes cannot exceed 
the notional assessable income that relates to that class for the 
eligible period.212 The reason for this is primarily to prevent 
Australian resident taxpayers from shifting easily moveable income 
(e.g., interest income) which would otherwise be derived in
209 Section 426(a) (i) of the Act.
210 Section 426 (a) (ii) . Amounts which are exempt from the 
CFC's notional assessable income are referred to as "sometimes- 
exempt income" which is broadly income or other amounts which are 
not included in the CFC's notional assessable income in a 
particular period either because the CFC has passed the active 
income test or because the de minimis exemption applies: section 
425(1) of the Act.
211 Under this quarantining rule foreign income is 
classified into four categories (i.e., interest, modified passive, 
offshore banking and other income): see section 424(1) of the Act. 
However, pursuant to section 424(2), capital losses incurred by a 
CFC are excluded from the quarantining rule. The rationale for 
this is that the taxpayer could selectively realise those assets 
which have decreased in value in order to take advantage of a 
loss while continuing to hold assets with an unrealised increase 
in value: see FSIIP o p  cit.. at chapter 6 and OECD CFC Report 
(1996) op cit. . at endnote 74.
212 See section 430 of the Act.
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Australia to the CFC so as to absorb in the current year any 
active income loss.
Taking the example of interest income, it is noted that under 
the quarantining rule, interest income213 derived by a CFC cannot 
be utilised to offset losses generated by another CFC within the 
group through the conduct of its active business. Instead, foreign 
losses are carried forward to be recouped only by the loss company 
(if at all), whilst the tax is payable on the foreign income. The 
rationale for introducing such a non-neutrality into the system is 
highly questionable. The FSIIP tries to justify this policy 
decision on the basis of anti-avoidance considerations.
"... with the active income exemption, no case remains for 
the provision of such treatment to foreign companies that 
incur losses in relation to activities connected with the 
derivation of tainted income."214
It is submitted that a blanket refusal to allow CFCs in the 
same group to transfer losses is unfair given that domestic losses 
may be transferred from one company to another company provided 
certain 100% common ownership tests are satisfied.215 A better and 
fairer policy would have been to extend the class quarantining 
rules of section 426 to transfers between CFCs (as in section 
160AFE), or even to disallow transfers of passive or interest 
income whilst retaining the quarantining requirement in respect of 
other income. The existence of such a non-neutrality creates tax 
biases in favour of domestic investments over foreign investments. 
Such a policy decision detracts substantially from the notion of 
capital export neutrality which dictates that foreign investments 
should, as far as possible, be taxed in a similar way to domestic 
investments .216
213 The definition of interest income in section 424(1) 
relies on the definition of interest income in section 160AE(3). 
Consequently, interest income is defined to mean income as 
consisting of interest, or a payment in the nature of interest, in 
respect of money lent, advanced or deposited; credit given; or any 
other form of debt or liability. However, amounts derived from a 
transaction directly related to the active conduct of trade or 
business; or which is offshore banking income; or derived from a 
banking business; or received from a related company and the payee 
has not derived interest income exceeding 10% of its total profits 
during the current or preceding year of income, are excluded from 
the definition of interest income.
214 FSIIP op cit. . at para 6.12.
215 See section 80G.
216 New Zealand's CFC rules allow limited consolidation of 
losses between CFCs that are commonly owned as to 66% and 
established in the same jurisdiction. Norway, also allows partial 
relief for CFC losses which can be used to offset losses of the 
attributable taxpayer - up to a ceiling of the taxpayer's taxed
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Apart from the major criticism regarding the non-allowance of 
loss transfers between wholly owned CFCs, modifications to the 
loss provisions are nevertheless absolutely essential to ensure 
that the integrity of the CFC regime is not undermined. The normal 
provisions of the Act which govern the treatment of losses (viz., 
sections 79D, 79E, 79F, 80 to 80G and 160AFD) incurred by resident 
taxpayers are largely ignored for the purposes of calculating the 
attributable income or loss of a CFC. The exception to this rule, 
is that to the extent to which expressions used in those 
disregarded sections are used in calculating the attributable 
income of a CFC, then the provisions of the disregarded sections 
will be preserved. For example, the anti-loss trafficking 
provisions of section 431(5) contain references to section 80, 80A 
and 8 ODA.217
3.5. General Observations about the Anti-Deferral Power of CFC 
Rules
In summary, it was shown above that the interaction of the 
control rule, pro rata rule and attribution rule ensures that an 
Australian controlling shareholder is attributed on its pro rata 
share of the eligible CFC's undistributed dividend and interest 
income derived either in a listed or unlisted country and which 
has not been taxed abroad at a comparable rate to that which would 
apply had the income been derived in Australia. Alternatively, it 
could be said that these three rules protect Australia's domestic 
tax base by removing the deferral advantage available in relation 
to tainted income which is accumulated in a CFC. However, there is 
little doubt that this policy objective is achieved at much cost 
and inconvenience to both taxpayers and tax administrators.
Nevertheless, this objective may yet prove to be cost 
effective when considering the potential for revenue leakage that 
arises without the CFC/passive income regime. At a minimum, it 
could now be confidently said that it is no longer cost efficient 
to shift passive income offshore in order to take advantage of a 
favourable foreign tax regime. The current taxation of passive 
foreign investment income may also result in an increase in the 
amount of domestic source income earned by resident taxpayers, 
since the tax advantage of deriving foreign source interest or
net capital of the CFC: see OECD CFC Report (1996) op cit.. at pp 
77-78 and 135-137.
217 Under section 431(5) prior period losses cannot be 
utilised in accordance with section 431(2) in the case where had a 
loss of a CFC been incurred within the meaning of section 80, it 
would not have been taken into account because of section 80A or 
80DA. Broadly, section 80A requires continuity of ownership of 
more than 50% in respect of the loss year and the gain year. 
Section 8ODA, is an anti-avoidance measure which ensures that the 
operation of section 80A is not circumvented where the person 
benefiting from the deduction arising from the loss in the gain 
year was not a shareholder in the loss year.
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dividend income is largely removed by the wide definition of 
tainted interest income and dividend income.
In addition, by aggregating (at the end of the statutory 
accounting period) the tainted undistributed income of a CFC with 
the assessable income of its resident controllers, the CFC rules 
largely relieve the pressure on the ATO to test for the existence 
of arm's length prices for every transaction involving passive 
income. However, as mentioned in Part I, there is one further 
aspect to transfer pricing which is not covered by the CFC rules - 
i.e., transfer pricing activities of foreign controlled Australian 
companies (e.g., shifting income or deductions onshore to utilise 
excess foreign tax credits). In this regard, transfer pricing 
rules may still be required.218 Moreover, the ability to defer 
Australian tax, for example, in relation to active income provides 
further scope for transfer pricing activities. This feature of the 
CFC rules will be discussed immediately below.
4. How The CFC Rules Backstop Transfer Pricing
The discussion in this section builds on the discussion in 
section 3. above by examining how the CFC rules backstop transfer 
pricing in relation to the most important exemption from CFC 
taxation - the active income exemption. First, the discussion will 
focus on the active income test which requires identification of 
two elements - the amount of tainted income (relative to non- 
tainted income) derived by the CFC (i.e., the "tainted income 
ratio"), and the type of economic activity applied by the CFC to 
generate income from related party transactions - "tainted sales" 
or "tainted services" income. These latter two categories of 
income reinforce the transfer pricing measures by introducing 
separate tests (e.g., substantial transformation test) designed to 
ensure that income which is effectively generated from economic 
operations in Australia is not shifted to the CFC via transfer 
prices. Obviously, the integrity of the attribution rule depends 
on the integrity of the active income test ("AIT"), since 
deferral is permitted in relation to active income.
218 Surprisingly, there is no Australian study of the tax 
gap created by transfer pricing activities involving foreign 
controlled Australian companies. It is submitted that such a study 
is necessary in view of the excessive compliance burden that 
taxpayers are subjected to under the transfer pricing rules. A 
study of the tax gap created by foreign-based multinationals 
operating in the US was discussed in Part II at 2.1. However, 
despite the tax gap created by the domestic operations of foreign 
multinationals, relatively speaking (based on the frequency and 
size of cross-border related party transactions), the greatest 
potential for revenue loss arises where residents contrive to 
shift domestic income offshore to avoid residence taxation. See 
also Hufbauer G C US Taxation of International Income: Blueprint 
for Reform (Institute for International Economics, Washington, 
1992) esp. at pp 116-119 where less sinister explanations are 
provided for low US taxes paid by foreign-controlled US firms.
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The second part of the discussion will focus on the re­
characterisation of income rules contained in section 47A. These 
rules are designed to short-circuit any tax planning opportunities 
that may arise where a CFC provides a benefit to its shareholder 
or an associate through a third party at below market value rates.
4.1. Exemption for Active Income
The purpose of the active income exemption has been well 
documented in the FSIIP and to a lesser extent in the EM. 
Principally, it is stated that the objectives of the AIT are to 
reduce the compliance burden and the burden of attribution where 
the CFC is predominantly engaged in genuine business 
activities.219 However, this concession, which did not appear in 
the Consultative Document, involves some additional compliance 
burdens - both in terms of legislative complexity and in meeting 
the requirements for exemption. To ensure that blatant tax 
avoidance opportunities which seek to somehow include passive 
income into active income do not arise, the AIT contains 
comprehensive rules for determining the type of income derived.
The existence of the AIT reflects a policy, on the part of 
the government, not to impeded the growth of Australian genuine 
businesses abroad. From the discussion in Part II (at 3.1.1.), the 
justification for such a policy is that an increase in FDI could 
potentially improve Australia's economy (e.g., increase market 
penetration for Australian goods), and its general balance of 
payments position. For one thing, the exemption of foreign active 
income from current taxation ameliorates the costs (which include 
taxes) associated with foreign investment and augments the 
benefits of globalisation for Australia by encouraging more 
Australian firms to pursue commercially justifiable opportunities 
abroad. The welfare losses suffered by Australia (in terms of 
revenue leakage and reduced source of capital) from allowing 
deferral of active income, is somewhat reduced in view of the 
inability of Australian taxpayers to claim deductions incurred in
219 The limited availability of the exemption is designed to 
distinguish genuine business and trading activities from passive 
ones and profit driven investments from those that are tax driven: 
see FSIIP op cit.. at para 4.7.
"As may be expected, it is no easy matter to formulate an 
exemption that rigorously distinguishes between genuine 
business and trading activities and passive investment 
activities. By no means is all passive income associated with 
tax avoidance activity; often it is a normal incident of 
genuine business activity. Nevertheless, experiences of other 
countries with CFC regimes show that the granting of the 
active income concession requires tight definition (while 
also maintaining the competitiveness of genuine offshore 
business operations of Australian taxpayers)."
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deriving exempt foreign income. 220 In fact, the increase in 
international capital activity could potentially increase the 
foreign currency claims of Australians and with it, the fiscal 
claims of the Revenue resulting from the increase in cross-border 
transactions.
Further support for the AIT may be drawn from the results of 
a study by Professors Gordon and Bovenberg which established a 
direct link between capital immobility and the asymmetric 
information available to locals in the host state and foreigners 
wishing to establish an economic presence there.221 The 
implication of such a finding is that risks associated with 
foreign investment are minimised where potential investors 
establish a presence in the host state. The growth of new 
communications technology has indeed facilitated the offshore 
expansion of many firms. Therefore, by exempting genuine business 
activities, transaction costs are reduced which in turn increases 
the attractiveness of pursuing economically viable investment 
opportunities abroad. That is, the AIT largely removes (from the 
investment decision process), a concern with post-tax returns 
which could have a negative impact on the efficient allocation of 
resources.222
In terms of traditional legal principles underlying the 
taxation of companies, the AIT can be justified on the basis that 
the foreign income does not fall within Australia's taxing powers 
because there is no economic attachment between the income derived 
and Australia. There is a personal attachment, however, in view of 
the corporate veil doctrine, this link is relatively weaker than 
the claim for exemption under the economic nexus rule and section 
23(r) of the Act. That is, there is less scope for asserting 
residence based source rules in relation to active foreign source 
income.
220 See section 51(1) of the Act. Therefore, it is argued 
that the commercial viability criteria acts as an economic 
efficiency lever which discourages offshore capital movements that 
create national welfare losses due to the inability of the 
shareholder state to tax the income from such capital (once it has 
left the borders of the residence state), and the inefficient 
utilisation of such capital (which could have been put to better 
use domestically).
221 See Gordon R H & Bovenberg A L, "Why Is Capital So 
Immobile Internationally? Explanations and Implications for 
Capital Income Taxation" (1996) American Economic Review 1057.
222 This conclusion is also based on the results of the
model developed by Devereaux and Freeman which established that 
allocation of total FDI flows between competing host states by 
multinationals is sensitive to differences in taxation between the 
locations: "The Impact of Tax on Foreign Direct Investment: 
Empirical Evidence and the Implications for Tax Integration 
Schemes" (1995) 2 International Tax and Public Finance 85-106 at
pp 95-99.
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4.2. The Operation of the AIT
The rules for applying the AIT, as indicated above, depend on 
the country of residence of the CFC (at the end of its accounting 
period), but in any case can mean a reduction in the amount of 
attributable income. For instance, the income of a CFC resident in 
a "particular unlisted country" and EDCI of a CFC resident in a 
"particular listed country" will not be attributable to Australian 
shareholders if the company passes the AIT. Where the income 
derived by the relevant listed country CFC passes the AIT, 
Australian shareholders will still automatically be attributed 
with any amounts derived as a beneficiary of a trust, or notional 
assessable income pursuant to section 102AAZD under sections 456 
and 385. Moreover, the shareholders will be attributed with income 
of the CFC which has not been "subject to tax" in the listed 
country. 223 For unlisted country CFCs that pass the AIT, trust 
distributions and section 102AAZD notional amounts are 
automatically attributed to the Australian shareholders under 
sections 456 and 384.224
Therefore, the major difference between the notional 
assessable amounts attributed to Australian shareholders of a 
listed country and an unlisted country CFC is that the "subject to 
tax" test is not relevant in relation to an unlisted country 
CFC.225 The significance of this difference is that under the 
"subject to tax" test foreign source income that may have been 
concessionally taxed in the listed country but which does not 
constitute EDCI is taken out of the AIT formula. Effectively, such 
an exclusion increases the possibility that listed country CFCs 
will not satisfy the AIT. This is because the amount of gross 
turnover relative to the amount of tainted turnover (used in 
calculating the "tainted income ratio" of the particular CFC), 
will be reduced by the amount of concessionally taxed income. 
However, before turning to consider the calculation of tainted 
income ratio, there are other requirements (all of which must be 
met for each accounting period) which are common to both CFC's 
resident in listed and unlisted countries and contained in section 
432(1). They are:
(a) The CFC must be "in existence" at the end of the 
statutory accounting period226 . A company will be taken to be in
223 The "subject to tax" test contained in section 324 must 
be satisfied regardless of whether the listed country CFC passes 
the AIT or not: section 385(2)(a)(ii) of the Act.
224 Proposals contained in Taxation Laws Amendment (Foreign 
Measures) Bill 1997 have been introduced to extend the active 
income test that currently applies to unlisted country CFCs to all 
CFCs.
225 See sections 384(2) and 385(2) for unlisted and listed 
country CFCs, respectively.
226 Section 432 (1) (a) .
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existence if it is incorporated and not dissolved. 227 This may 
require caution in jurisdictions where failure to pay annual fees 
can lead to de facto dissolution. Section 432(3) further provides 
that a company will be in existence if it is not a dormant company 
within the meaning of Part VI of the Companies Act, 1981.
(b) The company must have a residence in a particular country 
or countries at all times during the statutory accounting period. 
The residence rules of foreign jurisdictions will be critical to 
the determination of this question. Where a CFC has no particular 
place of residence, then by virtue of section 333(1)(b), such 
company will be deemed to be a resident of an unlisted country.
(c) The CFC must keep accounts which are prepared in 
accordance with commercially acceptable accounting principles 
("CAAPs"), and which correctly record and explain the matters, 
transactions, acts or operations to which they relate. 228 The 
first question that springs to mind from this requirement is what 
exactly is a CAAP? There is a suggestion that CAAPs do not 
necessarily need to be generally acceptable in Australia, however, 
it is advisable from a practical point of view that the accounting 
principles (adopted in preparing the accounts of the CFC), not 
deviate too significantly from the Australian accounting 
standards. It is anticipated that the CFC's accounts would 
generally be prepared in accordance with the accounting principles 
in use in the country in which it carries on its principal 
business activities. Where, however, the CFC carries on business 
in a number of business centres with different accounting 
principles, the CFC may choose to use the accounting principles 
generally applicable in the residence country of its principal 
shareholder.229
In view of the above requirement, it is submitted that it 
will be necessary for the CFC to maintain very detailed records to 
ensure the correctness of the recording and the explanations of 
each entry. This fact alone should contribute significantly to the 
costs of compliance with the legislation. Furthermore, the fact 
that the CFC may choose between different sets of CAAPs is 
constrained by the fact that the accounts must give a "true and 
fair view". 230 The question which arises in relation to this 
requirement is, according to whose standards should the "true and 
fair view" criterion be judged?
(d) The CFC must at all times during the statutory accounting 
period and when it was in existence and resident of a particular
Section 432(2) .
Section 432(1) (c) .
See the EM accompanying the Bill at p 1767. 
Section 432(1)(c)(ii).
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listed or unlisted country, carry on business in that country at 
or through a permanent establishment.231
The term "permanent establishment" is defined in section 6 of 
the Act and differs slightly from the definition of the same in 
Australia's DTAs. Broadly, a permanent establishment includes a 
place where (i) business is carried on through an agent; (ii) 
substantial equipment or machinery is used or installed; (iii) a 
person is engaged in a construction project; and (iv) goods are 
manufactured, assembled, processed, packed or distributed, if the 
goods are ordered and sold by a related party.
The Taxation Institute of Australia, in its submission to the 
Federal Government on the CFC rules, raised the argument that 
section 432(1)(e), when read in conjunction with sections 332 and 
333 operates unfairly in relation to companies which are resident 
in a listed country purely by virtue of incorporation in that 
country, but whose sole active operations are carried on in an 
unlisted country. Such a company is likely to be a resident of the 
listed country for the purposes of the tax law of that listed 
country and, therefore, pursuant to sections 332 and 333, it will 
be a resident of the listed country only for the purposes of 
section 432. As a consequence, such a company will be unable to 
satisfy paragraph (e) of subsection 432(1) since at all times 
during the statutory accounting period when the company was a 
resident of the particular listed country, it will not have 
carried on business in the listed country at or through a 
permanent establishment in that country.232
(e) Where all of the above requirements have been satisfied, 
the final requirement is that the CFC must achieve a "tainted 
income ratio"233 for the statutory accounting period of less than
231 Section 432 (1) (e) .
232 See "Submission on the Taxation Laws Amendment (Foreign
Income) Bill 1990" (1990) Vol 24, No 9, Taxation in Australia 632,
at pp. 642-643. The force of this submission will substantially 
subside once the measures introduced in the Foreign Income Bill 
1997 become law.
233 The formula to determine the tainted income ratio for 
the CFC which is resident in a particular unlisted country is set 
out in section 433(1):
Gross tainted turnover
Gross turnover
The formula for a CFC resident in a particular listed country 
is set out in section 433(2):
Tainted eligible designated concession income
Eligible designated concession income
The term "tainted eligible designated concession income", is 
defined in section 433(2) to mean so much of the gross tainted 
turnover as represents EDC income; and EDC concession income is so 
much of the gross turnover as represents DC income. Consequently, 
it is necessary to go through a two tier process first to isolate
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5% 234 rpji a t  -j_s #  the ratio for the CFC's accounting period of 
gross tainted income to gross turnover is less than 5%, then the 
CFC's income for that period will not be attributed to the 
Australian controlling shareholders. Where, however, the country 
of residence of a CFC cannot be determined, all of the CFC's 
income will be treated as tainted income.
Correspondingly, if more than 5% of the CFC's gross turnover 
constituted tainted income then the CFC fails the AIT and if the 
CFC is a resident of an unlisted country then under section 384 
all of its tainted income will be characterised as attributable 
income and attributed back to the Australian shareholders of the 
relevant CFC in accordance with their proportional interests in 
the CFC. On the other hand, where the CFC is a resident of a 
listed country and fails the AIT, then its eligible designated 
concession income, trust distributions, section 102AAZD notional 
amounts (subject to the de minimis exemption contained in section 
385(4)), and income that is not "subject to tax" in the listed 
country will be characterised as attributable income pursuant to 
section 385 .
However, where the listed country CFC qualifies for the 
active income exemption in respect of its designated concession 
income, then the de minimis exemption contained in section 385(4) 
will be applied only to the income derived in unlisted countries 
that is not taxed in the listed country. If the CFC fails the de 
minimis exemption test, that unlisted-country income will be 
attributed to the Australian shareholders.
From the above, it is clear that the critical element in 
determining the tainted income ratio of an unlisted country CFC is 
the concept of "gross turnover" and "gross tainted turnover". The 
policy underlying the reliance on the concept of gross turnover is 
that it avoids the allocation of expenses problems encountered 
with a "net" concept of turnover and is consistent with the gross 
basis of taxation under section 25(1) of the Act. By contrast, in 
determining whether a listed country CFC passes the AIT, the 5% 
threshold is calculated having regard only to the company's EDCI 
and not its gross turnover. As EDCI is often income of a passive 
nature, this will mean that, in many cases, the CFC's tainted 
income ratio will be 100%. The effect of this is to automatically 
attribute the whole amount of EDCI to the Australian shareholders 
of that CFC.
The Federal Government was aware of the potential 
discriminatory treatment of listed country CFCs when compared with
the gross tainted turnover (e.g., passive income, tainted sales 
income, etc), and secondly, to see whether any of it qualifies for 
treatment as EDC income.
Section 433 suggests (by its silence) that the tainted income 
ratio might be calculated using the currency in which the accounts 
of the CFC are kept (see section 433(4) and the EM at p 1769) .
234 Section 432 (1) (f) .
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unlisted country CFCs conducting genuine businesses abroad. There 
is more scope for an unlisted country CFC to earn some untaxed 
income than there is for a listed country CFC, since the 5% 
threshold for the unlisted country CFC is calculated having regard 
to the company's gross turnover which includes both active and 
passive income. The reason why the AIT is more onerous on listed 
country CFCs is because generally, dividends paid by listed 
country CFCs are exempt from Australian taxation pursuant to 
section 23A J . Dividends paid by unlisted country CFCs will 
generally not be exempt. However, as noted previously, the 
Government has intimated that such discriminatory treatment will 
desist once the Taxation Laws (Foreign Measures) Bill 1997 becomes 
law.
4.2.1. Gross turnover
A CFC's "gross turnover" for a statutory accounting period is 
based on the amount of gross revenue shown in the CFC's recognised 
accounts for that period. Section 434 provides detailed step by 
step instructions of how gross turnover of a company is to be 
calculated. Basically, gross turnover is calculated by reference 
to the gross revenue shown in the "recognised accounts" 235 of the 
company for the statutory accounting period (prepared in 
accordance with CAAPs and correctly recording the company's 
operations) . 236 Therefore, amounts that are not brought to account 
as revenue or income according to CAAPs, will not be taken into 
consideration in calculating gross turnover.
Other amounts that are excluded from the recognised accounts 
are amounts which are expressly excluded in section 436. The 
general focus of the exclusions from the tainted income ratio 
provided in section 436 (like those set out in sections 402 and 
403) is that only amounts which have either been comparably taxed 
in a listed country, previously attributed or paid out of profits 
assessed to Australian tax are excluded (see below). Without such 
exclusions, the tainted income ratio may be distorted by factors 
that are irrelevant to the AIT or to attribution of income. For 
example, the exclusion of franked dividends is necessary given 
that such amounts effectively come out of profits already subject 
to Australian tax.237
However, since 1995, the Commissioner has been given the same 
discretion to recalculate amounts shown in the recognised accounts 
of the CFC as he has when recalculating amounts derived from an 
international transaction between related parties under the
235 Section 317 defines "recognised accounts" to mean the 
accounts referred to in section 432(1) (c) (discussed above) that 
are prepared by the company for the statutory accounting period.
236 See section 434 (1) (a) .
i
See Australian Tax Practice: Commentary (Vol 11), (ATP, 
Sydney, looseleaf) at paras [436/1], [436/20].
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transfer pricing measures contained in Division 13 of the Act.238 
Accordingly, the Commissioner may make adjustments to amounts 
shown in the recognised accounts where such amounts do not reflect 
arm's length values for the acquisition or supply of one or more 
items of property. As a result of this amendment, the operation of 
the AIT has become even more uncertain and therefore, more costly. 
The uncertainty arises largely because of a perceived overlap 
between the "true and fair" principle to be reflected in CAAPs 
and the arm's length principle - especially given that it has been 
held that an arm's length price is one which is fair and 
reasonable .239
It is envisaged that in order to avoid the risk of penalties 
being imposed on the Australian shareholders (as a result of a 
transfer pricing adjustment), many Australian owned CFCs will be 
required to maintain extra documentation which in turn, will add 
to the costs of complying with the AIT. 240 Therefore, depending on 
the size of the foreign operations, the level of competition in 
the foreign market, and the fixed costs of running a business in 
the particular foreign jurisdiction, an excessive compliance 
burden could have a significant negative impact on the 
competitiveness of Australian businesses abroad, despite the 
rationale for introducing the exemption in the first place.
4.2.2. Gross tainted turnover
Having calculated the CFC's "gross turnover" for a statutory 
accounting period, it then becomes necessary to determine how much 
of that turnover is "tainted" in order to arrive at the concept of 
"gross tainted turnover". Basically, this expression means so much 
of the gross turnover for the statutory accounting period as 
consists of:
(i) passive income;
(ii) tainted sales income; and
(iii) tainted services income.
See section 434(3) which was inserted into the Act by 
Act No 170 of 1995 with effect from 16 December 1995 and 
applicable for statutory accounting periods commencing after 30 
June 1995.
239 See Azzi (1995) op cit. . at p 318.
240 Evidence suggests that the compliance costs of the US 
system of taxing foreign-source income generally, is about 40% of 
the total tax compliance costs of large US corporations (i.e., 
"Fortune 500" companies). It was estimated that this percentage is 
disproportionately high relative to the firms' foreign activities 
based on a comparison of assets, sales and“employment abroad: 
Blumenthal M & Slemrod J B "The Compliance Cost of Taxing Foreign 
Source Income: Its Magnitude, Determinants, and Policy 
Implications" (1995) 2 International Tax and Public Finance 37-53 
at p 41.
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As mentioned previously, the above categories of tainted 
income (which are based on the US' definition of tainted income), 
isolate those kinds of income or profits which the Federal 
Government believes may be generated by CFCs, particularly by 
those resident in unlisted countries, for the purpose of avoiding 
or deferring Australian tax. The deferral of Australian taxes in 
such cases occurs mainly as a result of the highly mobile nature 
of such income.241 Factor mobility is the essential ingredient 
which enables Australian taxpayers to shift the source of the 
income from Australia to a foreign jurisdiction. Consequently, the 
tainted sales and tainted services income rules, as will appear, 
seek to distinguish those amounts that are substantially derived 
from genuine business activities abroad, from income that could be 
derived anywhere.
tainted sales income242
The term "tainted sales income" 243 is defined in section 447, 
and effectively involves either the CFC (i) purchasing goods from 
an associate; or (ii) selling goods to an associate who is either 
an Australian resident or is operating through a permanent 
establishment in Australia. 244 As with the transfer pricing rules 
in Division 13, the concept of tainted sales income is invoked 
where an Australian company deals with a related party (e.g.,
241 Further, the inclusion of tainted sales and tainted 
services income in the gross tainted turnover formula, attests to 
the fact that related party income is highly mobile and hence can 
be easily manipulated to avoid Australian taxation.
242 For a fuller analysis of the operation of the tainted 
sales .income rule, see a paper presented by Williams D to The 
University of New South Wales: Faculty of Law - Continuing Legal 
Education: International Tax Chancres - Practical Perspectives "The 
Active Business Exemption After the Changes" on 19 November 1990.
243 A similar concept exists under the US Subpart F rules 
which is referred to as foreign base company ("FBC") sales income: 
see §954(d) of the Code. Similarly, the US rules apply with 
respect to "related persons" which usurp the definition of the 
same term as it is used in relation to FPHC income: § 954(d)(3).
244 Sections 447(1) (a) and (b) set out the conditions 
necessary for amounts to be characterised as tainted sales income. 
Paragraph (1)(a) deals with the situation where goods are sold to 
the company either by an associate who was a resident of Australia 
or by a non-resident associate who sold the goods in the course of 
carrying on a business at or through a permanent establishment in 
Australia and the sales income does not pass the substantial 
alteration test set out in section 447(4). Paragraph (1)(b) deals 
with the opposite situation where goods are sold into Australia 
where the purchaser of the goods was a resident associate or a 
non-resident associate and the purchase related to a permanent 
establishment carried on by that non-resident associate in 
Australia.
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subsidiary). 245 However, more importantly, the inclusion of 
tainted sales income in the CFC rules ensures that related party 
transactions are caught even where Division 13 may not apply. This 
is because the concept of "market value" is ignored, 246 and 
instead the focus is on whether the property acquired or supplied 
has been substantially altered (which excludes goods which have 
been merely re-packaged) . 247 To ascertain this, a number of tests 
are contained in section 447.248
The first test is referred to as the "substantial alteration 
test", and has the effect of excluding income from the sale of 
goods from being characterised as tainted sales income where the 
CFC substantially alters the goods. 249 The term "substantially" is 
not defined in the Act. However, the House of Lords in Palser v 
Grinling has held that in order to be substantial, an alteration 
must be "large or weighty" or "considerable, solid or big". 250 In 
the US, the "substantial transformation" exception was recently 
considered in relation to the activities of the Hong Kong and 
Irish subsidiaries of a US sunglasses manufacturer. After 
examining expert witness reports and listening to their evidence, 
Judge Carolyn P. Chiechi was able to conclude that substantial
245 The scope of the tainted sales income rules has been 
extended in the Foreign Income Bill 1997 to incorporate transfers 
between the Australian head office and a foreign branch in a 
limited-exemption listed country. The necessity for this amendment 
derives largely from the fact that the branch will not be treated 
as purchasing goods from the Australian company because it is not 
a separate legal entity: see proposed section 23AH(10A)(d). This 
is similar to the "branch rule" under the US FBC sales income 
where the branch is treated as a wholly owned subsidiary of the US 
parent: §954(d)(2).
246 See section 447 (4C) which was introduced into the Act by
Taxation Laws Amendment Act (No 2) 1992. The former section 447(4)
included a definition that required that the manufacturing 
exclusion was only available where the market value of a good was 
enhanced.
247 It was noted in the EM that a manufacturing process that 
changes the character of the goods (for example, cocoa made into 
chocolate bars) or that uses goods in the manufacture of new 
goods, falls within the manufacturing exemption. However, the mere 
packaging or labelling of goods would not (see EM at p 1784) .
Similarly, under the US Subpart F rules, packaging, 
repackaging, labelling, or minor assembly of property purchased 
from another person can never constitute manufacturing for the 
purposes of excluding related party sales income from being 
characterised as FBC sales income: see Reg. §1.954-3(a) (4) (iii) .
248 See section 447 (4C) of the Act.
249 See section 447(4) of the Act.
250 [1948] AC 291 at 317.
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transformation of goods occurred as a result of a "full range of 
activities necessary to assemble sun-glasses parts into finished, 
quality sun-glasses."251
However, regardless of the alterations made, it is a 
requirement under Australia's tainted sales income rule that a 
substantial part of the alteration must be carried out by the 
directors or employees of the company. 252 The rationale for such a 
requirement is readily understandable (i.e., the CFC must itself 
have incurred the risks and costs associated with adding value to 
the imported goods). Nevertheless, it is arguable that this 
requirement is unnecessarily harsh since it precludes the use of 
third parties to carry out a significant part of the 
alterations. 253 In contrast, the FBC sales income rules in the US 
operate to exclude certain income of a CFC arising from a sale or 
purchase of personal property, where the personal property sold or 
purchased is manufactured, produced, grown, or extracted within 
the country in which the CFC is created or organised.254
A second test of exclusion is provided in section 447(4A). 
This test excludes manufacturing income from being characterised 
as tainted sales income if a substantial part of the manufacture 
of those goods was carried out by the directors or employees of 
the CFC. It would appear that there is some overlap between this 
test and the substantial alteration test, since unless there was 
an alteration to the goods sold, they would not ordinarily pass 
the substantial manufacture test. 255 This is similar to the test
251 Bausch & Lomb Inc., et al v IRC (US Tax Court) (T.C.
Memo 1996-57, Tax Ct., Dkt. No. 13983-91) (at para 113), discussed 
in Azzi (1996) op cit.. at p 170.
See section 447(4)(b). No such requirement exists under 
the US FBC sales income rules in §954(b).
253 Cf., Rev. Rul. 75-7, 1975-1 CB 244 which permitted the 
use of an independent contractor by a CFC to effect the 
substantial transformation.
254 See §954 (d) (1) (A) and Reg. §1.954-3 (a) (2) . No such 
exclusion is available in Australia under section 447.
255 See the Explanatory Memorandum to the Taxation Laws 
Amendment Bill (No 2) 1992. where it is stated that " [m]anufacture
brings into existence a commercially distinct article with a new 
identity". In support of this statement the explanatory memorandum 
referred to the test formulated by Darling J in McNichol v Pinch 
(1906) 2 KB 352 at 352 (and adopted by Dixon J in FCT v Jack 
Zinader Ptv Ltd (1949) 78 CLR 336) is referred to, where his 
Lordship said:
"The essence of making or manufacturing is that what is made 
shall be a different thing from that out of which it is made"
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provided in the US regulations. 256 However, unlike the Australian 
rules, a safe harbour test is incorporated into the US test which 
deems manufacturing to have occurred if the conversion costs 
(direct labour and factory burden) of the CFC account for 20 per 
cent or more of the total cost of goods sold.257
The third and final exclusion from the definition of tainted 
sales income is known as the "substantial production test". This 
test operates where goods have been produced by the CFC and then 
used by the CFC in the manufacture of an article with a new 
identity. However, to satisfy this test a substantial part of the 
production and a substantial part of the manufacture must be 
carried out by the CFC's directors or employees.
Where a CFC passes either of the above tests then the income 
generated from the sales transaction is not treated as tainted 
income. For instance, under the modified substantial alteration 
test, where a CFC substantially alters the goods, then the income 
from the sale of goods that would otherwise be tainted sales 
income because of section 447(1)(a) or (b) will be excluded from 
those paragraphs. However, where the above exclusions are not 
satisfied, then such amounts will constitute tainted sales income 
and will be applied to increase the amount of gross tainted 
turnover of the CFC, thus making it harder to satisfy the 5% 
threshold set out in the tainted income ratio. Moreover, subject 
to section 400 (to be discussed below), Division 13 of the Act may 
be applied by the Commissioner to the related-party sales 
transaction.
Tainted Services Income
The term "tainted services income" serves a similar function 
to that of tainted sales income. Thus it is acknowledged that 
income from the provision of services by related parties is as 
equally subject to manipulation as income from the sale of goods 
between related parties. However, there are two major differences 
which arise between these two amounts of income which comprise 
gross tainted turnover for the purposes of the AIT. First, unlike 
the tainted sales income rule, there is no requirement under the 
tainted services income rule that the associate receiving the 
services be an Australian resident or to have an Australian 
business presence. 258 Another difference is that a CFC may derive 
tainted services income from a transaction with a non-related
256 See Reg. §1.954-3 (a) (4) (iii) . In Dave Fischbein
Manufacturing Co. v IRC. 59 TC 338 (1972), acq. 1973-2 CB 2, the
court held that the operations of the CFC were substantial in 
nature and generally considered to constitute the manufacturing of 
portable bag closing machines. These machines were assembled 
largely from components supplied by the CFC's US parent.
257 Reg. §1.954-3 (a) (4) (iii) .
258 See section 448(1) (a) of the Act.
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party where the latter is either an Australian resident or has an 
Australian business presence.259
Where the CFC provides services which directly relate to the 
goods it produces, and the CFC substantially alters the goods so 
that their market value is substantially enhanced, then any income 
derived from the provision of such services will not be included 
as tainted services income. 260 Section 448(6) in turn excludes 
several categories of income from tainted services income. One 
such exclusion is rental income derived in respect of the lease of 
land to the extent that such income constitutes passive income.261 
Therefore, in order for rental income to be excluded from passive 
income, it would appear that the lease transaction must be entered 
into with an unrelated party or that the CFC must have provided 
substantial property management services in connection with the 
land or fixtures and that the land is situated in the CFC's 
country of residence. This result is attained by examining the 
definition of tainted rental income in section 317.
A similar concept is included under Subpart F where it is 
referred to as foreign base company ("FBC") services income. 
However, the US definition of FBC services income is broader than 
its Australian counterpart. Generally, the income contemplated 
under section 448 includes income from the performance of services 
which can be done anywhere an office is available (viz., 
insurance, moneylending, and professional services262 ) , whereas 
under §954(e), FBC services income includes gross income derived 
in connection with the performance of services contemplated in the 
Australian rules, as well as gross income from the performance of 
services that can be done anywhere a laboratory is available 
(viz., industrial and scientific services).263
Further, as with the provision of services in Australia, the 
services (under Subpart F) must also be performed, for or on 
behalf of a related person, outside the country where the CFC is
259 See section 448(1) (b) of the Act.
260 See section 448(3) (a) and (b) (i) of the Act.
261 See section 448(6) (a) and (b) (i) . Further, it should be
noted that where the CFC derives passive income or income from the 
sale of goods, then that income is excluded from being 
characterised as tainted services income: see sections 448(5) and 
448(2), respectively.
262 See section 317 of the Act.
263 The services contemplated in §954 (e) include 
compensation, commissions, fees, or other economic gains obtained 
from the performance of technical, managerial, engineering, 
architectural, scientific, skilled, industrial, commercial or like 
services: §954 (e) and reg. §1.954-4(a). See also Isenbergh (2nd 
ed) at para 40.23.
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organised. 264 Similarly, income arising from the sale of goods 
produced (or substantially enhanced) by the CFC is excluded from 
both the Australian and US provisions where the services were 
performed after the sale of those goods has already taken 
place. 265 An example of an excluded activity would be the 
provision (in any location, including a tax haven) of after sales 
service provided by a car manufacturer to its customers or 
displaying shoes to a potential customer.266
4.2.3. General remarks about the role of tainted sales and tainted 
services income in backstopping transfer pricing
The justification for incorporating narrow definitions of 
tainted sales income and tainted services income (being limited to 
transactions generally occurring between an Australian resident 
company and its associated CFC), can be rationalised in terms of a 
need to exercise care to avoid interfering with the normal 
international and local business of the CFC. The reason for 
focusing on income derived from either a sale of goods or 
provision of services agreement with a related party is that 
Australian tax is less likely to be avoided in the case of a CFC 
purchasing goods from an unrelated party outside the CFC's 
jurisdiction. 267 McIntyre questions the efficacy of not 
challenging sales income or services income deflected to a tax 
haven country from dealings with unrelated parties. 268 By 
contrast, transactions between the CFC and a non-related party 
could theoretically constitute tainted services income under the 
Australian provision. However, the requirement that the unrelated 
party must either be an Australian resident or have an Australian 
business presence, means section 448 does not catch income 
deflected to a subsidiary in a tax haven from dealings with 
unrelated parties.
Regardless, there is little doubt that the tainted sales and 
tainted services income rules support the transfer pricing rules 
in Division 13, because they focus on the economic activities
See §954 (e) (1) (A) and Reg.§1.954-4(a) (2) . However, under 
measures announced in Taxation Laws Amendment (Foreign Income 
Measures) Bill 1997. an amount of tainted services income or 
tainted rental income derived from an associated CFC in the same 
country, is subject to the normal company tax rate in that country 
and does not reduce the attributable income of the associated CFC, 
will not be characterised as tainted services income: see proposed 
section 448(6A). The proposal will apply to statutory accounting 
periods of CFCs commencing on or after 1 July 1997.
265 See section 448(3) and §954 (e) (2) and Reg. §1.954- 
4 (d)(1) and (2), respectively.
266 See Isenbergh (2nd ed.) at para. 40.23.
267 See FSIIP op cit. , at paras 4.29-4.35.
268 See McIntyre op cit. (1989), at p 6-84.
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giving rise to the income and, in the process, relieve some of the 
administrative pressure and excessive compliance burdens 
associated with enforcing a very nebulous standard - the arm's 
length price. The tainted sales income rule obviates the need to 
rely on the market value concept by stipulating alternative tests 
(viz., substantial transformation, manufacturing and production 
tests). For instance, pursuant to the tainted sales income rule, 
the Commissioner is empowered to counter profit shifting arising 
from a simple export transaction if an Australian taxpayer sells 
goods manufactured in Australia to a CFC which merely repackages 
the goods and on-sells them to a third party for a profit.269 
However, the tainted sales income rule suffers from drawbacks. For 
one thing, the "substantial alteration" test could give rise to 
serious administrative difficulties. A major difficulty in 
applying the tainted sales income rule derives from the 
uncertainty with ascertaining the degree of alteration sufficient 
to satisfy the substantial alteration test. It is envisaged that 
expert witnesses such as engineers could be required to settle 
this point. Thus adding to the costs of compliance.
The tainted services income rule also reinforces transfer 
pricing by attributing mobile income derived from the provision of 
services that can be performed anywhere an office is available. 
However, the market value concept is indirectly relevant where the 
income from the provision of services directly relates to goods 
sold by the CFC and the CFC has substantially altered the goods 
with the result that the market value of the goods was 
substantially enhanced. If this occurs, then the income derived is 
excluded from being characterised as tainted services income. 
Therefore, the attendant problems with the arm's length principle 
could also feature prominently when applying the tainted services 
income rule.
Nevertheless, taken together, the tainted sales and tainted 
services income rules protect the domestic tax base by ensuring 
that mobile related party income derived from cross-border 
transactions, is sourced where the economic activity that 
generated that income is located. Such allocation of resources
269 This is the sort of transaction that the Asprey 
Committee noted could not be caught by the existing provisions of 
section 36 and 42: see Asprey Committee Report op cit.. at paras 
17.86-17.87.
Section 36 of the Act deems that a disposition of trading 
stock made otherwise than in the ordinary course of business to be 
a disposition at market value. Although this section overcomes the 
problem with section 42 it nevertheless is restricted in its 
operation to disposition of trading stock. Accordingly, it was 
concluded that the assistance section 36 can give the Commissioner 
"is much less than required": Asprey Committee Report o p  cit.. at 
para 17.79.
Section 42 of the Act enables the Commissioner of Taxation to 
apportion the profit between the manufacturing operations in 
Australia and the selling of the goods. But only the actual profit 
may be apportioned.
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backstops transfer pricing because it roughly corresponds with the 
inter-jurisdictional allocation of revenues from cross-border 
transactions between related parties as reflected by the arm's 
length principle. After all, the whole concept of arm's length 
(which is at the heart of every transfer pricing dispute) revolves 
around a comparison of functions performed and risks taken by 
independent parties which a proxy measure of the economic activity 
applied to generate the related party income. Hence, pursuant to 
the tainted sales and tainted service income rules, income from 
the sale of goods which have not been substantially transformed by 
a CFC, and income from the provision of professional services 
which can be easily performed outside the CFC's country of 
residence, will no longer enjoy a deferral benefit that derives 
from deflecting the income to a CFC in a low-tax country.
The discussion to follow immediately below further augments 
the preceding discussion by examining the attribution of active 
profits in relation to dividend payments between CFCs. This will 
be followed by an examination of the attribution of disguised 
dividend payments. As will appear, in view of the section 23AJ 
exemption, the integrity of the active income exemption partly 
depends on the two attribution rules to be discussed below at
4.2.3. and 4.3., respectively. To briefly recapitulate, the 
absence of strong anti-abuse rules designed to preserve the 
intended operation and scope of the AIT, significantly impacts on 
the second policy rationale of the CFC rules - i.e., backstopping 
transfer pricing.
4.2.4. How attribution under section 458 upholds the integrity of 
the active income exemption
As mentioned previously, the active income exemption allows 
deferral of Australian tax in respect of active income until such 
time as the income is repatriated to Australia. When the income is 
repatriated in the form of a dividend, then the FTCS will be 
invoked to subject such income to Australian taxation. However, 
where a non-portfolio dividend is paid by a listed country CFC 
then it will be exempt from Australian tax under section 23AJ.
This is the case even where an unlisted country CFC pays a non­
portfolio dividend to a listed country CFC which in turn can 
repatriate the same to Australia as exempt dividends. Accordingly, 
the Federal Government introduced section 458(1) which was 
specifically designed to attack such an arrangement.
There are two conditions necessary under section 458 for the 
attribution of non-portfolio dividends paid by a CFC that is a 
resident of an unlisted country to another CFC. 270 The subsection 
provides that the share of the non-portfolio dividend to be
The conditions that must be satisfied are that:
1. the resident taxpayer is an attributable taxpayer 
in relation to both the CFC which pays the dividends and 
the CFC which receives such dividends; and
2. the exceptions provided in subsection 458(2) are 
not applicable.
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included in the Australian shareholder's income will be calculated 
by multiplying the taxpayer's "attribution percentage" (AP) in the 
CFC receiving the dividend by the amount of the dividend paid.271 
The amount of the dividend paid (D) is to be reduced to the extent 
that it is paid out of profits that have previously been 
attributed to the taxpayer (GD) 272 or is paid out of "exempting 
profits percentage" (EPP273 ) , or has suffered foreign tax by way 
of deduction from the remaining part of the dividend (T) .274
271 The term "dividend" derives its meaning from the general 
provisions of the Act. Consequently, a dividend for the purpose of 
section 458 will be taken to include:
• a "dividend" as defined in section 6 of the Act;
• distributions by liquidators which are deemed to be 
"dividends" under section 47;
• loans, advances or payments to shareholders and 
associates of a private company which are deemed to be 
"dividends" under section 108;
• excessive payments to shareholders, directors and 
associates of a private company which are deemed to be 
"dividends" under section 109; and
• a distribution payment made by a CFC after 3 June 1990 
in relation to a distribution benefit provided to a 
shareholder of the CFC or an associate which are deemed 
"dividends" under section 47A (discussed in 4.3. below).
272 Reference to the grossed-up debit (GD) harks back to 
section 373 which broadly provides that where an attribution 
account entity (i.e., the payer CFC) makes an attribution payment 
(i.e., a dividend) to a taxpayer, the grossed-up debit is the sum 
of any attribution debit (including FIF attribution debit) that 
arose as a result of the dividend payment. All the underlined 
terms will be further discussed in section 5. below.
273 Broadly, the EPP of a dividend paid by an unlisted 
country CFC to another CFC (where both CFCs are members of a non­
portfolio company group), identifies the percentage of profits 
that are untainted or have suffered tax at comparable rates (i.e., 
exempting receipts) relative to the total amount of distributable 
profits of the payer CFC. Reliance on the concept of EPP serves 
the same role as the notional exempt income modifications to 
attribution of undistributed amounts under section 456. That is, 
they reinforce the underlying policy (and jurisdictional reach) of 
the CFC rules which seek to only attribute low-taxed income: see 
3.4.3. above and section 379 of the Act which provides the 
following formula to calculate the exempting profits percentage:
Exempting profits x 100 
Distributable profits
274 A one line mathematical formula is provided in section 
458(1) which reflects the foregoing. Therefore, where the 
conditions set out therein have been satisfied, then the formula 
for calculating the amount of dividends to be attributed is:
AP x (D-GD-EPP-T)
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Therefore, by attributing non-portfolio dividends paid by an 
unlisted country CFC to a listed country CFC, section 458 ensures 
that the section 23AJ exemption is not utilised to circumvent the 
operation of the FTCS. However, before an amount is included in 
the assessable income of a taxpayer under section 458, the 
taxpayer must have a controlling interest in the CFC paying the 
dividend and the CFC to which the dividend is paid. 275 The 
exception to this rule occurs where the profits are taxed in a 
listed country at that country's "normal company tax rate".276 The 
concept of "normal company tax rate" is defined in the Act in such 
a manner as to recognise payments of profits between a chain of 
CFCs. Consequently, attribution under section 458 serves to stop 
the Australian controlling shareholder (i.e., attributable 
taxpayer) from exploiting the section 23AJ exemption by 
transferring profits from unlisted country CFCs to listed country 
CFCs, since the Federal Government readily acknowledges that 
dividends received by a listed country CFC from an unlisted 
country CFC may not always be taxed at the listed country's 
"normal company tax rate".277
Section 325 defines what is meant by "normal company tax 
rate". Essentially, where a non-portfolio dividend has been 
subject to tax in a listed country at or above its normal 
corporate tax rate, no part of that dividend will be caught under 
section 458. Where the tax laws of the foreign country allow 
carry-forward losses to be utilised to offset tax liability in 
respect of current year profits from which the dividend is paid, 
then it could be argued that the dividend qualifies as having been 
taxed in a listed country at the normal rate of company tax.278
275 Section 458(1) (a) and (b) .
276 See section 458(2).
For instance, up until 1987, Australia provided for the 
allowance of a rebate of tax to all shareholders whether companies 
or individuals, or whether residents or non-residents: see section 
46 of the Act. Hence, the concept of normal company tax rate 
operates to negate the benefits from the inter-corporate dividend 
rebate that may be available in the listed country, at minimal 
administrative cost to the ATO. For one thing, the normal company 
tax rate concept obviates the need for the ATO to review other 
countries' tax rules (to ascertain whether in fact it provides an 
inter-corporate dividend rebate), since the attributable taxpayer 
is required to prove that the dividend is subject to tax at the 
normal company tax rate in the listed country.
278 This assertion is based on section 325 (b) which 
restricts the availability of the normal company tax rate 
exemption to instances where the listed country provides relief 
for foreign taxes payable (in respect of the dividend) under the 
tax law of a different listed or unlisted country. By doing so, 
section 325(b) excludes special concessions provided by the listed 
country in respect of the dividend. Accordingly, it is submitted
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The attribution rule under section 458 has been amended to 
relieve potential economic double taxation that could arise where 
the same economic unit (i.e., the multinational group) is taxed in 
the listed country more than once on the same income. The 
amendments to section 458 introduced in Taxation Laws Amendment 
Bill (No 2) 1991 made it clear that the exemption will apply 
equally where the listed country does not tax the dividend at its 
normal company tax rate because the profits out of which those 
dividends were paid have already been taxed in the listed country 
under the listed country's CFC regime. 279 Prior to the 
introduction of this amendment, section 458 was further refined to 
incorporate a shift in policy to extend the foregoing exemption 
from attribution to non-portfolio dividends paid by a CFC that is 
a resident of an unlisted country to a CFC that is a resident of
that carry-forward losses (which effectively reduce the amount of 
tax payable in respect of the dividend) should not be excluded 
under section 325(b) because they do not constitute "a credit, 
rebate or other tax concession in respect of the dividend". Refer 
also to the discussion in 3.4.3. above with regards to carry­
forward of losses and the subject to tax test under section 324.
279 See section 458 (2A) .
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another unlisted country. 280 The explanation of this shift in 
policy from the proposals in the original draft Bill, was that:
"[t]his measure will free from Australian taxation 
pre-1990-91 profits of CFC's and the exempt active income of 
CFC's until those profits are distributed to a CFC in a
See section 458(2) (b) . However, such an exemption from 
attribution is limited to situations where the payment of the 
dividend did not arise out of, or was not made in the course of, a 
scheme that:
• was by way of "dividend stripping"; or
• had substantially the same effect as a dividend 
stripping scheme (see section 458(7)(c) and (d)).
Despite repeated legislative attacks on "dividend stripping", 
the term has no precise legal meaning. One commentator has, 
however, attempted to formulate a possible definition, where he 
states:
"... it would seem that from the various sources referred to 
above, a conception of dividend stripping may be elicited as 
one of the elements which comprise an agreement among two or 
more parties whereby there is:
(1) a receipt by one party (the vendor of the shares, the 
stripped company or an associate of either of them) of a 
capital sum which in effect recoups the dividend forgone 
or diverted to the stripper; and
(2) a derivation of the dividend by the other party (the 
stripper) in circumstances such that, because of the 
availability of a rebate or an exemption from liability 
to tax, or because the dividend which would have been 
suffered had it been derived by the former or other 
shareholders is not incurred.
A further element, often present but not essential, is that 
the stripped shares should diminish in value to a degree 
commensurate with the dividend paid." Slater, A., Slater. Law 
and Taxation of Company Distributions in Australia (CCH, 
Sydney, 1986) at para 1276.
In Income Tax Ruling IT 2627 (Application of Part IVA to 
Dividend Stripping Arrangements) it is stated (at para 9) that: 
"... in its traditional sense a dividend stripping scheme 
would include one where a vehicle entity (the stripper) 
purchases shares in a target company that has accumulated or 
current year's profits that are represented by cash or other 
readily realisable assets. The stripper pays the vendor 
shareholders a capital sum that reflects those profits and 
then draws off the profits by having paid to it a dividend 
(or a liquidation distribution) from the target company."
It is further stated (at para 10) that "an important element 
to be looked at would be any release of profits of a company to 
its shareholders in a non-taxable form, regardless of the 
different methods that might be used to achieve this result."
217
listed country that does not tax the distribution at its 
company tax rate or to Australia."281
In summary therefore, section 458 is designed to ensure that 
profits which have been "taxed" (or deemed to be taxed) at a 
comparable rate to that applicable in Australia (had those profits 
been derived in Australia) is not subject to attribution. 282 This 
is the case even where the profits constitute active income and 
are paid through an unlimited number of tiers of CFCs. Obviously, 
the complexity of such attribution rule is largely explained by 
the need to identify cases where payment of non-portfolio 
dividends out of active income to interposed entities (e.g., 
partnerships and trusts) results in the possibility of avoidance 
of Australian tax.283
The nearest analogy in the US Subpart F rules to the section 
458 attribution rule is the "high foreign tax exemption" contained 
in §954(b)(4). This was discussed in the section dealing with the 
jurisdictional coverage of the CFC rules. In summary, to qualify 
for this exemption the FBC income and Subpart F insurance income 
must have been taxed by some foreign government at an effective 
income tax rate greater than 90 per cent of the top US corporate 
tax rate (i.e., taxed at an effective rate above 30.6 per cent).
At this general level of analysis it can be seen that the 
underlying rationale for the high foreign tax exemption 
corresponds with the underlying policy of the section 458 
attribution rule insofar as both provisions target highly mobile 
income which has not been taxed at a rate comparable to that which 
is applicable in the US and Australia, respectively.
281 Press Release issued by the Acting Treasurer dated 3 
June 1990, at p 3 of the Attachment. See also section 458(7) .
282 Putting it another way, such an attribution rule is 
concerned with the elimination of deferral in cases of avoidance. 
The existence of the section 23AJ exemption gives rise to the 
avoidance opportunity in this case.
283 These provisions were not examined here. See sections
458(3), (4), (5), (6), (6A) , (7) and (8) ; and Burns op cit., at pp 
230-234 where these provisions are discussed. Although it should 
be noted that in an effort to stem the possibility of USS's 
avoiding Subpart F by utilising foreign partnerships instead of 
CFCs, held in a ruling that determination of foreign base company 
income of a CFC that is a partner in a foreign partnership, is to 
be made at the partner level: Rev. Rul. 89-72 (1989-1 Cum. Bull.
257) . More recently, the same issue came up before the Full Tax 
Court in the case of Brown Group Inc, v Commissioner 104 T.C. 105 
(1995), where the majority (4:1) upheld the IRS's ruling: for a 
fuller account of the US position see: Isenbergh (2nd edition) op 
cit., at para. 40.28.
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4.3. Disguised Dividends: Section 47A
The rationale underlying section 47A is that once untainted 
profits are used for other purposes, it is appropriate that 
deferral ends. To realise this policy requires very detailed and 
complicated rules for ascertaining the amount of untainted profits 
and the arrangement under which those profits are transferred.
Once the requirements set out in section 47A(1) are satisfied 
(viz., an unlisted country CFC makes a distribution payment out of 
profits), then the section operates to deem the distribution 
payment to be a dividend for income tax purposes in instances 
where, as a result of the particular arrangement, that amount 
would not ordinarily constitute a dividend under the Act.284 
Hence, the term "disguised dividends" which, as will appear, leads 
to a cancellation of certain tax benefits otherwise available in 
relation to ordinary non-portfolio dividend payments.
Deeming certain distributions as dividends (and the recipient 
a shareholder285 ) is only one part of the equation. The other part 
is determining whether the deemed dividend is to be included in 
the recipient's assessable income under either sections 44, 458 
and 459. The amount of profits shown in the accounts of the 
provider of the eligible benefit which represent a distribution 
payment for the purposes of section 47A(1) differ substantially 
from those that represent distributable profits for sections 44 or 
458 attribution purposes. For one thing, no exemption for 
previously attributed amounts is provided for attribution of 
section 47A amounts under section 459. However, relief from double 
attribution is provided under section 459(4) where the amount of 
dividend to be attributed has been taxed in a listed country at 
its normal corporate tax rate.286
Therefore, given that the discussion so far has covered 
taxation of dividend payments between two non-resident companies 
under section 44(1) (b) and section 458, the discussion in this 
section will focus on attribution of section 47A amounts under 
section 459. Accordingly, it will be shown that the combined 
operation of sections 47A and 459 ensures that the benefits of the 
active income exemption are only claimed by those whose economic 
activities generated the active income, especially where the
284 See section 47A(1) (d) .
See section 47A(1)(e). However, it should be noted that 
although sections 47A and 459 deem the distribution payment to be 
a dividend in the hands of the recipient as a "shareholder", the 
recipient is not in fact a shareholder for other purposes of the 
Act.
See also section 47A(16) which eliminates from the 
subsequent application of section 47A to another distribution 
payment, dividends paid from profits shown in the accounts of the 
CFC (immediately before the distribution time) which have been 
treated as a dividend and included in the assessable income of the 
Australian taxpayer.
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activities are located in a low-tax jurisdiction. Without 
attribution in this case, the active profits could be distributed 
to a listed country CFC as disguised dividends and repatriated to 
Australia as exempt dividends. However, as well as reinforcing the 
general policy of the active income exemption, section 47A 
supports the transfer pricing rules where transfer of property or 
services occurs for nil consideration or for consideration less 
than market value. In that case the transferor (i.e., the unlisted 
country CFC) is deemed to have received market value as 
consideration for the property or services transferred. 287 To 
perform this function, section 47A utilises the concept of market 
value which in turn, is likely to create similar administrative 
problems as those associated with the arm's length principle. 
Nevertheless, section 47A is still a potent provision in attacking 
transfer pricing transactions which are not strictly within the 
realm of transfer pricing rules (e.g., transfer by an unlisted 
country CFC to third parties288 ) .
To further discourage avoidance of Australian tax, 
attribution of section 47A amounts under section 459 is not as 
generous as the attribution rule under section 458. How this 
policy is statutorily achieved, is discussed in the immediately 
following section.
4.3.1. Attribution of section 47A amounts under section 459
As noted above, section 458 applies to include in the 
assessable income of an attributable taxpayer, dividends paid, for 
example, by a lower tier CFC to a higher tier CFC. However, the 
payment of downstream deemed dividends is not caught by section 
458, since such payments will be made to a non-shareholder. To 
that end, section 459 complements section 458 and deals with 
dividends that are deemed to be paid by a CFC to any other 
associated entity of the CFC (e.g., a lower tier CFC) .289
Section 459(1) deals with the case where (i) a section 47A 
dividend is paid; (ii) section 458 does not apply to that 
dividend; (iii) the recipient of the payment is a CFC that is a 
resident of a listed country; and (iv) the taxpayer is an 
attributable taxpayer in relation to the payer company and the 
recipient at the time of payment. Where these events occur then 
the assessable income of the taxpayer is to include the amount of
287 See sections 47A(8) (f) and 47A(10) (j) .
288 See section 47A(3) (b) (ii) and (c) .
289 The ability of section 459 to operate where a 
distribution payment is made to a non-shareholder is made possible 
by section 47A(1)(e) which deems the recipient of the payment to 
be a shareholder in the payer CFC.
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dividend paid. 290 Therefore, section 459 would appear to catch 
upstream payments which may not necessarily be caught by section
458. It should be noted that where an amount is attributed under
459, then it is treated as notional exempt income under section 
402(2)(da) in the hands of the recipient CFC. This prevents double 
counting.
There are other significant differences between attribution 
of dividends under section 458 and attribution of deemed dividends 
under section 459. For example, the dividend attributable to the 
Australian taxpayer under section 458 may be reduced by (i) the 
amount of dividends previously attributed (i.e., GD), (ii) the 
attribution percentage of profits that represent exempting 
receipts (i.e., EPP) and (iii) the amount of foreign tax that 
would have been payable on the amounts described in paras (i) and 
(ii) (calculated by reference to the tax rate applicable to the 
dividend payment). No such relief is provided in section 459 which 
attributes (on a pro rata basis) the full amount of the deemed 
dividend.291 However, where the dividend is taxed in a listed 
country at that country's normal company tax rate then it is not 
to be included in the attributable taxpayer's assessable 
income.292
Similarities may be drawn between the broad scope of section 
459 and §951(a) of IRC. Both provisions operate to deem the 
resident shareholder to have received a dividend when certain 
conditions are met. However, unlike §951, section 459 only 
operates to deem a dividend in relation to "distribution payments" 
which come within the ambit of section 47A whereas §951 operates 
in respect of Subpart F income (viz., FBC income, insurance 
income, and certain income relating to international boycotts and 
other violations of public policy). However, unlike the tax 
treatment afforded Subpart F income for which relief for foreign 
taxes paid in respect of underlying profits may be available to a 
USS,293 where an amount is included in assessable income of the 
Australian taxpayer under section 459, the attributable taxpayer 
is not entitled to an indirect foreign tax credit or the section 
23AI or 23AJ exemptions.294
Having discussed the policy rationale and operation of 
section 459 which operates to subject distribution payments (as 
ascertained under section 47A) to accruals taxation, it is now
290 The amount included in assessable income is calculated 
using the formula - AP x D, where AP is the attribution percentage 
and D is the amount of the dividend.
291 See section 459(1) .
292 See section 459(4) .
293 See §960 of the Code (discussed later) .
294 See section 47A(2) .
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appropriate to turn to consider the rules provided in section 47A 
for identifying and computing the amount of distribution payments.
4.3.2. What constitutes a distribution payment for the purposes of 
section 47A
Pursuant to subsection 47A(3), a distribution payment arises 
where there is an eligible benefit which is a distribution 
benefit. An "eligible benefit" is treated as a distribution 
benefit:-
(a) where the eligible benefit was provided to an associated 
entity of the CFC that would be an associated entity 
immediately after the provision of the benefit; or
(b) where the eligible benefit was provided by the CFC or 
the CFC entered into an arrangement with another entity 
under which the CFC made transfers of property or 
services to another entity and that other entity 
provided the benefit.
Amendments to section 47A were introduced in Taxation Laws 
Amendment Bill (No. 2) 1991 to deal with the calculation of the
value of an eligible benefit that is provided by a CFC to its 
shareholder through a third party. For example, the amendment 
operates where the CFC transfers "property" or "services" 295 to a 
third party (for no consideration or for consideration less than 
market value) in return for the third party providing a benefit to 
the Australian shareholder of the unlisted country CFC or an 
associate of the shareholder (i.e., an "arrangement transfer"296 ). 
As a result of the amendment, the value of the eligible benefit is 
equal to so much of the market value of the arrangement transfer 
as is attributable to the provision of the eligible benefit.297
295 One commentator has questioned the inclusion of 
"services" on the basis that the provision of services would never 
be regarded as a dividend at common law: see for example, Fraser P 
"Section 47A and Disguised Dividends" a paper presented to The 
University of New South Wales - Taxation Business & Investment Law 
Research Centre on 19 November 1990, at p 10.
For the instances when an arrangement transfer is taken 
to constitute an eligible benefit: see sections 47A(5)(c)(ii) ; 
47A(7) (e) (ii) , (f) (ii) ; 47A(8) (e) (ii) and 47A(10) (g) .
297 See section 47A(10) (j) (ii) . An example should 
sufficiently illustrate the operation of this amendment while at 
the same time demonstrating the role of section 47A in 
backstopping transfer pricing rules.
Example: Assume Company A transfers property that has a market
value of $10,000 to a shareholder of CFC 1 and the 
shareholder pays a consideration of $5,000 for the 
property. As part of the arrangement for the transfer of 
the property, CFC 1 agrees to pay $5,000 to Company A. 
Pursuant to the new valuation method, $5,000 will be 
treated as a dividend paid by CFC 1 to the shareholder; 
whereas, prior to the amendment, the amount of dividend
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Transactions that generally give rise to the transfer of an 
eligible benefit by one entity to the other, inter alia, 
include298 :
(a) the waiver by an entity of a debt due to it by another 
entity;
(b) the grant of a non-arm's length loan by one entity to 
another;
(c) the grant of a loan by one entity to another to 
facilitate, directly or indirectly, the payment by the 
recipient of a dividend that would be exempt from tax;
(d) the grant of a loan by one entity to another to 
facilitate another transaction that would give rise to 
an eligible benefit; and
(e) the transfer by an entity to another of property or 
services for no consideration or inadequate 
consideration.
There is little doubt that the policy of singling out the two 
categories of transactions described in paragraphs (b) and (e) 
above, is analogous to the policy underlying the transfer pricing 
rules in Division 13 which empower the Commissioner to recalculate 
income arising from an international agreement between related 
parties where those parties were not dealing with each other at 
arm's length (see also 4.3.3. below). However, unlike Division 13, 
the eligible benefits identified in both paragraphs deem the 
transfer for less than market value to be a distribution payment 
even where the arrangement involves a seemingly unrelated party.
The reason for singling out the transactions described in 
paragraphs (c) and (d) above is self-evident. For one thing, both 
transactions deem the provision of a loan299 (for the purpose of 
making a dividend payment), to be an eligible benefit which would 
then constitute a distribution payment and be currently taxed 
under section 459 as a deemed dividend. In both instances, the 
payment does not prima facie constitute a dividend which is a 
distribution of profits (as opposed to a return of capital), as is 
required under the Act. Notwithstanding, ascertainment of the 
amount of profits in the accounts of the CFC providing the loan is 
necessitated by the fact that section 47A operates to re­
characterise such profits as a distribution payment, thus invoking 
the provisions of section 459.
would have been reduced to nil.
See sections 47A(4)-(15) which lists benefits that are 
treated as eligible benefits.
Transactions which are encompassed by the term "loan" 
include an advance of money, the provision of credit, the payment 
of an amount on behalf of another where there is an obligation to 
repay that amount or a transaction which in substance affects a 
loan of money: section 47A(21).
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The inclusion of eligible benefits arising from the waiver or 
release by an entity of the "obligation" 300 of another entity to 
pay or repay an amount,301 reflects a desire to ensure that the 
AIT (viz., the tainted income ratio) is not manipulated where, for 
example, a debt owing to the CFC is waived, thus reducing the 
amount of tainted interest income derived by the CFC and possibly 
causing as loss to be shown in the CFC's accounts. How this 
eligible benefit arises requires further elucidation in light of 
the uncertainty surrounding the ascertainment of when a debt is 
said to be waived.
4.3.3. What amounts to a waiver
Generally, it has been observed that "waiver" implies that 
you have something, and that you are throwing it away. 302 More 
specifically, there has been recent authority which may have cast 
some doubt on whether forgiveness of debt (not in the legal sense) 
amounts to a dividend. Support for this submission is based on the 
decision of Sweeney J in Black v FCT303 , where his Honour held 
that the forgiveness of a debt, on the facts before him, did not 
amount to a dividend as defined in section 6(1) or a "distribution 
of income" pursuant to the old section 108 (1) .304 Without 
embarking on a detailed examination of this case, it is noted that 
what was regarded as a "forgiveness of debt" in the accounts of
Pursuant to section 47A(6), an entity is taken to be 
under an obligation to pay or repay an amount even if the amount 
is not due for payment or repayment.
Where the eligible benefit is a distribution benefit and 
is provided by the CFC, then the distribution time is the time of 
waiver or release and the distribution payment is the amount 
waived or released: see section 47A(5) of the Act.
See Meagher, Gummow and Lehane, Equity -Doctrines and 
Remedies (2nd edition) (Butterworths Pty Limited, 1984), at para 
1723. This observation was confirmed more recently by Brennan J 
(as he then was) in the High Court case of The Commonwealth v 
Verwavne (1990) 64 ALJR 540/ at p 551 stated:
"... upon waiver, the party waiving the right ceases to be 
able thereafter to assert it effectively. When a right has 
been waived ... it is unnecessary to consider whether any 
other party has acted in reliance on the release or 
abandonment; the right is abandoned once and for all." If the 
eligible benefit is a distribution benefit and is provided by 
the CFC, then the distribution time is the time of waiver or 
release and the distribution payment is the amount waived or 
released.
303 90 ATC 4669, at p. 4704.
304 Section 108 operated in certain instances to deem a 
payment to a director of a private company to be a payment from 
profits of the company and therefore, a dividend.
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the company was merely an accounting entry which did not affect 
the legal position of the parties to the debt.305
Therefore, in view of the immediately preceding discussion, 
it is argued that where the legal rights attaching to a debt are 
retained by its owner, then section 47A should not apply because 
there is no "waiver" in the legal sense of "abandoning" something 
that you had. There is merely a "forgiveness of debt" for 
accounting purposes since, for legal purposes, the owner of the 
debt can still effectively assert its right over the debt. Hence, 
it is submitted that Black's case represents a legitimate tax 
minimisation opportunity for taxpayers. For instance, a potential 
escape from the harsh operation of section 47A was provided where 
a debt was merely extinguished by an accounting entry with the 
legal rights attaching to that chose in action (e.g., the debt) 
being retained by the owner. Consequently, it is not difficult to 
understand why a separate code (which reflected proposals 
introduced in 1995 by the former Labor Government) for taxing 
forgiveness of commercial debts, was introduced in 1996 by the 
Coalition Government of Mr John Howard. 306 It appears, at first 
blush, that the new code contemplates a forgiveness of debt both 
in the legal and the accounting senses.307
4.3.4. What constitutes profit
Ascertainment of the amount of profit standing in the 
accounts of the payer CFC is required in order to alleviate any 
double taxation which may arise where profits from which an 
eligible benefit is deemed to have been paid, are included in the 
assessable income of the attributable taxpayer under a previous
In analysing the rights of the parties, Sweeney J noted 
that the lender in forgiving the debt had only released the 
borrower from payment of the debt rather than from the debt 
itself. See Azzi J., "Forgiveness of Debt - A Windfall to the 
Borrower" (1991) Vol 25, No 11 Taxation in Australia 774, at p 
780 .
306 See Division 245 (enacted in Sch 2C) of the Act, 
especially 245-35. Division 245 applies to commercial debts 
forgiven after 27 June 1996 and generally characterises a 
commercial debt that has been forgiven, as assessable income. A 
debt is a commercial debt if the whole or any part of the interest 
payable on the debt is, was, or will be an allowable deduction to 
the debtor: section 245-25 of the Act. Commercial debts forgiven 
effected by will, bankruptcy or for reasons of natural love and 
affection are excluded from the code: section 245-40.
307 See sections 245-35 (1) - (3) of Schedule 2C. However, as 
the date when Schedule 2C was introduced exceeds the cut-off date 
for the thesis, it is not intended to examine whether the 
provisions under the new code would extend to "waivers of debt" 
for the purposes of section 47A.
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application of section 47A. 308 As mentioned previously, the 
complexity of section 47A (which spans over 21 subsections), lies 
mainly in the fact that the section contains detailed provisions 
designed to identify when a transfer of eligible benefits 
constitutes a distribution payment. To facilitate this purpose and 
at the same time accommodate the jurisdictional coverage and scope 
of the CFC rules, section 47A operates to deem an eligible benefit 
to arise under a certain arrangement (see 4.3.2. above), to be a 
distribution payment to the extent that there are untainted 
profits in the accounts of the payer company. It is that amount 
which is attributed under section 459 as a deemed dividend (see 
4.3.1. above). This is a particularly important consideration, 
given that section 459 excludes the operation of other exempting 
provisions in the Act.
The term "profit" which appears in section 47A(1), is not 
defined in the Act, although section 44 has always contained a 
requirement that assessable dividends must be paid out of 
profits. 309 Apart from deeming dividends paid from the company's 
share premium account or a repayment of moneys paid up on a share 
to be out of profits,310 the Act has never attempted to define 
"profits" for the purpose of ascertaining when dividends can be 
paid out of them. Therefore, it is necessary to turn to the 
definition of such term in the company law sphere.311 On that 
basis, it would seem that determination of the "profits" of a CFC
308 See generally section 47A(16) (discussed above) . See 
also section 47A(17) which deals with the case where profits of an 
unlisted country CFC are deemed to be a dividend in relation to a 
distribution payment made by the CFC, and the trustee of a trust 
estate is liable to pay tax under section 98 of the Act on an 
amount that relates to the deemed dividend. Where these conditions 
are satisfied, the amount of the deemed dividend taxable under 
section 98 is disregarded in determining the amount of the profits 
of the CFC in relation to a subsequent application of section 47A 
to another distribution payment. A similar result is created under 
section 47A(18) which deals with the case where the section 47A 
dividend is included in the assessable income of a trustee of a 
trust estate or a partnership.
Section 47A(15) provides that in determining whether a 
company has profits at a particular time, the assumption is made 
that the accounts of the company had been drawn up immediately 
before that time. As a result of this subsection, CFCs that are 
resident in unlisted countries will be virtually required to keep 
continuous track of whether there are "profits" which may be 
available for distribution.
310 See section 44 (IB) (a) and (b) of the Act. Cf. , 
definition of ordinary dividend under section 6(1) of the Act, 
which specifically excludes distribution payments that represent a 
return of capital or share premium account payments.
311 This proposition was accepted by the High Court in FCT v
Slater Holdings Ltd (No 2) (1984) 156 CLR 447.
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should be made having regard to the law of the CFC's place of 
incorporation. Moreover, depending on the law in the country in 
which the CFC is incorporated, the "profits" of a company may 
differ from the amount of accumulated profits shown in the 
company's accounts.
For example, at least in countries where company law derives 
from England (i.e., common law countries), it is well recognised 
that a company may pay dividends out of profits derived in the 
current year where it has accumulated prior year losses (referred 
to as nimble dividends).312 Therefore, the question which arises 
in this context, is whether the source for payment of "nimble 
dividends" constitutes "profit" for the purposes of section 
47A(1) ?313 This issue has not, as yet, been tested before an 
Australian court. It is envisaged that in practice, the question 
of whether an amount of property or services transferred by an 
unlisted country CFC (with accumulated losses), produces a 
distribution payment for purposes of section 47A, may prove to be 
a highly contentious issue in view of the harsh consequences that 
arise (to the Australian taxpayer) where such transfer is deemed a 
disguised dividend and attributed under section 459.
By contrast, the computation rules provided under sections 
47A(8) (f) and 47A(10) (k) could be helpful in determining what 
constitutes profits where property is either exchanged for 
shares314 or simply transferred for less than its market value, 
respectively. Broadly, both sections provide that where the 
eligible benefit is a distribution benefit in relation to the 
transferor of the property or services (i.e., the unlisted country 
CFC), the profits of the transferor immediately before the 
transfer are computed on the assumption that the "transfer of the 
property or services"315 was made to an unrelated entity for
312 Ammonia Soda Co Ltd v Chamberlain [1918] 1 Ch 266.
313 It should be noted that it is the "profits" of the 
particular company which must be ascertained. That is, profits of 
subsidiary companies shown in its accounts as a result of 
consolidation would not be relevant. Similarly, the profits of an 
associate accrued to the company under some form of equity 
accounting should ordinarily, not be relevant.
314 This includes an exchange for the acquisition of shares 
in a company, or units in a unit trust or of rights or options 
over shares or units: section 47A(8)(a) and (b).
315 Section 102AAB defines "transfer" to mean:
"(a) in relation to property - includes dispose of (whether 
by assignment, declaration of trust or otherwise) or 
provide; and
(b) in relation to services - includes allow, confer, give, 
grant, perform or provide."
Section 102AAJ further defines the term "transfer of property 
or services" to cover, inter alia, the situation where property or 
services have been applied for the benefit of an entity, as well
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consideration equal to the full market value. Consequently, both 
sections have the effect of bringing to account as profits, any 
unrealised gain on the property or services disposed. The 
unrealised gains in this case being the difference between the 
full market value of the benefit transferred and the consideration 
received in respect of the transfer. There is precedence for such 
treatment under the general rule in section 160ZD(2) for 
determining consideration in respect of disposal of a capital 
asset.316
Therefore, the guidelines for computing profits under both 
sections are helpful only to the extent that they provide 
certainty in comparison with the uncertainty surrounding whether 
profits from which nimble dividends are paid could ever support a 
section 47A disguised dividend. However, the fact that both 
sections could potentially operate to attribute unrealised gains 
is highly unfair in view of the fact that distribution payments 
attributed under section 459 are treated more harshly than 
dividends attributed under either sections 44 or 458.
4.3.5. The US equivalent to section 47A
The only provision contained in Subpart F which appears to 
resemble section 47A is §956 which was inserted into the Code to 
prevent USSs of a CFC from obtaining a permanent exemption on 
untainted income earned through a CFC. The resemblance relates 
more to the broad policy underlying both provisions - i.e., to 
ensure that untainted income is not utilised to absorb/disguise 
tainted income. To achieve this result, both provisions operate to 
deem amounts that prima facie do not constitute dividends under 
ordinary concepts, as dividends and thus subject to accruals 
taxation.
In general, §956 deems any increase in investments in US 
property as a dividend, and taxes it accordingly.317 The amount
as property or services that have been applied as directed by an 
entity: section 102AAJ(3) and section 47A(21) which provides that 
the term "transfer" has the same meaning ascribed to that term in 
Division 6AAA.
316 See section 407 of the Act which effectively extends the 
provisions of the capital gains tax (CGT) regime in Part IIIA of 
the Act, to the taxation treatment of CFCs. See also section 423 
which provides for a reduction to be made in respect of the 
consideration deemed to have been received by an unlisted country 
CFC under section 47A, on the disposal of an asset which is 
subject to CGT as modified by Subdivision C of Division 7 of Part 
X of the Act.
317 In explaining the introduction of §956, the Senate 
Finance Committee clearly linked the tax to the near dividend 
characteristic of an investment in US property by the CFC by 
stating that "generally, earnings brought back to the US are taxed 
to the shareholders on the grounds that this is substantially the
228
taxable as an increase in investment in US property is determined 
by subtracting the CFC's earnings invested in US property at the 
close of the previous taxable year (reduced by distributions of 
previously taxed income318) from its earnings invested in US 
property at the close of the current taxable year. Thus, unlike 
sections 47A(8)(f) or (10)(k), unrealised appreciation in the 
market values of assets does not enter into the calculation.
To limit opportunities for tax avoidance, US property is 
broadly defined in §956(b)(1) to include any property acquired by 
a foreign corporation (whether or not a CFC) which is:
(a) tangible property located in the US;319
(b) stock of a domestic corporation;320
(c) an obligation of a US person;321 and
(d) any right to use certain intangible property acquired or 
developed in the US.322
There are some important exceptions to what would otherwise 
constitute US property. The more significant of these include:
equivalent of a dividend being paid to them": Senate Report No 
1881, 87th Congress, 2d Session 88 (1962).
318 Since 1993, the category of previously taxed 
distributions has been broadened to amounts previously taxed under 
§§956 or 956A (relating to taxation of investment in excess 
passive assets): §956A(b) as modified by §956(b)(1).
319 This category includes both real and personal property 
that is physically located in the US. However, property that is 
temporarily in the US en route from a foreign point of origin to a 
foreign destination which is shipped through, or temporarily 
stored under customs bond in the US is not considered US property: 
Revenue Ruling 67-130, 1967 CB 191.
320 The significance of this kind of investment has been
reduced by the exclusion for investment in stock of an unrelated 
corporation (see §956(b)(2) and Reg §1.956-2(b) (i) (viii)). An
unrelated corporation is one where 25% or less of the voting stock 
is held either by the CFC or by the USS of the CFC: §956(b)(2)(F).
321 See Reg §1.956-2T(d) (2) for the various forms which the 
obligation may take. For example, an obligation of a US person may 
be in the form of a bond, note, debenture, certificate, bill 
receivable, account receivable, etc.
322 See §956 (b) (1) (D) . A right to use a patent, copyright, 
an invention or a secret formula in the US is deemed to be 
developed or acquired in the US when it is in fact used in the US: 
Reg. §1.956-2(a)(1)(iv)(d).
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(a) obligations of the US, money or deposits with persons 
carrying on the banking business, 323 or obligations 
obtained in the ordinary course of business/324
(b) property that is purchased in the US for export to, or 
use in, foreign countries;325
(c) any obligation of a US person arising in connection with 
the sale or processing of property that does not exceed 
the "ordinary and necessary" amount for carrying on both 
the business of the US person and the other party; 326 and
(d) an amount of the CFC's assets equal to the earnings and 
profits accumulated after the date of commencement of 
Subpart F (i.e., 31 December 1962) and excluded from 
Subpart F under §952 (b).327
The fact that the §956 computation is affected by such 
variables as earnings and profits, as well as the level of passive 
income and passive assets of the CFC, should mean that there is 
ample opportunity for taxpayers to determine the timing of income 
taxable to the USS from investments in US property by CFCs.328 
Similar timing opportunities may be available to the Australian 
shareholder or its associate, since the computation under section 
47A is similarly affected by the amount of passive income derived 
by the CFC and the level of profits and earnings of the relevant 
CFC. However, an amendment to §956 was introduced in 1993 to more 
accurately measure the increase of a CFC's investment in US 
property. This is achieved by considering the increase in the 
average of end-of-quarter investments in US property instead of 
measuring the difference in opening and closing values of US 
property investments held by the CFC.329
323 Section 956(b) (2) (A) .
324 Section 956(b) (2) (C) .
325 Section 956(b) (2) (B) and Reg. §1.956-2 (b) (1) (iv) .
326 If the two parties are related, the test of the 
appropriate amount is whether the amount would be ordinary and 
necessary to carry on the business of both entities if they were 
unrelated: Reg §1.956-2(b)(1)(v). This is a facts and 
circumstances test.
327 Section 956(2) (b) (H) and Regulation §1.956-2 (b) (1) (x) . 
Amounts are excluded from Subpart F under §952(b) where the income 
of the CFC includes any amounts from sources within the US which 
is effectively connected with the conduct of trade or business in 
the US.
328 For a full analysis of the calculation of the taxable 
increase in investment in US property by a CFC see Kramer S, 
"Coping with the Sec. 956 investment in US property rules", in the 
Tax Adviser, January 1982, at pp 24-32.
329 See §956 (a) (1) (A) . See also Isenbergh (2nd edition) op 
cit.. at para 39.5., and McIntyre op cit., (looseleaf) at 6-61h.
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Further, as is the case with section 47A, §956 is not avoided 
by simply arranging for the US property to be held by a nominee, 
since property held under such an arrangement is considered to be 
held directly by the CFC. However, a comparison of the 
administrative rules for operating both provisions highlights a 
major dissimilarity. Under §956 a USS is merely required to attach 
a statement in its tax return outlining the nature, amount and 
bona fides of the liabilities which it claims impact on the 
amounts to be included under §956.330 Under section 47A, the 
Australian attributable taxpayer may be assessed at any time, 
where unbeknownst to him/her, a distribution payment was made by 
the CFC during the year of income and the taxpayer's tax return 
did not include such amount as a section 47A dividend.331 Another 
major difference between the amounts attributed under §956 and the 
section 47A dividends attributed under section 459, is that relief 
for foreign taxes in the form of a credit is not provided in 
respect of section 4 7A amounts.332
Therefore, from the above discussion it is clear that section 
47A performs an active role in maintaining the integrity of the 
CFC rules and thus protecting the domestic tax base. First, 
section 47A supports the active income exemption by eliminating 
the possibility of a CFC or an associated Australian company from 
utilising the deferral benefit for active income where the income 
is used for other purposes than the business which originally 
generated it. For example, by deeming the waiver of a debt to 
constitute an eligible benefit, section 47A effectively guarantees 
that an attributable taxpayer in relation to an unlisted country 
CFC which has passed the AIT, is attributed under section 459 with 
the amount waived by the CFC in respect of a debt owed to it by a 
third party. Attribution under section 458 is precluded in this 
case because the distribution payment does not constitute a non­
portfolio dividend received under ordinary concepts.
The other related role of section 47A (which is realised with 
the assistance of section 459), is backstopping transfer pricing. 
By currently taxing amounts transferred at less than market value 
(i.e., a distribution payment), sections 47A and 459 effectively 
counter the tax deferral benefit that arises from shifting such 
income to an entity which becomes an associate as a result of the
See regs. §§1.956-1(e)(3) and (4).
331 See section 47A(2) (e) . See also section 47A(14) (e) , 
which effectively creates a penalty regime whereby the 
Commissioner is empowered to amend tax assessment outside the time 
period stipulated under section 170 where the conditions which 
precluded section 47A from operating (see section 47A(9) and 
(12)), no longer apply: section 47A(13).
A deduction under section 393 of the Act for foreign 
taxes paid is however, available. By contrast, the credit relief 
provided under §960 (discussed below), does not distinguish 
between amounts attributed under §956 or any other provision under 
Subpart F.
231
arrangement. Such an arrangement smacks of inter-affiliate 
pricing, but unfortunately, the provisions of Division 13 are 
limited to existing legal relationships between the related 
parties to the international agreement. Further, by deeming 
certain profit distributions by an unlisted country CFC as 
sections 47A(1) dividends, effectively ensures that the integrity 
of exemptions for listed country dividends and previously 
attributed amounts is not compromised, since an amount which is 
deemed a distribution payment under section 47A, is attributed to 
the Australian taxpayer under section 459 without regard to the 
exemptions in sections 23AJ and 23AI, respectively.
4.4. Modification to the Transfer Pricing Rules
#
Application of Australian tax law to the calculation of the 
income of a CFC attributed to an Australian resident taxpayer 
under the CFC measures will include the application of the 
provisions of Division 13. In certain limited circumstances, the 
notional application of Division 13 for the purposes of 
calculating the attributable income of a CFC may alter the nature 
of a transaction that would otherwise fall within the definition 
of an "international agreement". For instance, section 383 
requires that it be assumed that the CFC is a resident of 
Australia for the relevant period. Because of this assumption, it 
is also necessary to modify Division 13 when calculating the CFC's 
attributable income, to ensure that the Division can properly 
apply.
This is achieved by section 400, which states that the above 
assumption is to be ignored if necessary to ensure the proper 
application of Division 13 when calculating the CFC's attributable 
income. It does so by providing that for the purposes of the 
definition in section 136AC, the CFC will not be assumed to be a 
resident of Australia but will be considered to have its actual 
residence. This will mean that transactions that are international 
transactions for the actual application of Division 13 will be the 
same as for the notional application of attributable income.333 An 
adjustment is provided by section 400(b)(i) where Division 13 has 
been applied to a taxpayer to increase the taxpayer's taxable 
income, or to a CFC to increase its notional taxable income in 
order to calculate the CFC's attributable income, to decrease the 
notional taxable income of another CFC. The rationale behind this 
adjustment is to ensure that multiple taxation does not result 
where Division 13 has been applied or notionally applied.
Division 13 will not be taken into account when determining 
whether or not a CFC has passed the AIT. This test, as mentioned 
above, relies upon amounts which are recognised as revenue for 
accounting purposes. Tax concepts are ignored in making this 
calculation. Consequently, Division 13 income, being notional 
income for tax purposes only, is not taken into account in 
determining a company's active income ratio and will not therefore 
result in a company passing or failing the active income test.
333 Section 400(a).
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However, as noted in 4.2.1. above, the former labor Government of 
Mr Paul Keating, introduced an amendment which empowers the 
Commissioner to re-calculate amounts shown in the accounts of a 
CFC as gross turnover, where those amounts do not reflect arm's 
length prices as contemplated under Division 13.334 Therefore, 
since 1995 Division 13 income is indirectly included in the AIT.
Moreover, where a company does fail the active income test, 
Division 13 can subsequently be applied when calculating the 
amount of attributable income upon which the Australian 
controlling shareholder of the CFC will be assessed. The potential 
application of Division 13 is a trap for unwary players, 
particularly in the case of a listed country subsidiary which does 
not derive attributable income on a regular basis. If such a 
subsidiary were to derive attributable income in a particular year 
for some reason apart from Division 13, and Division 13 was then 
applied in calculating its attributable income, chances are that 
the Division 13 income may not be included in the tax base of the 
relevant listed country - that is, the income may not be "subject 
to tax" in the listed country in terms of section 324. If the 
deemed Division 13 income is then both DCI and tainted income 
(e.g., interest income), then the Division 13 income may be 
attributed back to the Australian parent. 335 Moreover, once such 
attributed income is actually repatriated to Australia it will not 
be exempt from Australian tax under section 23AI. Thus, double 
taxation of the same income could arise.
To avoid the potential for overtaxation while at the same 
time reduce compliance costs, the Federal Coalition Government of 
Mr John Howard, in July 1997 released a draft bill which seeks to 
exclude the operation of transfer pricing rules in relation to 
transfers between CFCs resident in the same broad-exemptions 
listed country. The proposed change represents good tax policy 
because it effectively reduces the compliance burden on Australian 
taxpayers with CFCs in those countries without the attendant 
revenue loss (to the Government) that is generally associated with 
providing such a concession. This is because the broad-exemption 
listed countries in which the CFCs are established, have their own 
transfer pricing rules, and thus are likely to ensure that their 
residents are taxed at full rates. 336 In some instances it may not 
be cost effective to pursue international transactions occurring
334 See section 434(3) . For a discussion of this amendment 
and the likely effects it will have on compliance costs see Azzi J 
"Proposed Amendment to Australia's CFC Rules" (1995) 11 Asia- 
Pacific Tax Bulletin 314 at 319.
See a paper presented by Sue Burton at the University of 
New South Wales - CLE Seminar, held on 19 November 1990, entitled 
"Foreign Operations of Subsidiaries and Branches", at p 14.
See proposed sub-section 400(aa) of Taxation Laws 
Amendment (Foreign Income Measures) Bill 1997. See also Draft 
Explanatory Memorandum for Taxation Laws Amendment (Foreign Income 
Measures) Bill 1997 ("DEM") at para 4.20.
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between related parties in countries with similar transfer pricing 
rules as Australia. This is because Australia like most other 
capital exporting countries, offers unilateral relief from 
juridical double taxation in the form of a foreign tax credit for 
reallocation adjustments made under the transfer pricing rules of 
other countries (i.e., correlative relief).337
Notwithstanding, it is necessary that Division 13 is 
applicable in calculating attributable income so as to prevent a 
CFC shifting profits to a related company which is not a CFC. That 
is why section 400 merely modifies the application of Division 13 
as opposed to completely abolishing its operation where the CFC 
measures also apply. For instance, in some instances a joint 
venture arrangement could fall outside the definition of a CFC in 
section 340.338 Where however, property is supplied to a joint 
venture under an international agreement, the Commissioner has 
stated that Division 13 (particularly section 136AD(1)) could 
normally be expected to apply to any of the joint venturers who 
were not dealing with each other at arm's length and where the 
consideration in respect of the supply of property was less than 
an arm's length consideration. 339 Whether a court of law would in 
fact uphold the Commissioner's views on the applicability of 
Division 13 to property supplied to a joint venture is as yet 
untested.
See Taxation Ruling TR 95/31. The IRS has also issued 
guidelines for US taxpayers seeking correlative relief for 
transfer pricing adjustments of foreign countries - viz., Rev.
Proc. 96-13 which updates Rev. Proc. 65-17. For a general analysis 
of the issues covered by TR 95/D31 and the problems that 
Australian taxpayers with US operations would have to deal with: 
see Azzi J "Correlative Adjustments to Relieve Double Taxation 
Arising from an Adjustment by a Foreign Tax Administration" (1996) 
4 Asia-Pacific Tax Bulletin 127.
338 A joint venture is an unincorporated contractual 
association, other than a partnership or a trust, between two or 
more parties to undertake a specific business project in which the 
joint venturers meet the costs of the project and receive a share 
of any resulting output. The establishment of such a structure 
does not create a separate legal entity. Often, such a joint 
venture will fall within the definition of the word "partnership" 
in subsection 6(1) of the Act: Tax Ruling TR 94/14 at para 458.
339 Tax Ruling TR 94/14 at para 465.
The Commissioner has also noted that the output or product of 
a joint venture would clearly fall within the definition of 
"acquire" found in subsection 136AA(1)(b). Where the property 
obtained (e.g., minerals or partly finished goods) is acquired 
under an international agreement, then subsection 136AD(3) could 
be expected to apply to any of the joint venturers who were not 
dealing at arm's length with each other and where the 
consideration in respect of the acquisition of property was more 
than an arm's length consideration: Ibid.
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Nevertheless, to the extent that section 400 allows the 
application of Division 13 in certain instances, it can be 
regarded as supporting the transfer pricing rules.
4.5. General Observations about the Backstopping Role of CFC Rules
In general, the discussion in section 4. has focused on the 
role of CFC rules in backstopping transfer pricing involving 
active income. It was shown that the tight definition of active 
income precludes those amounts that arise from purely passive 
activities. For instance, the definitions of tainted sales income 
and tainted services income effectively facilitate the inter- 
jurisdictional allocation of revenues based on the nature and the 
extent of the value added to goods or services (originating in 
Australia) in the foreign jurisdiction. Therefore, where goods 
manufactured in Australia were merely re-packaged in Hong Kong, 
then profits derived from the sale of those goods to either a 
related party or a third party would be subject to accruals 
taxation. By currently taxing such transactions under the CFC 
rules, the pressure on Australian tax officials to test whether 
every transaction occurring between the Australian parent and its 
Hong Kong subsidiary is somewhat relieved.
Further, where dividends (the source of which is active 
profits) were paid by an unlisted country CFC to a listed country 
CFC, it was shown that section 458 operated to preclude the 
operation of the section 23AJ exemption to the extent that such 
dividends were not subject to the listed country's normal company 
tax rate. By doing so, section 458 effectively upholds the 
integrity of the active income exemption while at the same time 
ensuring that the jurisdictional coverage of the CFC rules 
(expounded at 3.1. above) is not also manipulated.
It was also shown above (at 4.3.), that sections 47A and 459 
operate to remove the deferral advantage that results where 
untainted profits derived from genuine economic activities are 
used for other purposes. In addition, it was shown that both 
sections effectively extend the scope of transfer pricing rules 
contained in Division 13 to cover distribution payments made by an 
unlisted country CFC to an unrelated party. Finally, it was 
observed that in certain instances (e.g., supply of property to a 
related party that is not a CFC), the CFC rules allowed for the 
application of Division 13.
Therefore, in summary, all the provisions discussed in this 
section protect the domestic tax base by combining to backstop 
transfer pricing while at the same time upholding the integrity of 
the anti-deferral capabilities of the CFC rules by ensuring that 
untainted income is not used to disguise tainted income. The final 
section to follow will examine how the CFC rules protect the 
domestic tax base in relation to the FTCS.
5. How The CFC Rules Strengthen the FTCS
As noted previously in Part III (at 3.5.1.), the general 
rationale underlying the abolition of the section 23(q) was a
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desire to broaden the domestic tax base. The general rationale for 
introducing the FTCS was a desire to strengthen the application of 
worldwide taxation by subjecting foreign source income derived by 
Australian residents to full Australian taxation, whilst ensuring 
that double international taxation does not arise. Also in the 
discussion in the previous Part, it was noted that the FTCS only 
operates when profits are repatriated to Australia, at which point 
they are included in the assessable income of the Australian 
taxpayer and a foreign tax credit is provided to the taxpayer in 
respect of foreign taxes paid and for which the taxpayer is 
liable. Therefore, any profits accumulated offshore escaped 
subjection to Australian taxation under the FTCS. Such an outcome 
promoted CIN by creating a bias in favour of retaining profits 
offshore contrary to the intentions of the Federal Government 
(expressed in the Draft White Paper), in introducing the FTCS to 
replace the section 23(q) exemption in the first place - viz., to 
create a fairer and more efficient tax system by removing tax 
biases in favour of offshore investments.
Moreover, as noted previously, a specific policy rationale 
for introducing the FTCS was the alleviation of international 
double taxation. However, with the introduction of the CFC 
measures (in particular, the attribution rules under section 456 
and 458), the FTCS provisions had to be modified to ensure that 
domestic double taxation340 did not also occur. Domestic double 
taxation can arise where "dividends" paid by a CFC out of 
attributable income which is attributed to an attributable 
taxpayer (e.g., under section 458) are also taxed in the hands of 
the attributable taxpayer under section 44 upon receipt of such 
dividends. If such a possibility were not addressed this would 
cause a distortion in the tax system since it would create a 
horizontal inequity (as well as distort CEN) by providing a tax 
bias in favour of resident taxpayers deriving Australian source 
income as compared with resident taxpayers deriving foreign source 
income which is subject to current taxation under the CFC 
measures.
340 Double domestic or economic taxation effectively 
involves the country of residence taxing the same income of the 
same taxpayer (i.e., economic unit) twice (i.e., double counting 
of the same income). There have been various provisions inserted 
into the Act to alleviate this form of double taxation. The two 
main provisions in the CFC rules designed to rectify the inequity 
that could result from not reconciling attribution with 
distribution are (i) section 387 which alleviates double domestic 
taxation in the case of interim dividends paid out of previously 
attributed income and (ii) section 23AI which alleviates double 
domestic taxation in the case of dividends paid out previously 
attributed income. Other illustrations of relief from double 
economic taxation are: (i) the inter-corporate dividend rebate 
available under section 46; and (ii) the operation of the 
imputation system and, in particular, the availability of franking 
rebates on dividends paid out of company profits which have borne 
corporate tax (see section 160AQU).
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Therefore, in light of the discussion in the immediately 
preceding paragraphs, it can arguably be said that the CFC 
measures strengthen the operation and reach of the FTCS by 
currently subjecting the Australian attributable taxpayer to 
Australian taxation in relation to certain (i.e., tainted and low- 
taxed) income accumulated in a relevant CFC. Once foreign income 
is included in the assessable income of the Australian 
attributable taxpayer, the provisions of the FTCS are invoked in 
order to alleviate the potential of double international taxation. 
However, the FTCS provisions must be substantially revised to 
avoid manipulation of the system through the utilisation of active 
income to change the character of passive income of the CFC (see 
discussion in section 5.5. below).
As far as the taxation treatment of dividends received from 
CFCs is concerned, the provisions of the FTCS require much 
revision principally because CFCs can make distributions not only 
out of directly derived attributable income but also out of 
dividends received by them from investments in other foreign 
companies, not necessarily CFCs. The exemption method is adopted 
to relieve domestic double taxation which arises when dividends 
are paid out of previously attributed income and international 
double taxation which arises where dividends are paid out of 
comparably taxed profits. Where dividends are paid out of current 
year profits which also constitute attributable income, relief 
from double domestic taxation occurs by reducing the amount of 
attributable income by the amount of the dividend paid. The 
exemption method would not apply in this case since the mechanism 
for establishing whether the dividend which is paid out of 
previously attributed income is exempt, for anti-avoidance 
purposes, is only invoked at the end of the statutory accounting 
period of the payer foreign company. Both forms of relief contain 
rules for tracing dividend payments through a chain of companies.
5.1. Exemption of Previously Attributed Amounts
Section 23AI exempts any previously attributable income from 
further Australian tax when the income (which may be traced 
through any interposed entities) is repatriated to Australia. To 
claim this exemption a "link" must be established between the 
distribution amount (i.e., the "attribution account payment") and 
the amount included in assessable income of the attributable 
Australian taxpayer. This link is generally established through 
the maintenance by the attributable taxpayer of an "attribution 
account" in relation to an eligible CFC (i.e., "attribution 
account entity"). The attribution account is designed to record 
distributions through a chain of companies in which the 
attributable taxpayer has an interest.341 Thus, domestic double
341 There is no obligation to maintain attribution accounts. 
However, the absence of any obligation to maintain attribution 
accounts is not expected to prevent their widespread use.
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taxation is alleviated by reconciling attribution with 
distribution.342
The amount of income attributed to an Australian taxpayer 
gives rise to an "attribution credit". An attribution credit may 
also arise where the attribution account entity has received a 
distribution of attributed profits from another foreign entity. A 
distribution of previously attributed income is recorded as an 
"attribution debit" in the attribution account. 343 The 
attribution debit cannot exceed the amount standing to the credit 
of the account (referred to as the "attribution surplus" 344 ) at 
the time the distribution was made. The attribution credit arises 
at the end of the statutory accounting period in which the 
attribution account payment is made.345
Therefore, the function of an attribution credit is to give a 
credit to the Australian resident taxpayer for income on which it 
has been assessed and which is referable to undistributed income 
of the eligible CFC. In those circumstances, the amount of the 
credit is reduced by the tax paid on the attribution account
342 Another purpose served by the maintenance of an 
attributed tax account is to prevent double crediting for foreign 
taxes. Such an account ensures that the foreign tax credited on 
attribution follows the attributed profits to which it relates as 
those profits are passed through to the taxpayer, since a credit 
for underlying tax is also available under section 160AFCD.
343 An attribution debit arises for an attribution account 
entity in relation to a taxpayer if the entity makes an 
attribution account payment to either the taxpayer or another 
attribution account entity, and immediately before the payment was 
made there was an attribution surplus for the entity in relation 
to the taxpayer: see section 372(1).
344 An attribution surplus is defined in section 370 as the 
excess of attribution credits over attribution debits that exists 
at a particular time. This figure is not divided between 
accounting periods or tax years. That is, one ongoing account is 
to be maintained from the commencement date of the CFC legislation 
on 1 July 1990, and into the future indefinitely.
If the attribution account payment is made to an Australian 
taxpayer, the amount of the debit is the amount of the payment or 
the amount of the attribution surplus, whichever is lower.
However, if the attribution account payment is made to another 
attribution account entity, then the amount of the debit is the 
lesser of the attribution surplus or the taxpayer's "attribution 
account percentage" (for the attribution account entity to which 
the payment is made) of the attribution account payment: see 
section 372(2) .
345 Section 371(2) . A credit for the underlying foreign tax 
may be available to an Australian resident corporate shareholder 
pursuant to section 160AFCC upon attribution under section 458 
(see later).
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payment by the recipient company pursuant to section 371 (4) .346 
The amount of attribution credit recorded in the attribution 
account maintained by the attributable taxpayer is reduced to 
reflect the interest (both direct and indirect) held by the 
attributable taxpayer in the payer foreign company.
"Attribution account percentage" is defined in section 364 to 
mean the sum of the Australian taxpayer's "direct attribution 
account interest" and "indirect attribution account interest" in 
the foreign entity. In essence, the terms direct attribution 
account interest and indirect attribution account interest 
correspond in meaning and effect with the terms direct and 
indirect attribution tracing interests, for the purposes of the 
attribution rule. Therefore, where a taxpayer has a direct 
interest in the foreign entity, a payment made by that entity to 
the taxpayer is to be exempt up to the amount of the debit balance 
in the attribution account per section 23AI(1)(c).
Where the Australian shareholder has an indirect attribution 
interest in the eligible foreign entity through interposed 
entities, a payment made by the first foreign entity is to be 
traced through the series of entities by means of debits and 
credits to attribution accounts for each of those entities, until 
the payment reaches the taxpayer. Consequently, the amount that is 
exempt from tax under section 23AI will be an amount equal to the 
attribution account debit in relation to the eligible foreign 
entity that made the payment to the Australian shareholder.
Where an attribution credit arises because an amount of 
income was attributed under section 458(1), then the attribution 
credit is reduced under section 371(3) by the amount of foreign 
tax paid by the recipient CFC on receipt of the dividend that is 
referable to the amount that is assessable under section 458. The 
amount assessable is referrable to the part of the dividend that 
is paid out of unattributed income (e.g., active income). The 
reduction in this case is necessary to ensure that other 
assessable dividends paid out of other unattributed profits could 
not be sheltered and therefore exempt under section 23AI.
Alleviation of double domestic taxation in the US is achieved 
by §959 which is invoked when profits are distributed to a USS. 
Under §959(a) distributions of profits which have been taxed 
currently to a USS are not taxed again to the shareholder. To 
ensure this result, §959(d) deems the distribution not to be a 
dividend and like section 23AI, extends the exemption under 
§959(a) to the undistributed income of a CFC owned indirectly by 
USSs. 347 Thus when the income of a sub-subsidiary which has been
346 It is noted that these taxes may be creditable upon 
subsequent payment of a dividend under section 160AFCD (see 
later) .
347 Section 959(d) provides that if a CFC's earnings and 
profits for a taxable year which are attributable to amounts that 
are or have been included in the gross income of a USS under §951,
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taxed directly to a USS is distributed to the subsidiary, it will 
not constitute §951 income in the hands of the subsidiary and 
therefore will not be taxed again to the USS. However, where the 
operation of §959 differs from that of section 23AI, is in 
relation to the characterisation of previously attributed amounts 
that exceed the cost base of the USS's shares in the CFC. 348 For 
instance, under §961(b)(2), amounts excluded under §959(a) are 
treated as gains from the disposal of property and taxed as 
capital gains (which since 1993 have generally been entitled to 
preferential tax treatment349 ) . 35° The need for such a 
recharacterisation exercise is largely obviated under Australian 
CFC rules by the maintenance of attribution accounts which 
establish a link between amounts attributed and amounts 
distributed.
Section 959(c) expressly sets forth "categories" of 
previously taxed and untaxed earnings and profits and prescribes 
rules of priority to be followed in allocating actual 
distributions by foreign corporations to these categories as the 
distributed earnings pass from a foreign subsidiary to the 
domestic corporation. Broadly, distributions are treated as made, 
first, out of earnings and profits included in the domestic 
shareholder's gross income under §951(a)(1)(B) as an increase in 
earnings invested in US property (i.e., §956 amounts); second, out 
of earnings and profits included in the domestic shareholder's
are distributed through a chain of foreign ownership (described 
under §958(a)), they shall not also be included in the gross 
income of another CFC for purposes of applying §951 to that 
foreign corporation.
See also reg. §1.959-2(b) which illustrates the operation of 
the exemption in relation to the USS's indirect interests in the 
foreign paying company.
348 Undistributed amounts currently taxed to the USS as 
dividends under Subpart F, are taken to increase the cost base of 
the CFC stock by the amount of the Subpart F inclusion: §961(a).
349 See Bittker & Eustice (6th edition) op cit. , and para. 
1.02, SI.02, and Isenbergh (2nd edition) op cit.. at para. 42.1. 
See also the position in Australia where capital gains derived 
from the disposal of assets held by the CFC (and taxable in the 
hands of the Australian controllers as assessable income), are 
entitled to the benefit of indexation for inflation: see section 
407 which imports the general capital gains tax indexation rule in 
section 160ZJ into the regime for taxing CFCs.
Cf.. §961(b)(1) which merely reduces the stock basis of 
the USS in the CFC by the amount excluded under §959. Professor 
Isenbergh argues that the stock basis reduction under §961 is 
unnecessary because a similar result is already achieved under 
§959(d) (which treats excluded amounts as non-dividend amounts) 
and the general rule for cost base reduction under §301 (c) . 
Accordingly, he suggests that §961 supplants the operation of 
§301(c) : Isenbergh (2nd edition) op cit., at para. 39.20.
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gross income under §951(a)(1)(A) as Subpart F income or as a 
withdrawal of previously excluded Subpart F income; and, third, 
out of other (untaxed) earnings and profits.351 Within each of 
these categories of income "current" earnings and profits are 
distributed before retained earnings. Moreover, each category of 
income must be fully exhausted before distributing income out of 
the next category.352
In the case where an attributable taxpayer disposes of an 
interest in an attribution account entity which has previously 
attributed profits, the consideration received is reduced by the 
amount of the undistributed, previously attributed earnings. This 
adjustment is designed to ensure that the consideration received 
in respect of the disposal reflects a premium for future dividends 
payable out of such profits, whether or not the attribution 
account entity makes a distribution. 353 A similar result is 
achieved in the US under §1248 which brings to account amounts not 
previously attributed under Subpart F when a USS disposes of 
his/her interest in a CFC. More so however, §1248(a) operates to 
bring to account the amount of tax that would have resulted had 
the undistributed and not previously attributed income been 
distributed as a dividend instead of a tax favoured capital 
gain. 354 Accordingly, §1248 (d) (1) requires that a gain on the 
disposal of stock in a CFC that would otherwise be taxed as a 
capital gain be taxed as ordinary income. This treatment is 
extended to lower tier CFCs in the case where the first interposed 
CFC sells stock in lower entities.355
The foregoing analysis of the section 23AI exemption confirms 
that it was inserted into the Act in order to provide relief 
against double domestic taxation which would otherwise result if 
income which had already been attributed to an Australian 
shareholder was later subject to tax when the income was actually
351 See §959 (c) (3) of the Code.
352 Section 959(c) refers to §§316 (a) (2) and (a) (1) . Reg. 
§1.959-3(b) makes the rule clear.
See section 461(1) of the Act which is similar to the 
adjustment provided under section 401 (discussed at 3.4.3. above). 
Section 461(5) provides that inter alia, an interest in an 
attribution account entity includes an interest in shares of a 
company.
354 Therefore, where a USS sells his/her interest in the CFC 
(which need only have been, at the time of sale, a CFC in the 
previous five years) then part or all of the undistributed income 
is included in the income of the seller as a dividend: §1248 (a) .
355 See §1248 (c) (2) .
241
repatriated to the Australian taxpayer. 356 To ensure that a double 
deduction is not sought in relation to expenses incurred in 
deriving the section 23AI exempt amount, section 23AI(2) modifies 
the exemption under section 23AI(1) for the purposes of applying 
the foreign income deduction provisions in sections 79D and 160AFD 
and the general deduction provision in section 51 ( 1) . 357 It 
provides that such provisions are to be ignored when determining 
the deductibility of amounts incurred by the Australian parent 
company under section 51(1) of the Act. Consequently, costs 
incurred in anticipation of the derivation of dividends from 
subsidiaries which will be exempt under section 23AI will not have 
their deductibility under section 51(1) denied, notwithstanding 
the exemption of the dividend income. Hence, the section 23AI is 
not a "true" exemption, but rather it is a statutory recognition 
that income which is exempt under section 23AI has already been 
subject to current Australian tax under the CFC regime.
The exempt status of dividends that fall within section 23AI 
will also be ignored for the purposes of the FTCS. Broadly, a FTC 
will be available for foreign taxes paid by the resident taxpayer
One form of double domestic taxation which is not 
alleviated by section 23AI is that which results from the non­
recognition of foreign taxes for the purposes of Australia's 
imputation system. Section 160APN (and in appropriate 
circumstances section 160AQA) will deny, for the purposes of 
determining the extent to which a dividend has been franked, the 
benefit of foreign taxes paid where a FTC has been obtained in 
Australia to reduce Australian tax payable. Therefore, if a 
resident Australian company derives only foreign income and that 
company wishes to pass on to its individual shareholders all 
distributable profits after tax, only that part of the foreign 
income which has suffered Australian tax at the full corporate 
rates will be able to be passed on as a fully franked dividend 
since there will not be sufficient Australian tax paid to qualify 
the whole dividend as fully franked. This requirement is likely to 
lead to double tax on dividends where the Australian taxpayer tax 
cannot justify a fully franked dividend.
The double tax on dividends, in this case, is similar to that 
which existed under the old classical system for taxing companies 
and shareholders. The double tax arises in this case by reason of 
the fact that the foreign dividend is taxable in the hands of the 
recipient company (under section 44) with a foreign tax credit. 
However, the allowance of a foreign tax credit reduces Australian 
company tax payable and, since the imputation system is based on 
Australian tax paid and not total taxes (including foreign taxes), 
the company tax available for allowance as franking credits to 
shareholders is reduced: see Vann Company Tax Reform (1988) at pp 
3-12 .
357 The exemption will not be ignored for the purposes of 
determining the amount of "assessable foreign income" which the 
resident taxpayer has derived. This is because the attributable 
income from which the section 23AI payment is made will itself 
fall within the definition of "assessable foreign income".
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on such exempt income. For example, where a dividend is paid out 
of attributed income (i.e., exempt income) a FTC will nevertheless 
be provided for foreign dividend withholding tax paid on the 
dividend.
5.1.2. Credits for previously attributed income
Section 160AFCD provides that taxes paid on attribution 
account payments (e.g., dividends) made to a resident taxpayer by 
an attribution account entity, are to be creditable taxes 
notwithstanding that the attribution account payments are exempt 
from tax under section 23AI. 358 Although a foreign tax credit is 
available to the attributable taxpayer in respect of the 
previously attributed income at the time of attribution, at the 
time of distribution further taxes may be paid in relation to the 
dividend (e.g., dividend withholding taxes) which may not have 
been picked up at the time of attribution.359
As noted in the previous paragraph, section 23AI exempt 
income is not regarded as assessable income for the purposes of 
section 160AF(1)(d). Therefore, section 23AI exempt amounts do not 
add to foreign income when determining under section 160AF(1)(d) 
the upper limit of foreign tax credits allowable for income of 
that class. Consequently, where section 23AI exempt income is the 
only foreign income that is derived, a credit will be available 
under section 160AFCD, but will be an excess credit which may only 
be carried forward or transferred under section 160AFE.360
See section 160AFCD(a). The fact that a direct foreign 
tax credit is available in respect of foreign tax paid on the 23AI 
exempt dividend is rationalised on the basis that at the time the 
income was attributed to the Australian taxpayer, no direct 
foreign tax (e.g., dividend withholding tax) would have been 
payable in respect of the repatriation of such income to Australia 
in the form of a dividend. A foreign tax credit should, therefore, 
be available once such taxes have been paid: see FSIIP op cit. , at 
93 .
359 Foreign direct taxes paid on previously attributed 
income which is exempt from Subpart F under §959 are similarly 
creditable under §959 (c) (3) for the purposes of the US FTCS. Where 
a distribution of previously taxed income received by one foreign 
corporation from another foreign corporation is subject to 
additional foreign income taxes (e.g., withholding tax) in the 
hands of the recipient corporation, reg. §1.959-3(d) provides 
that, for the purposes of applying the exclusionary rules of §959, 
the amount in each of the earnings and profits categories 
established by §959 (c) shall, when distributed by a foreign 
corporation through a chain of foreign corporations, be reduced by 
the amount of foreign (or US) income taxes imposed on or with 
respect to the distribution.
360 The provisions of section 160AFE allow a resident 
corporate taxpayer to carry forward an excess FTC that arises in 
relation to a class of income for five years of income immediately
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The formula for computing the amount of foreign tax that the 
taxpayer is deemed to have paid in respect of the section 23AI 
exempt part contains three components.361 The first component 
refers to the direct foreign tax that the Australian resident is 
taken to have paid in relation to the section 23AI exempt 
amount. 362 Thus, the first step is to calculate the percentage of
following that year of income. The excess credits will have to be 
utilised in the order in which they arose.
Section 160AFE(1) specifies a first-in-first-out basis for 
the utilisation .of post-transfer excess credit balances arising in 
carry-forward years where the calculation of the FTC position of 
the resident taxpayer for that year of income produces an initial 
credit shortfall apart from section 160AFE. Subparagraph 
160AFE(1)(h) allows a resident company which is a member of a 
wholly-owned group of companies to utilise any excess credits 
transferred to it for that year of income to the extent that after 
offsetting any other excess credit of its own available from the 
preceding five years, there remains a credit shortfall for that 
year for the relevant class of income.
361 The formula for calculating the amount of foreign tax 
paid is set out in section 160AFCD(b):
(EP x DT) + (AEP x UT) - AT, where:
EP= percentage of the attribution account payment 
represented by the section 23AI exempt part;
DT= any foreign tax that, disregarding this section and 
section 160AFC is taken to have been paid by the Australian 
resident company, and to have been personally liable for, in 
respect of the attribution account payment;
AEP= percentage that would be EP if the attribution account 
payment were reduced by any part of that payment that is 
exempt under section 23AJ;
UT= any foreign tax (other than CFC-type foreign tax) that, 
disregarding this section, the Australian resident taxpayer 
is taken to have paid and to have been personally liable for 
under section 160AFC in respect of the attribution account 
payment; and
AT= amount of any "attributed tax account debit" arising 
from the attribution account entity in relation to the 
resident taxpayer on the making of the attribution account 
payment, to the extent that the amount of the debit does not 
exceed AEP x UT. This component of the formula takes into 
account the amount of credit that may have been allowed to 
the taxpayer under sections 160AFCA, 160AFCB and 160AFCC, to 
ensure that a credit would not be allowed twice for the same 
foreign tax.
The concept of "attributed tax account debit" is essentially 
similar to the concept of "attribution debit".
362 The foreign tax credit in this instance, is a direct 
foreign tax credit, since it is available to non-corporate 
taxpayers and is restricted to direct taxes on the dividend.
Moreover, section 6AB(3) deems a taxpayer to be personally 
liable for and to have paid any foreign tax in respect of the
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the attribution account payment which is represented by the 
section 23AI exempt part and multiply this by the dividend 
withholding tax.363
The second component refers to the foreign underlying tax 
(other than "CFC-type foreign tax") that the Australian resident 
is taken to have paid, and have been personally liable for, in 
respect of the attribution account payment. To obtain a credit for 
foreign underlying tax under 160AFC, the CFC incurring the foreign 
tax and the attributable taxpayer claiming the credit must be 
"related" companies. "CFC-type foreign tax" is defined in section 
16OAE(1) to mean a foreign tax on attributable income that 
corresponds with the tax on attributable income which is included 
in assessable income under section 456.
The exclusion of CFC-type foreign tax reflects a wariness by 
the legislators that such a tax may also be creditable under the 
CFC regime of another country (e.g., §960 of the Code). As such it 
was not appropriate that unilateral relief in the form of a FTC in 
respect of the same foreign tax should also be allowed under the 
Australian CFC provisions, otherwise double crediting could 
result. One credit being granted by the foreign jurisdiction and 
the other by Australia. It was felt that the minor significance of 
the double tax problem that may result from such an exclusion, 
balanced against the complexity of possible relief measures, did 
not warrant relief in this case. 364 The third component of the 
formula was inserted to ensure that the attributable taxpayer does 
not obtain a double credit. Once when the income is attributed and 
then again when it is distributed.
Therefore, the three components that determine the amount of 
credit available in respect of previously attributed income are 
designed to correspond with the section 23AI exemption by 
reconciling attribution with distribution. Thus, upholding the 
integrity of the FTCS and the section 23AI exemption.
foreign income (which includes the attribution account payment): 
see section 160AFCD(a).
363 It should be noted that unlike the credits under 
sections 160AFCA, 160AFCB and 160AFCC which are only available for 
"related" Australian companies, the credit for direct foreign tax 
arising under section 160AFCD is available for all Australian 
residents who have been taxed on an attribution basis, whether or 
not they are related and whether or not they are companies. 
Therefore, for a partner, beneficiary or trustee, it is necessary 
to ascertain the percentage of the attribution account payment 
represented by the section 23AI exempt part.
364 It was stated that since the CFC measures of most of the 
countries with such regimes only apply to tainted income earned by 
CFCs, the incidence of double CFC taxation would not be high: see 
FSIIP op cit. , at p 84.
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5.2. Reduction of Attributable Income Where Interim Dividends Paid
An interim dividend is taxable to an attributable taxpayer 
either by virtue of actual receipt (under section 44) or by virtue 
of receipt by a CFE. Thus, where a CFC which has attributed income 
for the current year and pays a dividend out of current year 
profits, the attributable taxpayer would, in the absence of 
specific rules to provide relief, be taxable on the taxpayer's 
share of the dividend as well as the share of the attributable 
income. A dividend paid by the eligible CFC to another CFC could 
also be subject to attribution under section 458. Where the 
dividend is paid out of the current profits of a CFC, attribution 
of the income and profits from which the dividend was paid may 
similarly result in multiple taxation.
Alleviation from such multiple taxation is provided in 
section 387 which applies whenever interim dividends are declared 
and paid out of current year profits which also constitute 
attributable income of a CFC. Section 23AI would not apply to 
relieve double taxation in this case because the attribution 
credit only arises at the end of the statutory accounting 
period.365
Section 387(1) operates to deem the dividend to effectively 
reduce the amount of attributable income of the CFC which would 
otherwise be attributed to the attributable taxpayer. For the 
purposes of this ordering rule the reduction in the attributable 
income is reduced either by an amount equal to the whole or part 
of the "grossed-up assessable component" or the "grossed-up 458 
component" of the dividend depending on whether the attributable 
income of the eligible CFC is attributed under section 456 or 
section 44 or section 458. It is also a requirement that the whole 
or part of the "grossed-up assessable component" or the "grossed- 
up 458 component" could reasonably be considered to have been paid 
out of the income and profits that are taken into account in the 
calculation of the attributable income of that period.366
The concept of the "grossed-up assessable component" is 
designed to ensure that the eligible CFC's attributable income is 
reduced by that amount of the CFC's profits which may be 
reasonably regarded as having been paid out of the assessable
Cf., The approach adopted in Subpart F which requires 
the status of a CFC to be tested during any consecutive 30 day 
period occurring in a taxable year. Accordingly, double taxation 
is alleviated in §951(a)(2)(B) by reducing the pro rata share of 
the USSs Subpart F income (in a particular taxable year) by the 
amount of actual distribution of dividends made by the CFC (during 
the same taxable year) to previous owners of the stock which is 
subsequently owned by USSs. Therefore, the potential for double 
taxation that may result where the CFC distributes income mid-year 
is less prevalent under Subpart F as compared with that under the 
Australian CFC rules.
366 Section 387 (1) (d) .
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dividend. Where the attributable taxpayer owns less than a 100% 
interest in the eligible CFC, the amount that the dividend is 
reduced by is correspondingly reduced to reflect the attribution 
percentage of the attributable taxpayer in relation to the 
eligible CFC.367
Where the dividend has been paid to an entity other than the 
attributable taxpayer, the reduction will only apply where that 
dividend or a part of the dividend is included in the attributable 
taxpayer's assessable income under section 458.368 This is 
achieved by grossing-up the assessable component of the 
attributable taxpayer by the section 458 amount (ie "grossed-up 
458 component"). The rules for determining this latter amount 
differ depending on the attribution percentage of the attributable 
taxpayer in relation to the eligible CFC and depending on whether 
the entity receiving the dividend is a CFC, a CFT, a partnership 
or an Australian trust.369
Although it is not immediately discernable, it has been noted 
that there is a "first-in, first-out" ordering regime set up by 
section 387. That is, the dividend paid is regarded as paid out of 
the attributable income of that year only to the extent that the 
accumulated distributable profits, if any, at the commencement of 
that year are exhausted - that is, the dividend is treated as 
first coming out of accumulated profits of earlier years. 370 This 
ordering rule will effectively limit the relief available under 
section 387 to the extent that the CFC declaring the interim 
dividend out of current year profits has retained earnings.
In the absence of such an ordering rule it would be possible 
to manipulate the dividend payment to the prejudice of the 
Australian Revenue. This could occur where the predicted end-of- 
year profit upon which the interim dividend payment is based, 
transpires (for example, because of a drop in demand and/or prices 
which occurs after the interim dividend has been paid) into an 
end-of year loss for the paying company. Without the dividend 
ordering rule, the attributable taxpayer may be entitled to relief 
under section 387 without the requisite double taxation that could 
result from including the dividend in its assessable income for 
the particular year in which the dividend is paid. Double taxation 
relief under section 387 is invoked because at the time the 
interim dividend was paid it could reasonably be considered to be 
paid out of the income and profits that are taken into account in 
the calculation of the attributable income for that period. 
Therefore, incorporating a dividend ordering rule into section 387
367 Section 387 (2) .
368 See section 387(1) (c) .
369 See section 387(2) .
370 See the EM at p 1718. This is in contrast with the
dividend ordering rule established under §959 (c) of the Code which 
adopts a "last-in, first-out" rule.
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is an anti-avoidance measure designed to protect the Australian 
Revenue by minimising opportunities for Australian controlling 
shareholders to reduce their Australian tax liability 
artificially.
5.3. Alleviation of Double International Taxation in Relation to
Non-Portfolio Dividends
A non-portfolio dividend paid by a company which is a 
resident of a listed or an unlisted country to an Australian 
resident company is exempt from Australian income tax pursuant to 
section 23AJ(1), to the extent that the non-portfolio dividend 
represents an "exempting receipt" (i.e., non-portfolio dividends 
paid by a listed country CFC or the "exempting profits percentage" 
of a non-portfolio dividend paid by an unlisted country 
company) ,371 Therefore, the link to establish an exemption under 
section 23AJ is that the non-portfolio dividend has been subject 
to a comparable rate of tax either in a listed country or 
Australia, thus avoiding double international taxation of the same 
amount of income .372
The percentage of "exempting profits" to "distributable 
profits" 373' is referred to as the "exempting profits percentage".
371 Whether the recipient shareholder is an individual or a 
company, no exemption is available under section 23AJ for 
portfolio dividends. These are generally taxable in Australia and 
subject to the FTCS. However, the FIF measures contain an 
exemption similar to the section 23AI exemption where income of a 
FIF which has been previously attributed to the Australian 
resident shareholder is exempt from Australian tax: see section 
2 3 A K .
372 Both the section 23AI and section 23AJ exemptions 
require the existence of a company / shareholder relationship for 
their operation. This is because they deal with the payment of 
dividends which are profit distributions by a company to its 
shareholders. Therefore, an Australian company which is merely the 
beneficial owner of shares (and is not registered as a 
shareholder) that constitute 10% or more of the voting power of 
the CFC would arguably not satisfy the exemption requirement on 
the basis that the distribution is not a dividend under general 
principles expounded by the High Court in Patcoro Investments Ptv 
Ltd v FCT (1976) 140 CLR 247.
373 The term "distributable profits" is defined in section 
317 to broadly mean the amount of the profits, whether of an 
income or capital nature, that are available for distribution by 
the company as dividends. The amount of the distributable profits 
is to be determined on the basis of the accounts of the company 
and any other relevant matters. Requirements contained in the 
constituent documents of the company providing for an "eligible 
provision or reserve" are to be disregarded for the purpose of 
determining distributable profits. An eligible provision or 
reserve is also defined in section 317 to include "a provision for
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The "exempting profits" of an unlisted country CFC are so much of 
its distributable profits as are attributable to the "exempting 
receipts" of the CFC. 374 The term "exempting receipts" of an 
unlisted country CFC is further defined in section 377. The types 
of receipts (derived post 30 June 1990) that will be treated as 
"exempting receipts" for an unlisted country CFC broadly include 
so much of the dividend that is distributed from (i) untainted 
income; (ii) income that has been subject to tax in a listed 
country; (iii) taxable income of a non-resident insurer; (iv) 
capital gains assessed under Part IIIA of the Act; (v) dividends 
received from a listed country CFC; (vi) fully franked dividends 
received from Australian companies and (vii) the exempting profits 
percentage of non-portfolio dividends received from unlisted 
country CFCs.375
The fact that non-portfolio dividends are only exempt under 
section 23AJ to the extent that they are paid from distributable 
profits of the CFC that represent exempting receipts, has the 
effect of diluting the amount of exempting profits by the amount 
of retained earnings in the company. This is because the dividend 
will be treated as being paid out of distributable profits on a 
proportional basis. The policy behind this dividend ordering rule 
is relatively straightforward. Without such an ordering of 
dividends, the section 23AJ exemption could be exploited by 
directing particular categories of income of the non-resident 
company to specified shareholders (e.g., residents of a third 
country) through the use of different classes of shares or by 
other means.376
In addition, section 23AJ effectively denies the Australian 
shareholder deductions in respect of expenses incurred in 
Australia in deriving the dividend income. Section 51(1) which is 
the principal deduction provision in the Act effectively provides 
that only outgoings or expenses incurred in deriving assessable 
income are deductible. Therefore, where the Australian shareholder 
incurs expenses in deriving dividends which are exempt under 
section 23AJ (e.g., where the taxpayer borrows domestically to
any liability in respect of foreign tax or Australian tax".
374 See section 378(1). Moreover, section 378(2) provides 
that where a prior dividend has been paid by the CFC, the CFC is 
taken to have paid the dividend out of exempting and other profits 
on a pro-rata basis. The exempting receipts of a listed country 
CFC comprise so much of the profits that have been subject to tax 
in the listed country and therefore, do not constitute EDC income.
See also the discussion in 3.4.3. and 4.2.4. above, 
whete exempting receipts are excluded from (i) amounts of notional 
assessable income where an attributable taxpayer disposes of 
his/her interest in a CFC, and (ii) amounts of non-portfolio 
dividends subject to accruals taxation under section 458, 
respectively.
376 See FSIIP op cit. , at para 8.20.
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purchase shares in the company which makes the dividend payment), 
those expenses will not be allowable deductions in the hands of 
the shareholder. Similarly, a credit will not be allowed for any 
foreign taxes paid on the dividends or on the underlying income 
from which they are paid. The policy behind the denial of 
deductions is one of protecting the domestic tax base, because it 
reduces the scope for Australian shareholders to double dip by 
claiming a deduction in both Australia and the foreign 
jurisdiction while at the same time encouraging Australian 
investors to claim deductions in the place where the income was 
generated. Thus removing a non-neutrality in the tax system that 
was observed to be eroding Australia's domestic tax base.377
Up until 1987, the Australian tax system had also fostered 
another non-neutrality which allowed deductions to be claimed 
against exempt inter-corporate dividends received from non­
residents.378 Since that time, section 46 has been restricted to 
payments between resident companies. Clearly, therefore, the 
removal of such non-neutralities has been a very important policy 
goal, given that to do so promotes horizontal equity while at the 
same time upholding the integrity of the domestic tax base. There 
is no reason why there should be a difference in the tax treatment 
of an Australian company borrowing funds to invest in another 
domestic company from one which borrows funds to invest in a 
foreign company.
Consequently, section 23AJ represents a "real" exemption from 
Australian tax in that generally neither the underlying profits of 
the foreign subsidiary, nor the dividend paid from those profits, 
are subject to Australian tax at any time. By way of contrast, the 
section 23AI exemption does not represent a total exemption of the 
subsidiary's income from Australian tax. It is merely a mechanism 
by which domestic double taxation is alleviated. The US does not 
grant exemptions from the operation of Subpart F similar to the 
exemption available under section 23AJ, since the US accruals 
regime operates on a transactional basis. However, an exemption is 
provided under §954(b)(4) where Subpart F income (other than FBC 
oil related income) was taxable by some foreign government at an 
effective income tax rate greater than 90% of the top US corporate 
tax rate. 379 Generally, the USS may make an election under
See a paper delivered by Phil Anderson entitled "A 
Treasury View of the Draft Legislation" - University of Sydney,
CLE Seminar -Committee for Postgraduate Studies on 9 February 
1990, at pp 3-4.
See former section 46(1). In turn, section 46(7) allowed 
for the deduction by providing that the amount of the dividend 
which is included in the taxable income of the taxpayer is to be 
the lesser of the taxable income and the amount of the dividend 
included in the company's assessable income (gross dividends).
The effective tax rate on an item of income is the 
amount of foreign tax paid (or deemed paid) divided by the net US 
dollar amount of the income item (grossed up by the amount of the
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§954(b)(4) in relation to some items of Subpart F income (except 
FPHC income) and elect not to apply the exemption in respect of 
other items of income.380
Therefore, it is clear that the denial of deductions under 
section 23AJ reduces the scope for avoiding Australia's fiscal 
jurisdiction since without such an exclusion the Australian 
taxpayer could claim the benefit of a deduction in Australia in 
respect of income derived in a foreign company without having to 
return the income as assessable dividends. Hence, the contention 
that the domestic tax base is protected by the non-allowance of 
deductions as far as comparably taxed non-portfolio dividends are 
concerned. Moreover, the section 23AJ exemption ameliorates the 
compliance burden associated with the FTCS in cases where little 
or no revenue would be raised while at the same time protecting 
the domestic tax base from erosion.
5.4. Relief From International Double Attribution
International double attribution occurs where one country's 
CFC regime applies in respect of the same amount of income which 
is taxed by another country's CFC regime. This could occur for 
example where section 456 applies to attribute profits which may 
include an amount of interest income which is also treated as 
Subpart F income. Therefore, in order to alleviate double taxation 
in this case, section 456A reduces attributable income for amounts 
that have been taxed under an accruals tax law of another country. 
The relief is limited to the resident's attribution percentage in 
the CFC. However, once the Foreign Income Bill 1997 becomes law, 
an amount will be exempt from accruals taxation where it is 
untainted income (viz., not EDC income) and derived in a broad- 
listed exemption country (viz., Canada, France, Germany, Japan,
New Zealand, UK and US).
Broadly, in order to qualify for relief under section 456A 
(i) the assessable income of the resident shareholder must include 
a section 456 amount; (ii) the resident shareholder's attribution 
percentage for the CFC must have been traced through a CFE that 
was interposed between the CFC and the taxpayer; (iii) an item of 
net income must be subject to tax (in a tax accounting period 
commencing or ending in the taxpayer's year of income) in the 
listed country at that country's normal tax rate, and (iv) the 
amount of net income included in para (iii) must be the whole or 
part of the net income included in the attributable income of the 
CFC in relation to that item of income. Where paras (i) to (iv) 
are satisfied the section 456 amount will be reduced by the 
attributable taxpayer's indirect attribution percentage of the
qualifying foreign taxes): Reg. §1.954-(1) (d) (2) (1995).
380 See Reg. §1.954-l(d) (i) ; (4) (i) and (5) which set out
how the USS is to make the election, but which also provide that 
with respect to FPHC income, the USS must elect to either include 
or exclude all passive FPHC income eligible for the exemption. See 
also the discussion pertaining to §954(b)(4) at 3.1. above.
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total of the amounts which would be subject to both countries' CFC 
rules.381
5.5. Adjustments to the FTCS Introduced in the CFC Regime
Coordinating the FTC rules with the CFC rules is a very- 
important exercise since without it the exemption of active income 
from the CFC rules could be manipulated by an attributable 
taxpayer to allow deferral of Australian tax in respect of passive 
income derived by a CFC. 382 Moreover, the need to coordinate the 
two regimes is self explanatory given that under the CFC regime 
the single entity doctrine is applied, whereas the FTCS has 
traditionally recognised (with the exception of the inconsistency 
created by the indirect foreign tax credit) the separate entity 
doctrine.
Consequently, the changes to the FTCS were introduced, inter 
alia, to identify the amount of foreign or Australian income tax 
paid by a CFC with a view to alleviating double taxation and 
minimising opportunities for double crediting. Double crediting 
arises where the credit granted in respect of the deemed payment 
of foreign tax (resulting from the inclusion of the sections 456 
or 458 amounts in the Australian taxpayer's assessable income), is 
incorrectly determined by failing to accurately account for the 
sections 23AI and 23AJ exemptions. Generally, the effect of the 
credit provisions to be discussed below is that a part of any 
foreign tax or Australian tax paid by the CFC will be added to the 
sections 456 or 458 amount under the amended section 6AC and a 
credit for the foreign tax or the Australian tax payable,
381 The formula for calculating the amount by which the 
section 456 amount is to be reduced is as follows:
Indirect Attribution x Foreign Accruals-Taxed
Interest viá CFE Attributable Income ("FATAI")
Where:
"Indirect Attribution Interests via CFE" means the total of 
the attributable taxpayer's indirect attribution interests in 
the CFC that are held through the CFE; and 
"FATAI" means the amount of the foreign accruals-taxed 
attributable income.
382 For instance, since active income earned in low tax 
jurisdictions is not taxed currently under the CFC regime, it is 
necessary to tax dividends paid from such income. If not, the 
operation of section 23AJ could allow the repatriation of such 
dividends to Australia from a low-tax jurisdiction via a 
comparable-tax jurisdiction, thereby avoiding the FTCS and 
creating a tax bias in favour of foreign investments. In 
particular, the derivation of active income in tax havens. 
Professor McIntyre recently stated that:
"What Australia and other countries should learn from the US 
experience is that the functions of CFC provisions and 
foreign tax credit provisions overlap and that coordination 
of the technical rules used in those provisions is quite 
important." (See McIntyre op cit., (1988), at p 447).
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whichever is lesser, will be allowed under subsection 160AF(1) of 
the Act, when those amounts are repatriated to Australia.383 
Therefore, the proper coordination of FTC rules with the new CFC 
regime is essential to ensure the success of the new system in 
achieving its goal of protecting the domestic tax base in view of 
the existence of the attribution rule and its non-applicability in 
the case of a CFC deriving active income and non-portfolio 
dividends from listed country CFCs.
Relief against double international taxation on attribution 
of a CFC's income is available in the form of an indirect foreign 
tax credit under section 160AF as a result of the interaction of 
sections 6AB, 6AC and the new provisions introduced into the FTCS 
(i.e., sections 160AFCA to 160AFCC). These latter provisions were 
introduced to deem the Australian taxpayer personally liable for 
and to have paid the underlying taxes paid by the CFC in respect 
of amounts attributed under section 456 and section 458. These 
amounts are, for the purposes of the foreign tax credit 
limitation, quarantined in the passive income class.384 Therefore, 
any foreign taxes (e.g., withholding taxes) paid by a CFC are 
creditable not only against the Australian tax payable on the 
attributed income which is grossed up under section 6AC(3) for the 
deemed foreign tax paid, but also against the Australian tax 
payable on other foreign income of the same "passive" class 
derived.
The class of income rule described in the preceding paragraph 
stipulates that the credit for foreign tax paid on income from one 
class is limited to the Australian tax that would be payable on 
that class of income. Prior to 1994, there were three classes of 
income - passive income; offshore banking income and other income 
(which includes active income). A fourth class - "an amount 
included under section 27CAA" of income, was introduced with 
effect from 1994/1995 year of income. 385 Generally, the income 
will be assigned to the particular class according to the 
character of the underlying profits from which the income was
As noted at 4.3.1. above, no relief is provided for 
amounts attributed under sections 459 or 459A. This omission was 
deliberate and is justified on the basis that these section are 
anti-avoidance in nature: see section 6AB(3A) and Burns op. cit.. 
at p 242. The attribution rule under section 457 which operates 
where a CFC changes its residence, was not discussed in this 
thesis because it was felt that discussion of such a provision 
would not further the purposes of this thesis.
384 See sections 160AF and 160AEA(1) (n) . The other two 
categories of income which, for the purposes of the foreign tax 
credit limitation are quarantined, are "offshore banking income" 
and "other income": see section 160AF(7)(b) and (c), respectively.
see section 160AF(7)(ba). Section 27CAA broadly provides 
that assessable income of a resident taxpayer is to include a lump 
sum payment from an eligible non-resident non-complying 
superannuation fund.
253
paid. This approach (which is referred to in the US as the basket 
approach) was first adopted in the US in 1986 by virtue of the 
1986 amendments to the Code in TRA 1986. The US basket approach 
contains 9 'separate classes of income. Generally, Subpart F income 
of the CFC which is attributed to the USS under §951(a)(1)(A) is 
classified according to its character in the hands of the CFC.386 
For example, dividends paid by a CFC to its USS will retain, for 
the purposes of the separate basket limitations, the character of 
the earnings and profits out of which they were paid. 387 Income 
which is attributed to the USS under §956 (per §951(a)(1)(B)) is 
subject to the same quarantining rule as that for dividends, 
since such inclusions are drawn from earnings and profits 
generally rather than from a specific source of income such as FBC 
income.388
The quarantining of income into separate classes ensures that 
any excess foreign tax credit arising in respect of one class of 
income, does not offset credit in respect of another class of 
income. For example, the quarantining of passive income is 
designed to ensure that excess credits which arise in respect of 
other income and which might otherwise be lost, cannot be absorbed 
by the creation of excess foreign tax credits in respect of 
passive income which, but for the need to absorb the "other 
income" excess credit, would have been derived from Australian 
sources. Thus, the quarantining rule is central to the proper 
operation of the FTCS.
5.5.1. Amendment to the calculation of underlying tax
Under the FTCS, a foreign tax credit in respect of foreign 
taxes paid by a related foreign company on the underlying profits 
from which the dividend was paid is allowed to the Australian 
taxpayer. Section 160AFC does not actually allow the credit, it 
merely provides the means by which indirect credit is calculated. 
Where all the requirements set out in that section are satisfied, 
section 160AFC deems the Australian company to have been 
personally liable for and to have paid the underlying tax. Such a 
deeming exercise then allows the Australian taxpayer to claim a 
foreign tax credit under section 160AF in respect of the 
underlying tax calculated under section 160AFC.
386 See §904 (d) (3) (B) ; Regs. §1.904-5.
See §904(d)(3)(D) and Reg. §1.904-5(c)(4). An example 
which would assist in the understanding of this look-through rule 
is the situation where the profits and earnings of the CFC paying 
the dividend to the USS are comprised of the following: (i) 60% is 
from investment (i.e., passive) activities; (ii) 21% is high 
withholding tax interest and (iii) 19% is non-controlled §902 
corporation dividend. In view of those circumstances the dividend 
received by the USS will be allocated as to 60% to the passive 
income basket; 21% to the high withholding tax interest basket and 
19% to the non-controlled §902 corporation basket.
388 See Reg. §1.904-(5) (c) (4) .
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To ensure that an indirect foreign tax credit could not be 
granted in respect of Australian tax paid by a related foreign 
company, the definition of "foreign tax" in section 6AB was 
amended to, inter alia, mean a tax imposed by a country other than 
Australia that is not a unitary tax or a credit absorption tax. 
Consequently, section 160AFC sets out procedures for calculating 
foreign underlying tax by separately identifying the part of the 
distributable profits which represent exempting profits, and the 
part which represents other profits. This amendment is contained 
in subsection 160AFC(5A) which was inserted to ensure that 
Australian companies only receive a foreign tax credit for 
underlying tax in respect of non-portfolio dividends which are not 
exempt from Australian tax by virtue of section 23AJ.389
Where an unlisted country company which has exempting profits 
and other distributable profits pays a non-portfolio dividend, 
section 16OAFC(5A) provides that the credit for the underlying tax 
is referable only to the non-exempting profits. 390 On the other 
hand, where a listed country company pays a non-portfolio dividend 
and where the Australian resident taxpayer for whom the underlying 
tax credit is being calculated has an attribution surplus 
immediately before the dividend was paid, then the underlying tax 
credit is to be computed by reference to a pool of distributable 
profits of the listed country company that are referable to the 
attribution surplus and to the taxes attributable to that surplus.
The inclusion of distributable profits in the definition of 
"underlying tax" in section 160AFC(2) gives legislative force to 
IT 2445 where the Commissioner had ruled that the term profits in 
section 160AFC(6)(a) means after tax profits which are determined 
without regard to any requirement either of the company's 
constituent document, or of any resolution or decision of the 
company restricting the availability of profits for distribution 
(see also section 317) .
The operation of the modified section 160AFC can best be 
understood by considering the following example (which is based on 
the example contained in the EM at p 1569).
Example: ACo, an Australian resident company, owns 60% of the
shares of an unlisted country CFC (FCo). For the
A credit does not arise directly under section 160AF(1) 
and section 160AFC(2) or (4) as modified by section 160AFC(5A), 
since non-portfolio dividends, to the extent that they represent 
attributed income, as mentioned earlier, are exempt under section 
23AI. The further intervention of section 160AFCD (discussed 
above) is required which deems the amount exempt under section 
23AI to be assessable for the purposes of section 160AF(1).
Dividends which represent a distribution of exempting 
receipts are not included in the assessable income of the 
recipient Australian company under section 23AJ and credit is not 
allowed for taxes paid on those exempting receipts.
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statutory accounting period FCo's accounts are as 
follows:
$
Section 23AJ exempt income 100
Listed country tax on section 23AJ income 30
Attributable income derived from unlisted country 500 
Tax paid in unlisted country on all income 
including 23AJ dividend 60
Assume that FCo pays a dividend of $510 to ACo and that ACo's 
attribution percentage is 60%. By virtue of section 160AFC(5A)(c) , 
the amount of dividend on which there is an entitlement to an 
indirect foreign tax credit is so much of the dividend that is not 
an exempting receipt (i.e., $450, being the amount of the dividend 
($510) less the exempting profits net of tax ($100 - $40391) ) .
The next step is to identify the relevant amount of 
underlying tax that may give rise to an indirect foreign tax 
credit in respect of the dividend received. Section 
160AFC(5A)(d)(ii), which deals with the situation where a dividend 
is received from an unlisted country company, provides that the 
amount of relevant underlying tax is the amount of foreign tax 
relating to the non-exempting receipt component of the dividend. 
Broadly speaking, this is the amount of tax paid on the non­
exempting receipt - $50 (i.e., (600 - 100) x 10%). 392 Therefore,
tax deemed to be paid by ACo and in relation to which an indirect 
foreign tax credit arises is $36 (i.e., 60% x $50).
391 The $40 of tax is comprised of the $30 listed country 
tax plus the $10 unlisted country tax (i.e., corporate tax rate of 
10%), on the section 23AJ exempt income. The apportionment between 
exempting receipts and non-exempting receipts is on an after tax 
basis. This is in accordance with the major amendment to section 
160AFC(6) which introduced the concept of "distributable profits" 
to replace the term "profits" which was defined in section 
160AE(1) as pre-tax profits of the company.
392 The formula for calculating the amount of relevant 
underlying tax for a dividend received from unlisted country 
company is:
Non-exempting tax + (General tax x Non-exempting percent)
The above terms are all defined in section 160AFC(5A)(d)(ii). 
Non-exempting tax means so much of the underlying tax that 
relates to non-exempting profits, in relation to the 
Australian company, forming part of the distributable 
profits.
General tax means so much of the underlying tax as does not 
relate exclusively to non-exempting profits, in relation to 
the Australian company, forming part of the distributable 
profits.
Non-exempting percent means the percentage of the General Tax
that may reasonably be related to non-exempting profits, in 
relation to the Australian company, forming part of the 
distributable profits.
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Under the US Subpart F regime, in particular §960(a)(1) of 
the Code, if a domestic corporation is required by §951 to include 
in its gross income an amount attributable to the earnings and 
profits of a foreign corporation, and if certain stock ownership 
requirements are satisfied, then the domestic corporation will be 
deemed to have paid a portion of such foreign corporation's 
post-1986 "foreign income taxes" determined under §902 as if the 
amount so included were a dividend paid by such foreign 
corporation. 393 The domestic corporation is also allowed to credit 
in respect of the foreign taxes paid (or deemed to have been paid) 
by a second - or a third - tier foreign corporation whose income 
is taxed under Subpart F.394 Beyond the third tier no FTC
A domestic corporation which receives a dividend from a 
foreign corporation in which it owns at least 10 per cent of the 
voting stock, is entitled to an indirect foreign tax credit in 
respect of the foreign income taxes paid by the foreign 
corporation on its underlying profits that were accumulated post- 
1986: § 902(a) and §960(a) which extends the operation of §902 to 
Subpart F. Regulation 1.902-1(a)(6) limits the availability of the 
credit to distributions that are taxable as "ordinary income" 
under §316 (which does not include capital gains: US v Associate 
Tel. & Tel. Co.. 306 F2d 824 (2d Cir. 1962)). In turn,
§904(d)(1)(E) provides a separate basket for non-controlled §902 
dividends.
394 There are three subparagraphs within §960 (a) (1) which 
set forth the statutory rules granting the foreign taxes paid on 
undistributed §951 income at all three foreign tiers. The effect 
of all three subparagraphs is that in order to be able to claim a 
FTC up to the three tiers of foreign corporations, a domestic 
corporation must (1) "directly" own 10% or more of the voting 
stock of the foreign corporation whose income is included in the 
gross income of the domestic corporation by virtue of §951 (the 
foreign corporation is referred to as the first-tier corporation); 
(2) directly own at least 10% of the voting stock of the 
first-tier corporation that owns at least 10% of the voting stock 
of the foreign corporation (second-tier corporation), whose income 
is included in the domestic corporation's gross income under §951, 
and (3) directly owns at least 10% of the voting stock of the 
first-tier corporation that owns at least 10% of the voting stock 
of the third-tier corporation whose income is included in the 
gross income of the domestic corporation under §951.
In addition to meeting the foregoing direct ownership 
requirements, a domestic corporation, in order to qualify for the 
indirect FTC, must have an indirect ownership interest in the 
second-tier corporation through the first-tier corporation of at 
least 5% and an indirect ownership interest in the third-tier 
corporation through the second and the first-tier corporation of 
at least 5% (per §960 (a) (1) and incorporating §§902(b) (3) (A) and 
902(b) (3) (B) ) .
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arises. 395 This is to be contrasted with the position in Australia 
where an indirect foreign tax credit entitlement arises in 
relation to unlimited tiers subject to the condition that the 
payer company and recipient company are related.
5.5.2. Credits for foreign tax paid on section 456 amounts
If an amount is attributed under section 456, then the 
attributable taxpayer (a company which is related to the foreign 
payer company) is entitled to a foreign tax credit for the 
Australian and foreign taxes deducted from the attributable income 
under section 393. To ensure this result,, section 6AB(1) was 
amended to provide that an amount included under section 456 
(i.e., the "section 456 amount" 396 ) is to be treated as foreign 
income. Once the above conditions are satisfied, then the 
attributable taxpayer will be deemed by virtue of section 160AF 
and section 160AFCA to have paid and to have been personally 
liable for an amount of foreign tax in relation to the section 456 
amount. 397 The amount of foreign tax deemed to have been paid by 
the attributable taxpayer will be equal to the attribution 
percentage of the total amount of the "notional allowable 
deductions" calculated under section 393.398 As with the US FTCS, 
foreign taxes do not include non-income foreign taxes.399
The credit allowed and which arises under section 160AFCA, is 
referrable to taxes paid by the CFC in respect of profits 
attributed under section 456, and not those paid directly by the 
attributable taxpayer. The relief for foreign taxes extends to the
In an attempt to mitigate some of the uncompetitive 
aspects of the tax rules introduced in the TRA 1986 pertaining to 
the taxation of foreign source income, the Taxpayer Relief Act 
1997 was enacted. Relevantly, that Act extends the availability of 
the indirect foreign tax credit to the sixth tier with the proviso 
that below the third tier, the indirect credit is limited to taxes 
paid or incurred for taxable years during which the payer was a 
CFC. The provision is effective for taxable years beginning on or 
after 5 August 1997 (i.e., date of enactment).
Section 456 income is classed as "passive income" under 
section 160AEA for the purposes of the foreign tax credit limit. 
See also §904(d)(2) which provides a separate passive income 
basket for FPHC income which roughly corresponds with the 
definition of passive income under section 446 of the Act.
See section 375(1)(a). The credit is equal to the amount 
of foreign tax deemed paid (see section 375(2)) and is taken to 
arise at the end of the statutory accounting period (section 
375 (3)) .
398 See section 6AB(2) .
See Burns (1991) op cit.. at p 152, where he notes that 
the exhaustive drafting of the definition of creditable foreign 
tax appears to preclude the inclusion of sales taxes.
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foreign underlying taxes deemed to have been paid by the CFC on 
non-portfolio dividends received from a foreign company (which is 
not a CFC) resident in an unlisted country out of low or non-taxed 
active income. Therefore, alleviation from international double 
taxation in this regard is by way of an indirect foreign tax 
credit which is designed to trace through a chain of related 
companies (i.e.,,those in a dividend series), the amount of 
dividends received and the foreign tax paid in respect of such 
dividends .400
Section 160AFCA also operates to relieve double domestic 
taxation. Amounts which have been taxed in full in Australia 
(i.e., amounts which have entered into the calculation of taxable 
income for the purposes of Australian tax law) will not be 
included in the CFC's attributable income by virtue of sections 
402(2)(a) and (b). Interest or dividends subject only to 
Australian withholding tax do not constitute notional exempt 
income of the CFC. Nevertheless, a foreign tax credit in respect 
of such amounts which have borne Australian withholding tax and 
which have been attributed to the attributable taxpayer under 
section 456, is available under section 160AFCA. Therefore, the 
relief mechanism in this case also operates to relieve double 
domestic taxation, since the income has already borne Australian 
tax under Australia's withholding tax provisions.
5.5.3. Credits for foreign tax paid on section 458 amounts
Where a CFC resident in an unlisted country pays a non­
portfolio dividend to another CFC which is resident in a listed 
country, and the dividend is not taxed in the listed country at 
that country's normal tax rate, then section 458 could apply to 
include the dividend in the attributable taxpayer's assessable 
income. In these circumstances, section 160AFCC may apply to deem 
the attributable taxpayer to have paid, and to have been 
personally liable for, an amount of foreign tax in relation to the 
section 458 amount. By allowing a FTC in respect of section 458 
attributed amounts, section 160AFCC ensures that the Australian 
taxpayer is taxed consistently whether it has amounts attributed 
to them under sections 456 or 458.401 However, no foreign tax 
credit is available if the dividend received by the recipient CFC 
is a disguised distribution which is deemed a dividend under 
section 47A.402
400 As noted at 3.4.3. above, the indirect tax credit is 
only available where the attributable taxpayer is "related" (i.e., 
owns more than 10% as stipulated in section 160AFB) to the CFC.
401 In order to prevent double domestic taxation, section 
402(2) (d) excludes section 458 dividends from the recipient CFC's 
attributable income (i.e., it is included in notional exempt 
income) provided that the Australian taxpayer is an attributable 
taxpayer in relation to both the paying and receiving CFC.
402 See section 47A(2) .
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As was the case with section 160AFCA, a FTC is available 
under section 160AFCC in relation to the section 458 amount by 
virtue of the fact that the amount of "foreign income" described 
in section 6AB(1) of the Act includes the section 458 amount. In 
order for the Australian taxpayer to receive a FTC with respect to 
the section 458 amount, both CFCs must be "related" to the 
Australian resident taxpayer. 403 The formula for computing the 
"direct tax" 404 which the resident company is deemed to have paid, 
identifies the foreign tax paid on the amount included in 
attributable income under section 458 by reference to the foreign 
tax paid on the dividend.405
Under section 160AFCC(d), the Australian resident company is 
deemed to have paid and to have been personally liable for 
underlying tax paid in relation to the section 458 amount (i.e., 
the dividend 406 ) received by the CFC (which was related to the 
Australian company at the time of payment). The amount of credit 
to which the Australian taxpayer is entitled, is equal to the 
amount that the recipient of the dividend would have been taken to 
have paid under section 160AFC had that CFC been a resident 
company at the time the dividend was paid.407
However, as only the section 458 amount is subjected to tax 
on the payment of the dividend, the underlying tax calculated 
under section 160AFC has to be reduced in order to reflect the 
section 458 amount. The adjusting formula which achieves this 
result is set out in paragraph 160AFCC(d) . 408 This formula is
403 See section 160AFCC(b) .
404 The direct tax referred to in para 160AFCC(c) will not 
include tax paid by the recipient CFC in a country in which it is 
treated as a resident, or is domiciled or has its place of central 
control and management there.
405 The formula for calculating the direct tax is:
Section 458 amount x Foreign tax
Dividend
406 See section 375(1) (d) .
407 Under section 160AFC(5A), the underlying tax that could
qualify for a FTC under section 160AFC would not include any 
underlying tax that is attributable to the exempting profits 
percentage of a dividend (sections 160AFC(5A)(a), (b) and (c)).
The balance of the dividend would include that part of the 
dividend, if any, that was paid out of income that has been 
attributed to resident taxpayers under section 456 and the part of 
the dividend that comprises the section 458 amount.
408 The formula which reduces the underlying tax to reflect 
the section 458 amount is:
160AFC deemed tax x _________Section 458 amount____________
Dividend - Exempting profits part
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necessitated by the fact that dividends can broadly be divided 
into three separate components (i) income which has been 
comparably taxed in a listed country (i.e., exempting receipts); 
(ii) income which has previously been attributed; and (iii) 
amounts which do not fall into either the first two categories but 
which need to be attributed upon payment (e.g., under section 
458) .
5.6. Treatment of Interest Income
Up until the introduction of the CFC regime, interest income 
(due to its highly mobile nature) was treated as a separate class 
of income for the purposes of the foreign tax credit limit under 
section 160AF(7). With the introduction of the CFC regime in 1990, 
the separate interest income class was collapsed into the general 
passive income class for the purposes of the foreign tax credit 
limit. However, interest is still treated as a separate class of 
income in calculating losses to be carried forward for the 
purposes of the FTCS. Interest income is defined in section 
160AE(3) and broadly mirrors the definition of interest income in 
section 446. That is, it is defined as income consisting of 
interest, or a payment in the nature of interest, in respect of a 
loan or any other kind of debt. More importantly, amongst the 
exceptions to the definition of interest income is interest 
derived from a transaction directly related to the active conduct 
of a trade or business.409
Prior to the introduction of the CFC regime (effective from 
the 1990/1991 year of income), dividend income was also singled 
for special treatment under section 160AFA. This section contained 
certain tracing rules that treat dividends received by Australian 
residents from related companies as interest income where 
specified circumstances apply. In order to determine whether 
dividends received by an Australian company from a related company
Section 160AFC deemed tax is defined to mean the amount (if 
any) of foreign tax the CFC, to which the dividend was paid, would 
be treated as having paid for the purposes of section 160AFC 
provided certain assumptions applied, including that the CFC was 
an Australian resident: section 160AFCC(d).
409 The Commissioner in Taxation Ruling IT 2518 has set out 
guidelines to clarify the circumstances in which an 
interest-earning transaction is to be construed as directly 
related to the active conduct of a trade or business. The 
transactions which the Commissioner considers to be directly 
related to the active conduct of a trade or business, inter alia, 
include:
(i) the sale, exchange or other disposition of property 
which is purchased, manufactured, produced, constructed, 
grown or extracted in the ordinary course of such trade 
or business; and
(ii) the performance of an activity which is an ordinary and 
necessary incident to the conduct of such trade or 
business.
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are to be treated as interest income for the purpose of the 
foreign tax credit limit, the foreign company was treated as 
having an "interest pool"410 during the accounting period in which 
the test is first satisfied and subsequent accounting periods. 
Broadly speaking, where during the accounting period of a foreign 
company that ends after 30 June 1987 or any subsequent period, the 
company derives "net interest income" amounting to at least 10% of 
its total profits, dividends paid by the company are treated as 
interest income in certain circumstances.411
Without the interest pool rule, it would have been possible 
to change the character of interest income and manipulate the 
foreign tax credit limit by interposing companies which received 
interest then paid dividends to the resident taxpayer in order to 
absorb excess foreign tax credits. The attribution account 
mechanism for calculating attribution credits serves a similar 
purpose because it is designed to correlate the amount of profits 
distributed (i.e., attribution account payments) with the tax paid 
on such distributions. Moreover, the indirect attribution account 
interest of the Australian shareholder like the indirect foreign 
tax credit calculation (in certain circumstances) can be traced 
through any number of interposed entities.412
The approach in the US (like Australia) is based on applying 
the separate basket limitations which is set out in §904 to actual 
and deemed distributions from a CFC. The §904 limitation feeds 
into the foreign tax credits available under §960 via the 
mechanism of the look through rules. By doing so, the CFC is 
effectively treated as if it were a branch of the USS.413 A 
similar set of rules focuses on the geographic source of income to 
ensure that domestic source income is not transformed into foreign 
source income by merely passing through a foreign corporation.
410 Under section 16 0AFA(1) and (1A) , an interest pool 
arises where, for the first time during an accounting period 
ending after 30 June 1987, or any subsequent period, a foreign 
company derives at least 10% of its total profit as "interest 
income".
411 See section 160AFA(1A). "Net interest income" is defined 
as interest income less deductions under any law which relate 
exclusively to that interest income and so much of other 
deductions as relate appropriately in the opinion of the 
Commissioner to that interest income: section 160AFA(4). This 
amount may include the deduction obtained under section 393.
412 See section 369(5) .
413 The double benefit that arises where a USS deducts 
foreign taxes paid by a CFC under §954(b)(5) who is then permitted 
to gross up the attributed income by the foreign tax deemed paid 
under §960 (for purposes of US FTCS), is avoided by treating the 
§960 amount as a dividend under §78. Thus the shortfall in the 
gross amount is ultimately taxed under §78.
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As mentioned previously, the USS must "look through" any 
distribution of dividends, interest, rents and royalties to the 
distributing CFC's underlying profits pursuant to
§904 (d) (3) (A) .414 The exception to this rule arises where interest 
received by the USS is properly allocable to income of the paying 
CFC. In such a case the interest is to be treated as income in a 
separate category (viz., related party income).415 However, in 
general, interest payments received by a USS from a CFC are 
allocated first to the passive income category and the excess is 
apportioned among classes of gross income in proportion to asset 
value.
5.7. Treatment of Deductions
The issue of allocation of deductions is of great importance 
for a number of reasons. Deductions impact on the amount of "net 
foreign income" included in the calculation of the foreign tax 
credit under section 160AF. Moreover, without proper allocation 
rules Australian taxpayers with offshore investments could enjoy a 
double deduction in respect of the same outgoing. Determination of 
to the extent to which expenditure is incurred in deriving income 
from a particular source may also be relevant for calculating 
current year losses under section 79D and prior year foreign 
losses under section 160AFD (discussed below).
Generally, Australian taxpayers will try to bring deductions 
incurred in relation to offshore operations on-shore so that they 
can be offset against Australian assessable income for Australian 
tax purposes. The reason for bringing the deductions on-shore is 
to maximise the taxpayers foreign tax credit entitlement, thus 
manipulating the foreign tax credit limit. If foreign income has 
been taxed at a rate in excess of the Australian tax on the same 
income then the credit limit can effectively be avoided by seeking 
to set deductions which really relate to foreign source income 
against domestic income because the foreign tax base is then 
enlarged and the foreign tax rate consequently reduced.416
414 For instance, under the dividend look through rule, 
income will be assigned to the various limitation baskets that 
reflect the character of the CFC's income, with the result that 
excess foreign taxes in those baskets can offset any residual US 
taxes in the basket where it would incur a residual US tax. 
Moreover, credits for underlying tax are in certain cases 
available in respect of dividends paid by a foreign related 
company to a resident shareholder company.
415 See §904 (d) (3) (C); and Reg. §1.904-5(c) (2) (i) . Interest 
which is paid or accrued by a CFC to a USS, or to any other 
related person in a situation in which the look through rules 
apply, is termed "related person interest" ("RPI"): Regulation
§1.904-5 (c) (2) (ii) .
416 See Vann and Parsons op cit. , at p 167.
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Essentially, there is no specific treatment of deductions in 
Australia's FTCS beyond the general allocation rules of the 
definition of "net foreign income" in subsection 160AF(8) which 
permits the deduction of so much of "deductions" that do not 
relate exclusively to foreign income but that in the opinion of 
the Commissioner relate appropriately to that income.417 
Allocation of deductions as between Australian source and foreign 
source income is also necessitated by subsection 51(1) of the Act 
which provides that deductions are not allowable to the extent to 
which they are incurred in gaining or producing exempt income. 
Therefore, the non-allowance of deductions incurred in deriving 
section 23AJ exempt income effectively forces domestic taxpayers 
to seek deductions in the source country thereby by-passing the 
need to apportion deductions between foreign source and Australian 
source. This is a significant development in that once the 
taxpayer can prove that a particular expense was incurred or 
necessarily incurred in gaining or producing the assessable 
income, the Commissioner is compelled to allow the deduction.
The High Court of Australia in Ronpibon Tin NL v FCT418 held 
that the precise allocation of deductions between both domestic 
and foreign sources is a matter to be decided on the facts of the 
case. This has been recognised and adopted by the Commissioner in 
Taxation Ruling IT 2466. The ruling states that all claims for 
allocation of deductions should be accompanied by a statement 
showing the basis of that allocation. The ruling further suggests 
that head office expenses and interest on loans used for business 
within and outside Australia are typical examples of deductions 
which may be apportioned. However, unlike the rules for allocating 
deductions in the US, there is no real guidance in Australia 
beyond the above vague (and in most instances, unhelpful) 
statement by the High Court in Ronpibon's case, as adopted by the 
Commissioner in IT 2446.
417 The rule for allocating expenses under the US FTCS is 
set out in Regulation §1.904-5 (c) (2) (ii) . The effect of such a 
rule is to set up a regime which is similar to the rule for 
allocating expenses under §§ 861(b) and 871(b). In general, 
interest expense (which is RPI) and other expenses, are allocated 
in their entirety, to passive income. This is a form of anti­
avoidance rule in that it prevents a 'USS from making a passive 
investment through a CFC and diluting the amount of the USS's 
passive interest income by apportioning the interest for look 
through characterisation purposes to all limitation categories in 
which the CFC has income: see Tarris V M "Foreign Tax Credit 
Limitation After Tax Reform: The Separate Limitation Categories 
and the Application of the Look-Through Rule" (1989) 42 Tax Lawyer 
275, at p. 336.
418 (1949) 78 CLR 47.
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Similarly, in the US, expenses are allocated to income 
effectively connected to the conduct of a trade or business.419 
The Code like the Act, does not generally specify how expenses 
should be allocated between US and foreign sources. 420 However, 
broadly speaking, a taxpayer is required to: (i) allocate 
deductions to a class of gross income to which that deduction is 
definitely related,421 and then if a statutory provision requires, 
(ii) apportion the deductions within that class between the 
statutory grouping of gross income and the residual grouping of 
gross income. 422 The statute usually requires a pro rata 
apportionment between the statutory grouping and the residual 
grouping where a deduction is not definitely related to any gross 
income.423 The apparent simplicity of the allocation of expense 
rules is somewhat deceiving. In a survey conducted by Professor 
Blumenthal and Slemrod, it was observed that most US firms with 
foreign operations suggested that these rules, along with the FTCS 
and §482, should be simplified in the interest of reducing 
compliance costs.424
Guidance, in appropriate circumstances may also be sought 
from Australia's DTAs. For example, Article 7(2) of the 
Australia/US DTA provides that profit attributable to a branch is
419 See §§ 861(b) and 871(b) of the Code. The allocation 
rule for interest expense, where the expense is incurred in 
respect of funds borrowed for general business purposes is 
contained in §864 (e) which provides that the interest paid in 
those circumstances is apportioned between US and foreign sources 
according to the basis of all the taxpayer's assets. In 
ascertaining the assets of the taxpayer, the assets of all 
affiliated companies are taken into account: see §1504.
420 For a general discussion of expense allocation rules see 
Doernberg R International Taxation (2nd edition) (West Publishing 
Co, St Paul, Minn. 1993) at §4.02.
421 A deduction is considered "definitely related" to a 
class of gross income if it is incurred as a result of, or 
incident to, an activity or in connection with property from which 
the income is derived: Reg. §1.861-8(b)(2).
422 Reg. §1.861-8 (a) (2) and §§ 862(b) and 863 (a). The term
"statutory grouping" is further defined to mean the gross income 
from a specific source or activity (e.g., interest source rule 
under §861(a)(1) - discussed at 4.1.1. in Part III). Gross income
from other sources or activities is referred to as "residual 
grouping": Reg. §1.861-8(a)(4).
423 See Reg. §1.861-8 (c) (3) .
424 See Blumenthal and Slemrod op  cit. , at p 49. However, it 
is beyond the scope of this paper to embark on a discussion of how 
and where such rules should be simplified.
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determined using an arm's length apportionment. 425 This 
calculation involves allocating expenses between head office and 
branch. If the operation concerned is a subsidiary, then the 
relevant treaty provision likewise provides an arm's length 
criterion for dividing profit. Article 7(3) amplifies the general 
directive in Article 7(2), in that the former article specifically 
recognises that in calculating the profit of a branch (which is 
not significantly different from a subsidiary operation), expenses 
that were incurred for the purposes of the branch are to be 
allowed as deductions.
Despite the guidance provided in Australia's DTAs there is 
still much room for improvement in this complex area of taxation 
law. The directives for one thing, will only apply where a 
bilateral tax issue requires resolution. Therefore, reliance on 
those articles is limited to situations where, for instance, the 
issue of allocation of deductions between Australia and the US 
arises. Moreover, the application of the arm's length principle to 
apportion deductions is also far from an ideal solution since such 
a concept is replete with problems of its own. Further, the 
guidance does not preclude arguments as to which expenses are 
incurred for the purposes of the branch/subsidiary. This, in 
effect, is not substantially different to the apportionment 
problem created by section 51(1) of the Act which uses similar 
terms.426
425 Article 7(2) provides:
"There shall be attributed to that permanent establishment 
the business profits which it might be expected to make if it 
were a distinct and independent enterprise engaged in the 
same or similar activities under the same or similar 
conditions and dealing wholly independently with the 
enterprise of which it is a permanent establishment or with 
other enterprises with which it deals."
See also the 1992 OECD MTC in particular, Article 7(2) which 
is in similar terms to Article 7(2) of the Australia/US DTA except 
for the last part of the last sentence (i.e., "or with other 
enterprises with which it deals") which is not contained in the 
OECD MTC. Article 7(3) of the 1992 OECD MTC further provides:
"In determining the profits of a permanent establishment, 
there shall be allowed as deductions expenses which are 
incurred for the purposes of the permanent establishment, 
including executive and general administrative expenses so 
incurred, whether in the State in which the permanent 
establishment is situated or elsewhere."
426 Outside the realm of DTAs the Commissioner of Taxation 
recently issued Draft Ruling TR 95/D11, which provides guidelines 
on the application of transfer pricing provisions in relation to 
permanent establishments (i.e., branches), specifically the 
allocation of income and or expenses. It was stated that if there 
is some doubt as to the operation of section 51(1) then the 
Commissioner may invoke the transfer pricing rules to support the 
apportionment or disallowance of a deduction under section 51(1). 
In doing so the Commissioner also noted that the word "incurred"
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5.8. Treatment of Losses
5.8.1. Current year losses
The provisions of section 79D govern the deductibility of 
expenses related to the production of foreign assessable income, 
whereas, the provisions of section 160AFD govern the reduction of 
foreign assessable income by a foreign loss incurred in a previous 
year of income. Expressions used in section 160AFD have the same 
meaning as in section 79D, and to that extent the analysis of 
expressions used in calculating prior year losses below are 
relevant to the discussion here and vice versa.
The new provisions of section 79D provide that the excess of 
"foreign income deduct ions1,427 over the "assessable foreign 
income"428 of the Australian taxpayer, if any, of that class is 
not an allowable deduction, 429 with the effect that a deduction 
that relates to income of a particular class of foreign income 
cannot be deducted from foreign income of another class or against 
income that is not foreign income nor be offset against domestic 
income. Thus, within a class, all assessable foreign income and 
all foreign income deductions will be pooled, and quarantining 
will only occur if the total of "assessable foreign income
refers to expenditure in fact incurred by the taxpayer and does 
not include a profit mark-up created by a charge between the 
permanent establishment and another part of the entity and that 
the timing of deductibility is determined by when the expenditure 
is incurred by the entity and not when any charge or payment is 
made in connection with that expenditure: at paras 22 and 33 of 
Draft Ruling TR 95/D11.
427 "Foreign income deduction" is defined in section 
16OAFD(9) as follows:
"... in relation to a taxpayer in relation to a class of 
assessable foreign income in relation to a year of income, 
means any deduction that, disregarding section 79D, is 
allowed or allowable from the assessable income of the 
taxpayer of the year of income, to the extent that the 
deduction relates to assessable foreign income of that class 
of any year of income".
428 "Assessable foreign income" is defined in section 
16OAFD(9) to mean:
"(a) foreign income that is included in the assessable income 
of the taxpayer of the year of income; or 
(b) where:-
(i) during the year of income the taxpayer derives a profit 
or gain of a capital nature from sources in a foreign 
country; and
(ii) the whole or part of the profit or gain is included in 
the assessable income of the taxpayer of the year of income 
other than under Part IIIA".
429 Sections 79D(1) (c) and (d) .
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deduction" (computed on a worldwide basis) exceeds the total of 
the "assessable foreign income" (also computed on a worldwide 
basis). Section 23AI dividends are not treated as exempt for the 
purposes of determining the amount of "foreign income deduction" 
under section 79D. 430 However, section 23AI and section 23AJ 
exempt income is disregarded in calculating foreign losses since 
such a calculation is based on "assessable foreign income".
The definition of "foreign income deduction", makes it clear 
that the deduction must be allowed or allowable from the 
taxpayer's assessable income of any year of income whether or not 
assessable income is actually derived in any year of income. The 
definition makes provision for apportionment where the deduction 
only relates to a part of the assessable income. To that extent 
the new definition provides a primitive regime for allocating 
expenses.
From the definition of the expression "foreign assessable 
income" it is clear that capital gains which enter into the 
taxpayer's assessable income through the operation of Part IIIA, 
do not enter into the calculation of either current or previous 
year losses under section 79D or section 160AFD. It has been noted 
that the attempt to keep capital gains out of the current and 
carry forward loss situation is unfair and contrary to the 
practice on the domestic side, but also to involve some 
assumptions about the meaning of the term income involving only 
income according to ordinary concepts.431 The disallowance of 
capital losses to be included in the calculation of a current or 
carry-forward loss represents a deviation from the principles of 
both CEN and horizontal equity.
5.8.2. Prior year losses
Foreign losses must be quarantined on a class of income basis 
under section 160AFD of the Act. The principal change to the 
foreign loss quarantining regime introduced as a result of the CFC 
regime was to replace the old source of income quarantining rule 
with the class of income quarantining rule. The effect of section 
160AFD is that post-1990-91 losses incurred by a CFC will:
• be quarantined so that a loss in respect of one class 
will only be able to reduce income of the same class 
(four classes of income will be used for this purpose: 
interest income, "modified passive income" [generally, 
passive income excluding interest and capital profits], 
"offshore banking income" and "other income");
• not be affected by whether or not carry-forward of 
losses is permitted in the country of source;
430 This is because pursuant to section 427, section 79D is 
to be disregarded in calculating attributable income of a CFC.
431 Vann, op cit. (1990) , at p 27.
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• only be able to be transferred to another CFC in the 
same group in special circumstances (i.e., "anti-loss 
trafficking" rules); and
• ensure that any amount that is not assessable income is 
disregarded in the calculation of the foreign loss or in 
determining the amount of a loss that may reduce 
assessable income.
A foreign loss for the purposes of section 160AFD is 
calculated as the excess of foreign income deductions relating to 
that class of assessable foreign income over the assessable 
foreign income of that class. Where there is no assessable foreign 
income, the loss is the amount of the foreign income deduction, 
the effect of the loss recoupment provision contained in section 
160AFD(2) is to reduce the taxpayer's assessable foreign income by 
the amount of prior year losses which had earlier been used to 
reduce the assessable foreign income of the taxpayer. 432 The EM 
states that it is implicit in the above formula that the 
assessable foreign income of the taxpayer may only be reduced to 
nil. 433 Section 160AFD(3) sets out an ordering rule whereby two or 
more losses of the same class are to be taken into account in the 
order in which they were incurred.
The anti-loss trafficking rules contained in section 
16OAFD(6) are an anti-avoidance measure which broadly operate to 
prevent an overall foreign loss in respect of a class of 
assessable foreign income from being carried forward for deduction 
against assessable foreign income of the same class where, had the 
loss been incurred domestically under section 80, deduction of 
that loss would have been denied by the operation of section 80A 
or 8ODA. Under the section 80A "continuity of ownership" test, 
shares carrying more than 50% of all voting, dividend and capital 
rights should be beneficially owned at all times during the 
subsequent (recoupment) year by the same person or persons 
collectively who held the shares in the year the loss was 
incurred. 434 Section 80DA prevents a company from claiming a 
deduction for a past year loss where the continuity of ownership 
test is satisfied but the person claiming the benefits of the
432 Pursuant to section 160AFD(2) there is no restriction on 
the number of years that prior year losses may be carried forward.
433 See EM at p 1576 .
434 It should be noted that section 80A is expressed to be
subject to section 80E. Such a provision enables the company to 
carry forward its revenue loss even where there has been a change 
in majority underlying interests so that section 80A is not 
satisfied. In such a case the loss may still be carried forward if 
the company satisfies the same business test as expounded in 
section 80E. To satisfy this test it has to be shown that the 
company carried on the "same business" as it did immediately 
before the change in beneficial ownership. As to what constitutes 
the "same business" see Gibbs J's decision in Avondale Motors 
(Parts) Ptv Ltd v FCT (1971) 124 CLR 97.
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deduction was not a shareholder of the company during the year in 
which the loss was incurred.
Where the above requirements are satisfied a foreign tax 
credit will arise. However, where a foreign carry forward loss is 
offset against subsequent foreign income, the credit for foreign 
tax paid on that income is correspondingly reduced.435 Although it 
is not entirely clear, this would only seem to be the case where 
under the foreign country's tax rules, the income is not reduced 
by carry forward losses for taxation purposes.436
The classification of interest income as a separate class of 
income for the purposes of the FTCS loss quarantining rules is 
inconsistent with the classification of the same for the purposes 
of the active income exemption or the classification of the same 
for the purposes of the foreign tax credit limit under section 
160AF. It was noted earlier that the reason for the difference in 
classification- stems from the fact that interest income, being a 
highly mobile form of capital is more susceptible to abuse than 
other forms of passive income. Whether this reason alone justifies 
creating an additional administrative burden from a compliance 
perspective is somewhat dubious in view of the fact that the 
function of the passive income category for the purposes of (i) 
the active income exemption, (ii) the foreign tax credit limit and 
(iii) foreign loss quarantining provisions should serve the same 
purpose. That is, to identify highly mobile income which could be 
subject to manipulation.
The extra compliance burden created by the addition of 
interest income as a separate class of income pales into 
insignificance when compared with the problems faced by US 
taxpayers who are expected to grapple with the US FTCS which has 
been described as "excessive" and extremely complex.437 Under that 
system there are 8 separate classes (or "baskets") of income plus 
a "general limitation income" basket. The adoption of the multi­
basket approach in the US has necessitated more detailed rules as 
to how foreign losses are to be treated for limitation purposes 
under §904. These rules are contained in §904(f)(5), which was 
introduced into the Code by TRA 1986. The general rule is that 
foreign losses in one basket must first be used to reduce 
proportionately foreign income in other baskets. Only after this 
allocation may the excess of foreign loss be used to offset US 
source income. Subsequently, when foreign income is realised in 
the basket which generated the loss, that income must be 
recharacterised so that it offsets the losses previously taken in 
other baskets.
435 See section 160AFD(4) .
436 See the example set out in Lehmann G and Coleman C 
Taxation Law in Australia (Second edition) (Butterworths Pty Ltd, 
1991), at para 10.130.
437 See McDaniel & Ault op cit. (1989), at p 108.
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Like the US, there is no attribution of losses to the 
attributable taxpayer under Australia's CFC regime. 438 A foreign 
loss, however, can be carried forward indefinitely. The amount 
carried forward is the amount of the loss reduced by the 
"sometimes-exempt income gain" of that class.439
Overall, the quarantining rule for calculating foreign losses 
serves to prevent Australian taxpayers from shifting highly mobile 
income which would otherwise be derived in Australia to the CFC so 
as to absorb in the current year any active income loss. This 
result is further reinforced through section 427 which effectively 
disallows CFCs in a wholly owned group to transfer losses within 
that group.440 Thus, the integrity of the active income exemption 
is maintained by incorporating a class of income basis for 
calculating prior year foreign losses. However, Australia unlike 
the US does not allow any residue foreign losses to be offset 
against domestic source income of the resident taxpayer. This is 
because the amount of deductions notionally allowed in relation to 
each class is not to exceed the notional assessable income of that 
class.441 This represents a serious deviation from CEN because 
losses of a resident company may be offset against the assessable 
income of another resident company where both transferor and 
transferee are members of a wholly owned group.442
On the other hand, it is observed that without the foreign 
loss quarantining rules Australian taxpayer which own interests in
438 See section 427.
439 See section 426. A "sometimes-exempt income gain" arises 
in relation to a particular class of notional assessable income if 
'the "sometimes-exempt income" of that class for the statutory 
accounting period exceeds the "sometimes-exempt deductions" of 
that class: section 425(4).
The "sometimes-exempt income" of a CFC in relation to a class 
of notional assessable income is the amount which is not included 
in that class because the CFC passes the active income test or 
because the de minimis exemption in section 385(4) applies: 
section 425(1).
The "sometimes-exempt deductions" of a CFC in relation to a 
class of notional assessable income are the amounts which would 
have been notionally allowed as deductions if the sometimes-exempt 
income for the period was included in notional assessable income: 
section 425(2).
440 The Federal Government is of the view that the non­
allowance of an Australian taxpayer to offset foreign losses 
incurred by a company controlled by the taxpayer (but owning less 
than 100% of the foreign company) against domestic income promotes 
efficiency of the Australian tax system and national equity: see 
FSIIP op cit.. at p 77.
441 See section 430.
442 See section 80G(6) .
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a CFC which is engaged in genuine business activities abroad could 
reduce their liability to Australian tax on passive income by 
shifting passive investments to the CFC. Moreover, the CFC could 
deduct the initial losses on its "other income" (i.e., non-passive 
income) and incorporate a subsidiary to carry on those operations 
when they commenced to yield profits. Because of the active income 
exemption, the profits of the new subsidiary would not be 
attributed to the Australian taxpayer until it distributed 
dividends. Therefore, the foreign loss quarantining rules protect 
the domestic tax base by ensuring that the other income category 
is not utilised illegitametly to shield what would have been 
attributable passive income were it not for the active income 
exemption.
6. Conclusion
Since receiving Royal Assent in January 1991, the CFC 
legislation has now become Australia's major and most effective 
weapon in protecting Australia's domestic tax base with respect to 
passive income derived by foreign company which is "controlled" by 
Australian taxpayers. Unlike Australia's jurisdictional powers to 
tax foreign source income prior to that date, the CFC regime 
completely ignores the fiction of the corporate entity to tax 
profits of a foreign company which under the traditional source 
and residence principles of taxation, would not, prima facie, have 
come within Australia's taxing jurisdiction. Exploring the tax 
treatment of interest and dividend income more vividly illustrated 
the deficiencies with Australia's international taxation rules 
prior to the introduction of the CFC regime. Both categories of 
income have in the past been the subject of particular concern to 
revenue authorities due to the propensity and ease with which they 
are manipulated to avoid Australia's tax net. Reliance on anti­
avoidance provisions (e.g., Part IVA and Division 13) would not 
have helped in this case, either.
Hence, the ultimate objective in writing this thesis which 
was to explore how and why the new measures succeed in protecting 
Australia's domestic tax base where the traditional and existing 
measures have failed. In order to properly evaluate the 
effectiveness of this radically new approach to taxation of 
foreign source income, it was necessary to judge the new regime 
against the criteria and standards of "good" international tax 
practice. This was done in Part II. However, it was noted that 
there are major logistical difficulties with obtaining and 
verifying information kept offshore. In an effort to further shift 
the burden of supplying such information in a timely manner, both 
Australia and the US have introduced provisions (viz., section 
264A and §982, respectively) which deny taxpayers the benefit of 
relying on offshore information when contesting tax assessments 
issued by the respective revenue authorities. In effect, these
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provisions provide statutory force for presumptive taxation of 
CFCs.443
Putting aside, for the moment, consideration of what 
constitutes "good" international tax practice especially the 
compliance costs, it is noted that the fundamental basis upon 
which Australia's CFC regime is premised, is that where the 
aggregate interests held by a group of five or fewer Australian 1% 
entities in a foreign company are equal to or greater than 50%, 
then the foreign company will be classified as a CFC. The 
significance of classifying a foreign company as a CFC, is that 
its income will be taxed currently to the Australian shareholders 
of that CFC in proportion to the shareholders' interests in the 
CFC. However, the full force of these provisions is mitigated 
where the foreign entity is engaged in manufacturing business, 
less than 5 per cent of its gross turnover is tainted income, or 
its ownership is widely dispersed, then deferral of Australian 
shareholder tax is permitted.
The US Subpart F provisions (in combination with §1248 and 
the FPHC rules) contain similar policy parameters for accruals 
taxation of passive income derived by CFCs as those stipulated in 
Australia's CFC rules. Major deviations from the Australian CFC 
rules nevertheless occur, for example, in relation to the 
subjective de facto control test which deems the existence of a 
CFC in relation to a resident in circumstances where the 
Australian taxpayer may not have a non-portfolio interest in the 
CFC (e.g., Australian 1% entity). Another major difference 
pertains to the wide jurisdictional reach of the US rules which 
are based on transactions undertaken by the CFC, rather than the 
jurisdiction in which the CFC is resident. Although, the high tax 
exemption in §954(b)(4) roughly achieves the same result (but 
without the complex details) attained under the Australian 
designated comparable jurisdictions approach and the accruals 
taxation of EDC income.
In other respects, the US Subpart F rules cast a wider net 
than their Australian counterparts for instance, in relation to 
exclusions from attribution under §959 where the excluded amounts 
are characterised as dividend payment as opposed to tax favoured 
distribution of capital gains. Other major deviations generally 
arise in relation to tainted income which is subject to accruals 
taxation - the US rules exclude related party income derived by 
CFCs established in the same country. There are proposals to 
introduce such an exclusion (in limited circumstances) into the 
Australian CFC rules. However, as noted previously, the scope of 
both regimes is substantially limited to those CFCs generally 
deriving more than 5 per cent of their turnover as passive income.
443 The exchange of information article contained in most of 
the DTAs that Australia and the US have negotiated with other 
countries, are helpful in this regard because they facilitate the 
automatic (unilateral or bilateral) transfer of information 
pertaining to the tax affairs of the resident or non-resident.
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In Australia, the 5 per cent de minimis exemption is confined to 
listed country CFCs.
The policy justification for currently taxing passive income 
and exempting active income has been rationalised by some 
commentators as one that promotes CIN, since by exempting active 
income derived from foreign operations, the international 
competitiveness of Australian companies deriving such income is 
not jeopardised. The government has not clearly articulated its 
intention in providing an active income exemption. However, it is 
suggested that the exemption is consistent with the overall policy 
of protecting Australia's domestic tax base by discouraging 
illegitimate (i.e., non-active) investments in low tax 
jurisdictions. Section 47A was inserted into the Act to also 
ensure that this exemption is not manipulated through disguised 
distributions of profit. An analogous provision in the US rules is 
§956 which currently taxes an increase in earnings invested in US 
property as dividends. However, unlike section 47A, §956 is 
limited to tangible property located in the US and does not extend 
to release of obligations owed by a third party to the CFC.
Turning to the role of the CFC rules in backstopping transfer 
pricing, it was shown that by incorporating tainted sales income 
and tainted services income rules into the active income 
exemption, the CFC rules are invoked in relation to related party 
transactions which may escape the transfer pricing rules. The 
substantial alteration test could prove to be very instructive in 
this regard. Similarly, the US rules currently tax the profits of 
foreign sales and services affiliates of USSs, but only where the 
goods are sold or manufactured, and the services are performed, in 
a different country to that in which the CFC is established. 
Further, the operation of section 47A was shown to be instrumental 
in realising this policy objective where an eligible benefit was 
transferred by the CFC to a third party which in turn, provided a 
benefit to the Australian shareholders of the CFC. Accordingly, it 
is submitted that Australia's CFC rules are amongst the most 
effective (as well as harsh) provisions for currently taxing 
distributions of untainted profit both in comparison with the US 
provisions, but also in comparison with other provisions found 
throughout the Act (viz., Division 13).
Finally, turning to the role of CFC rules in strengthening 
the FTCS, it is noted that by adopting a worldwide FTCS, Australia 
(and most of the major trading nations that have adopted a similar 
system), has attempted to promote international neutrality. 
However, like the US, the Australian FTCS contains some 
inefficiencies which are directly attributable to the Federal 
Government's desire to also pursue national interests. The 
inefficiency in this particular case arises from the limitation on 
foreign tax credits which limits the amount of foreign tax credit 
available to the amount of Australian tax payable in respect of 
the foreign income derived. The limitation serves to restrict 
potential revenue loss as well as deter blatant tax avoidance. 
However, the existence of the limitation on tax credits in
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practice compromises the attainment of international 
neutrality. 444 Full equalisation of taxes on foreign and domestic 
income would require that a refund be given for the excess of 
foreign over domestic taxes. By providing a mechanism for the 
carry-forward of excess foreign tax credits, the Federal 
Government has done much to rectify the non-neutrality which 
results from the foreign tax credit limit.
The position currently is that the Australian quarantining 
rules involve at most four (in the US, nine) classes of income. 
Such rules are considered extremely complex. Moreover, the benefit 
of such a complex system is questionable in view of the fact it is 
not expected to generate much revenue. This is because under the 
CFC regime most dividends paid by listed country CFCs and some 
dividends paid by unlisted country CFCs will be exempt from 
Australian tax. The position in the US is even more acute in view 
of the lack of a general exemption equivalent to section 23AJ, and 
the fact that the US tax on the USS resulting from the attribution 
of Subpart F income, may be largely offset by the foreign tax paid 
(or deemed to have been paid) by the CFC. Inevitably, difficulties 
will arise with respect to the appropriate basket in which to 
include an item of income and some items may fall between the 
baskets.
Regardless, of the persuasive arguments for simplifying the 
FTCS, it is noted that the multi-basket approach responds well to 
the averaging effect created by any overall limitation, thus 
minimising the revenue loss. Moreover, the modifications to the 
FTCS introduced in the CFC legislation reinforce the underlying 
policy of protecting the domestic tax base by ensuring that double 
crediting or a double deduction is not sought in relation to 
foreign source income which has been taxed in the foreign country 
at a tax rate comparable to that of Australia. This is 
particularly apparent in the case of income which is exempt under 
section 23AJ. In the US, the amount of tax deemed paid under §960 
is added to gross income as a dividend under §78, which prevents 
the double benefit of a deduction and a credit for the same tax.
The complexities associated with the CFC regime and the FTCS 
reflect the complexities of the international transactions at 
which those regimes are targeted. In examining the operation of 
the CFC rules, the thesis endeavoured to highlight the 
difficulties in complying with and administering such rules. It is 
generally acknowledged that the statutory provisions for the 
taxation of CFCs are amongst the most complex in tax legislation. 
This complexity has two aspects (i) the legislative provisions 
themselves are complex, making it extremely difficult for 
taxpayers, their advisers, and the tax authorities to understand 
and apply them; and (ii) the CFC legislation imposes a substantial
444 The justification for the limitation has been stated as 
preventing a situation where Australia will be contributing 
revenue to the tax authorities of high taxing source countries, 
and thus ensuring a "fair share" for Australia from the gains of 
foreign investment.
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compliance burden on taxpayers and a similarly onerous 
administrative burden on the tax authorities.
The costs associated with the compliance aspects of the CFC 
legislation can be quite significant to some taxpayers. For 
instance, The Federal Government's decision to base the CFC 
measures on a limited jurisdictional coverage approach rather than 
the transactional approach, was defended on the basis that such an 
approach provides the vast majority of firms with the opportunity 
to avoid the complexity of the new regime and thus lower 
compliance costs. However, as illustrated above, the concept of 
general designated concessions greatly increases the compliance 
costs of identifying when a CFC has benefited from any of the 
general designated concessions. Other major contributing factors 
to compliance costs are (i) the need to maintain attributed 
accounts, (i) the need to separately identify the different types 
of income earned by the CFC and (iii) the need to ensure that any 
distributions by the CFC to the Australian shareholder or its 
associate do not fall foul of section 47A.
For instance, although there is no obligation to maintain 
attribution accounts, the absence of such an obligation is not 
expected to prevent their widespread use. Consequently, it has 
been observed that the resulting increase in the compliance burden 
on Australian taxpayers who own more than one CFC, could lead to 
the collapse of many offshore subsidiaries (especially those that 
are incorporated in tax havens and those engaged in non-profitable 
businesses). Notwithstanding, it is submitted that such an outcome 
may very well result in a more efficient utilisation of capital as 
the increased compliance burden effectively reduces the after-tax 
rate of return on foreign capital relative to that on domestic 
capital. Therefore, Australia stands to gain substantially as a 
result of the increase in remittances (viz., sale proceeds from 
the liquidation of non-profitable offshore entities) where the 
Australian owners of the collapsed entities decide that the 
proceeds could be better utilised domestically. This is a 
particularly timely consideration in view of the myriad investment 
opportunities currently available in Australia as a result of low 
real wage costs (viz., low inflation coupled with a high rate of 
unemployment), the recent South-East Asian currency and economic 
turmoil, and the upcoming Sydney 2000 Olympics.
Accordingly, it is submitted that the combined operation of 
the FTCS with the CFC regime goes a long way to realising the 
three principal objectives foreshadowed by the Federal Government 
when it announced its proposals to introduce a FTCS to replace the 
section 23(q) exemption system - viz., (i) to subject Australian 
taxpayers with the same amount of total (domestic plus foreign 
source) income to approximately the same total (domestic plus 
foreign) tax burden regardless of the sources -of their income;
(ii) to remove tax inducements to invest abroad rather than in 
Australia; and (iii) to discourage tax avoidance via international 
profit shifting. The only major deviation from the three policy 
objectives foreshadowed is the scope for deferring the payment of 
Australian tax on active income derived abroad. However, it was 
shown above that the active income exemption may not ultimately
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harm Australian interests. For one thing, the process of 
globalisation has reduced transaction costs which in turn has 
created many more opportunities for Australian firms (particularly 
medium sized firms) to expand their operations offshore. The 
establishment of genuine businesses abroad should be encouraged to 
the extent that it increases international competitiveness and 
provides Australian firms with greater access to foreign markets 
which they otherwise would not have penetrated.
The discussion in this Part illustrated how the CFC measures 
operated to eliminate deferral of Australian taxation caused by 
manipulation of Australia's traditional taxation rules through 
application of the corporate veil doctrine to incorporate a 
foreign company to either intercept income or to accumulate the 
income in. It was shown that the existence of robust ownership 
tracing rules together with broad attribution rules operated to 
create a quasi-statutory residence-based source rule for passive 
income derived by an Australian controlled foreign entity. 
Moreover, the discussion in section 4. of this Part attempted to 
show how the CFC rules supported the transfer pricing rules by the 
introduction of such concepts as tainted sales and tainted 
services income into the AIT, and the disguised dividend 
provisions in section 47A of the Act. The discussion in section 5. 
went on to show how the CFC rules strengthen the FTCS provisions 
by modifying their operation to alleviate potential domestic and 
international double taxation, as well as to ensure that a double 
deduction is not granted to the Australian taxpayer in view of the 
tax planning opportunities that may be available as a result of 
the section 23AJ exemption and the AIT.
In concluding the final Part to this thesis it is appropriate 
to revisit the objectives outline in Part I which were that the 
CFC regime was introduced to protect the domestic tax base by 
eliminating deferral of Australian taxation in relation to low or 
non-taxed income derived from foreign direct investments that bear 
no relationship to the operation of an active business, and 
backstopping transfer pricing rules in relation to related party 
income. The policy rationale for targeting such income is that 
there is no justification for allowing deferral of such income 
that could just as well be located in Australia. In addition, the 
CFC rules strengthen the FTCS thus ensuring that it is not 
manipulated to facilitate the minimisation or avoidance of 
Australian taxation. Therefore, it is submitted that the CFC rules 
protect Australia's income tax base in relation to foreign source 
passive income and related party income.
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